


































In the late 1980s/early 1990s the EU started to purse a new policy: that of democracy promotion. It 
quickly put in place a whole range of instruments that would facilitate the transition to democracy and its 
consolidation in new democracies. Democracy assistance has over the last two decades, due to its 
‘positive’ features, increasingly emerged as one of the EU’s preferred instruments of that policy, expressed 
in particular in increasing budgets for democracy assistance programmes, new democracy assistance 
facilities, and explicit policy declarations on the topic. This thesis outlines and analyses the EU’s strategy 
of democracy promotion through the use of democracy assistance from its inception in the early 1990s 
until 2011, focusing on all major world regions except the enlargement dimension. While revealing 
numerous details on the strategy, it attempts to also answer the following three more fundamental 
questions: What is the EU’s underlying conception of democracy? What is its preferred model of 
democratization? And what is its preferred approach to democracy assistance? In looking for answers, the 
thesis first traces the emergence and evolution of the use of EU democracy assistance, revealing major 
developments, stumbling blocks, and key features of the policy tool. A discussion of primary law traces 
the partly difficult development of EC/EU competences to engage in democracy promotion and 
especially assistance as well as the limited role primary law plays in policy implementation. An outline of 
the procedural and institutional dimension investigates the role of core actors in policy-making and 
implementation, including EU institutions, civil society organizations, and third state governments. 
Further, the thesis provides detailed quantitative data on EU commitments and expenditure under its 
specific democracy assistance programme – the EIDHR – as well as under mainstream assistance 
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1. The Context 
 
The Revolução dos Cravos, which started on 25 April 1974 in the Portuguese capital Lisbon, did not 
only lead to a regime change in Portugal but also marked the start of what should later be termed 
the ‘third wave of democracy’: a series of regime changes from authoritarianism to democracy in 
numerous countries of various continents over a certain period of time that strongly 
outnumbered regime changes in the opposite direction.2 Consequently, within a period of twenty-
five years the number of electoral democracies worldwide more or less tripled and the number of 
liberal democracies doubled, exact numbers of course depending on the used definitions of 
democracy.3 Overall the process confirmed the widespread and growing appeal of (liberal) 
democracy in its numerous variations as most acceptable form of government for states and 
made it the predominant type of regime worldwide. The decade from 2000 onwards has 
witnessed further attempts at democratization, but also various setbacks, with the overall number 
of democracies in 2012 being similar to the level of 2000.4 Discussions have also been carried out 
on whether – attempted – moves towards democratization in the former Soviet Union (fSU) in 
the early to mid-2000s or in the Arab world since early 2011 still form part of third wave or of a 
new, ‘fourth wave of democracy’.5  
 One particular phenomenon that accompanied the third wave of democracy, in particular 
since the late 1980s and early 1990s, was the influence of the ‘international dimension’ of 
                                                     
1 European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of 
EU External Action – Towards a More Effective Approach, COM(2011) 886 final, 12.12.2011, at 7.  
2 S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century (1991), at 3-4 and 15-6. 
3 L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner, ‘Introduction’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds), The Global Divergence of 
Democracy (2001), at x and xii; C. W. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart and C. Welzel, ‘Introduction’, in C. W. 
Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. F. Inglehart and C. Welzel (eds), Democratization (2009), at 2; Freedom House, Freedom in 
the World – Electoral Democracies at  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Electoral%20Democracy%20Numbers%2C%20FIW%201989-
2012.pdf (last accessed on 1.7.2012).  
4 Ibid. 
5 M. McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist 




democratization upon domestic reform processes.6 Democratization had previously been 
considered a predominantly national affair, caused and moved forward by local circumstances 
and actions. Especially during the ‘snowballing’ of transitions in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) in 1989/19907 it became obvious that external factors were also at work and not 
insignificantly influenced the start, mode, and outcome of regime changes.8 Some of the external 
factors are unintentional effects of external presence or action, like the inspiration provided by 
functioning liberal democracies or by countries opting for a specific type of transition, like 
negotiations or peaceful protests. Other external factors are actions by external actors that 
specifically aimed at facilitating a transition to democracy in a specific third state or the 
consolidation thereof. Examples of such intentional actions – widely and also in this thesis 
referred to as ‘democracy promotion’ – include political conditionality, sanctions, election 
monitoring, and, of particular importance for this work, democracy assistance.  
 The term democracy assistance is nowadays widely used to refer to those programmes 
and projects that are devised, funded, and/or carried out by external actors and that specifically 
and directly aim at facilitating democratization processes in non-democratic states and new 
democracies.9 Typical democracy assistance projects include the funding of projects devoted to 
prepare the holding of elections, to support local election monitoring groups, to support the 
creation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in the fields of democracy and 
human rights, to train civil society leaders and journalists, to make citizens aware of their civil and 
political rights, to train political leaders and parliamentarians, and to reform the judicial system. 
The tool of democracy assistance forms part of, in European Union (EU)-terminology, a 
profoundly ‘positive’ approach and overall aims at working pro-actively and openly, in 
cooperation with the target states’ populations, private organizations, and state institutions in 
order to facilitate moves towards democracy and its consolidation. While democracy assistance 
first started to be used on a wider scale by the United States (US) in the mid-1980s, it has over 
the last twenty-five years become a central instrument of external democracy promotion of most 
old and new democracies as well as of international organizations like the United Nations (UN). 
Despite setbacks in democratization over the last decade, the global fight against terror, and 
backlashes by authoritarian states against democracy promotion efforts, aid budgets for 
                                                     
6 L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (1996).  
7 S. Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, in L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (eds), The Global Resurgence of Democracy 
(2nd ed., 1996), at 7. 
8 P. C. Schmitter, ‘The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies 
in Neo/Democracies’, in L. Whitehead (ed.), The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas 
(1996), at 28.  
9 P. C. Schmitter and I. Brouwer, Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection, EUI 




democracy assistance have strongly and steadily increased in the case of most involved actors, 
including in the case of the EU and its Member States.  
 
2. The Focus of this Thesis 
 
It has just been indicated that democracy assistance has over the last two decades also 
increasingly become one of the EU’s main instruments to assist democratization processes 
abroad. Numerous EU policy papers give evidence of the EU’s strong conviction that the 
positive features of the instrument, that is, its pro-active, open, co-operative nature, make it a 
highly preferable tool to be used in its external policies towards the majority of third states.10 
Annual budgets of EU democracy assistance programmes have strongly increased over the last 
two decades and are still increasing. Overall, between 2005 and 2009 the EU committed between 
350 and 525 million Euros annually for democracy assistance projects worldwide, including 
through its specific democracy and human rights programme, the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and through its general development programmes. 
Importantly, this data only relates to democracy assistance and does not include commitments for 
human rights projects and projects pertaining to good governance reform, in particular 
administrative reform, which is sometimes included in data on democracy assistance. Despite its 
efforts, the EU nevertheless still lags behind major other international donors, like the US, both 
in terms of financial commitments and percentages of democracy assistance of overall aid. 
 This thesis focuses on EU democracy assistance. Inspired by the important works of 
Thomas Carothers on US democracy assistance, in particular his 1999 book Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve, it aims to present a comprehensive overview and analysis of the major 
aspects of EU democracy assistance from its start in the mid-1980s/early-1990s until today in a 
single publication, covering ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, that is, the dimension of policy-making and 
that of implementation. While the comprehensive objective of the study renders it difficult to 
formulate a single research question, the following best captures the central objective of the 
study: “What is the EU’s strategy to promote democracy abroad through the use of democracy 
assistance and how has it evolved since its start?”. Overall, the thesis aims at describing and 
analyzing the development and use of the policy tool of democracy assistance and sees itself as 
part of ‘analytical’ studies on EU policies rather than of ‘critical’ approaches,11 which would, for 
                                                     
10 See e.g. COM(2011) 886 final, at 9.  
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example, criticize the model of democracy used by the EU.12 This study also points to existing 
problems and weaknesses in EU policy, deriving from unaddressed problems highlighted by the 
EU institutions themselves or problems exposed in the analysis. However, the main objective of 
the study remains to outline what the EU has been doing in the field of democracy promotion 
through the instrument of assistance since it started to use this policy tool. 
In more detail, the thesis includes a discussion of the following issues: 
 
 First, it charts the comparatively late emergence of EU democracy assistance in the mid-
1980s/early 1990s and outlines the main stages in the evolution of the policy tool from its 
inception until late 2011, arguing that the use of the tool developed step-by-step in 
response to internal learning processes and external factors rather than following a 
preconceived master plan. Numerous, at times core elements concerning the policy tool 
evolved nearly accidentally due to varying preferences and actions by different EU 
institutions. 
 Secondly, the thesis discusses the development of EU competences in the field of 
democracy (and human rights) promotion and argues that despite the current existence of 
a secure legal basis for democracy assistance, a separate title in primary law on democracy 
promotion would strengthen the policy and its tools.  
 Thirdly, a discussion of the institutional and procedural dimension outlines the main steps 
to be taken in policy-making and the implementation of EU democracy assistance. It 
exposes the varying involvement in different programmes and at different stages of policy 
making and implementation of EU institutions, target states’ governments, and of civil 
society organizations in the EU and in target states.  
 Fourthly, thesis separately analyses the two major types of EU democracy assistance 
programmes, that is, the EIDHR and the democracy-related elements of mainstream 
development programmes. The analysis in particular exposes  
- how EU commitments and expenditure for democracy assistance under the 
EIDHR and the mainstream development programmes has evolved since its 
inception, globally and by major world region, and 
- in which thematic fields the EU spends democracy assistance under the various 
programmes, globally and by major world region. 
 
                                                     
12 For such an approach, although not only focusing on the EU, see e.g. M. Kurki, ‘Democracy and Conceptual 
Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion’, 12 International Studies Review 3 




Additionally, based on the just mentioned analysis, the thesis intends to answer three more 
fundamental questions on EU democracy assistance: 
 
 First, which model or concept of the democracy is underlying EU action? It is argued that 
the EU is operating with a basic liberal model of democracy, allowing different versions 
thereof to be realized during implementation, upon the initiative of those involved in aid 
implementation.  
 Secondly, which concept of democratization does the EU work with? The thesis shows 
that the EU operates within the transition approach to democratization but allows for 
bottom-up and top-down, reformist and revolutionary types of regime changes to take 
place, overall, however, giving a slight preference to the gradual, bottom-up initiated 
reformist paths. 
 Thirdly, which is the predominant approach in EU democracy assistance? It is argued that 
both the developmental and the political approach to democracy assistance are followed 
in the EU context, both in the case of the EIDHR and the mainstream programmes. 
Overall, however, the developmental approach is prevailing.  
 
A question that usually emerges in the discussion of democracy promotion, the issue of the 
impact of EU aid, is not addressed in this thesis, which focuses exclusively on what the EU is 
doing in terms of facilitating democratic change abroad. Further, the thesis does also not assess 
the contribution of the use of the EU’s policy tool of assistance to nature of the EU as an 
international actor.13 
In terms of the period covered, the study aims to be as comprehensive as possible and to 
address the instrument of EU democracy assistance from its start in the mid-1980s/early 1990s 
until December 2011, when research was concluded. It should be mentioned that the field is 
constantly evolving and that in particular the Arab Spring has led to numerous new initiatives 
that are currently being realized, which this study does not and cannot discuss. One factor that 
has not allowed a comprehensive treatment in all sections but has in several chapters limited the 
focus to shorter periods of time than intended is the lack of available statistical data on EU 
assistance. 
 In terms of the geographical focus, the thesis aims to cover all third states except those 
pertaining to the enlargement dimension, that is, states with candidate and potential candidate 
status. The limitation has relevance for the discussion of applicable assistance programmes as 
                                                     
13 For such focus, see A. Wetzel and J. Orbie, ‘Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU 




well as the analysis of statistical data, both of which his only done for the ‘regular’ external 
dimension, that is, that beyond the enlargement context. The exclusion of the enlargement 
context results from constrains in time and space and the need for restricting the focus of the 
thesis. Further, it strongly appears that the requirement of democratization and objective of 
democracy promotion has a different, higher relevance in the enlargement context than in 
external policies, due to the simple fact that third states will eventually become EU members. 
This different logic calls for a separate analysis, which is, due to the mentioned constraints, not 
carried out in this study.14 
 It has, however, not always been possible to strictly observe the intended division 
between the regular external and the enlargement dimension. At times, data is therefore also 
provided on the implementation of programmes in candidate states and/or potential candidate 
countries, which is, however, clearly spelled out. The reason for this inconsistency again lies in 
the structure of available data. More specifically, some programmes, like the EIDHR, cover all 
third states and reports do not always allow extracting data for individual countries and regions. 
Further, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which is used 
as importance source for statistical data, uses different regional categories than the EU in its 
external aid programmes and consequently reports on potential candidate and non-candidate 
countries in the same category. At the same time, the OECD to some extent does not report on 
countries covered by this study, like on Russia. 
 The thesis focuses on ‘European Union’ democracy assistance rather than on ‘European’ 
democracy assistance. It therefore exclusively deals with programmes and projects funded by the 
EU rather than also with such funded by the EU Member States and/or other European states. 
EU democracy assistance has for various reasons, including primary law, for the last two decades 
predominantly been provided within the former first or supranational pillar of the EU rather than 
also within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The thesis therefore 
concentrates on programmes and projects funded by the annual EU budget as well as by the 
European Development Fund (EDF), which, for historical reasons, finances support measures in 
the group of 78 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states. Some CFSP measures implemented 
over the last two decades, in particular the recent rule of law missions carried out in the 
framework of civilian crisis management (CCM), show features of democracy assistance, but have 
                                                     
14 See e.g. H. Grabbe, ‘How does Europeanization affect CEE Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity, 
8 Journal of European Public Policy 6 (2001) 1013-1031; F. Schimmelfennig, S. Engert, and H. Knobel, ‘Costs, 
Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey, 41 
Journal of Common Market Studies 3 (2003) 495-518; M. A. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and 




been excluded from the focus of this thesis, except for the question of the delimitation of 
competences between the former first pillar and CFSP.  
 
3. Existing Literature and the Value-Added by this Thesis 
 
In the course of the last fifteen years a large body of literature has been built up on the topic of 
EU democracy promotion, which is of course a broader theme than democracy assistance, as it 
refers to all external activities of the EU that are carried out with the intention of facilitating the 
transition to democracy in a third state or supporting its consolidation. The literature comprises 
academic studies as well as, due to the nature of the topic, many policy-oriented publications by 
research institutes, think tanks,15 and EU institutions16. The various works in part differ in their 
specific foci. Some provide broader overviews of the EU’s strategies, instruments, and 
motivations and implemented activities, globally or in different regions.17 Others concentrate on 
specific instruments and/or countries and regions, frequently assessing the EU’s strategy and its 
success.18 Some authors have attempted to determine the factors that underlie the EU’s choice of 
                                                     
15 See in particular the publications by FRIDE, a think-tank based in Madrid, which until more recently for a long 
period concentrated on EU democracy promotion as one of its key research areas: 
http://www.fride.org/homepage_english (last accessed on 1.7.2012). Pasos (Policy Association for an Open 
Society), an ‘initiative’ to strengthen independent think-tanks based in Prague, has also analysed EU policies: 
http://pasos.org/ (last accessed on 1.7.2012). See in particular: E. Bogdanova, A New Beginning? Democracy Support in 
EU External Relations Under the Lisbon Treaty, PASOS Policy Brief No. 1 (2010) and V. Řiháčková, Walking the Tightrope 
of Democracy Aid: The Long and Winding Road towards ‘Flexible’, Well-targeted EU Funding for Democracy and Human Rights, 
PASOS Policy Brief No. 3 (2010). See, further, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) at 
http://www.epd.eu/ and International IDEA at http://www.idea.int/ (both last accessed on 1.7.2012), which 
produced some works on EU democracy promotion.  
16 See in particular the Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/0094641612/Office-for-Promotion-of-Parliamentary-
Democracy.html (last accessed on 1.7.2012). Reference should also be made to the few evaluations of EU 
programmes relating to democracy assistance funded by the EU that are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/index_en.htm. 
17 R. Youngs, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy, CEPS Working Document No. 167 (October 
2001); M. Light, ‘Exporting Democracy’, in K. E. Smith and M. Light (eds), Ethics and Foreign Policy (2001) 75-92; R. 
Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006 (2006); M. Knodt und S. Urdze, ‘Die 
Europäische Union als Exporteur von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit’, in P. C. Müller-Graff (ed.), Die Rolle der 
erweiterten Europäischen Union als Akteur in der Welt (2006) 385-403; R. Youngs, ‘Democracy Promotion as External 
Governance?’, 16 Journal of European Public Policy 6 (2009) 895-915; T. A. Börzel and T. Risse, ‘Venus Approaching 
Mars? The European Union’s Approaches to Democracy Promotion in Comparative Perspective’, in A. Magan and 
M. McFaul (eds.), Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Perspectives (2009) 34-60. 
18 G. R. Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of “Europe”: Limits to International 
Idealism’, 7 Democratization 2 (2000), 142-167; G. Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of 
Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality (2001); E. Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in 
Practice (2003); D. Kochenov, EU Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality: Pre-accession Conditionality in the Fields of 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (2008); T. Freyburg, S. Lavanex, F. Schimmelfennig, T. Skripka, and A. Wetzel, ‘EU 
Promotion of Democratic Governance in the Neighbourhood’, 16 Journal of European Public Policy 6 (2009) 916-934; 
P. J. Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and Democratization (2003); R. Youngs (ed.), The European Union and Democracy 





different instruments.19 Other authors have focused on the particularities of European democracy 
promotion as different from other actors, in particular the US.20  
 At the same time a body of literature specifically dealing with democracy assistance has 
emerged. The publications either focus on the instrument of democracy assistance as such, 
address the use of democracy assistance by different donors or in different countries, or focus on 
differences by major donors, in particular the US and European actors.21 Several studies, often 
funded by donors, assess the activities of the particular donor and provided detailed 
recommendations for the development of the policy tool.22  
 Several of the mentioned publications on democracy promotion and on assistance also 
address EU democracy assistance, either analyzing it at a more theoretical level as one of the 
numerous EU tools of democracy promotion or as one of the tools used in particular countries 
or regions.23 Fewer publication specifically and only deal with EU democracy assistance or 
analyze individual EU democracy assistance programmes.24 Reference should here in particular be 
made to the writings of Richard Youngs, who has over the last decade intensively researched the 
field of European and EU democracy promotion and assistance. Many of his works are published 
by FRIDE, the already mentioned Madrid-based research institute, which for several years 
focused on EU democracy promotion as one of its three main fields of research.25 Youngs’ work 
comprises more descriptive and analytical publications on EU activities in the field, providing 
quantitative data, discussing the thematic focus of assistance, preferred target states and partners 
                                                     
19 A. Jünemann and M. Knodt (eds), Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union/European External Democracy 
Promotion (2007); A. Warkotsch, ‘Non-compliance and Instrumental Variation in EU Democracy Promotion’, 15 
Journal of European Public Policy 2 (2008) 227-245; P. Kotzian, M. Knodt and S. Urdze, ‘Instruments of the EU’s 
External Democracy Promotion’, 49 Journal of Common Market Studies 5 (2011) 995-1018. 
20 M. van Doorn and R. von Meijenfeldt (eds), Democracy: Europe’s Core Value? On the European Profile in World-wide 
Democracy Assistance (2007); Magan A. and M. A. McFaul (eds), Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and 
European Strategies (2009). 
21 Schmitter and Brouwer; T. Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (1996); T. Carothers, Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999); FRIDE, Project ‘Assessing Democracy Assistance’ by World Movement 
of Democracy, at http://www.fride.org/project/19/assessing-democracy-assistance (last accessed on 5.5.2011); 
International IDEA and SIDA: Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences (2007); D. Huber, ‘Democracy 
Assistance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies’, 13 Mediterranean Politics 1 
(2008) at 43-62; R. Youngs, How to Revitalize Democracy Assistance: Recipients’ Views, FRIDE Working Paper No. 100 
(June, 2010). 
22 USAID, Final Report. Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study 
by E. Finkel, A. Pérez-Liñán and M. A. Seligson (2006); International IDEA, Democracy and Development: Global 
Consultations on the EU’s Role in Democracy Building (2009); Youngs, How to Revitalize Democracy Assistance: Recipients’ 
Views. 
23 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality; See 
the various country studies in: A. Jünemann and M. Knodt (eds), Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische 
Union/European External Democracy Promotion (2007); L. Fioramonti, European Union Democracy Aid: Supporting Civil 
Society in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2010). 
24 For a more policy-oriented analysis of the EIDHR with a focus on the period from 2000 to 2008 see S. Herrero, A 
Decade of Democracy Promotion through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, EDP Working Papers Series 
on Democracy Support No. 1/2009 (2009). See also the study carried out by this author for OPPD: Office for the 
Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD), Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance: Democracy 
Support in EU External Relations (2010). 




in implementation.26 Other works engage in more fundamental discussions on the approach to 
EU democracy assistance, suggesting for all European actors, including the EU, the preference of 
the developmental approach that stays away from too politically-perceived forms of assistance 
and links democracy assistance to human rights assistance and good governance reform.27 Two 
other European authors have carried out some crucial and detailed analysis of EU democracy 
assistance. Gordon Crawford, whose major field of expertise is in development studies has as one 
of the first analysts of EU democracy assistance in the early 2000s outlined the evolution, 
principle policy documents, and institutional structure for the implementation of EU democracy 
assistance.28 He then criticized the absence of a more strategic approach, proper assessment of 
the situation in target countries, and bureaucratic fragmentation and complexity, which the EU 
has ever since tried to tackle.29 Federica Bicchi, a specialist on EU foreign policy towards the 
Mediterranean, has in various papers analyzed EU democracy promotion and assistance in that 
particular region.30 Her article on the implementation of the EIDHR micro-project scheme 
during the period 2000-2006 in several Mediterranean countries, in which she establishes a gap 
between policy rhetoric and actual implementation, constitutes one of the most detailed studies 
of an EU democracy assistance programme done.31  
More recently, a study conceived by Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie and carried out by 
numerous researchers aimed at establishing the ‘substance of democracy promotion’, that is, the 
various thematic fields of concentration of EU efforts and the resulting concept of democracy, 
through an analysis of EU policies and activities in various world regions and countries.32 While 
the authors did not exclusively focus on democracy assistance, it was a central focus of attention 
in the various individual country- and region-focused studies. Different from current widespread 
practice the study defined democracy promotion broadly, encompassing, next to the typical 
                                                     
26 Youngs, Democracy Promotion: The Case of European Union Strategy; Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion 
Policies 2000-2006. 
27 R. Youngs, ‘Democracy as Product versus Democracy as Process’, in M. van Doorn and R. von Meijenfeldt (eds), 
Democracy: Europe’s Core Value? On the European Profile in World-wide Democracy Assistance (2007) 67-72; R. Youngs, 
‘Trends in Democracy Assistance: What has Europe been Doing?’, 19 Journal of Democracy 2 (April 2008) 161-169.  
28 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality; G. 
Crawford, ‘European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy’, in P. Burnell (ed.), 
Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (2000) 90-127; G. Crawford, ‘EU Human Rights and 
Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: From Lofty Principles to Lowly Self-Interests’, 9 Perspectives on European 
Politics and Society 2 (2008) 172-191.  
29 G. Crawford, ‘European Union Development Co-operation and the Promotion of Democracy’, at 120-1. 
30 F. Bicchi, ‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean: An Overview’, 14 Mediterranean Politics 1 (2009) 61-78; F. 
Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean’, 17 Democratization 5 (2010) 
976-996. 
31 Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of Implementation: EU Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean’.  
32 A. Wetzel and J. Orbie (eds), ‘The Substance of European Union Democracy Promotion’, Special Issue, 16 




dimensions of democracy assistance, also the socio-economic dimension.33 It found that, without 
however providing detailed quantitative data, that this latter field received the major share of 
attention, after civil rights and topics of good governance and anti-corruption, confirming the 
prevailing view that the EU mainly pursues the developmental approach to democracy assistance. 
Civil society, while still receiving much attention, and election support received less than had 
been suggested before.34 Variations among regions and countries were explained by asymmetric 
interdependences, geopolitical and economic interests of the EU, and the political situations in 
target states.35 The study did not find geographic proximity to matter for democracy assistance. 
All in all it found that EU democracy assistance reflected, borrowing a term from Thomas Risse, 
“the nature of the beast”,36 that is, concentrating on economic development and building multi-
level governance structures.37 
 This thesis adds a comprehensive study on EU democracy assistance to the existing 
literature on the topic, which has so far been missing among the numerous works that have either 
focused on particular periods of time, regions or countries, sub-fields of democracy assistance, 
specific programmes, or specific questions. Its particular value and difference to other works lies, 
therefore, in its comprehensive nature as regards the time-frame of analysis, the geographical 
focus, the focus on policy-making and implementation, and the range of questions asked. 
Overall, it is suggested that the comprehensive of the study allows it to draw more globally valid 
conclusions than studies with a more limited focus. 
 A second important contribution of this thesis to the literature on democracy assistance 
lies in the discussion of several topics that have so far been neglected in the academic discussion. 
Most notably, questions of EU competence to provide democracy assistance have so far not been 
discussed, except for the related discussions in the area of human rights. Hardly any study on EU 
democracy assistance has so far outlined at which stage in the process of policy-making or 
implementation those crucial decisions are taken, which lead to the final distribution of funds 
among countries and thematic areas. At last, EU democracy assistance is often equated with the 
EIDHR. The thesis established a more balanced picture, giving equal attention to democracy 
assistance provided under mainstream development programmes, that indeed account for the 
major part of the funding. 
                                                     
33 Wetzel and Orbie, ‘Promoting Embedded Democracy? Researching the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion’, 
at 574.  
34 A. Wetzel and J. Orbie, ‘With Map and Compass on Narrow Paths and through Shallow Waters: Discovering the 
Substance of EU Democracy Promotion’, 16 European Foreign Affairs Review (2011), at 707-16.  
35 Ibid., at 716-21.  
36 T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative Policy 
Analysis meet the European Union’, 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 1 (1996) 53-80. 
37 Wetzel and J. Orbie, ‘With Map and Compass on Narrow Paths and through Shallow Waters: Discovering the 




4. Interdisciplinarity and Methodology  
 
The topic of democracy assistance is due to its very nature mainly discussed by political scientists. 
For this reason, the majority of academic works used to outline the conceptual framework of the 
thesis, which is done in Chapters 1 and 2, pertain to political science and, in the section on theory 
of democracy, to political theory. At the same time, as the author’s primary higher education and 
occupation is in law, the thesis also draws from important works on EU law and policies written 
by lawyers, like on the EU’s human rights policy. Overall, the thesis aims to be interdisciplinary, 
using academic literature and approaches to analysis from both political science and law in order 
to arrive at a comprehensive treatment of the topic and to obtain insights that would not be given 
by a single discipline.  
The major method used in this thesis to outline and analyze EU democracy assistance has 
been the analysis of EU legislative acts, policy documents, and implementation reports on EU 
programmes. Some exploratory interviews were carried out with Commission staff in Brussels, 
the EU Delegation to Ukraine and Russia, and civil society representatives in Brussels and 
Ukraine. Next to qualitative analysis, the thesis provides numerous tables with statistical data on 
EU democracy assistance. The quantitative data has been taken or extracted from EU 
implementation reports or statistical reports, in particular as regards the EU’s specific 
programme, the EIDHR. For information on mainstream development programmes, on which 
the EU only reports in a highly limited way, data has been extracted from the OECD database on 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows. This constitutes a major different to other 
studies on EU democracy assistance, like the mentioned study supervised by Wetzel and Orbie. 
While these authors develop the ‘substance of EU democracy promotion’ on the basis of two to 
three country-focused case studies in seven world regions, this thesis induces this substance from 
aggregate data on EU assistance in basically all states except for EU membership candidates.  
 
5. The Structure of this Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts and eight chapters. Part I, which is entitled ‘General 
Framework for the Study of Democracy Assistance’, provides a theoretical overview of the main 
concepts, conceptions, and theories used or referred to in the further analysis, including of the 
international dimension of democratization, democracy promotion, democracy, and 
democratization (Chapter 1). Further, it presents the definition of democracy assistance used in 
this thesis and provides an overview of key issues relating to this policy tool, including a 




historical evolution of democracy assistance, major approaches to democracy assistance, 
motivations for democracy promotion, questions of effectiveness, legality and legitimacy, and 
problems quantitative data (Chapter 2). 
 Part II, which constitutes ‘An Analysis of EU Democracy Assistance’, comprises the 
remaining six chapters of the thesis. Chapter 3 starts the analysis by an overview of the 
emergence and evolution of EU democracy assistance since the mid-1980s and early-1990s and 
provides a detailed analysis of the core policy documents published in the course of the last 25 
years. Chapter 4 complements the evolutionary account by a discussion of the development of 
European Community (EC) and EU competences in the field of democracy promotion and 
democracy assistance and of the legal bases in primary law. Chapter 5 focuses on the institutional 
and procedural dimension of EU democracy assistance, outlining the main stages in policy-
making and implementation of EU democracy assistance programmes and the role of different 
institutions, bodies and other actors. Based on this outline, the remaining Chapters concentrate 
on an analysis of the EU’s major programmes to assist democratization processes abroad. 
Chapter 6 analyzes the EIDHR and presents quantitative data on EU commitments and 
expenditure, the thematic focus of assistance, the geographical distribution, and on main partners 
in implementation. Chapter 7 analyses the numerous mainstream development programmes that, 
amongst others, fund democracy assistance programmes and projects. Chapter 8 provides a more 
detailed analysis of the implementation of these programmes, again providing quantitative data 
on commitments and expenditure, on the thematic focus of assistance and its geographical 
distribution. The conclusion to the thesis, while recapitulating major research result of individual 
chapters, also addresses the three main cross-cutting questions raised above: on the notion of 
democracy underlying EU democracy assistance, the preferred path to democratization, and the 
































Chapter 1 concentrates on core concepts and conceptions relevant for the study of democracy 
assistance and introduces the set of central definitions used in this thesis. It provides, together 
with Chapter 2, the general conceptual framework for the more detailed analysis of EU 
democracy assistance carried out in Part II of this study. 
 Chapter 1 consists of four main sections. It first presents the definition of democracy 
assistance used in this thesis, which is based on a definition by Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco 
Brouwer that captures, next to showing some other advantages, in detail the core elements of the 
phenomenon. It should be mentioned that overall there exists quite widespread agreement on 
democracy assistance’ core features and mode of operation, even if some authors at times still 
conflate the terms democracy assistance and promotion or use different terminology than 
assistance, in particular the term democracy support.38 The following section steps back to a more 
general level to present the so-called ‘international dimension of democratization’,39 of which 
democracy assistance, as one instrument of democracy promotion, forms part. The discussion of 
this international context sheds further light on the particularities and pros and cons of 
democracy assistance, next to introducing other key definitions, like that of democracy 
promotion. Thirdly, as democracy assistance facilitates democratization processes, Chapter 1 
gives a short overview of the major approaches in the study of democratization and of the 
individual ‘stages’ of such a process. Finally, as the final goal of democracy assistance is the 
establishment of a democratic regime or system of government, Chapter 1 introduces the 
concept of democracy and some major conceptions thereof.40 
                                                     
38 See, for example, Int. IDEA and SIDA: Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences (2007). 
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II. Core Definitions, Concepts, and Conceptions 
 
1. Defining Democracy Assistance 
 
As mentioned above, the definition of democracy assistance used in this thesis is closely based on 
a definition suggested by Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer in 1999. It understands 
democracy assistance as 
 
all programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported and/or (directly or indirectly) 
implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, mainly take place in target countries, in 
principle with the consent or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly designed 
to directly contribute to the liberalization, democratization or consolidation of democracy of the 
target country.41 
 
The definition unites two basic features that render it particularly useful. On the one hand, it does 
not suggest any specific strategy of democracy assistance, such as that assistance has to 
concentrate on certain substantive issues, for example on elections. Similarly, it does not 
prescribe conceptions of democracy, like the goal of establishing social democracy, or of 
democratization, like a preference for gradual, reformist regime change, except for requiring a 
direct rather than indirect contribution to democratization. Overall, by very generally referring to 
donor activities aiming at democratization (...explicitly designed to directly contribute to…), it allows 
capturing a broad range of strategies and conceptions employed by individual donors, without 
imposing alien ones. This principal openness only finds limits in, first, that activities have to aim 
at establishing liberal democracy (broadly defined), which constitutes the overall framework and 
border of current engagement by all Western states and organizations, and, secondly, that they 
operate within the genetic approach to democratization (...directly contribute to the liberalization, 
democratization or consolidation of democracy...) (see Sections II.3. and II.4. further below). On the 
other hand, while being unspecific about underlying conceptions, the given definition provides a 
quite detailed enumeration of the usually present main features and the mode of action of 
democracy assistance which allows the reader to get a good understanding of this particular form 
of democracy promotion.42  
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concessionary element. P. Burnell, ‘Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse’, in P. Burnell (ed.), Democracy 




These main elements should briefly be addressed. First, democracy assistance consists of 
programmes and projects, that is, a series of activities that aim at achieving certain objectives within a 
certain period of time and budget. Programmes and projects can take many forms but in essence 
envisage the transfer of information, knowledge or expertise from democracies to democratizing 
states or the spread of information, knowledge or expertise within democratizing states in order 
to reform local processes and institutions or to change perceptions and attitudes. They are types 
of activities that usually require a higher, more elaborate degree and longer-term engagement by 
the external actors than most other forms of democracy promotion, in particular as regards 
planning, implementation, and personnel. Additionally, there is basically always a financial 
element, usually a foreign grant, that is, a financial contribution by way of donation, used for the 
implementation of a programme or project or at least the provision of money in exchange for a 
service or work on the basis of a contract. Consequently, democracy assistance is also usually 
measured in amounts allocated or spent.  
Secondly, democracy assistance requires that foreign actors have adopted, supported and/or 
implemented a programme or project. The degree of foreign involvement in the planning and 
implementation of programmes and projects can vary considerably and range from entire 
external control to a high degree of involvement of local actors, with many different 
combinations prevailing in practice. It is widely recognized that, just as in socio-economic 
development cooperation, strong participation of and ‘ownership’ by recipients and beneficiaries 
of projects at any level is crucial for achieving higher relevance, effectiveness, and sustainability of 
a project.43 At the same time, however, efforts to ensure pursuing a certain strategy and to 
achieve coherence with other actors’ programmes push donors to keep considerable control of 
their efforts.  
Thirdly, democracy assistance is provided openly and not secretly or semi-secretly.44 While 
secret or semi-secret activities can in principle positively contribute to democratization, they 
pursue a different approach than openly given assistance and can due to their very character also 
not share many of the characteristics of openly provided assistance.  
Fourthly, democracy assistance programmes and projects are mainly implemented within 
target countries (…mainly take place in target countries…). Local implementation allows working with 
                                                                                                                                                                      
democratic openings or further transitions and that is neither a carrot nor a stick. T. Carothers, Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve (1999), at 6.  
43 See, for example, Channel Research: Generating Impact Indicators European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (March 2005), at 36-7. More generally, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the 
Accra Agenda for Action (2008), adopted in the framework of the OECD, state ‘ownership’ as one of the main 
criteria of aid effectiveness.  
44 Although difficult to trace, it is known that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was engaged in many secret 
efforts during the Cold War. Carothers, at 25. There are also more recent examples of secret activities, see, for 




and focusing on people, institutions, procedures in their original environment and therefore to 
more directly support domestically-rooted processes of reform. As mentioned, such involvement 
of domestic actors and consideration of local circumstances is also widely expected to increase 
aid effectiveness. At the same time, so-called ‘external democracy assistance’45 also exists. It 
occurs if an authoritarian setting does not allow the implementation of projects within a 
particular state, or if the nature of the project requires so. Externally implemented democracy 
assistance is, however, considered to be potentially less effective as it reaches a smaller audience 
and works removed from the democratizing context.46 Moreover, extensive external assistance 
would financially and administratively be unfeasible.  
Fifthly, democracy assistance is in principle consensual, that is, it is carried out with the 
consent or at least toleration of the recipient state’s government. The consensual nature is 
important for assistance to entirely unfold its mode of action and use its potential. Consent 
means explicit acceptance or agreement, while toleration requires absence of direct or indirect 
obstacles in the implementation of assistance, like outright bans, harassment and intimidation of 
participating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals by the authorities, 
obligatory and burdensome registration rules or disadvantageous taxing provisions.47  
Consensus is usually present in transitional and, even more, in consolidating countries, 
where there is a fundamental commitment to democratization and where assistance finds its most 
receptive environment and conditions for success and can in principle address a very broad or 
even unlimited range of democratization-related issues.48 Assistance is much more problematic in 
authoritarian or semi-democratic settings, where a real commitment to democracy is by definition 
missing or limited. Frequently, authoritarian governments oppose democracy assistance outrightly 
and therefore restrict it to ‘external democracy assistance’,49 which consequently constitutes an 
exceptional form of ‘non-consensual assistance’. But also if authoritarian governments tolerate 
assistance, which usually occurs as a result of internal or external pressure or in exchange for 
benefits, like trade concessions, they usually tightly control projects and involved organizations, 
often considerably circumscribe their focus and scope, and thereby impede proper 
                                                     
45 Schmitter and Brouwer, at 14.  
46 Ibid.  
47 C. Gershman and M. Allen, ‘New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assistance’, 17 Journal of 
Democracy (2006), at 40-6; National Endowment for Democracy (NED), The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance: A 
Report prepared by the National Endowment for Democracy for Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman Committee on Foreign 
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48 See, for example, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, at 304-6.  
49 See, for example, the end of a USAID-financed project in Yemen, D. Finkel, ‘U.S. Ideals Meet Reality in Yemen’, 
‘A Struggle for Peace in a Place Where Fighting Never Ends’, and ‘In the End, a Painful Choice’, Washington Post 




implementation.50 In authoritarian and semi-authoritarian settings, assistance therefore generally 
works under constraints that can reduce its potential impact. It can nevertheless contribute to 
preventing a worsening of the situation and to keeping some pro-democratic forces alive.51 
The definition of democracy assistance does not explicitly mention the consent (or 
toleration) of the third state’s citizens and/or civil society. Such would, practically speaking, be 
difficult to obtain, but is crucial for the implementation of programmes and projects, as citizens 
and civil society organizations are frequently key targets or implementing actors. Their consent is 
assumed to be – and indeed is usually – present, as civil society groups in most cases constitute 
the major pro-democratic forces and opponents to authoritarian governments. However, it 
should also be mentioned that some traditional (‘civil society’) groups, especially in Muslim states 
of North Africa and the Middle East, refute assistance by Western states, in particular by the US, 
as they refute liberal democracy or, at a more general level, consider democracy assistance as 
imperialist.52  
Sixthly, democracy assistance programmes and projects are explicitly designed to 
contribute to the democratization of target states. The relevant explicit indication about a donor’s 
aims is usually found in programme/project statements or descriptions and therefore easily 
identifiable. It can, however, also be difficult to discern, especially if donors work with sub-
concepts, like civil society and the rule of law, without explicitly mentioning broader objectives. 
Such lack of clarity forces analysts to accept that a certain part of the projects they are working 
with is not clearly attributed. Importantly, democratization must not necessarily be the only and 
primary goal, but programmes can have multiple aims and also pursue hidden objectives, like 
reducing or controlling migration or improving the investment climate (for example through 
good governance projects).53 Clearly outside the definition of democracy assistance fall 
programmes that indeed have an impact on democratization, but which donors have not 
intended, like the positive effects of socio-economic reform programmes.  
Seventhly, democracy assistance programmes and projects are designed to directly contribute 
to the democratization of third states. Some projects very clearly meet the criterion, like those 
focusing on the core actors, institutions, and processes of a democratic system of government, 
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for example on political parties, elections, and the media.54 Other projects clearly at most 
indirectly facilitate democratization processes, like socio-economic reform projects, for example a 
literacy campaign or business-development project, and do therefore not constitute democracy 
assistance. However, there is a grey zone of projects, the direct or indirect effect of which cannot 
as easily be established, in particular many projects in the sector of rule of law and civil society 
development. Do projects on access to justice and on social sector-focused NGOs directly 
facilitate democratization and therefore in any case constitute democracy assistance? In essence, 
the solution depends on underlying conceptions of democracy and democratization, which are 
intentionally left open in the above definition on democracy assistance. It therefore has to be left 
to the decision of individual donors as to what they consider to directly contribute to 
democratization. At the same time, however, and the issue will be returned to in the discussion 
on the developmental approach to democracy assistance (Chapter 2) and the categorization of 
projects (Chapters 6 and 8), analysts of democracy assistance have to accept the existence of the 
mentioned grey zone and that the body of projects they are working with includes unclear cases. 
Eighthly, the definition of democracy assistance states that the latter is designed to 
contribute to democratization, that is, to facilitate and assist it, rather than to steer, dominate or 
determine it. It relates to the widely accepted idea that democratization in essence is and has to be 
a domestic process, based on some (even rudimentary) domestic impetus for democratization at 
elite, intermediate and/or mass level, and necessitating a broad range of domestic reforms 
initiated and carried out by domestic actors. It can be supported by external donors, but not 
imposed from outside.55  
Finally, as regards the three stages of the democratization process (…liberalization, 
democratization and the consolidation of democracy…) reference is made to the more detailed discussion 
in Section II.3. of this chapter. It should only briefly be mentioned that in order to deal with the 
complexity and diversity of democratization processes, scholars employ a very general model of 
regime change from some form of non-democratic or authoritarian to a democratic regime, 
which distinguishes between the mentioned three phases that conceptually differ but may be 
overlapping in time.  
 
All in all, the used here definition of democracy assistance does not impose specific conceptions 
of democracy, democratization, or approaches to democracy assistance on donors, while at the 
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same time it captures the main features of this type of democracy promotion. The core idea of 
democracy assistance is to directly support domestic political reform processes through an open 
knowledge, expertise and information transfer or spread that takes place in direct work with local 
actors, institutions, and processes within the target state. Such mode of operation in principle 
requires the consent of or toleration by the targets states’ authorities. Exceptionally, assistance is 
provided outside the target state (‘external democracy assistance’) and/or against the consent of 
the government. The direct facilitation of democratization processes involves a direct focus on 
core actors, institutions, and processes of the political regime rather than an indirect effect via, in 
particular, successful socio-economic reform. Difficulties in identifying the aim and the direct or 
indirect effect on democratization of a project or programme requires analysts of democracy 
assistance to accept the existence of a grey area of projects whose inclusion/exclusion is 
problematic.  
 
2. The International Dimension of Democratization  
 
The ‘international dimension’ or, to stress its complexity, the ‘international dimensions’ of 
democratization, broadly refers to all actors, influences, and activities that originate or are located 
outside a country’s borders and have some relevance for a domestic democratization process.56 It 
was until the 1980s generally attributed limited importance, as transitions to democracy were 
considered to be one of the most “autochthonous political acts” at all, in which “domestic actors 
play a predominant role”.57 Since then hardly any democratization process has occurred though in 
which international factors have not been influential.58 This does not suggest that external factors 
were usually dominant or decisive for transitions to democracy to begin and succeed, but only 
that they were present and to some lesser or larger degree influential. Underlying reasons for this 
change include increased exchanges between and interdependence of states (‘globalization’), 
mainly based on global business and trade, travel, modern forms of communication, in particular 
(satellite) television, mobile phones, and the internet, in particular social media, as well as the 
increasing appeal of (liberal) democracy, the growing number of democratization processes and, 
last but not least, increasing explicit efforts to promote democracy abroad, including through 
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democracy assistance.59 At the same time, the early negligence of academic analysis of the 
international context has from the early 1990s on given rise to a constantly expanding body of 
literature on the international influence on domestic democratization processes. This shift 
happened against the background of a broader and increasing awareness that the scientific fields 
of international relations and comparative politics needed to be linked to a higher degree.60 Some 
of the literature also asserts a more prominent role for international influences in the early cases 
of the third wave of democracy.61 As mentioned in the Introduction, the latter term, coined by 
Samuel Huntington, refers to all transitions that have occurred since the Portuguese regime 
change in 1974, including those in other Southern European states, Latin America, Asia, and the 
former Communist area.62 Arguably it is still ongoing, with the more recent, but largely 
unsuccessful, regime changes in the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan) and 
those in the Balkans constituting forms of small ‘after-waves’ to the major wave that reached its 
peak in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989/1990. Some authors have preferred to call the post-
Communist transitions part of a ‘fourth wave’, while, more recently, the ousting of the 
authoritarian presidents in Tunisia and Egypt has also frequently been termed the beginning of a 
‘fourth wave’.63 
 The following discussion disaggregates the international dimension into actors and four 
basic influences and/or approaches. It shows that the EU is just one of many actors and 
positions democracy assistance within the international context of democratization.  
 
a) Actors  
 
A whole range of different actors that in various ways influence domestic political reform 
processes populates the international dimension of democratization. First, Western democratic 
states appear as key actors. They are ‘models’ for many people living in authoritarian settings or 
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transitional states,64 operate with a broader range of instruments than all other actors, and, in 
particular, run the largest democracy assistance programmes. While the most notable actors are 
the US and European states, especially the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and the northern 
European countries, Canada, Australia, and Japan also play important roles.65 More recently, the 
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have also entered the stage as democracy 
promoters.66 Democratizing countries frequently play exemplary roles for states embarking on 
transitions.67  
Secondly, many international organizations, like the EU, the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (COE), the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN) also are active 
democracy promoters. Despite some overlapping, each pursues its very specific, unique 
approach, favours different instruments of democracy promotion, and concentrates on different 
geographical areas.68 Many of the organizations have established specific institutions or bodies 
concentrating on democratization-related work, like the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE and the European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (or so-called Venice Commission) of the COE. The International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an international organization specifically 
devoted to democracy promotion and focuses on research, advice, and project work. It currently 
consists of 28 European, Latin American, African, and Asian member and observer states. 
Of special relevance for democracy assistance is the group of so-called semi- or quasi-
governmental bodies, which are governmentally funded but operate independently. It comprises, 
on the one hand, political or party foundations, which are established by individual political 
parties with which they remain personally and ideologically affiliated, receive governmental 
funding, but retain a high degree of autonomy from the parties and the government as regards 
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Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002 (2002), at 16 and 40f. 
68 For a general overview see Herman and Piccone, at 228-240. For more specific accounts on individual 
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the spending of their budgets.69 The oldest and most known foundations are the German so-
called ‘Politischen Stiftungen’,70 which have provided the blueprint for numerous foundations 
founded worldwide.71 Of more recent origin and innovative is the Netherlands Institute for 
Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), a joint foundation of seven political parties.  
On the other hand, several governments have themselves created semi-governmental, 
independently operating democracy assistance institutions. Most notable are the US’ National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
(WFD), which mainly disburse funds through party-related institutions or parties themselves.72 
Other examples are the Canadian ‘International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic 
Development’ (called Rights & Democracy) and the Center for Democratic Institutions 
(Australia). Efforts by members of the European Parliament to establish a similar body at EU-
level did not generate enough support in the early-mid 2000s.73 More recent initiatives by EU 
Member States have resulted in an agreement to establish a European Endowment for 
Democracy (EED), which will share some of the features of the above-mentioned quasi-
governmental organizations.74 The particular attraction of the various semi-governmental bodies 
lies in combining the advantages of state and private/civil society actors. They have access to and 
support and trust of political and politically important bodies in both the donor and recipient 
states, while retaining enough autonomy from their governments to engage in political sensitive 
issues, in particular work with political parties and related institutions.  
Fourthly, democracy assistance would basically be impossible without the uncountable 
number of locally, nationally and/or internationally operating civil society organizations, in 
particular NGOs, that engage in awareness-raising and advocacy on democracy-issues, contribute 
to governmental policy-making, and/or implement democracy assistance projects with private 
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funds or governmental grants.75 A very particular organization was ‘Otpor!’, a civic youth 
organization and – later – movement active against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and widely 
credited for having played a key role in the latter’s successful dismantling. Otpor!’s strategies were 
highly influential on many similar groups and movements in other states, like Kmara in Georgia 
and Pora in the Ukraine. Former Otpor! members have ever since the early 2000s been advising 
various organizations and movements in authoritarian states, like in Georgia, Ukraine, and Egypt 
on a (peaceful) strategy of regime change.76 Moreover, there are some notable private actors and 
foundations that strongly engage in democracy promotion, like George Soros, the major private 
donor in former Communist states.77  
Businesses, in particular multi-national corporations (MNCs), still play hardly any role in 
the field, except for some attention to commercial activity-related aspects of good governance 
and rule of law in some corporate social responsibility (CSR) agendas.78 
 All in all, the overview shows the high number and diversity of actors present in the 
international context of democratization.79 Their engagement is characterized by both overlap 
and complementarity, posing problems of coordination, but also allowing divisions of labour and 
diversity in focuses and methods that can be highly beneficial for democracy promotion and 
assistance.  
 
b) Influences and/or Approaches 
 
It is possible to distinguish between four basic influences and/or approaches through which 
external actors have/try to have an impact on domestic democratization processes.80 The first, 
contagion, constitutes an unintentional influence or effect of external presence or action. The 
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remaining three, coercion, conditionality, and consensus, denominate different forms of 
purposeful, intentional action, also referred to as democracy promotion. Again following 
Schmitter and Brouwer, democracy promotion can therefore be defined as consisting of all overt 
activities, adopted, supported, and/or (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors and 
explicitly designed to directly contribute to the liberalization, democratization or consolidation of democracy of a 
target country.81 Individual democracy promotion activities, also called instruments or tools, can be 
attributed to one of the three approaches or, at times, to more than one, depending on their 
particular content. Table 1, provided on the next page, presents the four sub-contexts of the 
international dimension of democratization and the major democracy promotion tools, which 




Contagion consists of the unintentional transmission of messages about the content and 
possibility of political freedom and democratic politics from democratic countries or such 
undergoing transitions to democracy.83 The literature also uses the concept of diffusion for the 
same phenomenon, which refers to spread of ideas, institutions, procedures, behaviours, or 
models from one context to another.84 Rather than being unintentional only, forms of diffusion 
often also comprise intentional efforts of external actors that move from one country to another 
to emulate certain processes. While contagion was always present, it has, for the already 
mentioned reasons, like more intensive cross-boundary relations, become particularly strong and 
obvious during the ‘third wave of democracy’.85  
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Examples of contagion include the force of attraction of the EEC/EU and its liberal democratic 
and market economic Member States, that have, next to the use of conditionality, facilitated 
democratization processes in Southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s and in Central and South 
Eastern Europe since the 1990s.90 Further, transition processes have frequently inspired 
populations of states to attempt regime change as well. Examples include the ‘snowballing’ of 
transitions throughout Eastern Europe in 1989/90,91 the wave of the so-called ‘colour 
revolutions’ in Serbia and some states of the former Soviet Union (fSU) in the early-mid 2000s,92 
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Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, 5 Perspectives on Politics 2 (June 2007), at 262; V. Silitski, ‘What Are We 




and, most recently, the wave of protests throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East in early 
2011. Calls for ‘jasmine strolls’ in China in early 2011, alluding to the Tunisian ‘jasmine 
revolution’, show that contagion is not limited to countries of the same region.93 Finally, also the 
particular type of transition has at times been copied. A case is point is the choice of peaceful 
means for regime change in most Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) as well as 
the use of round table talks, especially in Poland and Hungary,94 as well as, more recently, the 




The coercive approach involves the use of military, economic or political force or pressure to 
(attempt to) (re)establishing a democratic regime against the will of the target state’s government 
or under control by external actors. In EU-jargon usually referred to as ‘negative’, ‘reactive’ or 
‘punitive measures’, its major forms are military imposition, controlled democratization under 
international administrations, as well as sanctions.96 Additionally, also diplomatic measures, like 
démarches, that express disapproval or concern about political developments in a third country, 
can be included in this group, although, the extent of pressure is of course much more limited.  
Democratization by military intervention and during occupation comprises several cases 
that differ, amongst others, as regards the relevance of democracy for the action, the scale and 
duration of military action, and their unilateral or collective, UN-sanctioned nature. Major 
historical and current examples are Japan, Germany, and Austria after World War II, Grenada 
(1983), Panama (1989), Haiti (1994), Sierra Leone (1997-98), Afghanistan (2001-) and Iraq (2003-
).97 Examples of controlled democratization processes during interim administration include 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-) and Kosovo (1999-).98  
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The most coercive form of democracy promotion remains a rather rarely used tool 
though. On the one hand, the overwhelming majority of international lawyers and states, except 
the US, consider it illegal under international law, except if the UN Security Council would 
authorize an intervention on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.99 On the other hand, 
military intervention suffers from limitations and has considerable negative side effects, in 
particular human rights abuses, necessarily resulting from military action that may cause 
opposition against the intervening and occupying powers.100 Only in few, specific cases, like the 
quick reinstatement of a democratically elected but forcefully removed government, is pro-
democratic intervention (also without UN Security Council authorization) therefore acceptable.  
Sanctions are imposed on third states, governments, groups or individuals, with the aim 
of pressing the addressees to change behaviours or policies or to push populations to demand 
reforms from their leaders or regime change itself.101 Different types of sanctions include 
economic sanctions, which restrict imports and/or exports, financial sanctions, which limit 
financial transactions or freeze assets held abroad, military sanctions, which prevent trade in 
arms, and diplomatic sanctions, which sever diplomatic ties and impose travel and visa 
restrictions for leading figures of the regime.102 Sanctions can be generally applied and 
indiscriminately affect a broad range of individuals or products or be targeted or ‘smart’ and 
focus on actors that are primarily responsible for the negative situation, like authoritarian leaders, 
or are otherwise crucial for changes, like the economic elite, or on specific goods. Moreover, 
sanctions can be adopted and applied unilaterally, that is, by individual states or organizations like 
the EU, or multilaterally/collectively, based on UN (General Assembly or Security Council) 
resolutions.103  
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The use of unilateral and multilateral sanctions has increased considerably since the early 
1990s with a particular preference for targeted over general (economic) sanctions.104 They are 
widely considered, if applied in the right circumstances, to be a very effective instrument that is 
less violent and destructive than other coercive tools and has considerably smaller and more 
acceptable retro-costs, that is, costs for the sanctions-applying state and for third states, while still 
satisfying the desire of responding strongly to violations of norms.105 Further, sanctions are 
widely considered legal, especially of international legal standards, like proportionality, are met.106 
Nevertheless, questions of negative side effects for sanctions-applying and neighbouring 
countries and the risk of incoherent application due to political and economic considerations 
remain. 
 
iii. Political Conditionality 
 
Political conditionality can be defined as the linking by a state or international organization of 
perceived benefits to another state to the fulfilment of conditions relating to the introduction and 
maintenance of a democratic system of government as well as the protection of human rights.107 
It can find application in a ‘negative/punitive’ way or a ‘positive/encouraging’ way. The literature 
also frequently uses the categories of ex ante and ex post conditionality, however, not always 
defining them in the same way.108  
 Negative conditionality envisages the reduction, suspension, or termination of benefits in 
case democratic principles are violated. Examples include the cancellation of political meetings, 
the alteration of assistance channels away from governmental recipients to civil society 
organizations, the postponement of financing assistance projects, the reduction or suspension of 
assistance, the partial or total removal of trade benefits, like tariff reductions, and the partial or 
complete suspension of trade agreements.109 As the list shows, several conditionality measures 
strongly overlap with different types of sanctions. However, sanctions are usually (slightly) more 
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punitive and are adopted, for example in the EU context, according to different procedures. The 
existence of both categories can largely be explained by their historical evolution, in particular, 
the only gradual emergence of different forms of smart sanctions over the last two decades. 
 Positive/encouraging conditionality foresees the provision of benefits if political 
conditions are fulfilled. It does not remove granted relations or benefits, but just withholds 
promised benefits as long as political conditions remain unfulfilled. Positive conditionality has 
some features of the coercive approach as it uses the economic and political power of Western 
states or organizations to influence third states’ governments. At the same time, it also contains 
elements of the consensual approach, discussed in the next sub-section, in particular the ‘pro-
active’ rather than ‘reactive’ nature and some elements of dialogue and encouragement, as third 
states are given possibility and time to rectify or improve a situation, without immediately being 
punished.110 Examples of positive conditionality include the withholding of ratification of a 
cooperation or trade agreement, the non-provision of development assistance, or the linking of 
accession to an organization, like the EU, to progress in democratic development or respect for 
democratic principles. Table 1 also refers to ‘incentive conditionality’, which is a more specific 
type of positive conditionality that offers third states ‘additional’ benefits for further 
improvements in human rights and democratization records. Specific EU-related examples of 
incentive conditionality, like the ENPI Governance Facility and ACP Governance Initiative are 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
The application of conditionality occurs through various specific here so-called 
‘conditionality-instruments’, which differ from actor to actor and regards the particular field of 
application. For example, several US legislative acts concerning external assistance, like the 
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, contain provisions prohibiting the US government to 
provide aid to governments engaged in “a consistent pattern” of human rights violations.111 EU 
law does not contain an equivalent legal prohibition, but EU institutions are (just) given the 
possibility to respond to violations through the use of so-called ‘political conditionality clauses’ or 
‘human rights and democracy clauses’, which have since the early-mid 1990s been systematically 
included in many EU external agreements and unilateral assistance regulations.112 The clauses 
determine principles of human rights and democracy to be ‘essential elements’ of the particular 
legislative act and give the parties to the agreements or the donor (the EU) the right – in 
conformity with international law – to partially or completely suspend or terminate the 
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agreements or the effects of the regulations.113 Political conditionality as precondition of EU 
membership is explicitly mentioned in the EU-Treaty and to be implemented through a complex 
monitoring system.114 Special incentive arrangements are either specifically envisaged in legal acts, 
like the GSP regulation115 or devised as policy instrument, like the ENPI Governance Facility.116  
On the whole, political conditionality has since the early 1990s increasingly been a 
popular tool, especially in its positive form, with Western actors investing considerable efforts in 
devising different conditionality instruments. Negative conditionality, suffering from the same 
weaknesses as sanctions, has much less frequently been applied. Studies on its impact for 





Consensual forms of democracy promotion, in EU-jargon usually called ‘positive measures’, are 
characterised by the consent or at least toleration of the third state’s government, active and 
positive engagement by the foreign actor, as well as, frequently, by pro-active rather than re-
active involvement and direct engagement with local individuals or institutions. Some of the tools 
at time also take on coercive features, for example, if a positive instrument is used to express 
disapproval and to exert pressure, like when human rights dialogues raise issues of specific 
human rights violations and the Western actor expresses concern. During the last two decades 
various consensual forms of democracy promotion have emerged or developed, which should 
briefly be looked at in turn, except for the tool of democracy assistance that is treated in more 
detail in other sections of this Chapter and in Chapter 2.  
 Political dialogues are fora for discussion, argumentation and information exchange 
between Western governmental officials and/or parliamentarians and their counterparts in 
authoritarian or democratizing states. Civil society is usually at most informally involved, for 
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example, in parallel meetings before or after the actual dialogue.118 The underlying purpose of 
dialogues is to persuade participants of non-democratic states, through interaction and learning 
processes, to implement reforms.119 As mentioned above, there might also be elements of 
coercion and pressure to achieve the desired result (‘name and shame’). The formats of dialogues 
range from bi-lateral, ad-hoc meetings upon the request of one state to discuss specific events in 
a third state, as in the case of the OSCE’s so-called Vienna Mechanism, over structured, regular, 
bi-lateral meetings, prepared and followed-up by specific (sub-) committees permanently dealing 
with democracy-issues in a particular state, as in the EU context, to regular, general meetings of 
all members of an organization to broadly discuss the implementation of their commitments, as 
in the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings (HDIMs) of the OSCE.120  
 Human rights and, usually implicitly (through political and civil rights monitoring) 
democracy monitoring, refers to various supervisory procedures established and carried out 
within international and regional human rights protection systems, like the UN, COE, and OSCE 
systems.121 They are often, but not necessarily, based on legally binding international or regional 
human rights conventions, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
The numerous existing mechanisms show considerably differences, amongst others, as regards 
who monitors (like courts, independent experts, or governments), who is entitled to start the 
procedure (affected individuals, groups or monitoring bodies), which information is allowed as 
basis for the investigation and report (like state reports, information by alternative, in particular 
NGO sources), whether on-site investigation is permissible, whether the process and results are 
public or confidential, and what are the consequences of monitoring, like binding judgements or 
non-binding reports. Like in the case of dialogues, monitoring mechanisms either try to 
constructively engage target states governments and to persuade these to adopt reforms, or 
impose pressure through ‘naming and shaming’ or the threat of or use of even harsher measures. 
On the whole, monitoring has not lost appeal since it was first used in the late 1960s/early 1970s 
and many existing mechanisms are constantly being reformed with a view to increasing their 
effectiveness.  
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Election monitoring constitutes a more specific type of monitoring. It has been defined 
as the “purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process and the making of 
informed judgements on the conduct of such a process on the basis of the information collected, 
by persons who are not inherently authorised to intervene in the process”, with a particular stress 
on the principles of objectivity and non-interference.122 The purpose is to promote free and fair 
elections and thereby democratization through deterring electoral fraud by governmental bodies 
or parties, thereby enhancing public confidence in the electoral process and encouraging electoral 
participation, as well as, raising the overall legitimacy of the outcome of the process, that is, of 
the elected government.123 Election monitoring is a very popular instrument and many donors, 
especially the EU, have during the last decade invested considerable efforts into its 
development.124 Reasons for its popularity include the central position of elections in the liberal 
democratic model, the more ‘technical’ character of elections as compared to other elements of 
democracy, like civil society, which makes them an easier target for external actors,125 and their 
visibility, which provides a convenient tool to enhance a donor’s own international presence.  
The last category of consensual instruments consists of measures that combine 
monitoring, facilitating and mediating functions. They have largely emerged in the 1990s, because 
of their more intrusive nature rather within regional than international frameworks, in particular 
within the OSCE, and frequently concentrate on one particular theme or (set of) human right(s). 
Most notable for the topic of democratisation is the OSCE’s so-called Moscow Mechanism, 
which, in one of several possible forms, consists of missions of experts or rapporteurs who act as 
monitors, reporters, and mediators in a conflict,126 and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of 
Media, who has similar functions in the media sector. Other examples include the COE’s 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU’s so-called Special Representatives, usually 
appointed for particular countries or geographical regions and with a broader mandate than 
democracy promotion only.127 
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On the whole, over the last decades international factors have increasingly played a role in 
democratization processes of individual states. Not only have there been more unintentional 
factors at work, also intentional actions – democracy promotion – have multiplied enormously. 
In particular since the early 1990s, democracy promotion actors have increasingly presented new 
instruments to facilitate democratization and have ever since refined them and developed them 
further. These numerous instruments range from pursing coercive to more positive, engaging 
approaches, in practice often combining elements of both. Overall, despite the frequent primary 
association of democracy promotion with the military intervention in Iraq, coercive measures are 
definitely the least preferred option. If employed, preference is given to those with less negative 
side-effects, that is, smart, targeted sanctions. Democracy promoters on the whole prefer using 
positive tools as well as positive and incentive conditionality, which bring together several 
advantages:128 Their direct engagement with local actors, processes, and institutions implements 
the idea that successful democratization must be a domestically rooted and driven process; their 
open and consensual nature avoids or at least reduces conflicts with the target states’ authorities; 
they allow the concurrent pursuit of other external policy objectives, as they do not disturb 
political and economic relations; their proactive rather than reactive nature envisages action not 
only after (serious) violations of democratic principles but beforehand; they are less prone to 
influence by geopolitical and economic foreign policy considerations, which usually discriminate 
against smaller, distant, less important states; they avoid the negative side-effects of certain 
coercive measures (death, destruction, negative economic repercussions for the target state’s 
population, neighbouring countries, and the sanction employing state). The major critique about 
positive measures has been that they allow Western states to pursue ‘business as usual’ rather 
than reacting more decisively to violations of democratic principles.  
 
3. Explaining Democratization 
 
Democratization is usually – and also in this thesis – defined as the process of regime change 
from some form of non-democratic to a democratic regime.129 The various experiences of the 
countries having undergone such regime change demonstrate the diversity of the process. 
Transitions begin at various levels of socio-economic development; some authoritarian regimes 
break down under strong popular pressure, in others the incumbent political elite is the major 
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democratizing force; time frames, external influences, and, last but not least, successful 
consolidation of the new democratic regime differs from case to case. Dankwart Rustow has 
therefore proven to be right, when he suggested in his seminal article of 1970 – challenging the 
then prevailing view – that “there are many roads to democracy”.130 
 Just as the way to democracy is diverse, there are also numerous different theoretical 
explanations of why and how democratization starts, proceeds, succeeds and/or fails. New 
theories or refined versions of older theories continue to emerge regularly and can be expected to 
appear as long as the third wave is being followed by small after-waves or (possibly) a fourth 
wave of democracy. In order to cope with the quantity of theoretical explanations, it is helpful to 
generally distinguish between two major approaches in the study of democratization: the 
structural approach and the genetic or transition approach.131 Both have been refined since they 
have first emerged and, in particular, incorporated elements of each other, but have nevertheless 
retained their specific characters. While most democratization theories can either be attributed to 
one or the other basic approach, many also mix elements of both.132 
 
a) The Structural Approach in the Study of Democratization 
 
Studies following the structural approach explain democratization by looking at structural 
conditions that lie outside the political system and its actors. The most important of these 
structural conditions is socio-economic development, but conditions like culture, in particular 
religion and political culture, have also been addressed. One particular strand of the approach, 
historical sociological analysis, has explained democratization as an outcome of the balance or 
weight of different social classes.133 
 The structural approach constituted the first and original school of regime change and 
was particularly popular between the 1950s and the 1970s. It was then largely suppressed by the 
transition approach, which criticized it for its determinism, ethnocentrism, exclusive long-term 
focus, and treatment of individuals as members of groups with predetermined behaviours only. 
Moreover, its predictions failed to materialize, when despite socio-economic development a 
                                                     
130 D. A. Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model’, 2 Comparative Politics 3 (1970), at 346.  
131 For different classifications see: Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratization, at 5; R. B. Collier, ‘Democratic 
Transition’, in P. B. Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought (2001), at 213f; D. Potter, 
‘Chapter 1: Explaining Democratization’, in D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh and P. Lewis (eds), Democratization 
(1997), at 10f.  
132 For example G. Sørensen, Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospects in a Changing World (1998, 2nd ed.); 
Huntington, The Third Wave; Pridham, The Dynamics of Democratization; Potter, Goldblatt, Kiloh and Lewis (eds); J. 
Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006 (2010).  




‘reverse wave’ to authoritarianism took place in the 1960s and early 1970s.134 Eventually, the 
structural approach reemerged in a refined and qualified version in the early 1990s, in particular 
as a result of the transformation processes in Central and Eastern Europe, to some extent 
responding to the various points of criticism mentioned above.135 In particular, newer structural 
studies address the role of individuals and suggest, for example, that “economic development 
makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real”.136 
 
i. Socio-economic Development and Democratization 
 
As mentioned, the structural factor given most attention in the study of democratization was and 
still is socio-economic development. 
 Original studies on the relationship between socio-economic development and 
democratization and/or democracy – concepts, which original studies did not necessarily clearly 
distinguish from each other –137 overlapped with the modernization theory. They suggested that 
democracy would result from, but also require each state to go through a universal sequence of 
different developmental phases of socio-economic development, including industrialization, 
urbanization, higher educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of society. 
Development would effect changes in the social structure and in the political culture of a society, 
which would eventually, in the final stage, lead to democracy. All in all, socio-economic 
development was considered to be a precondition or prerequisite for democratization as well as a 
necessary outcome.138 
 Since the early 1990s a large number of new studies on the relationship between socio-
economic development and democracy/democratization has been carried out, employing 
different quantitative methods and focusing on different time frames and countries.139 While they 
                                                     
134 V. Randall, ‘Modernisation’, in P. B. Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought (2001), at 442; 
Huntington, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, at 3.  
135 L. Diamond, ‘Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered’, 35 American Behavioral Scientist 4/5 
(March/June1992), at 468; S. M. Lipset, ‘The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, 59 American Sociological Review 
(February 1994), at 1; L. Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), at 78f; Pridham, The Dynamics of 
Democratization, at 8; Randall, at 441 and 443; A. Przeworski and F. Limongi: Modernization: Theories and Facts (1997), at 
156. 
136 Huntington, The Third Wave, at 316.  
137 For example, S. M. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy’, 53 American Political Science Review 1 (March 1959). See the critique of Rustow, at 341f.  
138 Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy’, at 82; 
Diamond, ‘Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered’, at 488; Przeworski and Limongi, at 158; Randall, 
at 441.  
139 For an overview see, for example, Diamond, at 469. See also S. M. Lipset, K. - R. Seong and J. C. Torres, ‘A 
Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy’, 45 International Social Science Journal (May 1993), at 155f; 
Lipset, ‘The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited’, at 1; T. Vanhanen, Prospects for Democracy: A Study of 172 




have overall produced very diverse results, the majority of studies has suggested the following 
relationship between the phenomena.  
 First, socio-economic development is no longer believed to be a precondition or 
prerequisite for democratization but democratization can in principle occur at any level or rate of 
socio-economic development.140 Nevertheless, secondly, the majority of studies suggest that 
higher levels and rates of socio-economic development make the achievement of a democratic 
system more likely.141 For example, Seymour Martin Lipset, once a proponent of the 
modernization approach, wrote in the early-mid 1990s that “while we cannot assume the impact 
of growth to be mechanistic in encouraging pluralism” it is nevertheless a factor “conducive to 
the development of democracy”.142  
It is less clear though, whether the positive effect of socio-economic development is 
equally strong at all levels of development. Some authors have suggested that its impact is 
strongest at lower levels of development. Others have found that the likelihood of a positive 
impact is stronger at middle levels of socio-economic development (‘zone of transition’).143 Very 
widespread is also the assumption of a relationship in the shape of an N-curve, which suggests 
high chances for democratization in poor and lower-middle income countries, low change at 
some middle range, and high chances in rich countries.144 Several influential studies of the 1980s 
suggested that certain levels of socio-economic development produced authoritarianism rather 
than democracy. In particular, the Dependency School showed that Latin American bureaucratic-
authoritarian dictatorships were the result of dependent capitalist development. The reasons were 
the need to suppress social parties, organizations and popular demands more generally, in face of 
severe economic measures. As a result, the way to democracy was considered to be a circuitous 
one, in which dictatorships were required to achieve development, which would eventually lead 
to democracy. The theory lost appeal though in the late 1980s, when there was hardly evidence 
that dictatorships carried out successful socio-economic reform.145 All in all, given the numerous 
suggestions, many authors simply assume that socio-economic development is at any stage a 
facilitating factor for democratization.  
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The third conclusion to be drawn from studies on socio-economic development and 
democracy is that higher levels and rates of socio-economic development are even more 
important for the successful consolidation of democracy than for transition itself. In this sense, 
Larry Diamond nearly went so far as suggesting economic growth to be a precondition for the 
consolidation of democracy.146  
Finally and little disputed, theory suggests there exists “a consistent and strong positive 
relationship” between socio-economic development and the existence and survival and stability 
of political democracy.147 If a country is rich it is most likely a democracy (and vice versa). 
However, this does not mean that socio-economic development is a precondition for democracy, 
as also poor states, like India and Mongolia can have democratic systems of government. Further, 
the chances for the survival and stability of democracy are higher if states are richer or if states 
are economically developing.148 
The question remains why socio-economic development facilitates democratization and 
democracy. A first set of arguments directly relates to higher income and economic security. A 
secure job and income allows people to give more attention to politics, as they are not only 
concerned with securing basic necessities. Further, economic development leads to the 
establishment of an economically independent middle class that provides a strong counterweight 
to the state and demands political freedoms and participation.149 Finally, economic development 
means that the state is no longer the only source of economic opportunities, elections stop to be 
zero-sum games, nepotism and bureaucratic corruption decline, all of which remove obstacles to 
democratization.150 A second set of arguments asserts that development creates a civic culture 
that makes democratization more likely, as such culture involves higher levels of trust among 
members of a society, a willingness to tolerate diversity, to accommodate and compromise. 
Education appears to be the most important intervening factor in the creation of a civic 
culture.151 
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ii. Cultural Factors and Democratization 
 
Next to socio-economic conditions, culture has received and still receives considerable attention 
in the literature. Moreover, Seymour Martin Lipset argued in 1994 that “cultural factors appear 
even more important than economic ones” in explaining the presence of democracy.152  
Overall, studies on culture and democracy vary considerable as regards their focus and 
results. Some contend in a rather general way that only Western culture provides the suitable 
basis for the creation and working of democratic institutions and that it only has to be shown 
that it can also work beyond this cultural framework (‘restrictive cultural thesis’).153 Slightly more 
moderate versions of the cultural thesis only assert that certain cultures, in particular Islam, 
Confucianism, and Orthodox Christianity, are hostile to democracy.154 Similarly, until the 1960s 
the hierarchical and authoritarian character of Christianity was considered as obstacle to 
democratization in Latin America.155 Of all major world religions only Protestantism was always 
positively correlated with democracy.156 
Arguments on the sheer incompatibility of certain cultures with democracy have 
encountered much criticism and have largely been dismissed.157 As regards more moderate 
approaches, it has been shown that cultures are complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, 
assumptions, and behaviour patterns and therefore have features compatible and incompatible 
with democracy. It depends on which features are stressed or compromised, and whether change 
within a culture is possible and/or acceptable.158  
A different type of work correlating culture and democracy has concentrated on political 
culture, defined as the system of beliefs and values in which political action is embedded and 
given meaning.159 The idea was that a certain type of political culture, namely a civic culture, was 
necessary or more favourable for democratization (that is, democrats are needed before a 
democracy can be established). A state torn by war and dominated by corruption is little likely to 
become a democracy. The thesis was met with criticism. Terry Lynn Karl has mentioned 
examples of democracies that emerged from uncivic warfare and Dankwart Rustow has argued 
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that “not all causal links run from beliefs and attitudes to actions”, but “there are reciprocal 
influences” between these two.160 
 
b) The Genetic or Transition Approach in the Study of Democratization 
 
The second major approach in democratization studies is the so-called genetic or transition 
approach. It dismisses the idea of a common causality, like socio-economic development, for 
democratization, but believes that each case is different and that it is the dynamics of the 
democratization process that is crucial for determining success or failure. Studies following the 
transition approach therefore concentrate on the dynamics of the process of regime change itself, 
which they conceptualize as a complex process consisting of three conceptually different phases: 
liberalization, transition, and consolidation.161 The time shortly before, during, and shortly after 
the transition has originally been given most attention, however, since the 1990s the 
consolidation process has also stirred much interest. The approach also recognizes the existence 
and importance of ‘crucial’ moments, which can be particularly decisive for the success or failure 
for the democratization process. Importantly, in the overall process an important role is 
attributed to political actors and their strategic choices, especially also during crucial moments. 
Actors therefore move to the center of the process of regime change and move it forward by 
making efficacious, consequential choices.162 Originally, the focus was mainly on political elites, 
however, from the 1990s on the masses and civil society were also given more attention.163 
 The genetic approach was originally developed in the 1980s in critique of the structural 
approach and, in particular, modernization theory, as well as against the backdrop of transitions 
in Southern Europe and Latin America, which constituted the first cases of analysis.164 The 
genetic approach was mainly criticized for ‘excessive voluntarism’, that is, that everything 
depended on the activities and choices of individuals, in particular of the political elite, 
unrestrained by structural factors.165 It responded to the critique by eventually taking pre-existing 
social, economic, and political relations into account as confining conditions that may restrict or 
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enhance choices, just like the refined structural approaches accepted the role of actors.166 
Moreover, the focus on elites was complemented by a focus on civil society.167 Overall though, 
the strategic choices of actors continued to be given primary attention.  
 The following paragraphs should briefly introduce the three conceptually different and 





Transition to democracy might be preceded by a period of political liberalization. Political 
liberalization is a process during which authoritarian rulers extend some civil liberties to their 
populations, like through the release of political prisoners, the easing of media censorship, the 
permission of (some) civil society activity, and possibly even the permission of some political 
opposition activity. However, the process falls short of real democratization as the authoritarian 
government continues to suppress some of the core elements of a democratic system of 
government, in particular, the holding of regular, free and fair elections.168 While a state of 
liberalization is preferable to authoritarianism, it cannot replace full democratization. 
 The reason for authoritarian rulers to liberalize varies, but is usually caused by a regime 
crisis, in particular a socio-economic or related legitimacy crisis. Authoritarian regimes are 
particularly vulnerable as regards socio-economic crisis, because they are usually functionally 
legitimated. Failure to develop economically and to ensure basic social services can cause critique 
of authoritarian governments and – because there is no strict difference between the government 
and the regime – also of the authoritarian regime as such.169 However, economic success can also 
be the reason for a legitimacy crisis.170 As pointed out by structural studies, economically 
independent and educated middle classes can begin to push for democratization, with South 
Korea and Taiwan being usually cited as major examples of such process.171 A legitimacy crisis 
can also occur with the death of a leading figure, if the regime built its legitimacy on that person, 
like in Franco’s Spain.172 In any case, in the face of a crisis, an authoritarian government can 
either retain authoritarianism (or even introduce harsher measures of control), but can also begin 
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with liberalizing reforms. The preferred choice is usually determined whether the group of hard-
liners of the political elite – conservatives, who believe in the possibility and desirability of 
retaining the authoritarian regime – or the group of soft-liners – reformers, who believe that the 
regime needs some liberalization or who even desire real democratization – are more 
influential.173 Also the role of civil society and the population can become important, in particular 
in support of the reformist soft-liners.174 
 If an authoritarian regime liberalizes, this might turn out to be the first step to a transition 
to democracy. The newly gained liberties can lead to even stronger demands and pressure, which 
can no longer prevent a regime change. However, the process is characterized by strong 
uncertainties.175 Liberalization can also be halted, reversed, continued and reversed again. In the 
last decade, it has also occurred more frequently that states maintained a status of liberalization 
for a longer period of time, which eventually resulted in liberalization not only being a transitory 
status but a type of regime.176 Morocco, Armenia, Singapore, Malaysia and, in some accounts, also 
Russia, Azerbaijan, and (before early 2011) also Egypt, can currently be considered ‘liberalized 




The transition phase constitutes the major stage of the democratization process, as it is when 
regime change happens. It is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, when everything is in 
flux, but in the process of being defined.178 Its starting-point and even more its end-point are 
difficult to determine and various suggestions have been made in the literature. According to 
Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan a transition can be considered to begin with the collapse of the 
authoritarian regime and to be completed when there is agreement about the political procedures 
to produce an elected government, when this government results from relatively free and fair 
elections (so-called founding elections), when the elected government de facto has power to 
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generate policies and is not controlled by unelected institutions, like the military, and when the 
new executive, parliament, and judiciary does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.179 
Similarly but less detailed, other authors have located the end-point of a transition with the 
beginning of the operation of the new system, that is, when a freely and fairly elected government 
starts to produce policies.180  
 Terry L. Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter have suggested four ideal types of transitions to 
democracy, which were originally deduced from early third wave transitions in Southern Europe 
and Latin America but also identified in Central and Eastern Europe.181 As they are ideal types, 
individual cases of transitions cannot always easily be allocated to one or the other, but often mix 
elements of more than one type. The four types are as follows:182 
(1) Transitions from above or top-down, in the case of which reformers or soft-liners of the 
ruling authoritarian regime remain the decisive actors, like in Turkey, Brazil, and, at least initially, 
the Soviet Union, where Mikhail Gorbachev was a quite unique ‘liberalizing reformer’.183 Top-
down transitions also includes the more seldom case of transition by imposition, which refers to 
cases of regime change through military intervention by foreign states, like in Germany after 
World War II, in Iraq, and Afghanistan; 
(2) Reform transitions from below or bottom-up, in the case of which non-violent mass 
mobilizations eventually force authoritarian rulers to reform, like in Czechoslovakia; 
(3) Revolutions or violent mass uprisings, like in Cuba and (although disputed) in Romania;  
(4) Negotiated transitions, in the case of which members of the authoritarian regime and the 
political opposition agree on regime change through compromise, negotiation and/or pact, like in 
Spain, widely considered the very model of ‘elite settlement’;184 
 As indicated, various types of transitions are difficult to attribute to one of the four ideal 
types. In the various cases of the so-called ‘colour revolutions’, in particular in Serbia, Ukraine, 
and Georgia, an ‘electoral model’ of regime change was followed.185 It included a concerted effort 
by opposition leaders, civil society groups, and international election observation missions to 
achieve regime change through winning relatively free and fair elections. When elections were 
‘stolen’, the united opposition and civil society organizations encouraged citizens to carry out 
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non-violent mass protests until the incumbents would resign.186 It was suggested to constitute a 
new ideal-type of a transition to democracy.187 The most recent attempts at regime change in the 
Arab world can be attributed to groups (2) and (3), depending on the violence involved and the 
role of the incumbent regime to cede power in each particular state. 
 There is much discussion on the most successful mode of transition. Some authors have 
claimed that in certain regions, in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa, revolutions might be 
necessary for regime change, as polarized positions of incumbent and opposition leaders make 
negotiations unlikely.188 Studies of transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Central 
and Eastern Europe have praised the model of negotiation, which has the advantage that it 
envisages a life for authoritarian rulers after regime change and therefore encourages their 
participation.189 Strong civil society organizations and civic engagement appears as important 
factors in various types of transitions.190 Most recently, academic scholarship has found strong 
evidence that the repeated holding of more or less competitive elections generates momentum 
for democratization, even if several subsequent elections remain flawed.191 There is increasing 
agreement though that transition by (military) imposition has strongly disqualified itself with the 
experiences in Iraq.192 Irrespective of the type of transition, during the transition phase many 
crucial institutional decisions on the basic rules and procedures of the new democratic system 
have to be taken, including on the executive system, the electoral system, the role of the judiciary 




A completed transition is not the endpoint of the democratization process. Not all institutional 
choices are made or changes are favoured, reforms of central institutions are ongoing, civil rights 
and liberties are not entirely guaranteed, and not all actors respect democratic rules. A transition 
has to be followed by a process of consolidation. As consolidation takes place in different partial 
regimes or sub-fields of democracy, like the civil society and the rule of law sectors,193 it can 
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proceed with different speeds in different subfields and therefore be completed in some and 
ongoing in others.  
The concept of consolidation has originally been understood as simply referring to the 
stability or survival of a newly established democratic system, that is, the “prevention of 
democratic breakdown”.194 However, such a meaning has eventually been considered too limited 
and not capturing the developments following a transition process. It has subsequently become 
widely conceptualized as the process during which, first, at the normative/belief level, all 
significant political actors, including the political and economic elite as well as civil society and 
the masses, begin to believe that democracy is the best form of government for their political 
community at that particular point of time, and secondly, at the behavioural level, the same actors 
start to voluntarily practice and behave according to the democratic norms and rules. The latter 
includes that the actors obey the constitution and mutually accepted norms of political conduct, 
accept the right of all parties to compete for power, do not seek to overthrow the regime, and do 
not use violence.195  
At the same time, the consolidation process must involve a further improvement of those 
elements of democracy that have not been entirely fulfilled yet, in particular as regards the respect 
for civil rights and liberties. The process will entail a whole range of reforms at various partial 
regime levels of democracy, including the development of the party system, of the electoral 
system, the legislature, the judicial system, state administration, the media, and civil society.  
 
On the whole, democratization or the process of regime change from one form of non-
democratic to a democratic regime, has been variously explained in the academic literature. 
Overall, two basic approaches are discernable in the study of the phenomenon. On the one hand, 
the structural approach focuses on long-term, structural factors that lie outside the political 
system and its actors. The most researched of these structural conditions is socio-economic 
development. While studies have come to different conclusions, many have asserted that socio-
economic development is not a precondition of democratization but nevertheless facilitates 
transitions to democracy and consolidation. Moreover, it is positively correlated to the presence 
and stability of democracy. On the other hand, the second basic so-called transition or genetic 
approach rather looks at the shorter-term process of regime change itself, focuses on actors, 
which it believes to play a central role, and their choices. It believes in crucial moments during 
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which specific choices can have great impact. This approach has differentiated three conceptually 
different and timely overlapping phases: liberalization, transition, and consolidation. While the 
first is characterized by an extension of civil rights and liberties but falls short of democratization, 
transition refers to the actual regime change, and consolidation to the process in which 
democracy becomes widely accepted and practiced (“the only game in town”).196 
 
4. Models of Democracy 
 
One of democracy’s main features is diversity. It has gone through various major 
‘transformations’ since the fifth century BC and has become widespread in various forms in 
different countries worldwide since the early-mid 20th century.197 At the same time, academic 
discourse on democracy has brought forward numerous different models, which describe, 
support, or challenge existing democratic systems or suggest new conceptions. All in all, 
democracy is today one of the most contested concepts in political theory.  
 Against the background of this diverse and disputed nature many authors in the field of 
democratic theory make the useful distinction between one overarching concept of democracy, 
about whose meaning there is in principle agreement, and several different conceptions or 
models thereof, like the elitist, pluralist, social democratic, and participatory model, which, while 
(in many cases) sharing certain ideas and features, involve contestable claims about how much 
democracy is desirable or practicable and how it might best be realized in sustainable institutional 
form.198 The basic concept and four specific models are discussed in turn.  
 Preliminary it should be explicitly stated that the discussion in this section relates to 
‘political democracy’, that is, it concerns the system of governance of the public arena of a state 
(the ‘political system’), rather than of the economy, society, or the private sphere. While models 
of democratic governance can also focus on these spheres and, as will be seen further below, 
social and participatory theory claim that they should, they are not of primary interest here.  
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a) The Concept of Democracy 
 
The basic concept of democracy can be understood as ‘rule by the people’, which is the 
translation of the Greek word ‘democratia’,199 or, more concretely and following Barry Holden, as 
“a political system in which the whole people, positively or negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic 
determining decisions on important matters of public policy”.200 Similarly, David Beetham suggests that a 
system is democratic “to the extent that it is subject to control by all members of the relevant 
association, or all those under its authority, considered as equals” and that the concept of 
democracy therefore consists of two core principles: ‘popular control’ and ‘political equality’.201  
 Lack of space does only allow a brief look at the main elements of the definition. The 
concept of democracy requires that the whole people, that is, all individuals or all members of an 
association do and are entitled to participate in decision making, rather than a single person or 
few persons due to birth, wealth, or education. Exceptions are only possible if limited, objectively 
applied, and justified, like for children. Unlike Holden, Beetham’s definition stresses the equal 
entitlements of all individuals (‘political equality’). Further, people are not only entitled to but 
should indeed make basic determining decisions and not be prevented from doing so by 
discouraging or coercive measures. The basic concept does not stipulate a duty to participate as 
some specific conceptions do in order to achieve some ideal form of democracy.202 Participation 
can be direct or indirect which means that individuals can either act themselves or through their 
representatives. Indirect participation through representation became accepted in the mid-18th 
century and made democratic rule possible in entities larger than city-states.203 The features of 
positive and negative involvement refer to the origination of policy, that is, whether people or their 
representatives initiate it. Finally, in a democracy people participate in basic determining decisions, 
which are decisions that actually determine courses of events and from which subsidiary 
decisions and actions flow.204 
 
b) Two Core Ideas of Liberal Democracy 
 
Democracy is today overwhelmingly understood as ‘liberal democracy’. In other words, if a 
system of government does not accept the two principal tenets of liberal democracy, hardly 
anybody would call it democracy. These two main ideas are ‘liberty’ and limited ‘government’.  
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The first core idea of liberal democracy has always been and still is concerned with the 
liberty of the individual. Individual liberty is the freedom of the individual with respect to his or 
her social, economic, and political environment. Some definitions also make reference to the 
concept of self-determination, meaning that the free individual is the one who determines his or 
her own actions.205 Liberal democracy requires several key liberties to exist, like the freedom of 
speech and of association, and requires the respect of certain freedoms in other fields, like the 
economic area, to function properly. The main theories underlying the idea of individual freedom 
are theories of individual rights, which, largely following John Locke, claim that all individuals 
have essential basic human qualities in common by virtue of which they have certain basic rights, 
including “a fundamental moral right to do as he or she wishes in certain areas of life”.206 
The second key idea of liberal democracy, limited government or limitations in the scope 
or locus of democracy, is a direct consequence of the first. If the individual should have a sphere 
of liberty and autonomy, the sphere in which the whole people and/or the government should be 
able to influence, determine or restrict his or her actions, even by democratic means, should be 
limited.207 The limited state is not only necessary for as much individual freedom as possible, but 
the sphere of freedom is also necessary for the functioning and persistence of the liberal 
democratic system. The main arguments are, first, that there need to be autonomous areas of 
will-formation, be it the private sphere, civil society or the economy, which are separate from the 
state and, secondly, that democracy needs a plurality of power centres to keep control of those in 
political power.208 Where precisely the limits between the autonomous sphere and legitimate 
democratic decision-making are, is, however, subject to considerable dispute. Writers on the 
political right draw the borders around democracy more restrictively. Writers on the political left, 
like ‘social liberals’, are much more willing to accept (democratic) interventions in freedoms, in 
particular in the economic sphere.209  
So far liberty and government have been treated as concepts that are in tension with each 
other, based on the idea that government is a threat to liberty and that liberty is best achieved in 
absence of any governmental constraints (so-called ‘negative liberty’). Such view is closely related 
to the Anglo-American tradition.210 There is, however, also a different view on government, 
linked to a different conception of liberty (so-called ‘positive liberty’), which underlies some 
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liberal theories with a ‘social’ focus.211 It allows qualifying latter theories as ‘liberal’ despite their 
greater acceptance of state intervention in autonomous spaces because it does not consider such 
intervention as an assault on liberty. Such a view does not see government as a threat but as an 
agent of the people and wants it to do something actively for them, like welfare measures, rather 
than simply staying apart. At the same time, such view stresses the participation of individuals in 
government as element of their liberty and self-determination. The concept of ‘positive liberty’ 
understands individual self-determination as ‘rational autonomy’, that is, individuals making 
reasoned decisions rather than reacting to the desires of the moment and accepts or even requires 
the state to provide ‘rational guidance’ to the individual.212 This conception is more typical of 
Continental European and, in particular, the French tradition and explains a greater acceptance of 
state interference in autonomous spheres in Europe than, for example, in the US. However, it 
needs to be stressed that also in this conception state interference or the scope of democracy has 
limits and liberal democracy’s key features of liberty and limited government remain valid, 
although they are differently defined and their borders are differently drawn. 
 
c) Essential Features of (Liberal) Democracy 
 
On the basis of the concept of democracy and the core ideas of liberal democracy, this section 
looks in more detail at the essential procedural and institutional features of democracy, that is, 
those features that must be present for a political system to be qualified as (liberal) democratic. In 
doing so it takes as basis Robert Dahl’s seven ‘minimum procedural conditions’ for ‘polyarchy’,213 
which have become widely accepted in the academic literature.214 In addition to these seven 
procedural conditions, a large majority of authors have also added the dimension of the rule of 
law as further essential element of democracy. 
 Importantly, while the presence of the seven minimum procedural conditions allows a 
country to be called democratic, a fully developed liberal democracy, which is usually implied 
when authors explicitly refer to ‘liberal democracy’, is expected to also protect and promote a 
whole range of further rights and liberties. In other word, while Dahl’s seven features of course 
relate to a liberal form of democracy, the qualification of a country as liberal democratic usually 
requires more than only meeting the seven minimum procedural conditions. The reason for this 
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expectation is linked to one of the core ideas of liberal democracy, that is, the extensive sphere of 
personal liberty. While no minimum or exhaustive catalogue of these further rights and liberties 
exists, it includes the rights enshrined in the ICCPR as well as, although more disputed, such 
enshrined in other human rights conventions, like the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Exemplary rights and liberties to be protected include the 
right to property, to choose employment, the freedom of residence, religious freedom, the 
freedom to enter a marriage, and minority rights.215 
 At this point, also the term ‘electoral democracy’, which has over the last two decades 
increasingly been used in academic writing, should be introduced. It is definitely one of the most 
prominent of all ‘democracies with adjectives’, which also include illiberal democracy, guided 
democracy, military-controlled democracy, oligarchic democracy, authoritarian democracy, 
defective democracy, and a nearly uncountable number of others.216 The terms refer to political 
systems or ‘hybrid regimes’ that show features of both a democracy and an authoritarian regime 
and populate a grey zone between the two forms of government. An electoral democracy is 
usually defined as a democracy in which the last national election or elections fulfilled several 
conditions of freedom and fairness, including the presence of a competitive multi-party system, 
universal suffrage, a secret ballot, the absence of massive voter fraud, results representing the 
public will, and significant public access of the major parties to the electorate through the media 
and open political campaigning.217 However, beyond free and fair elections, other basic rights and 
freedoms, including the core rights of freedom of expression, association, and assembly are 
overall not being guaranteed to a more than minimal extent and beyond the election period. The 
concept of electoral democracy and indeed all democracies with adjectives are problematic 
because they in fact fail to meet the minimum requirements of a democratic system as, for 
example, defined by Dahl, but use the designation ‘democracy’. It would be preferable to call 
such systems ‘electoral regimes’ rather than electoral democracies.  
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i. The Minimum Procedural Conditions of Democracy218 
 
Robert Dahl’s seven minimum ‘rights, institutions, processes’ that a system must meet in order to 
be qualified as democratic, are as follows:219  
 
1. Elected officials     5. Freedom of expression 
2. Free and fair elections     6. Alternative information 
3. Inclusive suffrage      7. Associational autonomy 
4. Right to run for office  
 
In the further discussion, the first four criteria, relating to elections, and the fifth and sixth, 
having particular relevance for independent media, should be treated together. 
 
Elections 
It has been mentioned that representation has, since the mid-18th century, been considered as 
legitimate and due to the size of democracies and modern life-patterns increasingly also as 
absolutely necessary feature of democracy.220 Among various possible forms of selecting 
representatives, like rotation or lot, elections have from the beginning on played a key role in 
modern liberal democracy and remain central today. Some liberal conceptions, like elitist 
democracy attribute them the most important role of all, while other models, like social and 
participatory democracy, are more critical about elections and suggest additional forms, in 
particular, direct forms of citizen participation, but in the majority of cases do not give up 
elections either.221 As mentioned in more detail in Chapter 2, this widespread support for 
elections also finds expression in their recognition in international human rights law with several 
international and regional documents, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), European Convention 
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on Human Rights (ECHR) and various OSCE documents explicitly referring to a ‘a right to vote’ 
as a key element of a ‘democratic’ system of government.222 
 Dahl’s four election-related criteria of democracy stress different features of elections. 
The first states in a more elaborate form that “control over government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in elected officials”.223 This is, on the one hand, a general statement about 
the instrument of elections in democracy but, on the other hand, also implies some more specific 
issues, which are in the literature often referred to as ‘decisiveness’ of elections.224 It demands that 
elected representatives (1) do in fact exercise governmental power, that is, that the winners of 
elections take office and are able to exercise their powers without overriding (usually informal) 
opposition from unelected groups (like the military), (2) exercise only those powers that are 
constitutionally foreseen, and (3) end their mandate as constitutionally prescribed.225 Dahl’s third 
and fourth criteria relate to equal and universal suffrage by demanding that basically all adults 
have the right to vote in the election of officials and have the right to run for elective offices. 
Finally, the elements of the criteria of ‘free and fair’ elections are more difficult to pin down, but 
they are broadly considered to involve the following. Elections have to be ‘frequent, regular or 
periodic’ and not single-time events. Only if actors, political and others, can be sure that 
competitive elections will continue to be held in the future, those losing elections will accept their 
outcome and wait for the next election to gain access to power instead of applying other 
means.226 Moreover, the intervals between elections should not be unduly long to ensure that 
those in power can still be considered to express the free will of the electors. The usual time 
between elections lies between 4-6 years.227 Further, elections have to be ‘genuine’, which implies 
that there should be a choice between at least two competing parties or candidates.228 They also 
need to be free and fair in a more literal sense, which implies that all participating parties and 
candidates should have the chance to lead their campaign in a free and equal manner and, voters 
                                                     
222 See, for example, H. J. Steiner, ‘Political Participation as Human Right’, 1 Harvard Human Rights Yearbook (1988), at 
77-134; T. M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’, 86 American Journal of International Law 1 
(January 1992), at 46-91; G. H. Fox, ‘The Right to Political Participation in International Law’, 17 Yale Journal of 
International Law 2 (1992), at 539-607; J. Crawford, Democracy in International Law (1993); G. H. Fox and B. R. Roth, 
Democratic Governance and International Law (2000); M. Nowak, ‘ARTICLE 25 Political Rights’, in M. Nowak, U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993), at 436. 
223 Dahl, at 221.  
224 G. O’Donnell, Democracy, Law and Comparative Politics, IDS Working Paper No. 118 (2000), at 12; Schmitter and 
Karl, at 81; Collier and Levitsky, at 443. Some of these authors have explicitly added the criteria of ‘decisive’ to 
Dahl’s list, rather than interpreting his first criteria in this way.  
225 See also: U. N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25: ‘The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, 
Voting Rights and the Right of Equal Access to Public Service (Art. 25)’, 12 July 1996, at para. 7.  
226 O’Donnell, at 14.  
227 U. N. Human Rights Committee, at para. 9.  
228 U. N. Human Rights Committee, in particular paragraphs 25 and 26. See also N. D. White, ‘The United Nations 
and Democracy Assistance: Developing Practice within a Constitutional Framework’, in P. Burnell (ed.), Democracy 




should be free in their choice and not be forced or coerced into certain behaviours.229 These latter 
criteria are guaranteed by the freedom of association and of speech, which are discussed in the 
next sections. 
 
The Freedom of Expression, the Right to Alternative Information and the Media 
The freedom of expression and right to alternative information have been essential foundations 
of democratic societies and systems of government since the late-18th century and are nowadays 
included in all major human rights documents.230 The freedom of expression gives citizens the 
right to express themselves on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, 
the government, the type of regime, the socio-economic order and the prevailing ideology, 
without the danger of severe punishment. The freedom to seek, receive and impart information 
provides that alternative sources of information exist and are protected by the law. The rights can 
only be restricted for certain specific reasons, like for the respect of the rights and reputations of 
others, which have, additionally, to be laid down by law.231  
Both rights are of essential importance in liberal democracy and provide the basis for 
meaningful political participation. They are not only relevant for individual and ordinary citizens, 
politicians, political parties or groups, but are also of particular relevance for the media, especially 
the mass media, which have during the 20th century become the principal means through which 
citizens, individually or organized in groups, and their elected representatives communicate to 
inform and influence each other (media as “the connective tissue of democracy”) and through 
which groups themselves communicate.232 While the media therefore provide the basis or means 
for communication, it is important to stress that they are more than simply neutral channels for 
the exchange of views, but that they are widely considered to have – at times even considerable – 
power in determining or influencing which issues and how these are discussed. They are usually 
considered as element of civil society, discussed shortly below. 
 The most significant functions of media in a democracy include the surveillance of the 
sociopolitical environment, that is, reporting developments likely to impinge positively or 
negatively on the welfare of citizens; providing meaningful agenda-setting through identifying the 
key issues of the day; acting as platforms for an intelligible and illuminating advocacy by 
politicians and spokespersons of other causes and interest groups; carrying out dialogue across a 
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diverse range of views, as well as between power holders (actual and prospective) and mass 
publics; providing mechanisms for holding officials to account for how they have exercised 
power; to provide incentives for citizens to learn, choose, and become involved in the political 
process.233  
 
The Freedom of Association: Political Parties and Civil Society 
Dahl’s criteria ‘associational autonomy’ refers to the right of citizens to form (relatively) 
independent associations or organizations and it is, like all before discussed rights, widely 
recognized in international human rights law.234 The groups most relevant for the present 
discussion and to be looked at in turn are independent political parties and civil society 
organizations. Political parties are not treated as part of civil society but as a separate group, in 
the literature often also referred to as ‘political society’, with the major differentiating 
characteristic between the two groups being parties’ direct involvement with state power and 
ambition to control or to manage it, while civil society remains apart.235 
Political parties are widely considered to be ‘indispensable’ elements in modern liberal 
democracy, although it has been suggested that civil society groups are increasingly playing the 
same roles as parties and thereby reducing the latter’s importance.236 Their four central functions 
are: (1) to structure the electoral process by nominating candidates for office and by offering 
citizens a choice between alternative sets of leaders; (2) to provide most citizens with a stable and 
distinctive set of ideas and goals (symbols) which anchor their expectations, orient them towards 
policy options and make them feel part of the process of collective choice; (3) once elected, they 
form the government and provide an internal structure to the legislative process; and (4) to 
aggregate the interest of citizens, channel their expectations through their internal processes and 
produce a programme that mixes public policies in such a way to satisfy the general demands of 
their constituents.237 
 Civil society has been variously defined, however, a definition such as Philippe C. 
Schmitter’s has achieved relatively broad acceptance.238 He defines it as “as set or system of self-
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organized intermediary groups” that are: (1) relatively independent from both public authorities 
and private units of production and reproduction, i.e. of firms and families (dual autonomy)239; 
(2) are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in defence/promotion of their 
interests or passions (collective action); (3) but do not seek to replace either state agents or 
private (re)producers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole (nun-
usurpation); (4) but do agree to act within pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ or legal nature 
(civility).240 This definition includes a vast array of groups, like trade unions, consumer and 
industrial organisations, lobbies, interest groups, pressure groups, civic organisations, voluntary 
associations, non-governmental organisations, non-profit groups, policy networks, developmental 
organisations, but also the independent media and the “broader field of autonomous cultural and 
intellectual activity: universities, think tanks, publishing houses, theatres, filmmakers, and artistic 
performances and networks” (i.e. “the ideological marketplace”).241 Excluded are groups that are 
not behaving ‘civilly’, like mafia-type organizations, guerrilla movements and reactionary religious 
organizations.242 Further, Schmitter’s definition excludes groups that are merely inward-looking 
and perform private ends, like sport clubs and religious groups. The importance of such groups 
in democracy has, however, been stressed by Putnam, who argues that also such groups build 
‘social capital’, that is, “the features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social 
trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit”.243 Problematic is the role of 
ascriptive organisations based on kinship, ethnicity, or locality as well as some religious 
organizations strongly involved in social activities, like Muslim neighbourhood-assistance groups, 
which might lack Schmitter’s requirement of autonomy and Diamond’s open and voluntary 
nature244, but are said to (potentially) play important roles in democratization processes and in 
democratic politics of (non-European) states and societies.245  
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 The idea of civil society as intermediate sphere between the private sphere (including 
individual and family-life, inward-looking group activity and economic activity) and the state 
considerably enlarges the role of citizens in liberal democracy beyond their participation in 
elections. First, it provides a framework for citizens to influence policy-making, either through 
initiation of new proposals or the modification of existing ones at any time of the legislative 
period. This function of civil society is particularly relevant for individuals and groups that feel 
not represented by political society or who feel that latter does not sufficiently take into account 
specific issues. At the same time, from the viewpoint of government, civil society provides 
authorities with some aggregated information about citizens’ and citizen group’s opinions and 
demands. Secondly, civil society allows for controlling and limiting state power at any time, rather 
than only holding officials accountable on election day, a function, which is mainly performed by 
and through independent media, but also by other civil society organizations.246 Next to these two 
central tasks, civil society has additional roles, including the stimulation of participation and 
awareness-raising of the meaning of ‘democratic citizenship’, which should reduce citizen’s 
alienation from the political system. Further, it can cross-cut and mitigate traditional cleavages, 
foster tolerance, moderation and willingness to compromise and provide a training ground for 
political leaders.247  
However, civil society has also been criticized for not giving equal chances to everyone 
and for favouring the educated and wealthy, which usually already have connections to the 
political establishment.248 Further, it was suggested that a strong civil society can make the 
formation of majorities more difficult, lengthy, and precarious, thereby lowering the legitimacy of 
the democratic government and possibly leading to compromises that no one wants and can 
identify with.249 Excessively strong civil societies have been considered especially problematic in 
new democracies, where democratic states and governments are still relatively weak and where 
civil societies may not yet have accepted to cooperate with the state, but continue to see their role 
in opposition to it.250  
 On the whole, the respect of the various rights that underlie Dahl’s seven minimum 
procedural conditions and the resulting institutions, organizations and procedures give rise to a 
political system that can be called democratic. As indicated, for a full liberal democracy, this 
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system must also respect and promote an (albeit not precisely defined) range of other rights. For 
some kind of mid-range definition of democracy, many authors have added the rule of law as 
further feature to Dahl’s seven procedural minimum conditions.  
 
ii. An Additional Element: The Rule of Law 
 
The concept of the rule of law features in many conceptions of liberal democracy and sometimes 
it is even attributed such a key position that it is called democracy’s ‘crowning glory’.251 However, 
as with most concepts discussed in this Chapter, there is no single and widely accepted definition 
and the rule of law has been conceptualized in many different ways.252 While various 
categorizations of the different understandings of the rule of law have been suggested,253 here a 
distinction should be made between a basic, limited conception, a broader so-called formal 
conception, and a third so-called material or substantive conception, which together – in view of 
many authors – constitute the rule of law in a liberal democracy.254  
 In the narrowest understanding, the rule of law is made up of several precepts and 
principles that relate to the ordinary working of a legal system. Jeremy Waldron speaks of a 
“laundry list of features that a healthy legal system should have” and cites Lon Fuller’s eight 
desiderata of ‘internal morality of law’, which have achieved broad agreement.255 Laws should be 
(1) general, (2) publicly promulgated, (3) prospective, (4) intelligible, (5) consistent, (6) 
practicable, (7) not too frequently changeable, and (8) actually congruent with the behaviour of 
the officials of a regime.256 Some authors have summarized these or similar lists in statements like 
“the law should be capable of providing effective guidance” and “people should be ruled by the 
law and obey it”.257 Others stress the “supremacy of legal authority”, meaning that law should 
rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens” (‘Legalitätsprinzip’).258 Existence of 
the eight criteria will allow the rule of law to fulfill three of its central purposes: to protect against 
anarchy, to allow people to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can know in 
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advance the legal consequences of various actions, and to guarantee against at least some types of 
official arbitrariness.259 All eight criteria are expected to prevail in a liberal democratic system. 
However, rule of law can also be found in authoritarian regimes and some features of ‘socialist 
legality’ are congruent with rule of law accounts.260  
Rule of law in liberal democracy is therefore usually considered in broader, more 
fundamental terms and identified with a ‘specific ideal of justice’ and specific institutional 
arrangements (the formal conception of the rule of law).261 These additional features equally serve 
the three central purposes of the rule of law, in particular to control official arbitrariness.262 First, 
a key role is attributed to an independent and impartial judicial system, which should uphold 
individual rights. The existence of certain procedural rights, like the right to judicial remedies, a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, the presumption of 
innocence, and equality of all persons before the courts, play a particularly important role in this 
respect.263 Secondly, rule of law is closely linked with the doctrine of separation of powers, which 
should ensure horizontal accountability.264 Laws need to be created by the legitimate law-making 
institutions, i.e. an elected legislature, whose members should be bound by the laws like any other 
member of society.265 Should the executive be engaged in some kind of regulatory, norm-creating 
activity, it is important that it is based on clear legislative empowerment so that “executive 
regulation remains firmly imbedded in the overall regulation of the legislative function”.266 The 
parliament is expected to permanently question the government and to hold it accountable. 
Additionally, the judiciary controls the parliament and the government as to whether they are 
exceeding their mandates or violate established rules and judicial review lodged in a high court 
requires politicians “to step back into the constitutional box that defines the legitimate 
boundaries of the system”.267 Because judges are not democratically elected but appointed, 
judicial review creates the so-called “countermajoritarian difficulty”: courts interfering with the 
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popular will, which could be interpreted as ‘rule of men’ instead of rule of law.268 The rationale 
for giving judges this power is that, because they are politically insulated, they are in the best 
position to protect the survival of the democratic system. Moreover, judges are themselves 
constrained by rules, constitutional rules, which limits their competences and activities.269 
The substantive conception of the rule of law adds, as the term indicates, a substantive or 
material dimension to the formal and organizational elements of the rule of law. Some of these 
formal elements already implied substantive features, like the procedural rights of individuals as 
part of a functioning judicial system and political rights as part of the division of power. The 
substantive conception of the rule of law adds, however, a broader range of fundamental or 
human rights for individuals to these few ones, which should be respected in law-making and 
implementation and be ensured by the judicial system. It is widely accepted that civil and political 
rights are encompassed by such conception. It is more disputed to which extent other categories 
or rights, in particular social rights, also pertain to it.270 
The idea of constitutionalism is closely linked to the idea of the rule of law and has been 
termed its “primary organizing principle”.271 Frequently the two notions are even used 
interchangeably. Constitutionalism requires that the exercise of political power in a state shall be 
exercised in accordance with and through a general system of principles, rules and procedures, 
including procedures for amending any of these.272 In the broader sense, the constitution is the 
system of laws, rules, norms, conventions and procedures which govern the actions of all those 
subject to it.273 The ‘constitution’ in the narrow sense is the cluster of supreme or ‘essential’ 
principles, rules and procedures to which other laws, institutions and governing authorities are 
subjected to. It is a “code of rules, which aspires to regulate the allocation of functions, powers 
and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and define the relationship 
between these and the public”.274  
 On the whole, the concept of the rule of law is frequently mentioned as further essential 
element of democracy. Depending on its conceptualization, it enlarges the concept of democracy 
to a smaller or larger degree, by the requirement that law regulates the actions of officials and 
people, that there is the division of powers and the existence of an independent judicial system, 
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or even that individuals are endowed with a whole range of civil and political and even social, 
economic, and cultural rights. 
 
d) Various Models of Democracy  
 
Based on the outline of the essential procedural and institutional elements of democracy and the 
rule of law, the following sub-sections concentrate on four more specific models of democracy 
that either stress individual elements thereof (elitist and pluralist models) or add additional 
features and extent its scope beyond the political system (social and participatory democracy). 
The latter two models are, moreover, not satisfied with a procedurally focused definition of 
democracy, but stress the need to include a substantive dimension.275 The models are, of course, 
just a few of a much higher number of different conceptions of democracy discussed in the 
academic literature, which can, due to lack of space, not be presented in more detail.276 The four 
models have been chosen in view of the analysis and characterization of EU democracy 
assistance, which at first sight appears to correspond to one or more of them.  
 
i. The Elitist Model of (Liberal) Democracy 
 
Elitist theories of democracy, different variations of which are in the literature also called 
‘competitive elitism’, ‘economic theory of democracy’, ‘leadership democracy’, and ‘plebiscitary 
leadership democracy’, have first emerged and become popular in the early-mid 20th century, but 
have important defenders also today.277 They have slightly evolved over time and modified some 
of their assertions, however, have retained their key claims.  
 The central feature of elitist theories is the focus on elections and politicians. The most 
famous and still most quoted definition of elitist democracy is by Joseph Schumpeter who, 
although not having ‘invented’ the elitist model, has made it popular.278 He has suggested that 
“the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s 
vote”.279 Democratic life is therefore “the struggle between rival political leaders, arrayed in 
parties, for the mandate to rule”, while the citizens’ role is “periodically to choose and authorize 
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governments to act on their behalf”.280 Adam Przeworski has more explicitly referred to the role 
of political parties and defined democracy as “a system in which parties loose elections. There are 
parties: divisions of interests, values, and opinions. There is competition, organized by rules. And 
there are periodic winners and losers”.281 All in all, in elitist theory the competition or 
contestation for votes is considered the crucial and sufficiently defining feature of democracy, 
which explains democracy’s central dynamic that provides the basis for everything else.282 In 
particular, there is no or little space for the actions of citizens beyond voting for their 
representatives on election day and the presence and active role of organized civil society as 
policy-input provider and watch-dog is disregarded.283 Indeed, while newer elitist models are less 
pronounced about it, Schumpeter openly stated that the average citizens’ role should be restricted 
to casting a ballot.284 
 Defenders of elitist democracy claim that their model best describes how actually existing 
Western liberal democracies function.285 In particular, it stresses the crucial role of political 
leadership, that is, of professional politicians and political parties, while showing the lack of 
interest and participation of ordinary citizens beyond election day, when they, moreover, make 
only very broad policy choices or choices for personalities rather than policies.286 Critics have in 
particular focused on the reduced role accorded to citizens and civil society in elitist models and 
argued that in reality people are more interested, capable, and active than assumed by elitist 
conceptions. Moreover, lack of interest and participation was blamed on social and political 
structures that did not provide the basis for participation. Some critics have even questioned 
whether elitist theories can be called liberal democratic, as they refute several of liberalism’s key 
tenets, like that of the rationally minded citizen able to decide by himself what is best in her or his 
interest.287 However, except for some highly technocratic versions, most theories are considered 
to remain within the liberal democratic scope, as citizens can hold elites accountable on election 
day and as elites are open and in principle everybody can become part of it.288 
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ii. The Pluralist Model of (Liberal) Democracy 
 
The (classic) pluralist model of democracy emerged and was extremely popular in the 1950s and 
1960s, after which heavy criticism from various sides basically led to its dissolution into various 
competing schools. Since the mid 1980s a so-called ‘neo-pluralist school’ has crystallized, in 
particular in the writings of Robert Dahl, which maintains many of its forerunner’s central tenets, 
while at the same time responding to critique.289 Much of pluralist theory was based on studying 
the US system of democracy, however, several authors also developed their theories by analyzing 
European, including continental, states.290 
 The core feature of the pluralist (and neo-pluralist) model of democracy is the recognition 
of the plural or heterogeneous character of society, the economic sphere, and the state and of the 
dispersion or diffusion of power among a multiplicity of groups or poles.291 The key focus is on 
the intermediate sphere between individuals and the state, which consists of a whole range of 
different ‘pressure’ or ‘interest groups’, or ‘groups’ more generally, like trade unions, business 
organizations, community organizations, religious bodies, non–governmental organizations, and 
lobbies – most of which would today be comprised by civil society.292 Further, also the state and 
its various institutions are considered to consist of divers, ‘plural’ centres that defend their, at 
times conflicting, interests and pursue different aims.293 Also political elites are groups competing 
for influence, and, if winning an election, are leading groups that are in a more powerful position 
than the others, however, in their execution of power restrained by the preferences of the 
latter.294 The pluralist model retains elections and the competitive party system as an element of 
democracy, but attributes them a much less important role than in elitist democracy.  
 According to the pluralist model, all or at least most citizens are members of one or, 
indeed, more of these groups and all groups have, albeit different, resources or powers to pursue 
and advocate for their interests through different means. Accordingly, democracy is an endless 
process of conflict, competition, discussion, bargaining and compromising between these 
multiple and diverse collective actors, in which the government is trying to mediate and 
adjudicate between the competing demands to arrive at political decisions that are most 
acceptable to many or most of these groups, although by no means are all interests likely to be 
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satisfied fully.295 Elections form part of the system, but are just one of the many channels through 
which citizens express preferences.296 
 While pluralist theory was lauded for correcting the ‘one-sided’ approach of elitist 
approaches and for showing the complex context in which policies are made, it was, in particular, 
criticized for its (mis)conception of power and power relations and the role of the state in dealing 
with these.297 Critics argued that individuals and groups were highly unequal in their powers and 
that there was no guarantee that all, or even most, were able to make their views heard, 
participate in discussion and, importantly, in setting agendas.298 Neopluralists give more attention 
to these difficulties, but still claim that the essence of democracy is “a variety of pressure groups, 
an ever-shifting set of demands and an ultimately indeterminate array of political possibilities”, 
generated by liberal democracy itself and that, next to competitive political parties and an open 
electoral sphere “vigilant pressure groups can achieve…a degree of political accountability” that 
only liberal democracy can achieve.299 
 
iii. The Model of Social Democracy 
 
Social democracy is difficult to conceptualize. It has always been strongly determined by the 
diverse and frequently changing programmes and activities of social democratic parties whose 
political involvement has given rise to various social democratic systems and whose major policy 
shift has been the increasing distancing from socialism and (conditional) acceptance of the 
neo(liberal) economic order in the late 20th century.300 At the same time, some originally social 
democratic ideas, like welfare, have become universalized and so deeply rooted in Western states 
that they are no longer associated with social democratic politics only.  
Two basic principles appear to underlie social democracy. First, social democracy has 
always accepted liberal democracy, shared most of its key values, and worked within its 
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parameters. In particular, it wanted social democratic parties to compete in electoral competition 
for governmental office to implement policies. While it originally stressed strong institutions and 
bureaucracy, it has more recently shifted to ‘less state’ and more pluralistic and participatory 
forms of democratic processes, even if trade unions always played a key role.301 Secondly, 
extending beyond the basic liberal model, social democracy aims at achieving a high degree of 
social and economic equality. It does so because of a normative claim that each individual should 
receive an equitable part of social resources302 and because it considers socio-economic equality 
to be a pre-condition for the realization of political equality. The underlying argument is that high 
degrees of socio-economic inequalities can render political equality meaningless and thereby fail 
democracy.303 While liberal democracy is therefore in principle accepted, it is not considered to be 
‘full’ or ‘real’ democracy, but needs to be enriched by a socio-economic equality agenda, not least 
to ensure its own realization and survival.  
The main tool employed to achieve socio-economic equality is intervention in and 
regulation of the (capitalist, free market) economic and social system, through compensatory 
and/or countervailing measures and through social policies.304 While the preference for the so-
called ‘mixed economy’, which results from the just referred to measures, is not unique to social 
democracy, there is a more principled commitment to intervention as well as the acceptance of 
more intrusive forms of intervention.305 In many states social policies are based on a list of 
individual social rights, like the right to work, to fair remuneration, to social security, or a general 
social clause in the constitution of a state.306 Social rights and their justiciability strongly differ 
from state to state albeit with many states and courts still treating them as principles of a 
programmatic nature than subjective rights that individual can enforce in courts.307 
 The democratic regulation of the social and economic sphere overlaps with, or 
can also be referred to as social democracy’s commitment to the ‘welfare state’.308 Despite the 
historical link between social democracy and welfare policies, the latter are no longer the domain 
of social democratic parties only, as the welfare system has become deeply rooted in many 
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states.309 It is therefore difficult to consider welfare policies as an element only of social 
democracy. At the same time, the welfare state advocated by social democracy is characterized by 
a very strong and principled commitment to the welfare state. It considers the rise in public 
welfare as a primary responsibility of the state, advocates welfare for all citizens and not only for 
the poor, and accepts more deep-going intrusions into the economic system.310 
 
iv. The Model of Participatory Democracy 
 
The scope of forms and theories of ‘participatory democracy’ that have emerged since the 1960s, 
when they first appeared amidst political upheavals and student protests, is very broad.311 It 
ranges from versions which define participatory democracy as some (increased) civil society 
involvement within the current Western liberal model, to such which, like proponents of 
‘expansive democracy’, envisage the introduction of participatory modes of governance in all 
possible spheres of life, including the family, churches, and prisons, or aspire to an all-
encompassing ‘democratization process’, total ‘politicization’ and therefore entire reform of 
liberal, representative democracy.312 The focus here is on ‘moderate’ versions that lie somewhere 
between these two approaches, which, while quite ardently criticizing many aspects of liberal 
democracy, do not give up on it completely but retain several of its key features and, like social 
democracy, build on them to achieve a more complete and ‘substantive’ form of democracy.313 
Participatory theories share social democracy’s concern for socio-economic equality, but 
concentrate more on ‘modes of participation’ by individuals and groups rather than social and 
welfare policies.  
 The starting point of participatory democracy is a deep criticism of actually existing liberal 
democracies’ failure to achieve real (political and socio-economic) equality and liberty for the 
majority of citizens. First, the capitalist system, which produces a privileged class, and societal 
differences rooted in class, colour, education, sex, etc., leads to a situation in which some have 
more political power than others (political inequality). Failure to take these socio-economic 
difference and resulting inequalities into account has led to their perpetuation in liberal 
democratic system and even worsening of the situation of the underprivileged, who feel 
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increasingly estranged. Secondly, there is not real liberty due to the lack of participation of 
underprivileged and, at a more general level, due to the limitation of democracy to the political 
system rather than also, for example, at the workplace.314 
The participatory model’s key to ‘real’ democracy is more widespread, active and direct 
participation of all citizens in a more broadly defined political process, the society and the 
economy. Active politics is not seen as the domain of government (as in elitist models) or of 
interest groups and their leaders (as in pluralist models) but of each citizen: everybody is foreseen 
to participate actively and permanently and not just to cast her or his vote on election day and 
everybody is considered to be capable of doing so.315 All in all, liberal institutions, like parties and 
elections are retained, but conceptualized differently. In particular, representatives are seen as real 
agents or delegates, just acting upon the preferences of those who appointed them, rather than as 
leading figures.316 Further, institutions have to be more open, accessible, and transparent, and 
organizations, like parties and NGOs, be themselves democratized. Participatory theory also 
envisages more civil society activity, as well as self-government and decentralization.317 
More participation is not just envisaged in a more strictly defined political space, but also 
in fields like the education system, the media, churches, etc., as well as, the workplace. Different 
models of ‘workplace’, ‘economic’, or ‘industrial democracy’ have been put forward, ranging from 
limited workers’ involvement in privately owned firms to forms of collective ownership.  
Strong participation and, as part of it, deliberation and discussion, is expected to lead to 
better policies and higher legitimacy of the regime and government. The major point of critique 
of participatory models relates to too positive assumptions of the willingness of citizens to 
participate in a highly engaging political, social, and economic system.318 
 
e) Democracy and Related Concepts: Human Rights and Good Governance 
 
This last section on democracy aims to briefly clarifying democracy’s relation with two other 
concepts that are frequently linked with it in the academic literature and the practice of donors: 
human rights and good governance or democratic governance.  
 Democracy and human rights are different concepts, as the first relates to a form of 
government and the second to individual entitlements of human being. At the same time, there is 
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a basic and intrinsic relationship between the two.319 Each of Dahl’s seven minimum procedural 
conditions of democracy can be and has above been formulated as civil or political right that is 
mentioned in the major international and regional human rights instruments, in particular the 
ICCPR and ECHR. Further, also the concept of the rule of law encompasses human rights, in 
particular if conceptualized in a broad, substantive way. Finally, it has been mentioned that a full 
liberal democracy is expected to promote and protect a considerable array of other human rights 
than just the essential minimum conditions. On the whole, if the political right to vote and the 
core civil rights of freedom of association, assembly, and expression are guaranteed and acted 
upon, and a judicial system is in place that enforces these rights, they together necessarily give rise 
to a democratic system of governance. If, in addition, other human rights are being respected and 
promoted, one can speak of a liberal democracy.  
 The relationship is more complex as regard social and economic rights. They are usually 
not part of essential minimum conditions of democracy and also not necessarily among those 
rights that a system needs to respect in order to qualify as full liberal democracy. At the same 
time, there is an important line of literature that stresses the need of a certain degree of socio-
economic equality in order for a democracy to function properly and to sustain.320 If somebody 
has no home, sufficient food, and is illiterate, that is, when some basic needs are not met, he or 
she lacks the necessary conditions to participate politically and, due to a feeling of being 
abandoned and excluded, also lacks the willingness to for doing so.321 As indicated above, social 
and participatory models of democracy refer to this relationship between the socio-economic and 
political dimension and demand democracy to aspire socio-economic equality in order to ensure 
political equality. Social rights appear as one possible remedy to achieve a higher level of socio-
economic equality, as they oblige governments to pursue policies that pursue that goal. This way, 
social rights are supporting rather than core rights of a democratic system of government.  
 Next to democracy and human rights promotion, since the late 1980s also the sector 
good governance has increasingly been endowed with larger aid budgets. It was made popular by 
the World Bank’s identification in 1989 of ‘poor governance’ as one reason for the failure of 
development programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa and the concurrent suggestion to engage more 
strongly in promoting ‘good governance’.322 The focus on governance was not entirely new, 
however, earlier efforts in the sector were thematically more limited and largely concentrated on 
public administration reform. The Bank’s report marked the start of a broader focus. 
                                                     
319 Beetham, at 92.  
320 Holden, at 28f; Fabre, at 121f. 
321 Fabre, at 120-8, for a detailed discussion of the arguments and counter-arguments.  




While it is accepted that governance refers to the body of rules, institutions, and 
traditions with which power is exercised and used to devise and implement policies, there is 
disagreement on which sectors should be covered by a good governance agenda and what exactly 
constitutes ‘good’ governance. While it is beyond this section to discuss ‘good’ governance in 
detail, the following five dimensions and their substantive features frequently feature in 
conceptions: (1) voice and accountability, which basically relates to Dahl’s seven minimum 
procedural conditions of democracy; (2) political stability and lack of violence, which requires the 
absence of political and social tensions and unrest and the stability of government; (3) 
government effectiveness, which requires stable, predictable, and efficient governmental actions, 
decisions and administrations; (4) minor regulatory burden for business; (5) the rule of law; and 
(6) lows levels of corruption.323 Some major actors in international development, like the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), prefer the use of the term ‘democratic governance’, 
however, by and large cover the same fields of engagement and efforts.324 The enumeration 
shows that good governance is frequently so broadly defined that it encompasses democracy. 
Often, however, the two concepts are presented as opposing concepts with good governance 
only referring to those elements of the above enumeration that are not democracy, that is, 




Chapter 1 has introduced core definitions, concepts, and conceptions that are relevant for the 
study of democracy assistance. First, it has presented Schmitter and Brouwer’s definition of 
democracy assistance that refers to “all programmes and projects which are openly adopted, supported 
and/or (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors, mainly take place in target 
countries, in principle with the consent or toleration of these countries’ authorities, and are explicitly designed to 
directly contribute to the liberalization, democratization or consolidation of democracy of the target country”.325 
The definition captures the essential features of the phenomenon while overall not prescribing 
concepts of democracy, democratization and assistance, except for working within the liberal 
model of democracy broadly defined and requiring a direct rather than an indirect impact on 
democratization and therefore excluding socio-economic assistance. The discussion of the 
definition has outlined that the core idea of democracy assistance is to directly support domestic 
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political reform processes through an open knowledge, expertise and information transfer or 
spread that takes place in a direct relationship with local actors, institutions, and processes within 
the target state. It therefore in principle requires the consent or toleration by the targets states’ 
authorities. Exceptionally, assistance is provided outside the target state (external democracy 
assistance) and/or against the consent of the government, but then potentially less effective.  
 Secondly, Chapter 1 has introduced the international dimension of democratization, 
which broadly refers to all actors, influences, and activities that originate or are located outside a 
country’s borders and have some relevance for a domestic democratization process.326 This 
dimension has become increasingly important since the start of the third wave of democracy and 
also increasingly more researched. Next to unintentionally influencing democratization processes 
in third states (or playing a kind of model role), the numerous diverse actors employ a whole 
range of tools or instruments to intentionally facilitate democratic development. The tools can be 
of a coercive nature, like military intervention, can use political conditionality positively or 
negatively, like EU membership conditionality or the suspension of aid, or can be positive, like in 
the case of democracy assistance and dialogues. Democracy promoters on the whole prefer using 
positive tools as well as positive and incentive conditionality, which have several advantages, 
including its open and consensual nature and the direct engagement with the democratizing 
institutions and society.  
 Thirdly, the Chapter has briefly introduced two major approaches in the study of 
democratization: the structural and the genetic approach. The structural approach focuses on 
structural factors that lie outside the political system, in particular on socio-economic 
development, and analyzes their long-term influence on democratization. The transition or 
genetic approach focuses on the shorter-term process of regime change itself and on the role of 
actors and their choices, which are considered crucial for democratization. It is this approach that 
uses the three, conceptually different but timely (potentially) overlapping phases: political 
liberalization, transition, and consolidation. The first is characterized by an extension of civil 
rights and liberties but falls short of democratization, transition refers to the actual regime 
change, and consolidation to the process in which democracy becomes widely accepted and 
practiced (“the only game in town”).327 
 Finally, Chapter 1 has introduced the concept of democracy, key ideas of and tensions 
within liberal democracy, and different models or conceptions of democracy of the 20th and 21st 
centuries. The concept of democracy was defined, following Holden, as “a political system in 
which the whole people, positively or negatively, make, and are entitled to make, the basic 
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determining decisions on important matters of public policy”.328 Beetham spoke of a system in 
which there is ‘political equality’ and ‘popular control’.329 There is nowadays much agreement that 
democracy must be liberal democracy, the core ideas of which are liberty and limited 
government. According to Dahl, democracy consists of the following seven essential ‘rights, 
institutions, processes’: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to run for 
office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy.330 
Additionally, many authors add the rule of law – variously defined – as further defining feature of 
democracy.  
 Different, more specific models or conceptions make different claims on how much 
democracy is desirable, practicable and how it can and should be realized. The model of elitist 
democracy stresses the electoral process and argues that competition and contestation for votes is 
democracy’s central dynamic and key defining feature. It attributes a central role to the political 
elites and hardly any role to ordinary citizens except as voters. Differently, pluralists stress the 
plural character of society, the state and the economic sphere, each of which is constituted by 
numerous ‘(pressure) groups’, constituted by individual citizens in various capacities. While 
representative institutions play a role as mediator and final decision-makers, democracy is mainly 
explained as an endless process of interaction, discussion, competition, bargaining and 
compromise between the numerous, diverse and/or overlapping collective actors. Social 
democracy and participatory democracy are putting a stronger focus on questions of socio-
economic equality, not least that of achieving political equality and liberty. Social democracy 
works within the institutions and processes of the basic liberal model but additionally stresses the 
need for a whole range of social and economic policies, frequently, but not only, based on 
constitutionally guaranteed social rights. Participatory democracy, highly critical of but retaining 
liberal democracy, envisages a high degree of direct participation by ordinary citizens in a broader 
range of fields, including the political, social and economic sphere.  
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Chapter 2 focuses on several basic issues and questions regarding democracy assistance in the 
international context that appear particularly relevant, especially in view of the more specific 
analysis of EU democracy assistance in Part II of this thesis. It aims at providing a short 
introduction to each of these selected topics as well as a brief overview of the academic and 
policy-related literature. 
 Chapter 2 is articulated in six parts. It first provides an overview of the evolution of 
democracy assistance in international context, starting with early 20th century ‘Wilsonianism’ and 
concluding with the backlash against democracy assistance by authoritarian rulers as well as 
continuing interest in the tool by Western donors in the 21st century. The chapter then discusses 
the features and pros and cons of the two major approaches used in democracy assistance as 
identified by Thomas Carothers. Thirdly, Chapter 2 identifies the various underlying motivations 
of actors to promote (and therefore also to assist) democracy abroad. Importantly, this section 
does not discuss the preference for assistance as compared to other instruments, but the rationale 
that underlies all types of democracy promotion. This discussion of the motivations is followed 
by a brief introduction to the questions of legality and legitimacy of democracy assistance. Fifthly, 
Chapter 2 asks the question whether democracy assistance is an effective tool of democracy 
promotion. Finally, Chapter 2 provides some quantitative data on how much the major 
international donors have over the last decade spent for democracy support programmes and 
projects.  
 
II. Introducing Basic Issues on Democracy Assistance 
 
1. The International Evolution of Democracy Assistance 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the emergence and evolution of democracy assistance 
worldwide. It presents the major steps, actors, and factors that have been relevant in the 




from the evolution of the broader domain of democracy promotion, the discussion at times also 
sheds light on major steps in the development of this policy dimension.  
 
a) The Early 20th Century: ‘Wilsonianism’ 
 
As other sections of this overview also show, the US has frequently stood out as the key actor in 
the development of democracy promotion and assistance. The first examples of Western 
engagement to promote democratization mentioned in the literature are US involvement in Cuba 
and the Philippines after the Spanish-American war (1895-98), and in Puerto Rico after 1898.331 
Many authors particularly stress the defining role of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921) 
though, who justified several military interventions in Central America as part of an effort to 
bring democracy to that region, in 1917 declared war on Germany to “make the world safe for 
democracy”, and advocated for a post World War I European order of democratically constituted 
and nationally ‘self-determining’ states.332 His idea of ‘liberal democratic internationalism’ or 
‘Wilsonianism’,333 based on earlier US ideas of some form of ‘democratic peace theory’ and moral 
duty, as one of the first free states and democracies, to bring freedom in the form of liberal 
constitutionalism to the world,334 appears as key explanatory factor for many US democracy 
promotion activities until today.335  
Many of the early examples of democracy promotion involved military action. However, 
other tools were also employed, like election-monitoring operations and forms of democracy 
assistance, for example the provision of electoral advice in Central America. After World War II, 
US democracy assistance also included constitutional advice and civic education, in particular in 
Germany and Japan.336 All in all, while all these are important early examples of the use of 
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democracy promotion tools, in particular of assistance, they were rather exceptional and not part 
of a broader, long-term policy.  
 
b) The 1950s and 1960s: Colonialism, Decolonization, and Development Policies 
 
Some forms of colonial rule, the decolonization process, and early development policies included 
elements of democracy promotion and assistance without, however, giving rise to comprehensive 
democracy promotion policies in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Most notable of all is British colonial rule, which involved the ‘institutional transfer’ of 
the Westminster political and administrative system to the colonial domain, and the training of 
civil servants and other elites.337 Despite the strong features (and despite the critique) of being 
‘imposition’ rather than assistance to some locally driven democratization processes, this transfer 
of models and training has widely been identified as a key explanatory factor for the more 
successful and lasting democratization of former British colonies, like India, than of countries 
under domination by other powers.338  
Secondly, the decolonization process and the implementation of the principle of – and 
later the right to – self-determination mandated several Western states and the UN to promote 
democratization in colonies and trust-territories gaining independence, but without the UN 
Charter providing for specific policy-instruments.339 Subsequently implemented activities related 
mainly to the organization of referenda and first elections, in some cases also to the writing of 
constitutions, and remained therefore within the scope of known examples. All in all, the efforts 
of Western governments usually ended shortly after the respective territories had gained 
independence and were furthermore also largely unsuccessful.340 Nevertheless, the UN’s 
involvement in pre-independence referenda and elections constitutes the direct forerunner of 
today’s election monitoring missions to independent states, which started with the mission to 
Nicaragua in 1990.341 Moreover, in the mid-1960s the UN Security Council also first turned to 
mandatory sanctions as a tool for ensuring equal political participation, along with other goals.342 
Finally, during a brief period in the 1960s the then new field of development policy 
included the explicit goal of political development and provided for some ‘political assistance’ 
projects, as they were called at the time. This especially relates to the US and its policies in Latin 
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America, of which J. F. Kennedy’s ‘Alliance for Progress’ and ‘law and development’ 
programmes are the most known examples.343 While also some European donors’ development 
agendas included, albeit not very explicitly, the objective of political development, European 
policies basically focussed exclusively on socio-economic aid.344 The exceptional American focus 
can partly be explained by Wilsonianism and partly by the idea that political (liberal democratic) 
development was inherently linked to and indeed a condition of (capitalist) economic 
development – a view that would in the late 1980s resurface as a highly influential factor for the 
development of democracy promotion/assistance. It had few adherents then, though, and 
political projects were but for few exceptions abandoned in the late 1960s.345  
It also needs to be mentioned that during the 1960s the US was, in particular through the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in numerous countries secretly engaged in assisting certain 
political parties, swaying elections or otherwise influencing political outcomes – in particular to 
prevent the spread of communism rather than to build liberal democracy – much of which 
stopped after becoming public and strongly criticized in the late 1960s and early 1970s.346 
Three major factors prevented the widespread emergence of democracy promotion and 
assistance in the 1950s and 1960s. First, despite some interest in the political domain as part of 
socio-economic development assistance, the then prevailing approach to democratization was 
based on the modernization theory. As mentioned, it claimed that democracy was the final stage 
of a process of socio-economic development, was impossible in contexts of underdevelopment, 
but would also necessarily follow socio-economic development.347 The right strategy was 
therefore to focus on the socio-economic domain and to wait.  
Secondly, there was opposition from the newly independent, developing states. They 
argued that Western states were continuing with some form of neo-colonialism and refuted 
relevant human rights and democracy-related concerns and activities as illegal interference in their 
domestic domain.348 At that time, they had the necessary political and economic power for doing 
so. Western states relied on the raw materials of newly independent states and, given the East-
West confrontation, former colonies could play out one superpower and its allies against the 
other. Further, liberal democracies were, with only about 36 democracies existing in 1962, far 
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from being the prevailing type of political regime and did therefore not have the weight they 
acquired in the early 1990s to pose demands.349 
Thirdly, the Cold War influenced Western states’ policies. As regards right-wing 
dictatorships, Western states considered their overall security usually better served by keeping 
good political, military and economic relations rather than alienating these regimes by imposing 
political demands, thereby playing into the hands of the Soviet Union (SU) or even triggering the 
latter’s reactions.350 Additionally, in many cases containing communism rather than building 
liberal democracy appeared as the dominating policy-goal, with, in particular the US, supporting 
right-wing governments in their suppression of left-wing opposition groups, whose political 
programmes risked giving rise to regimes too far to the left of US liberalist ideas.351 As regards 
communist states, in particular those in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Western democracy 
promotion activities were clearly excluded by the fear of Soviet involvement, especially after 
events in Hungary in 1956 and, later, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, proved Soviet control of satellite 
states and its willingness to respond to attempts of replacing socialism by capitalism in those as 
well as other countries (‘Brezhnev doctrine’).352  
On the whole, despite various experiences with democracy promotion and assistance 
within the framework of decolonization and development policies in the 1950s and 1960s, these 
did not signify the start of a comprehensive policy and use of the tool.  
 
c) The 1970s: The German Political Foundations and Human Rights Policies 
 
The 1970s became the crucial period for the start of a more widespread and long-term use of 
several democracy promotion instruments, in particular of democracy assistance, monitoring and 
political conditionality. The shift to political aid by the German political foundations, and 
developments within the human rights movement, were the most crucial factors.  
As mentioned above, the German Politischen Stiftungen are established by individual 
German political parties, remain personally and ideologically closely affiliated with these parties, 
receive governmental funding based on the strength of the respective party in the German 
Bundestag, but can spend their budgets relatively freely and without influence by the government 
and the parties. They were originally founded after World War II in order to contribute to 
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strengthening a new democratic political culture within Germany.353 As post-Nazi German 
foreign aid appeared to be more acceptable if distributed through semi-independent political 
foundations rather than the German government, the Stiftungen soon also became Germany’s 
‘official’ development organizations operating worldwide.354 
In conformity with the then prevailing modernization theory, the German political 
foundations also initially concentrated on socio-economic aid projects. In the early-mid 1970s, 
however, they began to provide democracy assistance and, in particular, to support party- and 
trade union-related institutions and to finance media and civic education projects. They first 
concentrated on Southern Europe, but soon also on Latin America.355 Their assistance went 
beyond earlier examples of democracy assistance, both, as regards the material focus as well as 
the duration of programmes. Just as American policies, the activities of the German political 
foundations had, until the end of the Cold War, an anti-communist character, even if there was a 
slight moderation with Willi Brandt’s Ostpolitik from the early 1970s on.356  
Two general factors and several characteristics of the foundations explain the latter’s shift 
to political aid. First, in 1974 the third wave of democracy began and created more favourable 
conditions for the provision of democracy assistance in an increasing number of states, especially 
in Southern Europe and Latin America. Secondly, by the 1970s the modernization approach to 
democratization was increasingly criticized as its predictions had failed to materialize, in particular 
because there were no clear moves towards democracy despite higher levels of socio-economic 
development in several parts of the world.357 That these two general factors primarily encouraged 
the German political foundations rather than all Western actors to provide political aid resulted 
from their experience with democratization-related activities within Germany, their character as 
semi-governmental/semi-independent bodies, and their deliberately-kept low profile, which 
caused less critique of foreign involvement.  
The US and, in particular the European states, which missed these experiences and 
features, continued not to or only to secretly engage. At the same time, factors like the Cold War 
and the opposition from target states prevented their geographically broader engagement beyond 
countries affected by the third wave. Additionally, while the modernization approach was hardly 
followed anymore, another theory of development began to influence governmental development 
policies and provide arguments against political aid. It claimed that capitalist development and 
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democratization could not take place at the same time, as the first of these would require 
unpopular reforms that in practice only an authoritarian government could implement.358  
During the 1970s the framework of human rights protection also developed in important 
ways, especially as regards the changing concept of state sovereignty and the use of various tools 
of human rights promotion. These developments would in the long run also prove important for 
democracy promotion and assistance. Initially, however, important limitations applied. On the 
one hand, democracy promotion was merely implicit in human rights promotion, as everything 
occurred under the heading of ‘human rights’ rather than under ‘democratization’.359 On the 
other hand, while human rights policies included a focus on several of the core liberal democratic 
rights, like the freedom of speech, the central political right to participate in government and to 
vote remained excluded.  
The US was a leading actor in the development of national, externally focused human 
rights policies. In the early-mid 1970s the US Congress adopted externally focused human rights-
related legislation, which was implemented as well as further developed during the presidency of 
Jimmy Carter, who declared human rights to be the ‘soul’ of his foreign policy.360 Instruments of 
the new policy included political conditionality for US development assistance and US voting on 
multilateral loans in international financial institutions as well as human rights assistance 
programmes and projects.361 Further innovations were the publication and submission to 
Congress, from 1977 on, of annual US State Department reports on human rights practices in 
(and especially in assistance receiving) third states, and the creation of the position of human 
rights officers in US embassies.362 Despite criticism of double standards in implementation, 
Carter’s policies were overall widely lauded and eventually earned him the Nobel Peace Price in 
2002.363 They focused on civil rights, in particular on freedom of speech, religion and assembly, 
without, as mentioned, addressing other core political rights and therefore more directly and 
explicitly democratization.364  
Western European states did not follow the US example, but remained much more 
cautious in the development of their external human rights policies. There were some individual 
examples of the use of human rights promotion tools, but overall these remained single events 
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and were not part of broader policies. One case in point was the European Parliament’s human 
rights assistance programme, which started in 1978, but had little funding and a substantively very 
limited scope, focusing on torture victims. 
Important developments at the international level, in particular within the UN, were the 
emergence of monitoring mechanisms in the late 1960s and 1970s. The first of these mechanisms 
were the so-called ‘1503 Procedure’ (1970) and the ‘1235 Procedure’ (1967), created by Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolutions, which gave UN-Charter-based bodies, in particular 
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), the possibility to investigate ‘serious patterns of 
human rights violations’ and other cases the CHR deemed appropriate for special inquiry.365 Of 
even more profound impact was the entering into force in 1976 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (next to the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and 
Cultural Rights (ICSECR)), which established a specific monitoring body, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), and introduced the regular supervision of each of the rights contained in the 
Covenant.366 As mentioned, while several core democratic rights were encompassed and therefore 
monitored, Article 25 ICCPR on the right to participate in government and to vote was not given 
a liberal democratic interpretation until much later.367  
During the 1970s, human rights also became an explicit focus of the newly created 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Different from the above examples, 
the CSCE did not create legally binding rules or specific tools of supervision and/or promotion 
in the field of human rights. The only instruments were verbal expressions of concern and 
discussions, which, however, were until the fall of Communism in 1989/90 officially criticized by 
Communist states as violating the principle of non-interference or countered by arguments that 
Western states favoured civil and political rights over social rights.368 The assessments of the first 
fifteen years of the CSCE in the field of democracy and human rights differ considerably, ranging 
from failure to high importance.369 In any case, as with the emerging international system for 
human rights protection, the CSCE constituted a framework to build on after the Cold War. 
On the whole, the 1970s were important for the evolution of democracy assistance. On 
the one hand, the German political foundations began to provide political aid, which is widely 
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considered as the starting point of the current widespread use of the tool. On the other hand, the 
national and international frameworks for human rights protection developed considerably 
further, which eventually facilitated the evolution of democracy promotion. 
 
d) The 1980s: The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)  
and USAID Programmes 
 
During the early-mid 1980s the US took again the lead in the evolution of democracy promotion 
and assistance. It made democracy promotion and assistance ‘official’ US policy and thereby 
predated the move into the field by other governments, in particular in Europe, for several years.  
The new US policy of ‘fostering the infrastructure of democracy’ was most famously 
announced by president Ronald Reagan in his speech before the British parliament in June 
1982.370 It led to several proposals of possible policies, like Reagan’s (strongly anti-communist) 
‘Project Democracy’, of which the US Congress eventually favoured the creation of the already 
mentioned quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy (NED).371 Founded in 
1983, it became the first organization ever created to be entirely devoted to democracy assistance. 
It was strongly inspired by the German political foundations but differs in its institutional set-
up.372 The NED is registered as non-profit organization and receives annual congressional 
appropriations, which it independently disburses through four main grantees, next to providing 
some grants directly to NGOs. The four main grantees, which were mostly specifically created to 
receive and spend NED funds, are, similarly to the German political foundations, linked to the 
two major US parties373 as well as to representatives of business and of trade unions.374 The 
NED’s first projects focused on civil society groups and electoral processes, geographically 
mainly concentrating on Latin America. Both its material and geographical focus were extended 
in the late 1980s, when also the NED’s initial anti-communist agenda was abandoned.375 
US initiatives were not limited to the quasi-governmental sector, but around 1985 also its 
governmental development organization, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), began to provide democracy assistance and established a specific office 
for democratization-related aid.376 The first programmes and projects primarily focussed on 
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elections, parliaments, as well as the administration of justice and concentrated on Latin America, 
but extended thematically and geographically towards the end of the 1980s.377  
The reasons for the US’ move into the field are complex and have been in detail outlined 
by Thomas Carothers.378 It should only be mentioned briefly that while the initial motive for 
Reagan’s initiatives was strong anti-communism, the rise of US democracy promotion and 
assistance in the 1980s eventually resulted from a moderation of anti-communism and a 
conviction that a shift away from support for friendly dictators in decline was not only possible 
but in the long-run the preferable option for the US. This idea was in line with Wilsonianism that 
thereby again proved to define US behaviour. At the same time, also the wave of transitions to 
liberal democracy in Latin America was crucial, which affected at least eleven states between 1979 
and 1985 and provided the necessary, positive environment for assistance.379  
The development of democracy assistance in the US was initially particularly influential in 
Canada. In 1988, the Canadian parliament set up its own governmentally funded but 
independently operating organization to provide democracy (and human rights) assistance in 
third countries. Unlike the NED, the Canadian so-called Rights & Democracy Centre however 
only directly works with local and regional NGOs.380  
In Europe, developments as regards democracy promotion and assistance continued to 
be slower. European leaders declared in 1986 that they were committed to promoting and 
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and stressed in this context the “principles of 
parliamentary democracy and the rule of law”.381 The statement constituted an important further 
expression of the weakening of the traditional concept of state sovereignty. However, the 
envisaged tools of human rights (and democracy) promotion were rather weak, encompassing 
only declarations of concern and diplomatic missions. An EC-funded NGO programme for 
Chile, created in 1986 upon the initiative of the European Parliament, was a rather exceptional 
early example of European democracy assistance.382 Some, particularly noticeable organizations in 
CEE, especially the Polish trade union movement Solidarity, received considerable secret/semi-
secret support, amongst others, in the form of funding and technical assistance by various 
Western European trade unions.383 
In the mid-1980s the first private democracy assistance activities began. Most notable was 
the establishment, in 1984, of the Soros Foundation Hungary by George Soros, who had been 
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active in the Helsinki network and supported dissidents throughout Central and Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union since the 1970s. As the first independent foundation created under 
Communism to promote an ‘open society’, it achieved a high profile but also had an obviously 
complicated relationship with the Hungarian government. Its acceptance by the regime can be 
explained by its initial concentration on education and culture rather than openly political topics. 
Soros foundations in other CEECs were eventually created in the late 1980s and early 1990s.384  
On the whole, during the 1980s the US, as first state, officially started with democracy 
promotion policies. It created the first ever organization explicitly and primarily devoted to 
democracy promotion, the NED, and began to provide assistance through official development 
channels (USAID). European actors lagged behind these developments and retained a much 
more cautious approach. 
 
e) The Early 1990s: The Start of Democracy Promotion and Assistance in Europe 
 
In the late 1980s, discussions started in some European states, like in Sweden, about the possible 
inclusion of human rights and democracy-related objectives in external policies.385 This new focus 
was in particular envisaged in the framework of development policies and as part of discussions 
on a new development paradigm. Before any of the governments publicly declared a change in its 
policies though, Europe and the world were taken by surprise by the unexpected fall of 
Communism in CEE in the second half of 1989 and first half of 1990 and the final end of the 
Cold War. Against the background of the pro-democracy movements and the removal of an 
important obstacle to democracy promotion, European states also finally made human rights and 
democracy promotion explicit objectives of their external policies. The first official declarations 
of European policy shifts were given by the British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in June 
1990, followed by a joint declaration of the development ministers of the Nordic states in 
September 1990.386 Basically all other European states and the EC followed within two years. 
Importantly, by then the policy shift was no longer just part of a new approach in development, 
but democracy promotion was also conceived as a separate, independent policy whose primary 
objective was democratization.  
Using the experiences of the various actors that had entered the field before the early 
1990s, the instruments of the new European policies included immediately all already known 
negative and positive tools, including democracy assistance. Geographically, the policies had in 
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principle a world-wide focus, even if, at least initially, the focus was on Latin America, Africa, and 
the CEECs. As regards the institutional/procedural structure for the provision of democracy 
assistance, between 1990 and 1992 basically all Western states started their official, governmental 
democracy and human rights assistance programmes. Further, the UK followed the NED model 
and in 1992 established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD). In most other 
European, but also some extra-European states, like in Japan, the idea of individual political 
foundations was preferred and political parties started to receive governmental funding to create 
their own foundations that would provide democracy assistance in third states.387  
At the same time an increasing number of private organizations also explicitly devoted to 
assist democratization, in particular of NGOs, emerged in all Western as well as in newly 
democratizing states. They arose as a result of the new liberties and ongoing democratization 
processes, the desire to participate in the process of political reform, as well as the numerous 
possibilities to receive grants through governmental programmes. NGOs engaging in the human 
rights sector had been active at least since the 1970s, and had also addressed issues relevant for 
democracy, but had only exceptionally focused on core democratic rights per se.388  
 Several factors enabled and facilitated the emergence of democracy promotion in Europe 
in the early 1990s. First, as mentioned, there was a change of paradigm in development policies, 
which, in essence, suggested democracy to be a condition or even a pre-condition of successful 
socio-economic development. It signified a final, fundamental break with the modernization 
theory that had proposed an inverse relationship between the two concepts (but also had since 
the early 1970s been of waning influence) as well as with the theory that suggested that socio-
economic development and democratization could not occur concurrently.389 The new approach 
was firstly widely exposed by the World Bank in a 1989 publication on Sub-Saharan Africa.390 The 
Bank identified authoritarianism and related factors, like arbitrariness in rule implementation and 
corruption, as key reasons for the failure of development efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
suggested making ‘good governance’ – in conceptual terms overlapping with the concept of 
democracy – an essential part of development policies.391 Proposed policy tools included 
conditionality and assistance. At the same time, the new focus on democracy (and human rights) 
could also help to boost the popularity of development policies and ensure steady aid budgets, 
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after the failure of the policies had led to strong public disappointment and criticisms of the 
development policies of the previous decades.392 
Secondly, as mentioned, when the Soviet Union refrained from interfering in those 
CEECs that were undergoing transitions to democracy, the Cold War at last ended. This factor 
removed previous important obstacles to democracy promotion. Western liberal democracies 
could now much more openly raise political concerns as regards authoritarian, right-wing 
developing countries as well as (still) communist regimes and these could no longer play Western 
states and the Soviet Union against each other.  
 At the same time, the third wave of democracy increasingly affected the former 
Communist block, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. The transitions did not only 
create favourable environments for democracy promotion activities, but also a strong demand or 
pull factor for, in particular, assistance in political reform.393 Democracy promotion in CEECs 
and some (former) Soviet states not only became possible, but indeed requested.  
Finally, the third wave of democracy led to an enormous increase in electoral and liberal 
democracies worldwide. The worldwide numbers increased from about 40 democracies in the 
early 1970s to about 76 liberal and even 117 electoral democracies in the mid-1990s.394 This 
increase not only signified a growing acceptance of liberal democracy as the only legitimate form 
of government, but in particular gave liberal democracies a more powerful position to demand 
respect for human rights and democratic principles by increasingly intrusive means.395 
 In summary, between 1990 and 1992 basically all Western European states started to 
engage in democracy promotion and to provide democracy assistance. Their policy shift was in 
particular driven and enabled by a change of the leading approach in development, the transition 
to democracy in CEECs, as well as the end of the Cold War.  
 
f) The Mid-1990s and Beyond: Consolidation and Challenges 
 
The period since the mid-1990s has been dominated by the consolidation of democracy 
assistance as tool of democracy promotion as well as its confrontation with numerous challenges.  
 Democracy promotion has never been the only or the major foreign policy objective of 
either the US or European states, which always also took economic, energy, security and other 
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factors into account when deciding on foreign policy issues.396 Nevertheless, democracy 
promotion has for the last two decades kept its place as one foreign policy objective in the case 
of all liberal democratic states, including new democracies.397  
The exact political rhetoric, concrete policies and actions, and preferences for individual 
tools have of course differed from state to state as well as, in some cases, from government to 
government.398 The US and, to a lesser extent, the UK have continued to pursue a more assertive 
and explicit approach and have also been more willing to use negative tools of democracy 
promotion, in particular military intervention.399 The most notable examples are George Bush’s 
‘freedom agenda’, which aimed at bringing democracy and free trade to the Middle East and 
wider world, and the military intervention in Iraq in 2003.400 Overall, this intervention had a 
highly negative effect for policies of democracy promotion of the US as well as more broadly, as 
it resulted in the exclusive equation of democracy promotion with regime change by foreign 
military action. In consequence, a decade later, Barack Obama, while retaining the objective of 
democracy promotion as foreign policy objective, adopted (and indeed, in order to restore the 
US’s reputation, had to adopt) a much more careful language and approach.401  
European states, besides the UK, have pursued democracy promotion policies less 
expressively. Many states have published new and updated versions of policy papers during the 
last decade.402 A commonality of these strategies has been the linking of democracy and security, 
of democracy and socio-economic development, as well as, more specifically, the inclusion of a 
democracy promotion focus in post-conflict strategies.403 Otherwise, national outlooks, traditions, 
and personalities appear to be the most influential factors that determine the exact policies of 
individual European states.404 Radical policy shifts have occurred rather seldom. The most 
notable example thereof is the new role assumed by France in the crisis in Libya in 2011. So far 
one of the more reluctant actors in democracy promotion, Nicolas Sarkozy has taken a leading 
role in replacing the Qaddafi regime.405  
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One expression of widespread support to the objective of democracy promotion was the 
creation, in 2000, of the Community of Democracies, an intergovernmental coalition of about 
100 ‘democratic’ UN Member States that have declared their dedication to strengthening 
democratic values and institutions at home and abroad.406 The Community has been viewed with 
much scepticism, in particular due to unclear criteria and politicised decisions on membership 
and too broad and unclear set of objectives.407 However, its development has kept up 
momentum, not least due to civil society involvement and support,408 changing governmental 
presidencies that are responsible for the organization of the regular ministerial and working-
group meetings, and initiatives suggesting more concrete actions, like the elaboration and sharing 
of best practices. The UN Democracy Caucus as well the European Democracy Caucus at the 
European Parliament, which aim at achieving better coordination and consensus as regards 
democracy promotion topics in their respective institutions, are an offspring of the 
Community.409 However, its most visible outcome is the UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF), 
established in 2005 as UN trust fund to support democracy-related projects.410 
As part of democracy promotion policies, democracy assistance has remained a core tool 
of the majority of actors and has undergone a process of consolidation, characterised by higher 
aid budgets, a stabilisation of actors, and a geographical spread of activities. 
Democracy assistance budgets have increased overall over the last two decades.411 USAID 
expenditure increased from about 121 million US$ in 1990 to about 900 million US$ in 2005.412 
USAID data on operating costs show a further increase between 2006 and 2010 from 1,014 
million to 1,770 million US$, which was mainly due to US activities in Afghanistan and Iraq.413 
The NED’s annual budget long amounted to about 30 million US$, but rose from about 80 
million US$ in 2004 to 136 million US$ in 2008.414 The EIDHR’s annual budget grew from about 
17 million Euros in 1991 to 154 million in 2010.415 The allocations of individual European states 
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also increased; that of the UK, for example, from about 276 million Euros in 2003 to 508 million 
Euros in 2006.416 The budget of each of the major German political foundations, the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, amounted to 120 million Euros in 2008.417 
The UNDEF has no stable budget, but operates with voluntary contributions by individual 
states. Between 2005 and 2010 it received annually between 27 and 8 million US$.418  
 The actors that have entered the field of democracy assistance in the early 1990s have 
consolidated their positions. Initially, the division of roles and tasks (and distribution of available 
resources) among all types of actors was not entirely clear and settled. In particular, the position 
of semi-governmental bodies was questioned when states started to themselves engage in 
democracy assistance. Both, the German political foundations as well as the NED feared no 
longer receiving their annual appropriations.419 However, the advantages of the specific character 
of semi-governmental bodies, which allowed engagement in sensitive areas without facing 
immediate critique of interference or partisanship, convinced governments to continue funding 
them and overall led to an increase in the number of political foundations.420 Civil society 
organizations, especially NGOs, were from the beginning on recognized as absolutely necessary 
partners in programme and project implementation, without whom governmental actors could 
not operate easily.  
Further, while assistance in the 1970s and 1980s concentrated on the early third wave 
countries of Latin America and Southern Europe, since the 1990s it has been provided in 
basically all world regions. Different donors have of course concentrated on different countries 
and regions, as well as over time shifting attention from one area to another. For example, France 
has always been heavily oriented towards Francophone states, while Spain has overall mostly 
concentrated on Latin America. Most US democracy assistance provided between 1990 and 2003 
went to Latin America and the Caribbean (about 24%), although Africa, Eurasia, and Europe also 
received a considerably large share (18-20%).421 During the same period, European democracy 
assistance was mainly disbursed in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern European and the 
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former Soviet Union.422 From the late 1990s on and, even more after 2001, both the US and 
Europe, increasingly focused on Asia and the Middle East.423  
 Growing democracy assistance budgets and a geographical spread of activities has, 
however, also been met by increasing resistance in recipient states. Some dictatorships, like 
Turkmenistan, have always opposed the implementation of democracy assistance projects on 
their soil. In addition, since the mid-2000s there has also been a growing number of semi-
authoritarian and authoritarian states that have, after initially permitting (at least some) democracy 
assistance, started to oppose it. The major example is Russia, with former President Vladimir 
Putin very openly and strongly criticizing foreign political assistance as interference into Russia’s 
sovereignty. But also states in Central Asia (like Kazakhstan and even Kyrgyzstan), the Middle 
East (like Iran, Bahrain, and Yemen), and Latin America (like Bolivia), have moved in that 
direction.424 
This new backlash has mainly been caused by the colour revolutions, which produced 
serious concern in many authoritarian countries, even if they lacked many of the features present 
in those states in which the revolutions took place, and even if the role of outsiders in the 
revolutions was indeed very minor. Also ideas that these colour revolutions, together with the 
intervention in Iraq, formed part of a global regime-change strategy of the US, played a role. At 
the same time, the backlash was facilitated by a strengthened economic position of the 
authoritarian countries that largely resulted from the rise in energy prices in the early-mid 
2000s.425 
 Countries critical or entirely oppositional to democracy assistance have adopted 
increasingly sophisticated means for its control or prevention. Initially, general tools, like 
restrictions to the right of association and complicated NGO registration rules, and relatively 
blunt instruments, like the harassment of NGO leaders and the destruction of office spaces, were 
used to prevent the implementation of projects. Eventually more targeted measures were taken, 
usually foreseen in administrative rules or even laws, even if blunt measures, like the expulsion or 
even arrest of foreign nationals working in the field, continue to prevail. The newer measures 
include the downgrading and de-legitimization of independent groups by the creation of 
governmentally-created and funded so-called ‘parallel’ or ‘Ersatz-’ NGOs,426 extremely high 
taxation for grant recipients, requirements that NGOs must receive prior government permission 
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to receive foreign funding, either a single time or on a grant-by-grant basis, that overseas funding 
must be channeled through governmental agencies or via designated bank accounts that are easily 
monitored or frozen, and that foreign funding is restricted to a limited percentage of an NGO’s 
total income. These restrictions are – domestically convincingly – presented to be legitimate in 
order to avoid foreign interference into domestic politics, to improve NGO governance and 
ensuring their conformity with domestic laws, like taxation and money laundering provisions, or 
even fighting terrorism. Usually, however, they go beyond acceptable limitations.427 
 Overall, Western donors have not shown signs of fundamentally changing their 
approaches in face of the backlash. They applied the same strategies as they had always done in 
dictatorships that opposed democracy assistance, that is, working quietly and informally within 
the country or, if that was not possible, from a neighbouring country. They also continued, as 
much as possible, to retain a political profile rather than shifting to less sensitive topics, as much 
as this was possible.428 The new backlash to democracy assistance strongly shed light on the 
question of norms regulating the provision and restriction of democracy assistance, which has so 
far insufficiently been addressed at the international level.429 
In summary, the first six decades of the 20th century witnessed several individual 
examples of the use of democracy assistance as a tool of external democratization efforts. The 
US usually stood out as leading actor, in particular during the presidency of Wilson, but also 
during the presidency of Kennedy, when development policies first included a political 
component. Decolonization also confronted the UN and European states with the topic, though. 
However, none of the activities led to a long-term policy of democracy promotion or assistance. 
Reasons include critique of neo-colonialism, the Cold War, the prevalence of the modernization 
approach to development, as well as the much more limited prevalence of liberal democratic 
regimes and the more limited appeal they had than today. The granting of some form of political 
aid, in particular to party-related institutions and trade unions by the German political 
foundations, in the early-mid 1970s is widely considered as the start of the current widespread 
use of democracy assistance. It resulted from the particular character and historical tasks of the 
foundations, facilitated by the beginning of the third wave of democracy in Southern Europe. In 
the early 1980s, and therefore before the end of the Cold War, the US took again a leading role 
and entered the policy field by creating the NED and starting USAID democracy programmes. 
The reasons for the move were a mix of strong initial anti-communism that eventually gave rise 
to ideas linked to the democratic peace and Wilsonianism. American activities of the time 
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concentrated on Latin American countries, many of which were then affected by the third wave 
of democracy. When this wave also reached Central and Eastern Europe and lack of Soviet 
interference signified the end of the Cold War, European actors also declared democracy 
promotion as a foreign policy objective. By then, a new development credo had also taken root, 
which considered democratization a condition or even pre-condition of successful socio-
economic development. Moreover, power structures had changed, developing countries were 
economically weaker to object to foreign activities in the field of human rights and democracy, or 
had themselves undergone liberalization or democratization processes and were therefore less 
critical or even welcoming of pro-democracy initiatives. Since the early 1990s, democracy 
promotion has remained a foreign policy objective of basically all liberal democratic states, even if 
it has been frequently sidelined by economic, energy-related, and security-related concerns. 
Democracy assistance has remained a stable instrument thereof, characterized by a growth and 
stabilization of actors, a rise in aid budgets, and a geographical spread of activities. It has 
increasingly also been confronted with opposition in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
regimes.  
 
2. Basic Approaches to Democracy Assistance 
 
The numerous and diverse actors in the field of democracy assistance are pursing different 
strategies, in particular as regards the thematic or substantive areas of concentration of their 
projects and programmes. The differences result from a number of factors, including the 
character of the donor, the target state, and the main rationale for the action, that is, whether 
democratization is the primary or just a secondary aim. Different underlying conceptions of 
democracy and of democratization also play an important role, though.  
 On the basis of several years of experience by donors and some professionalization in the 
sector, analysts of democracy assistance have suggested ideal types of democracy assistance 
strategies that encompass the mentioned numerous diverse approaches. These ideal types should 
assist in getting a clearer picture of the actually pursued approaches as well as in the assessment 
of their advantages and disadvantages. However, the exercise was in particular also driven by 
desires to work out differences in and clearly dissociate European and American approaches in 
the field. The models are useful, however, as they are ideal types they risk to simplifying the 
strategy of individual actors. In particular, the models tend to associate one actor with one 
strategy only and to suggest that one actor can exclusively pursue one strategy rather than 




 The currently most known categorization has been outlined by Thomas Carothers, who 
distinguishes between the political and the developmental approach to democracy assistance.430 
Its appeal also stems from the fact that the two categories neatly complement the major models 
of democracy and democratization. The categorization to a large extent overlaps with the 
distinction between a product-oriented approach to democracy assistance, which focuses on the 
elements of the institutional end-state of a liberal democratic government, and a process-oriented 
approach to democracy assistance, which aims at shaping the underlying processes of democratic 
change, suggested by Richard Youngs.431  
 
a) The Political and the Developmental Approach to Democracy Assistance 
 
The political approach to democracy assistance focuses on core political actors, institutions, and 
processes and funds projects benefitting political parties, leading politicians, the media, civil 
rights-focused NGOs, parliaments, and, albeit to a more limited extent, the independent 
judiciary. One of the key processes it concentrates on is elections, in the case of which aid is 
provided to central electoral commissions and for civic and voter education projects. The 
political approach has a short-term focus, putting most stress on the actual period of transition, 
and recognizes the importance of crucial moments during which targeted aid is assumed to be 
particularly effective. Assistance of this kind can be strongly challenging to the ruling classes of a 
non-democratic state, especially if it works with the political opposition, dissidents, and the 
media, that broadcast into an authoritarian state from abroad. However, political assistance is not 
necessarily always that confrontational, but usually also carried out with the consent or toleration 
of the authoritarian regime.432 
 The models of democracy and democratization underpinning the political approach are 
obviously a more narrow, political conception of democracy or, in the extreme case even 
electoral democracy, and genetic theories of democratization that focus on the actual stage of 
regime change and highlight the relevance of crucial moments and events.  
 The developmental approach to democracy assistance rests on entirely different 
assumptions and pursues a different path. It considers political reform as part of a broader 
process of development that includes socio-economic and cultural dimensions, and that can only 
occur in a gradual, bottom-up process involving all sectors. Developmental democracy assistance 
therefore focuses on state capacity building projects and good governance reform, in particular, 
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in a technocratic and apolitical fashion. Particular attention is therein given to local level reforms 
and the topic of decentralization. It supports rule of law reform, limited to sectors though, like 
the economic sector, in which independent courts are less threatening to the political regime. It 
assists in the development of civil society, however, focusing on NGOs working in the social, 
economic, and cultural sector rather than such on civil and political rights. Human rights, 
including social, economic and cultural rights, are key areas of concern. All in all, the 
developmental approach has a long-term perspective and tries to be non-political, non-
confrontational, and to work in partnership with the recipient states’ government. In the very 
extreme case, it might also promote democracy only indirectly, through socio-economic 
development aid (which lies beyond the here used definition of democracy assistance though).433 
 The developmental approach is inspired by a broader concept of democracy, in particular 
one that also encompasses the social and economic dimension, and by structural theories of 
democratization.  
 The political approach has frequently been associated with the US, while the 
developmental approach has been labeled the European approach. As indicated, this constitutes a 
simplification, as on both continents a multiplicity of actors with different strategic preferences 
operates, which makes it impossible to speak of a ‘single’ European or American way.434 
Nevertheless, it seems possible to say that overall the large majority of European actors give 
preference to the developmental approach, even if there are also examples of political aid, 
including by the EU itself. At the same time, although also in the US an equally high or even 
higher amount of funding is used for developmental democracy assistance as for political 
democracy assistance, there is a stronger interest and willingness to pursue the political 
approach.435  
 
b) The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Approaches 
 
The main advantage of the political approach is its direct focus on the central elements of a 
liberal democratic system of government. If the institutions, actors, and processes it supports – 
free and fair elections, political parties, parliaments, independent media, free civil society 
organization – are not in place, a system is not (yet) democratic, even if the target state shows 
positive trends in other sectors of governance, like functioning administrative institutions and 
low levels of corruption. The political approach thereby also avoids blurring the objective of 
                                                     
433 Ibid, at 8-9; Youngs, ‘Democracy as Product versus Democracy as Process’, at 68.  
434 A. Gerrits, ‘Is there a distinct European democratic model to promote?’, in M. van Doorn and R. von Meijenfeldt 
(eds.), Democracy: Europe’s Core Value? (2007), at 63.  




democracy assistance, namely democratization rather than only liberalization, some good 
governance reform, or socio-economic development.436 Further, reforms in the political 
dimension are widely considered a condition for the successful development of other sectors, like 
of governance, the rule of law, and the socio-economic domain, and therefore a necessary point 
of focus.437 Awareness of the existence of crucial moments in regime change renders it better 
prepared to recognize these and to target assistance adequately, as happened during the electoral 
or colour revolutions in Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia.  
 A major disadvantage of the political approach is that it is more prone to opposition from 
the authoritarian states’ government. It can cause a stronger pushback and lack of further access 
to the country, like in Burma, Cuba, and Turkmenistan.438 Donors might have to work from 
abroad only, which is considered to be potentially less effective. A further point of criticism is its 
limited focus, in particular if it concentrates on elections only. Even if relatively free and fair 
elections are held, a democratic system can still suffer from weak participation and representation 
and lack wide inclusion (the so-called ‘fallacy of electoralism’)439. Finally, the focus on the 
transition period and crucial moments might lead to single interventions, which can be useful, but 
also divert attention from the need for longer-time and broader reform, like the judicial branch. 
All in all, the political approach might therefore be successful in assisting a transition to 
democracy, but less for achieving its consolidation.440 
The developmental approach has several advantages. It usually allows access to countries 
that oppose too politically-oriented activities and therefore provides a first basis for initial action, 
like in China. Further, it foresees longer-term engagement that is necessary for real and 
sustainable reform in some sectors, like rule of law development. It brings attention to the link 
between socio-economic and political reform and therefore has some potential to implement 
mutually beneficial projects.441 Further, it bears lower risks of imposing a certain model of 
democracy but allows the most appropriate domestic democratic system to grow. Due to a 
stronger focus on civil society development, it renders the democratization process more 
inclusive than the political approach. Overall it appears to be more beneficial for the successful 
consolidation of democracy rather than the transition as such. 
A major problem of the developmental approach is that it may lead to various reforms in 
intermediate areas, without however, showing concrete results in the political domain. In the 
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worst of cases, it thereby helps strengthening rather than weakening or replacing authoritarian 
rule, as the non-democratic leaders can take credentials for successful socio-economic reform and 
development and in other sectors. Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Vietnam, have long been major 
aid recipients for governance-reform programmes, however, have shown little signs of regime-led 
democratization. It remains to be seen if Kazakhstan, which is sometimes cited as example of a 
successful application of the developmental approach, will successfully democratize. There is also 
not yet enough knowledge when and how socio-economic development and reforms in the 
governance sector interlink with and spill over to the political domain.442 Similarly, Carothers has 
warned of ‘the sequencing fallacy’, that is, too rosy assumptions that rule of law reform will fully 
occur in authoritarian states and eventually spill over to the political domain.443 Another weakness 
of the developmental approach is that donors might think or pretend to promote democracy, 
however, are in fact not doing so.444 Finally, authors have questioned whether the developmental 
approach’s focus on civil society can by itself, without concurrent support in the political sphere, 
lead to changes.445 
All in all, each basic approach has particular strengths and weaknesses. Carothers has 
righty appreciated the existence of diverse approaches, especially as regards an ever more 
challenging international context for democracy assistance.446 Some authors have strongly called 
for donors to correct their approaches if they were single-sided. For example, Youngs has 
advised European donors, which are usually much closer to the developmental approach, to 
more intensively engage with political aid.447 In any case, awareness of the diverse approaches and 
their pros and cons provides important grounds for learning from other actors and better 
coordinating activities. 
 
3. The Rationale of Democracy Promotion (and Assistance) 
 
Among the numerous rationales that underlie democracy promotion and democracy assistance, a 
basic distinction can be made between ‘value-based’ motives, which stress the intrinsic 
worthiness of the goal of action, and ‘instrumental’ motives, which follow instrumental 
considerations and intend to fulfill donors’ interests rather than those or only those of 
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recipients.448 The first are often also referred to as ‘moral’ or ‘ethical’ concerns, although 
frequently any foreign policy that takes into account human rights, democracy or other ‘ethical’ 
issues is called ‘ethical foreign policy’, irrespective of whether the underlying motives are indeed 
of ethical or instrumental nature.449 All in all, the differentiation has mainly analytical value as in 
reality a certain activity is usually based on a blend of motives. Further, actors are often not 
particularly explicit about their motivations or conceal real intentions while stressing some, 
politically more acceptable aims. Donors can also be complex entities with sub-units that have 
different intentions, which can render policy statements very broad and/or incoherent. 
 
a) Value-based Motives 
 
As indicated, in the case of value-rational motives democracy is promoted with the ‘ethical’ aim 
of assisting a third state or people to establish for itself the only acceptable and the best type of 
regime, without donors having any or any major self-interests in mind. On the one hand, liberal 
democracy has over the last decades increasingly emerged as the only legitimate form of rule.450 
The underlying rationale is that it respects and realizes, more than any other type of government, 
the values of human self-determination or autonomy and of equal human worth or dignity.451 
Each individual, by being born as human being, has the right to control the decisions about 
her/his life, including in the political sphere, rather than being subject to the decisions and rule of 
others and, importantly, each person has this right to an equal degree.452  
The claim that democracy is universally the only acceptable form of government has not 
been without criticism and opposition by (authoritarian) rulers as well as the academic 
community. It was argued that Asian values, based on Asian religious and philosophical traditions 
like Confucianism and Buddhism, as well as Islam are incompatible with (certain features of) 
liberal democracy. Forceful arguments have also been brought forward to refute these arguments 
though and examples of functioning democratic regimes in East Asia and Muslim states and calls 
for democratization in these states give support to the universalist claim.453 
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 On the other hand, there are suggestions that democracy is the best form of 
government.454 First, by involving basically every (adult) member of a community in policy-
making processes, either directly or through representatives, in governmental or civil society 
functions, the outcome is expected to be better policies, more likely meeting the interests of all or 
the large majority and therefore rather realizing the ‘public’ or ‘common good’ than other forms 
of rule. Such view is based on the (disputed) idea that each individual, even if to a different 
degree, is equipped with intellectual capacities to participate in the political process, that each 
individual knows her/his interests best, and that the ‘public good’ is what all people in an 
informed and deliberative process collectively decide it to be rather than that the ability to decide 
on best policies is reserved to a small, educated class. Opinions of experts are important, but 
should only be the basis for democratic decisions rather than replacing them.455  
Secondly, by achieving better policies and realizing the common good, the democratic 
process leads to a high degree of acceptance of policies and voluntary abidance by the law, even if 
in some cases the particular preferences of an individual are not followed.456 At a more general 
level, this adds to acceptance of the type of regime and regime stability, which is also benefiting 
from the possibility to (democratically) dismiss governments in case of policy-failures rather than 
provoking a regime-crisis as such.457 Thirdly, a widely assumed positive feature of democracy is 
that it more than other types of rule respects and realizes a broad range of human rights, beyond 
the core civil and political rights that define it and constitute its key procedures and institutions. 
Human rights violations also occur in democracies, however, in average they are much less 
frequent than in authoritarian systems.  
 Value-rational motives are mainly associated with the activities of civil society 
organizations,458 even if a considerable number of NGOs active in the ‘aid industry’ strongly 
appear to be attracted by Western grants rather than led by moral concerns only. As regards 
states and governmental organizations value-rational motivations are usually regarded with more 
suspicion. However, while many conflicts between certain national interests and ethical concerns 
are continued to be decided in favour of the first,459 there is evidence that human rights and 
democracy-related concerns have increasingly influenced foreign policies of Western 
governments since the early 1990s.460 One if the principal factors for such development seems to 
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have been the influence of public demand, in particular of civil society groups and networks 
active at national and international level, however, also a moral conviction of individuals/officials 
involved in policy-making.461  
 
b) Instrumental Motives 
 
In the case of ‘instrumental motives’ democracy promotion actors expect some outputs for 
themselves rather than just for the target country. A first set of positive externalities pertains to 
the economic sector. First, democratizing states/democracies usually also establish or have a 
liberal market economic system similar to those prevailing in the West and eventually integrate 
into the international, market liberal economic order, which allows for and facilitates free trade 
and foreign investment by the donor.462 Some authors consider this to be the real underlying 
reasons of, in particular US, democracy promotion. These authors additionally argue that the 
particular concept of democracy that is being promoted is a limited one, void of any social and 
participatory features.463  
Secondly, democracies usually have higher levels of good governance and of the rule of 
law than authoritarian states. These more stable, predictable, and efficient governmental policies, 
less complicated regulatory system for business activities, and lower levels of corruption, in 
combination with a clearer and healthier legal system with laws and contracts that are enforceable 
in independent courts, facilitate foreign business and investment activities.464 There are also 
examples of authoritarian states, like China and Vietnam, that have carried out some good 
governance and rule of law reforms and thereby created conditions beneficial for foreign 
businesses. However, these are exceptions, their actions fall short of comprehensive reforms, and 
authoritarianism, good governance, and rule of law usually do not go well together, not at last 
because of conceptual clashes.465 The academic literature has also pointed to the difficulties of 
concurrently pursing democratic, good governance, and rule of law reforms though, stressing the 
weak and volatile character of democratic actors, institutions, and processes during transition and 
consolidation processes.466 
 A second set of self interest-based motivations relates to increased levels of security for 
Western states. First, a frequently mentioned motivation is the so-called ‘democratic peace 
theory’, which can be traced back to Kant’s 1795 prediction of an ever-widening pacification 
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among ‘republican’ states and has been supported by empirical evidence in numerous studies. It 
suggests that “democracies almost never fight each other” but find other, more peaceful ways of 
solving their conflicts.467 It does not mean that democracies absolutely never go to war against 
each other or that they are inherently peaceful as regards all types of regimes, indeed, they are as 
aggressive and war-prone as other forms of government in relation to non-liberal regimes,468 but 
that they usually behave peacefully as regards other democracies and that the overall prospect for 
peace in the world increases with the number of existing liberal democracies. The democratic 
peace has been explained by the influence of democratic norms and culture, in particular the need 
of discussion and peaceful solution of conflicts, as well as the workings of democratic procedures 
and institutions, like the involvement of parliaments and civil society in decision-making.469 Other 
explanations rather stress factors that are correlated with democracy, like transnational linkages, 
wealth, trade and economic interdependence.470 While the democratic peace theory relates to 
established democracies, it has been shown that it is not necessarily also true for democratizing 
states, which appear to have a higher potential for conflicts, even higher than stable 
autocracies.471 
 Secondly, democracies usually, even if not always, fare better in finding long-term 
solutions to different types of conflicts, like ethnic conflicts. Underlying reasons are, like the with 
the democratic peace theory, normative as well as institutional/procedural features of democracy. 
Authoritarian states tend to suppress conflicts until they eventually erupt in strife or civil war, 
causing waves of refugees or humanitarian crisis with consequences for developed, democratic 
states. 
Further, while the relation between democracy, democratization and economic 
development is complex, it is established that democracies usually have higher levels of socio-
economic development, while authoritarian states are poorer. Poverty, together with lack of 
political liberties, is a major factor for illegal immigration to the West.472 
 Finally, while it is now widely accepted that the causes of Islamist radicalism and related 
terrorism are complex, the absence of political liberalism (together with socio-economic 
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development) do still feature among its possible origins.473 By supporting the spread of liberal 
democracy, Western states can therefore contribute to fighting terrorism.474 
 A last, purposive-rational motive of democracy promotion, since the interventions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq in particular of positive instruments of democracy promotion, is that it 
provides states, organizations and other actors a stage to promote their own image as supporter 
of an ethical cause as well as, more generally, to be present internationally and in individual 
states.475  
 
4. The Legality and Legitimacy of Democracy Assistance 
 
While questions of legality and legitimacy of democracy promotion and assistance are frequently 
– for valid reasons – treated as a single issue, it appears useful to address them separately, as they 
do not entirely overlap. It can generally be said that, while democracy assistance is nowadays in 
principle considered to be legal under international law, there remain nevertheless questions 
about whether the particular model of democracy promoted by a specific donor is acceptable to 
the recipient government, civil society and citizens of target states.  
 
a) Democracy Assistance in International Law and Allowed Restrictions 
 
The core provision or rule of international law at stake as regards the legality of democracy 
assistance is the principle or rule of non-interference into the internal affairs of a sovereign state 
stipulated in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and customary international law.476 It is violated if, 
first, the interference relates to an issue that lies within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of a 
state and, secondly, if the threat or use of coercion is of a degree that can or does indeed restrict 
the free choice of a state.477 Fulfillment of the second criterion can relatively easily be discarded, 
as democracy assistance – different from negative measures like sanctions – is in principle 
consensual or at least tolerated, which by definition excludes coercion. Further, even if assistance 
projects are carried out against the will of the target state government, they will basically never be 
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able to achieve the degree of coercion that is able to restrict the choice of the targeted state’s 
government and therefore amount to the coercion required by Article 2(7)/customary law.478  
The first criterion is more complex.479 Until the late 1980s, the choice of the political 
regime of a particular state was considered to be one of the fundamental elements of state 
sovereignty and therefore firmly within domestic and beyond international jurisdiction.480 This 
contrasted with the situation of human rights more generally and, in particular, of civil rights, for 
which a legitimate concern of the international community was by then accepted. Once states had 
agreed on UN human rights monitoring mechanisms in the late 1960s/early 1970s and signed 
and ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), they could no 
longer in principle reject foreign concern about the human rights situation in their territory. The 
argument was quickly extended to all states.481 Accepted mechanisms of foreign interference were 
verbal expressions of concern, monitoring, assistance, as well as increasingly, but with much 
more opposition and dispute, also coercive measures like conditionality and sanctions.  
It is important to recall that some of the human rights already then considered beyond 
domestic jurisdiction constituted ‘core’ elements of the liberal democratic model, like the right to 
freedom of speech and association. However, the central liberal-democratic right, the right to 
participate in government and to vote in elections remained excluded from the changing 
definition of the domestic domain. To be precise, the right was expressed in Article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948) and Article 25 of the ICCPR and 
equally underlay the monitoring mechanism of the ICCPR as other included human rights, 
however, it was given an interpretation that did justice to most prevailing political systems, 
especially Communism and authoritarianism, and allowed, for example, single-party systems.482 It 
rightly appeared as more defining of the political regime and more ‘threatening’ to authoritarian 
governments to be acceptable. 
The relevant changes only occurred in the early 1990s. Since then numerous international 
lawyers have increasingly suggested that an ‘international law of democracy’ has developed, which 
contains a variety of principles and ideas relating to different areas of action.483 Most important 
for this discussion is the claim of the emergence of a ‘right to democracy’ or ‘to democratic 
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governance’ in international human rights law.484 It implies the treatment of the core political 
rights like other human rights, in particular like other civil rights, that is, beyond domestic 
jurisdiction and accepting international ‘interference’ of various kinds, including monitoring and 
democracy assistance.  
The main basis for the claim is the change in state practices since early 1990s. Since then 
a majority of states worldwide has a liberal or at least electoral democratic system, many 
international organizations explicitly embrace democracy as objective and membership criteria, 
basically all Western states implement democracy promotion policies, and democratizing, semi-
authoritarian and even some authoritarian states accept democracy assistance in their territory.485 
Also the creation, in 2000, of the Community of Democracies and the adoption of an UN 
General Assembly (UN GA) resolution on ‘promoting and consolidating democracy’ in 2000, as 
well as regular UN GA resolutions on “enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic 
and genuine elections and the promotion of democratization” since the early 1990s, can be cited 
in support.486 On the one hand, it is therefore argued that the right to democracy has emerged as 
right of customary international law; on the other hand, many authors have referred to the 
already existing treaty provisions, in particular to Article 25 ICCPR, which have received a widely 
accepted re-interpretation.487  
 The developments and claims have not been undisputed and remain topics of discussion. 
Academic critique has especially been expressed as regards the easiness and rapidity with which 
claims have appeared, without sufficiently elaborating on their basis and, especially, disregarding 
that in many parts of the world (liberal) democracy has not yet taken root or is theory rather than 
practice. Further, there is critique on the lack of elaboration on the specific conception of 
democracy that underlies the emerging right and a too narrow focus on elections and ‘electoral 
democracy’ rather than more elaborate versions.488 At the same time, authoritarian states have 
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continued to insist on their sovereignty as regards their type of government and, more recently, 
an increasing number of states that is moving towards authoritarianism, is doing so.489 
 On the whole, despite criticism and opposition, democracy assistance is today in principle 
widely considered a permissive tool under international law. At the same time, it is also widely 
accepted though that states are allowed to restrict certain types of democracy assistance on their 
territories. The extent to which such restrictions are permissible have to be determined by 
applicable regional and international human rights law. More concretely, the human right mostly 
at stake, in particular as regards donations to political parties and NGOs, is the right to freedom 
of association. While latter has in principle to be ensured, international law and regional human 
rights law, like the ECHR, allows for limitations through laws, if these are “necessary in a 
democratic society” (Article 22(2) ICCPR, Article 11 ECHR). While the question about 
‘democratic necessity’ has to be determined for each state and situation separately,490 it appears 
that within the framework of the ICCPR as well as ECHR (outside the EU), restrictions for 
foreign donations to parties, in particular by states and businesses, are permissible as they ensure 
a proper democratic process rather than inhibiting it.491 Also contributions in kind and possibly 
also advice can constitute forms of ‘donations’ and therefore fall under the relevant provisions. If 
advice benefits more than one party of the political spectrum though, it might be permissible. 
The question has to be answered differently as regards the civil society sector and in particular as 
regards NGOs, which perform a different role than political parties and vitally depend on 
donations. Restrictions to receive foreign donations, including the total prohibition, high taxes, 
the need to channel foreign donations through specific (governmental) bank accounts, and other 
burdensome reporting requirements, are widely considered to go beyond what is ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’ and are therefore illegal.492  
 All in all, there have been increasing calls for a more explicit international codification of 
permissible and non-permissible forms of democracy assistance.493 
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b) The Legitimacy of Democracy Assistance 
 
The question of legitimacy refers to the acceptability of a particular actor’s project, programme, 
or broader strategy of democracy assistance. In other words, is the particular model of democracy 
being promoted by one donor the most suitable and most viable for a particular target state and 
does the policy, as much as possible just support the development of the domestic model of 
democracy that would have developed without (intensive) foreign involvement rather than 
‘imposing’ or fostering the development of a ‘foreign’ system. It should be recalled here that the 
international dimension has (most likely) always had some influence upon domestic 
developments. In other words, any ‘domestic’ democratic model had always been to some degree 
influenced by external factors and was not the result of domestic factors only, like historical 
experiences, the type of authoritarianism, the mode of transition, the socio-economic situation, 
and cultural factors (most of which themselves have been influenced by external developments). 
Consequently, some external influence has in principle to be accepted as legitimate. However, 
with the much more intensive and direct forms of democracy promotion and higher (potential) 
influence upon the domestic system, questions of legitimacy necessarily arise.  
 The argument is made here that donors in practice, despite frequently claiming the 
opposite, do not and, indeed, in most cases, cannot restrict themselves to the promotion of the 
central, general and universally accepted elements (rights) of democracy. Rather, they consciously 
and/or unconsciously facilitate the development of a specific model of democracy. First, in most 
projects and programmes the core meaning of the various rights will be given more substance 
and thereby extent into and suggest a particular conception of democracy.494 For example, 
projects on the freedom of association hardly ever only consist of advising governments and 
parliaments on or advocating for an NGO law that ensures the freedom to found NGOs. In the 
overwhelming majority of cases the promotion of this particular right consists of direct support 
to the civil society sector (next to, but less, to the political society sector) and shapes latter by 
favouring certain groups before others, like advocacy NGOs before private voluntary 
organizations, and fosters certain types of activities and behaviours that are core elements of 
certain democratic systems but not others, like advocacy.495 Secondly, donors foster particular 
models of democracy by focusing to different degrees on the various rights/elements of the right 
to democracy. For example, a donor who predominantly focuses on elections and political parties 
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and neglects civil society promotes a form of elitist democracy rather than a more participatory 
one.496 The third way in which donors promote certain models results from their focus on the 
here so-called supporting or other protected rights of democracy. For example, donors who 
restrict themselves to core rights and, among these, on elections rather than civil society, and 
complement such assistance by programmes that develop free markets, facilitate the development 
of a limited liberal model, while donors who invest efforts into the promotion of social rights, 
assist in the creation of a form of social democracy.  
The suggested solution to the raised issue of promoting certain specific models of 
democracy rather than just core, universally accepted rights is not to restrict oneself to the 
promotion of latter. First, by limiting oneself to these core meanings, the range of possible 
projects will necessarily be smaller and even further reduce the potential impact of assistance 
policies. For example, assistance to the adoption of NGO legislation that guarantees rights of 
these groups, which is crucial and even appears as precondition for any civil society activity, does 
not, however, help NGOs to actually emerge, become professional, and sustain. Latter could only 
be supported with more elaborate and sophisticated projects and programmes that go beyond the 
core meaning of the (negative) right. Similarly, legally guaranteeing the freedom to impart 
information does not necessarily lead to an independent and professional media sector. More 
elaborate projects and programmes are not only reality and a return to more basic, limited 
assistance hardly imaginable, but they are also widely considered to be necessary and are 
requested by recipients. Secondly, even if donors would limit themselves to core meanings, the 
same problem would arise, as donors would, as mentioned, weigh different – and equally 
legitimate – core and supporting rights to different degrees, without that it would be possible to 
prescribe a single acceptable mix.  
The solution therefore has to be a different one. It is suggested that legitimacy of 
democracy assistance can be achieved, while using more elaborate projects and programmes, by a 
high degree of involvement of recipients in policy and strategy making for individual countries. 
Involvement is imaginable at least two different levels, the governmental and civil society level, 
which could separately define country strategies for the particular sectors they represent. Ideally 
and depending on the particular situation of a state, also a common exercise of the public and 
private sectors is imaginable. Fostering cooperation among these sectors would itself constitute a 
valuable exercise in democracy promotion. It needs to be mentioned, that many donors involve 
third state’s government into the strategy-making process, which also represents the ‘consensual’ 
nature of democracy assistance. At the same time, civil society has so far largely been left without 
                                                     




say in the determination of policies and strategies, but has only been involved in the 
implementation stage.  
 
5. The Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance 
 
One of the most basic questions asked about democracy assistance is whether it can be an 
effective form of democracy promotion and/or whether democracy assistance, as has been 
practiced over the last two decades by various donors, has successfully contributed to moving 
forward liberalization and democratization in individual target countries and is therefore worth 
continuing and developing. An answer to the first, more general question can only be based on 
an assessment of actually practiced democracy assistance and therefore depends on answering the 
second. However, a negative assessment of actually implemented assistance policies over the last 
decades does not necessarily imply that the instrument of assistance as such is necessarily 
ineffective, as deficiencies in policy-making and implementation rather than characteristics of the 
instrument might account for it.  
 Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is that we do not (yet) know for sure. 
Despite increasing efforts to develop democracy support evaluation tools, there continue to be 
many weaknesses in the state of art of evaluating democracy assistance programmes and 
projects.497 Overall, efforts to evaluate democracy assistance and, as one element thereof, to 
assess the effectiveness of a project or programme, have used methodologies developed in the 
framework of studying (socio-economic) development issues. They have therefore employed 
quantitative methods, which have used various statistical programmes,498 and qualitative methods, 
which are mainly retrospective evaluations that base their assessment largely on interviews with 
individuals that have been involved in a project or programme.499 Rarer, but of increasing 
attraction are participant-observers methods in which a researcher ‘lives’ with a project for a 
longer period of time during project implementation and more ‘participatory’ methods, which 
aim at a strong involvement of individuals positively and negatively affected, including as 
evaluators.500 While most of these quantitative and qualitative studies invest much effort into 
clarifying and justifying their methodologies, most of them remain subject to, often considerable, 
critique. The two major difficulties facing all studies on democracy assistance appear to be 
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determining indictors for democracy, for (successful) democratization, as well as establishing the 
causality of assistance for changes, given that assistance is just one factor in a very complex 
system and process. 501  
 Independent and well-founded studies carried out over the last two decades have come to 
diverging results as regards the effectiveness of democracy assistance programmes. Qualitative 
evaluations have largely concluded rather disappointingly on the effects of assistance in individual 
countries and at most found a limited or moderate impact. For example, Carothers has found 
that US democracy assistance in Romania in the first half of the 1990s has had some, but overall 
rather little impact at the meso- or partial regime-level and the macro- or the regime-level, as well 
as that some projects (the micro-level) had no or even negative impacts. 502 In a later study, he 
found that USAID assistance during the 1990s had at best made minor contributions to 
improvements in some sectors in Guatemala, that none of the projects carried out in Zambia had 
more than marginal effects, and that US assistance basically had no impact in Nepal.503 A study 
on foreign aid in South Africa in the second half of the 1990s finds an impact of foreign 
assistance in the civil society sector, but criticizes the particular type of democracy promoted, 
more concretely, the absence of social components.504 Similarly, Carapico found an impact, but 
criticised that assistance created conflict rather than cooperation between governments and 
NGOs in the Middle East.505  
Quantitative studies have equally produced mixed results. While some have not found 
any positive effect of assistance on democratization, others have discovered, albeit moderate, 
positive impacts.506 Most notable in this respect is a comprehensive USAID-sponsored study on 
the effects of American democracy assistance in more than 160 countries between 1990 and 
2003, which found that US assistance has overall, although in some regions more than in others, 
helped to increase democracy above the levels that would have been achieved without it and, in 
particular, at the meso-levels of elections, political processes and civil society.507  
 Hardly any researcher has concluded that assistance cannot be an effective instrument 
though. The reasons for the small or lack of impact were rather seen to lie in an insufficient 
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number of projects and failures in programme design and implementation.508 At the same time, 
studies which showed a moderately positive impact also recall that expectations as regard the 
potential impact of assistance need to remain modest, as it can only support and facilitate 
processes but not determine political developments in third states.509 In any case, despite some 
suggestions to abandon evaluation in view of the difficulties of measurement, the overwhelming 
majority of practitioners and scientists rightly continue to invest efforts into improving existing 
methods or developing new ones.510 
 
6. Limitations of Quantitative Data and some Statistics on Democracy Assistance  
 
As indicated, democracy assistance is usually measured in amounts spent for projects and 
programmes. While this does not ultimately provide information about the quality and 
effectiveness of the tool, it nevertheless has some informative value. Higher commitments (and 
expenditures) reflect that donors attribute a more important role to the instrument and at least 
suggest a higher potential impact. This section highlights the problems of currently available data 
on democracy assistance and provides some statistics on democracy assistance by major 
international donors.  
 
a) Limitations of Quantitative Data on Democracy Assistance 
 
Currently available quantitative data on democracy assistance by different donors has to be 
consulted with considerable care as it is impregnated with several limitations. This particularly 
applies to comparative exercises. The major problem is the question of which type of assistance is 
considered to be democracy assistance and therefore included in the dataset. As mentioned 
above, donors can and do define democracy and democratization differently. While they overall 
agree on several central elements of democracy assistance, like electoral assistance, they do not 
necessarily have the same view on whether other elements, like rule of law, human rights, civil 
society, and administrative reform should be included in or excluded from the category of 
democracy assistance and therefore reported on in the same or separate datasets. A related 
problem is that hardly any donor is very explicit about its applied or underlying definition of 
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democracy assistance and that it therefore frequently remains obscure what is exactly reported 
on. Obviously, comparisons of datasets of different donors can therefore be problematic. 
A second major and related difficulty concerns the question of categorizing different sub-
types of democracy assistance. On the one hand, there is the more basic issue of selecting these 
sub-types. Donors are using different sub-categories, which, again renders comparisons difficult. 
Further, individual donors have frequently not used the same sub-categories in different reports 
on their democracy assistance programmes, have changed their categorizations in subsequent or 
parallel reports, or have used entirely different sub-sectors in programming and implementation 
documents, which makes it difficult to present aggregate data, trace evolutions, and assess 
implementation. On the other hand, there is the question of allocating projects (or even 
programmes) to different sub-categories. Donors have overall not provided their staff with 
relevant categorization criteria, which can render attributions slightly arbitrary, especially if 
individual projects and programmes pursue multiple objectives and more than one categorization 
is in principle possible or if project names do not really reflect the focus of activities. Clear 
instructions for those who are categorizing would help ensuring a more precise presentation of 
actual activities of donors. 
Next to these main problems, there are several other issues that need to be born in mind 
when working with quantitative data on democracy assistance. During the early years of 
democracy assistance, that is, until the early-mid 1990s, reporting was rare and information is 
therefore often not available or incomplete. Since then most donors have published regular 
reports, however, due the growth of the sector and high amount of information, these 
documents are now often rather general or just provide selective or descriptive data rather than 
being comprehensive and clearly breaking down data for different thematic foci or for individual 
regions and countries. Overall, public donors, especially states and international organizations, 
which underlie stronger accountability rules, are usually better at providing data than private 
organizations. Some donors provide comprehensive and, as they claim, complete lists of projects 
funded by the particular donor during a particular period of time. These provide very detailed 
information, however, in order to give a useful insight into a donor’s activities by sector and 
country or region, which can be used as basis for assessments and/or future policy decisions, 
they would need to be complemented by analytical sections, which are often missing.  
Another problem relates to the fact that donors run various democracy assistance 
programmes, some of which are more clearly marked as such while others only have smaller 
democracy assistance components and run under more general titles. In reports reference is often 
only made to the first type of programme, like the EIDHR, while others are being neglected. This 




either represent budgetary allocations, that is, (legal) pledges to provide a certain amount of 
funding during a particular period of time, usually a budget year, or expenditure during a certain 
period of time, that is, data on actually disbursed funds. Both are imported sources of 
information and together provide a complete picture of donor activities. Commitments and 
disbursements should in the long run more or less overlap, however, budget allocations and 
expenditure differ in individual years due to natural and unnatural delays in project 
implementation, which renders comparisons difficult. Natural delays result from the amount of 
time needed to implement projects, while unnatural delays result from inefficiencies in 
administrative actions. Some budgeted allocations will usually not be spent due administrative 
mismanagement or due to the fact that difficult situations in target states make implementation 
impossible. One problem of donor data is that it often does not clearly indicate whether it relates 
to commitments or expenditures.  
 A quantitative data source analysts of democracy assistance have increasingly drawn from 
is statistical databases of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).511 They contain statistics on aid flows from all international donors to developing 
countries in different thematic sectors. The data are provided on an annual basis by the various 
international donors themselves, but are controlled by the OECD to conform to certain 
definitional standards. They are available online and therefore easily accessible.  
 Reporting to the OECD on aid flows has not always been covered all flows, but has 
increasingly done so. The completeness of data on commitments has improved from 70 % in 
1995 to over 90 % in 2000 and has nearly reached 100 % from 2003 on. Reporting on 
disbursements has been around and over 90 % since 2002, since when data on disbursements is 
available online.512 For the period since 2000 and 2002, respectively, OECD data therefore 
provides a reliable and valuable source of information, while data for the preceding period still 
helps to get insight into donor activities, but has to be read with the awareness of its limitations.  
The thematic categories on which aid flows are reported are predetermined by the OECD 
and include sectors like social infrastructure, economic infrastructure, production (agriculture, 
industry etc.), and humanitarian aid. The OECD sector that is usually made recourse to when 
reporting on democracy assistance is ‘governance and civil society’. It forms part of the broader 
sector on social infrastructure and consists of two main sub-categories, ‘government and civil 
society – general’ and ‘conflict prevention & resolution, peace & security’. Although studies often 
provide overall data on both categories, it is more accurate to focus on the first category only and 
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to leave aside the second, as the latter constitutes a different thematic topic that can clearly be 
distinguished from democracy assistance.  
 The category ‘government and civil society – general’ has since 2009 comprised the 
following eleven sub-sectors: (1) public sector policy and administrative development; (2) public 
financial management, (3) decentralization and support to sub-national governments; (4) anti-
corruption organizations and institutions; (5) legal and judicial development, (6) democratic 
participation and civil society; (7) elections; (8) legislature and political parties; (9) media and free 
flow of information, (10) human rights; (11) women’s equality organizations. Before that year it 
used slightly different sub-categories, in particular, category (1) was reported on in two separate 
sub-categories (‘economic and development policy and planning’ and ‘government 
administration’) and categories (3), (4), and (8) were not reported on separately. Lack of data for 
certain years in statistics is therefore to a large extent due to the new organization of categories in 
2009 (as well as, of course, lack of aid flows). While the addition of more specific sub-categories 
has to be welcomed, the merger of public sector policy and government administration into a 
very comprehensive category runs counter the aim of providing a more detail insight into donor 
activities.  
 It should at this point be stressed that a major problem with the use of OECD data on 
‘government and civil society – general’ for democracy assistance is the broad thematic scope of 
the category. While definitions of democracy assistance definitely vary, most agree that fields like 
‘public sector policy and administrative development’, ‘public financial management’, 
‘decentralization and support to sub-national governments’, and ‘anti-corruption organizations 
and institutions’, and ‘human rights’, while overlapping with democracy assistance, go beyond the 
meaning of the term.513 When using OECD data, the broader scope of assistance reported on 
needs to be kept in mind and, as will be seen below, individual sub-categories can be used to 
construct the category of democracy assistance.  
 The geographical coverage of OECD data is slightly complex as it has undergone several 
changes during the last two decades. Since 2005, the databases only include data on so-called 
official development assistance or ODA, which are flows to developing countries that are 
included in the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients.514 This list includes all least, low and middle 
income countries, which are countries that, for example in 2008, had an annual per capital GNI 
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of less than about 11500 US$, are not members of the G8, the EU, or had a firm data for EU 
accession. Aid flows to, for example, Russia and the CEECs, albeit small or inexistent, are 
therefore not reported on. The list currently comprises about 155 low- and middle-income 
countries and territories. During 1993 and 2004, the OECD additionally operated with a second 
list of aid recipients that received so-called official aid (OA) and comprised of more advanced 
developing countries and most countries in transition from Communism, in particular the 
CEECs and the Western NIS Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Other former Soviet states had from 
the early 1990s on been included in the list of ODA recipients. Data for OA is not accessible 
anymore today which makes it, for example, impossible to identify aid flow to the Ukraine before 
2005 from the OECD database. Further, during the last two decades many countries shifted from 
one group to the other, graduated from the ODA list, or were added to the list. All in all, when 
extracting data for individual years or periods, it is necessary to keep these changing geographical 
scopes in mind.515 
 
b) Some Statistics on Democracy Assistance by Major Donors 
 
The following tables provide data on democracy assistance by the major Western donor 
countries. Table 2 shows the strong increase in US democracy assistance expenditure during the 
period 1990-2005, which rose from about 128 million US$ in 1990 to about 902 million US$ in 
2005. The data represented in the Table was extracted for an academic study from records held in 
USAID databases, using a clear and specific definition of democracy assistance rather than 
providing data collected and categorized by the donor itself.516 It therefore constitutes a highly 
valuable source, which is, due to the complex and time-consuming collection method, rarely, if at 
all, available for other donors. Table 3 provides data on US democracy assistance during the 
period 2006-2010, representing net costs, that is, costs of operating USAID’s objectives in the 
sectors ‘democracy and human rights’ (until 2006) and ‘governing justly and democratically’ (since 
2007), as provided by USAID itself in its annual financial reports for the years 2006 to 2010.517 
Finally, Table 4 represents the distribution of USAID democracy assistance among the major 
thematic sectors for the entire period 1990-2005, again using data collected for the just 
mentioned academic study.518 
                                                     
515 See the History of DAC lists of ODA recipient countries at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/55/0,3746,en_2649_34447_35832055_1_1_1_1,00.html (last accessed on 
28.12.2011). 
516 Azpuru, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, at 151-2. USAID, Final Report: Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on 
Democracy Building. 
517 http://www.usaid.gov/performance/afr/index.html (last accessed on 4.5.2011). 





Table 2: US (USAID) Democracy Assistance 1990-2005 (expenditure; in million US$)519 
 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
US$ (mill.)  195.70 259.82 352.56 414.37 483.34 418.10 446.30 
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 1990-2005 
555.92 520.18 539.59 549.17 753.62 817.22 1134.44 901.94 Total: 8470.35 
 
 
Table 3: US (USAID) Democracy Assistance 2006-2010 (total costs; in million US$)520 
 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006-2010 
US$ (mill.) 1014 1303 1410 1753 1768 7694 
 
 
Table 4: Distribution of US (USAID) Democracy Assistance  
1990-2005 by major Sectors (expenditure; in million US$)521 
 
Sub-Sector US$ (mill.) % of Total 
Election 1190.43 14.1 
Rule of Law 1611.95 19.0 
Governance 2494.20 29.4 
Civil Society 3173.77 37.5 
Total 8470.35 100 
 
 
Table 5, available on the next page, provides data on democracy assistance in million Euros by 
major European donor states during the period 1999 to 2006.522 The data stems from reports by 
donors themselves and therefore relates to democracy assistance as defined by the individual 
donors rather than by a standardized definition. Comparisons within the Table are therefore 
problematic and it should rather serve to give some general indications on commitments (and in 
the case of Denmark on expenditure) by European states. Blanc fields indicate that no data has 
been available.  
 Finally, Tables 6 and 7, printed on the next page, provide data on ODA commitments 
and expenditure in the OECD sector ‘government and civil society – general’ (excluding the 
fields ‘conflict, peace and security’) by the major Western donor states of democracy assistance 
for all developing countries during 2005-2009 and 2002-2009, that is, for those years for which 
data is available in the OECD statistical databases.523 As mentioned, the sector ‘government and 
civil society – general’ is broader than the majority of definitions of democracy assistance. 
However, it allows comparing the level of engagement of the various actors.  
                                                     
519 Azpuru, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, at 153. 
520 http://www.usaid.gov/performance/afr/index.html (last accessed on 4.5.2011). 
521 Azpuru, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, at 157. 
522 Data for the Table has been extracted from a FRIDE study: Youngs (ed.), Survey of European Democracy Promotion 
Policies 2000-2006.  













































and rule of 
law 
governance 
1999   123     
2000 180    90   
2001 250  163  117 70  
2002 290   75 129 97 86 
2003 350 276 189 64 153 103 81 
2004 360 413  42 162  62 
2005  346  158 159   
2006  508  154    
 
 
Table 6: OECD ODA Commitments in the Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – general’ by major 




1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Australia 11 82 75 78 180 108 107 116 281 456 
Canada 130 147 76 129 142 144 113 160 203 266 
Denmark 58 51 71 37 76 47 122 98 128 125 
Germany 35 7  33 156 148 185 234 295 348 
Japan 312 229 26 16  60  26 140 130 
The 
Netherlands 
106 184 65 76 79 189 147 283 315 264 
Sweden 104 148 197 140 129 119 163 162 255 292 
UK 120 148 107 263 281 424 456 509 550 704 




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Australia 372 512 482 782 820 4462 
Canada 388 394 690 554 458 3994 
Denmark 228 111 214 344 245 1955 
Germany 383 570 823 933 992 5142 
Japan 102 309 250 209 82 1891 
The 
Netherlands 
228 457 351 494 398 3636 
Sweden 529 634 367 454 542 4235 
UK 967 804 583 2052 1300 9268 




                                                     
524 Youngs (ed), Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000-2006, in particular, at 20, 39, 89, 120, 140, 167, 188, 
and 216. The acronyms mentioned in the Table refer to the following ministries and development agencies: BMZ 
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung); DfID (Department for International 
Development); SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency); MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Danida 
(Danish International Development Agency). 




Table 7: OECD ODA Disbursements in the Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – general’ by major 




2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Australia 107 176 223 364 469 569 560 483 2951 
Canada 94 142 171 250 273 370 430 410 2140 
Denmark  80 76 90 114 158 160 213 891 
Germany 129 216 275 373 563 700 884 952 4092 
Japan 2 147 110 70 243 267 218 98 1155 
The 
Netherlands 
170 205 242 256 295 344 397 368 2277 
Sweden 155 197 259 274 457 488 498 534 2862 
UK 340 430 567 729 891 1125 1391 803 6276 





Chapter 2 has provided an overview of selected, major questions concerning the phenomenon 
and study of democracy assistance. Familiarization with these topics and the related academic and 
policy-oriented literature is a precondition for the more detailed study of EU democracy 
assistance.  
The Chapter has first addressed the evolution of democracy assistance at the international 
level. It pointed to numerous individual examples of democracy assistance throughout the first 
six decades of the 20th century, like under W. Wilson and J. F. Kennedy and as part of 
decolonization, which did not amount to long-term policies though. The Cold War, opposition 
by target states, the prevalence of the modernization theory, as well as the more limited number 
and appeal of liberal democracy accounted for this lack of development. The provision of 
political aid by the German political foundations in the early-mid 1970s is usually seen as the start 
of the current more widespread and long-term use of democracy assistance. The US, which 
frequently stood out as key actor in the evolution of the policy tool, followed suit in the early-mid 
1980s by creating the NED and starting to provide democracy assistance through USAID. Its 
policy shift was initially the result of strong anti-communism and soon driven, against the 
background of transitions in Latin America, by Wilsonian ideas. European actors only entered the 
stage in the early 1990s, once the Cold War was over, the third wave had swept over Central and 
Eastern Europe, and a new development credo had taken root. Since then, democracy promotion 
has remained a foreign policy objective of basically all liberal democratic state and democracy 
assistance a major tool thereof, as evidenced by increasing aid budgets, a stabilization of actors, a 
geographical spread of activities, and increasing professionalization in the sector. At the same 
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time, it has always faced and is again increasingly facing opposition from authoritarian target 
states that are using various means to hinder the implementation of projects on their soil.  
Secondly, Chapter 2 has introduced two ideal typical approaches to democracy assistance, 
as suggested by Thomas Carothers: the political and the developmental approach. The political 
approach focuses on the central institutions and processes of a liberal democratic system of 
government and primarily supports political parties, civil rights focused (advocacy) NGOs, the 
media, parliaments, and (with limitations) rule of law development. The developmental approach 
avoids such political work and rather focuses on broader, underlying structures and less politically 
active bodies. It supports governance reform (leaving aside the political sphere), capacity 
building, decentralization, rule of law reform, civil society development in the socio-economic 
sector, and human rights. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. For example, the 
political approach points to the core issues of democracy and democratization, but might be too 
confrontational for some dictatorial regimes and risk the expulsion of actors. The developmental 
approach highlights the need of broader and long-term reforms for democracy to take root and 
survive, while bring criticized for doing everything else than promoting democracy. While the 
first is primarily associated with the US and the second with European policies, in practice, both 
are found on each continent and major actors usually pursue a combination of both. Donors 
pursing the one or the other approach, or mixes thereof, can learn from each other and strife to 
better coordinate their activities. The diversity is to be considered positive in view of the 
complexity of democratization processes and lack of knowledge about the best course of action.  
Thirdly, Chapter 2 has shed light on the possible motivations underlying democracy 
promotion and assistance. It has distinguished between value rational/ethical motives and 
instrumental motives. In the case of value-rational motives donors engage without self-interest 
but in order to assist people to achieve the only legitimate form of government as well as the best 
form of government. Democracy is widely considered the only acceptable form of regime as it 
realizes the values of human self-determination or autonomy and of equal human worth and 
dignity. Further, it is considered the best form of government as it produces better policies, has 
higher levels of regime acceptance, and higher levels of human rights protection. In the case of 
instrumental motivations, donors are lead by their own interests rather those or only those of 
target states. The most known positive externalities of democratic systems are free trade and 
positive climates for foreign investment, security due to the democratic peace theory, and lower 
rates of (illegal) migration. In practice, donors will usually be influenced by both types of 
motivations.  
 Fourthly, the Chapter has addressed the question of legality of democracy assistance and 




international law. More specifically, questions concerning types of government are no longer 
within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction and various forms of external involvement on the topic 
therefore permissible. A right to democracy is emerging as human right, which rests on both, 
state practice since the early 1990s, as well as on provisions of the ICCPR (in paraticular Article 
25 ICCPR). At the same time, certain restrictions on external democracy assistance are 
permissible, like the prohibition of foreign donations to political parties. A different question 
concerns the legitimacy of democracy assistance or the acceptability of such assistance by the 
target state and/or its population. As donors always work with a particular model of democracy, 
legitimacy can be achieved by a strong involvement of the recipient in the design of assistance 
strategies.  
 Fifthly, Chapter 2 has addressed questions of the effectiveness of democracy assistance. It 
has shown that despite increasing efforts in devising evaluation tools, evaluators do still struggle 
with developing the best methodologies to assess democracy assistance projects and 
programmes. Problems in particular relate to questions of definitions of democracy and 
democratization. Existing studies have come to different results on democracy assistance’ 
effectiveness. Qualitative studies have largely only found modest effects or such limited to 
specific sub-systems of democracy. At the same time, some quantitative studies have shown 
positive results of programmes, like of USAID democracy assistance during the 1990s.  
 Finally, Chapter 2 has pointed to some existing limitations in the presentation of 
quantitative data on democracy assistance. Most notably, donors use different definitions on 
democracy assistance and therefore do not report on exactly the same phenomenon, which 
renders comparisons difficult. Additionally, many donors lack to specify what exactly they are 
reporting on. Similarly, often sub-sectors of democracy assistance differ from donor to donor or 
even with different donor reports, which makes comparisons difficult. Frequently donors do not 
specify whether they are reporting on commitment or expenditure data. Finally, while the OECD 
database on aid provides a valuable source that allows easy access to data of all major donors, 
democracy assistance is not one of its aid categories, but the broader category of ‘governance and 
civil society’ has to be used as most approximate category.  
 Having these limitations in mind, the Chapter has concluded with some data on 
democracy assistance by major international donors. The various Tables indicate the constant 




































Chapter 3 introduces the topic of EU democracy assistance. It adopts a chronological approach 
and outlines the emergence and evolution of this particular policy instrument from the mid-1980s 
until today, differentiating between eight subsequent stages. Each stage is dominated by one or 
more particularly important developments as regards the instrument, which was defined in the 
framework of various EU policies, like the EU’s external human rights and democratization 
policy, development policy, and regional policies like the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). While references to these broader policies are made, the focus of Chapter 3 is mainly on 
the tool of assistance.  
The evolutionary overview sheds light on several more specific questions concerning 
democracy assistance. It presents the various actors that have played a crucial role in the 
emergence and development of the instrument and mentions the major disputes and discussions 
among the numerous EU institutions that have moved the policy instrument forward. It 
highlights the motivations that underlie EU democracy promotion, including assistance. It 
introduces the EU structure for providing democracy assistance, that is, the various types of 
programmes that fund EU democracy assistance projects. Further, it focuses on the EU’s 
approach to democracy assistance and aims to discover whether EU actions can rather be 
attributed to the so-called developmental or political approach to democracy assistance. Finally, 
Chapter 3 aims at working out the model of democracy that underlies EU action.  
 Chapter 3 mainly draws from policy documents published by the various EU institutions 
over the last decades. The development of EU democracy assistance constitutes an interesting 
and important topic that should not be missing in a broadly conceived study of EU democracy 
assistance. At the same time, this chapter addresses many programmes, actors, and issues that will 
reappear and be discussed in more detail in following chapters and therefore serves as useful 





II. The Major Stages in the Development of EU Democracy Assistance 
 
1. The Pre-1990s: The Late Emergence of EU Democracy Promotion and Assistance  
 
a) The Absence of EU Democracy and Human Rights Promotion before the mid-1980s 
 
Chapter 2 has outlined that the US developed an external human rights policy in the 1970s, even 
if this policy had a one-sided focus on civil rights and was criticized for incoherence in 
application in different countries. The major tools of the new US policy were political 
conditionality and the financing of projects to promote human rights abroad. Inspired by the 
German Politischen Stiftungen, which had started to provide democracy assistance in Southern 
Europe in the mid-1970s, in the early-1980s the US also began to additionally support 
democratization processes through assistance. Thomas Carothers identified these latter events as 
the start of the current ‘wave’ of democracy assistance.527  
The EU – then still the European Economic Community (EEC), but usually more simply 
referred to as European Community (EC)528 – and European states lagged behind these 
developments. Their political, economic, and development relations with third states 
overwhelmingly disregarded questions of human rights and of regime type up to the mid-1980s 
or they responded weakly when in a problematic situation.529 Development aid was basically 
exclusively of socio-economic nature, lacking tools like conditionality or support for human 
rights and democratic development. In the case of severe human rights abuses in some African 
states in the 1970s, like in Uganda in 1977, the EC responded with strong hesitation. It only re-
channeled assistance so that it would not contribute to further human rights abuses (referred to 
as ‘Uganda guidelines’), but did not suspend aid or interrupt trade relations, for which it was 
criticized.530 Next to a widespread absence of tools and their application, general policy-
documents were also not available that would suggest that democracy and human rights mattered 
in external relations. Overall, it is therefore not possible to identify an EC external human rights 
and democracy policy in the period before the mid-1980s. 
                                                     
527 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad, at 20f. 
528 European integration began with the foundation of three ‘European communities’ in the 1950s, of which the 
European Economic Community (EEC), frequently also just referred to as European Community (EC), was the 
most comprehensive one. It was formally renamed the EC by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The European Union 
(EU), founded in 1992, encompassed the supranational EC next to its two intergovernmental pillars. The Treaty of 
Lisbon, simplifying the structure, introduced the EU as the only name of the organization, replacing and succeeding 
to the EC.  
529 Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform, at 56; Marantis, at 5.  




The only exception to this pattern was political membership conditionality for states 
wishing to accede to the EC.531 The ‘Document on European Identity’ of 1973 by the heads of 
state and government of the Member States and the ‘Declaration on Democracy’ of 1978 by the 
– in the meantime institutionalized – European Council rendered explicitly clear that only 
democratic states could accede to the EU.532 This policy of membership conditionality did not, 
however, result in a broader policy of democracy promotion beyond the enlargement dimension. 
Further, unlike during the enlargement process to Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, the 
EC also did not support the democratization processes in Portugal, Spain, and Greece in the 
1970s and 1980s with democracy assistance measures, which could have been an early example of 
EU democracy assistance.  
The causes for the different approach and development of human rights and democracy 
promotion policies in the US and of European states are difficult to ascertain, but appear to be, 
on the one hand, that European countries lacked the particular driving forces that caused the 
start of democracy promotion in the US, in particular an equally strong anti-communism, a belief 
in the democratic peace theory, and a self-perception of having a moral imperative to bring 
liberty to the world. On the other hand, the memories of the events in Hungary in 1956 and of 
the Prague Spring of 1968, as well as Europe’s colonial past, rendered European political 
interference in Communist, Central and Eastern European countries and in developing countries 
more difficult than in the case of the US.  
 
b) Early, Isolated Examples of EC Democracy Assistance 
 
Despite the absence of a policy of EU democracy and human rights promotion before the mid-
1980s, some individual, isolated examples of EC human rights and democracy assistance can 
nevertheless be identified that should eventually play important forerunner roles. These early 
initiatives can be traced to the European Parliament, which, as the only democratically – and 
since 1979 directly – elected EU institution, always considered itself in a prime position to bring 
questions of human rights and, increasingly, also of democracy, to the table.533 Arguably, its 
efforts were not only due to altruistic, normative reasons, but allowed the Parliament to develop 
                                                     
531 Pridham, G. (ed), Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (1991). 
532 Document on The European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers (Copenhagen, 14 December 
1973), Bull. EC 12-1973, at 118-122; Declaration on Democracy, Copenhagen European Council, 8 April 1978, Bull. 
EC 3-1978, at 5-6. See also the first stipulation of political conditionality as regards EC membership by the European 
Assembly in the so-called Birkenback Report of 1962.  
533 K. Smith, ‘The European Parliament and Human Rights: Norm Entrepreneur or Ineffective Talking Shop?, 




its role as an important player in the EU political system.534 The Parliament could create these 
early human rights and democracy assistance programmes without the need to convince the other 
institutions due to the budgetary powers it had gained in budget reforms in the early 1970s.535 
 Reference should first be made to the EC’s first human rights programme, ‘Subsidies in 
respect of certain activities performed by NGOs pursuing humanitarian aims and promoting 
human rights’, which first received an, albeit rather small, allocation in the 1978 budget.536 The 
programme had two tracks. First, there was a Community-internal focus, which mainly financed 
research activities on the human rights situation in the EC and the Member States537 and, later, 
also projects on racism and xenophobia.538 Secondly, it foresaw projects concerning third states 
that focused on the humanitarian field, torture victims, and political refugee organizations. 
Projects were, however, hardly carried out in the target states but overwhelmingly in the EC and 
foresaw, for example, support to rehabilitation centres for victims of torture. Both, the 
geographic as well as thematic focus was therefore much more limited than, for example, projects 
financed at the same time by the US and despite its strong efforts in developing an external 
human rights policy, the Parliament overall pursued a rather careful, non-intrusive approach.  
 The introduction of this first programme showed, on the one hand, that the Parliament 
carefully observed developments in the US, several of whose policy initiatives it copied, like 
assistance and reports on human rights that it started to publish in 1983. On the other hand, the 
focus on the EC-internal dimension reflected the growing importance accorded to human rights 
in the EC legal and political system. As is well known, in absence of a reference to human rights 
in the founding treaties, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) started to protect fundamental 
rights as fundamental principles of Community law from the late 1960s on.539 In 1977 the 
European Parliament adopted its first major political document on human rights, the 
‘Declaration on Human Rights’, with which the other institutions associated themselves. It 
confirmed the steps taken by the ECJ and expressed the importance the institutions attached to 
                                                     
534 R. Rack and S. Lausegger, ‘The Role of the European Parliament: Past and Future’, in P. Alston, with M. Bustelo 
and J. Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (1999), at 801.  
535 P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed., 2003), at 18. 
536 Budget line 293 of the 1978 budget. For the further development of the line, see Table A in the Appendix. 
537 The remarks in the budget envisaged projects with regard to “human rights and the European Community” and 
“with regard to human rights in the Member States [hic]”. Recall here the critical stance the Member State would 
eventually develop as regards EU human rights activities in the sphere of competence of the Member States, while 
this first programme envisaged also programmes “with regard to human rights in the Member States”.  
538 Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia of 1986 by all EC institutions, OJ 1986 C158/1.  
539 Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (3rd ed.), at 319f; G. de Búrca, ‘The Evolution of EU 
Human Rights Law’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (2nd ed., 2011), at 477; B. de Witte, ‘The 
Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, in P. Alston, with M. 




human rights as well as their willingness to respect those in the exercise of their powers.540 
Obviously, the new budget line should assist in the implementation of this objective.541  
 Secondly, in 1986, after some years of experience with the human rights programme, the 
European Parliament inserted the budget line ‘Community Aid to NGOs operating in Chile’ into 
the EC budget.542 The rather brief remarks in the budget for this line only referred to “support of 
activities carried out by NGOs operating in Chile and economic cooperation in light of political 
developments in the country” and were therefore ambiguous. Secondary sources mention that 
the projects were for the most part intended for and used for the support of and the 
strengthening of local democratic groups.543 Overall, the programme therefore appears to be the 
EC’s first, at least partial democracy assistance programme. It was endowed with a remarkably 
high budget, when compared to the human rights budget line (about 22 million ECUs between 
1986 and 1990), which underlined the high interest of the Parliament in the programme.544 In 
1992 it confidently announced the “positive results” of the programme for the democratization 
process in Chile and used it as important argument for launching more programmes in the 
sector.545 During 1986 and 1990, the line for Chile remained the only form of external democracy 
support through assistance by the EC. It was to be implemented without the formal agreement 
with the government of the target states, which should eventually became a core defining feature 
of the specific democracy assistance programmes. The EC had by that time gained experience 
with disbursing funds directly to NGOs in the framework of development aid. 
 The question remains why the EC’s first democracy assistance programme should have 
been implemented in Chile. Indeed, the EC was not the only supporter, but Chilean opposition 
within and outside Chile received considerable support from a high number of European and 
other states as well as international organizations.546 The reasons were the intensive contacts 
between European political leaders and numerous exiled Chilean opposition politicians residing 
in Europe and the intensive lobbying of these individuals. Further, the widespread condemnation 
of Augusto Pinochet’s regime and the small geopolitical importance of Chile facilitated the 
adoption of such a programme, which was in the mid-1980s still inconceivable in many other 
parts of the world. It was also mentioned that there were no conflicts as regards the model of 
democracy aspired to by the Chilean opposition.547 
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 Next to assistance, the Parliament also pushed for the use of political conditionality. It, in 
particular, called for the inclusion of human rights clauses in external agreements, like the ACP 
Convention. When the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 gave the Parliament the right to 
assent to association agreements, it was willing to use this leverage to insist on an inclusion of 
such clauses.548 
 
c) A Soft Start of the EC’s External Human Rights Policy: The Statement on  
Human Rights within European Political Cooperation in 1986 
 
By the mid-1980s, pressure to make a formal declaration as regards the role of human rights in 
EC external relations was high, given the international system of human rights protection, US 
policies, the demands of NGOs and public opinion, as well as the growing importance of 
fundamental rights within the EC. In July 1986, the first general statement of principle on an 
emerging external human rights and democratization policy was adopted by the twelve foreign 
ministers of the EC Member States, meeting within European Political Cooperation (EPC), the 
forerunner of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The main elements of their first 
‘Statement on Human Rights’ have remained valid until today: 549 
 
“They reaffirm their commitment to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and emphasize the importance in this context of the principles of parliamentary 
democracy and the rule of law…The Twelve seek the universal observance of human 
rights. The protection of human rights is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world 
community and of national individually. Expressions of concern at violations of such 
rights cannot be considered interference in the domestic affairs of a State…The 
promotion of economic, social and cultural rights as well as of civil and political rights is 
of paramount importance for the full realization of human dignity.”  
 
The document was definitely groundbreaking as regards the new role human rights should play in 
external relations and the new limits on state sovereignty it expressed.550 The explicit reference to 
‘parliamentary democracy’ in the context of human rights promotion made it clear that 
democracy promotion was encompassed. At the same time, however, the statement expressed 
some limitations to the new policy that suggested only a beginning, soft turn, rather than a strong 
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shift. Most importantly, it only envisaged soft forms of human rights and democracy promotion, 
like monitoring by international organizations, the issuing of declarations, and diplomatic 
missions. More intrusive instruments like conditionality, sanctions, and assistance were, despite 
the existing and just referred to programmes, not mentioned. The document also did not yet 
speak of democracy and human rights as principles of EU external policy, but only generally 
referred to their promotion. 
 
To sum up, there was no EC external human rights and democratization policy before the mid-
1980s. In 1986, a soft turn towards such policy occurred, which, however, initially only envisaged 
the use of rather soft tools, like diplomatic measures. Additionally, ever since the early 1970s, the 
European Parliament pursued its own agenda in developing an external human rights policy for 
the EC. Most notable in this respect was the creation of the first human rights assistance 
programme in 1978 and the first, at least partial democracy assistance programme in 1986. 
 
2. 1990-1992: The Start of EC Democracy Assistance 
 
a) The European Parliament and Democracy Assistance in Latin America  
 
The ‘Statement on Human Rights of 1986’ did not result in the development of democracy 
assistance programmes through the EC. Initially the European Parliament remained the main 
actor pushing the development of the policy instrument ahead. It kept allocating increasing funds 
to the programme for NGOs in Chile as well as, albeit less, to the human rights line of 1978.551 
Additionally, in 1989 it decided to establish yet another democracy assistance budget line for 
Latin America. ‘Democracy in Chile and Central America’, which was first mentioned in the 1990 
budget, had a very clear and explicit focus on democratization and was initially endowed with – 
for that time – remarkable 10 million ECUs per year, which soon also increased.552 Already from 
1991 on, the programme supported democratization-related projects in numerous Latin 
American states.553  
 By 1990 the EC therefore financed two democracy support programmes in Latin America 
and therefore in the same region where US democracy assistance had started. Obviously, the 
advance of democracy in Latin America and the resulting positive, receptive environment and 
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demand for democracy assistance played the main role for the start of EC democracy assistance 
in that region, next to the already mentioned specific reasons for aid to Chile.  
With the continuing support for existing and the creation of new democracy assistance 
programmes, the Parliament also confirmed its interest in and support of this policy tool. It is 
also remarkable that in 1990 the EC spent more for democracy than human rights assistance, 
although it was the human rights agenda that in the 1970s and 1980s appeared to have developed 
ahead of democracy promotion – internationally and in the EC. 
 
b) 1990: The Real Beginning of the EC’s External Human Rights and  
Democratization Policy 
 
Before EC democracy assistance should also be provided in regions beyond Latin America, some 
major developments – entirely unexpectedly – took place between mid-1989 and mid-1990, 
which created entirely new conditions and caused not only a European, but also an international 
move to (more or more extensive) human rights and democracy promotion policies. Most 
notably, as outlined in Chapter 2, the third wave of democracy swept over Europe and parts of 
Asia and Africa and resulted in numerous new (liberal) democracies that not only welcomed but 
also asked for democracy assistance. Further, the end of the Cold War allowed open engagement 
in human rights and democracy promotion and did not longer allow authoritarian states to play 
Western states and the Soviet Union against each other. At last, a new credo in development 
policy became – relatively quickly – widely accepted, which suggested good governance, and as 
part of it, democracy, as a condition or even pre-condition of successful socio-economic 
development.554  
 It has been mentioned in Chapter 2 that these events were followed by explicit 
declarations on pursuing external human rights and democracy policies by a large number of 
European states, beginning with a British statement in June 1990 and one declaration of the 
Nordic countries in September 1990.555 Also at European level intensive discussions took place 
throughout mid-late 1990 about how to proceed in this considerably changed environment.556  
The Dublin European Council of June 1990 was preoccupied with decisions on launching 
an intergovernmental conference (IGC) on Political Union to prepare the next step of EC 
integration. It mentioned that the future CFSP, to be elaborated in the IGC on Political Union, 
should, amongst others aim at promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. This was 
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eventually indeed included in primary law. However, the Dublin European Council did not 
express itself on the immediate consequences of the new international environment for the EC’s 
policy on external human rights and democracy promotion.557 It only briefly referred to 
strengthened support for “human rights” and “sound government management” in the context 
of developments in South Africa.558  
It was again the foreign ministers of the EC Member States meeting in the framework of 
EPC during the Rome European Council in December 1990, which adopted a statement that 
called for an immediate strengthening of the EU’s external human rights and democracy 
promotion policy. Their new ‘Statement on Human Rights’ of 1990 repeated the major general 
guidelines of the homonymous statement of 1986, stressed the relevance of democracy as equally 
important issue as human rights, and mentioned the “interrelationship between democracy, 
human rights, and sustainable development” as a new, central idea of the Member States’ and the 
EC’s development policies.559 It therefore first established the link between development and 
democracy promotion that was to remain an important framework for the further evolution of 
both fields.  
 
c) 1991: The Elaboration of Principles and Tools for the New Policy by the EC 
 
Following the crucial human rights document by the EC foreign ministers in December 1990, the 
EC institutions intensified their efforts in elaborating the new policy agenda. Most EC institution 
issued a key policy document during 1991, which focused on various issues. 
 
i. The Commission 
 
In March 1991 the Commission published its first communication on ‘human rights, democracy, 
and development’ (SEC(91) 61 final), which presented ideas for a “general line of conduct” for 
the new policy. It incorporated ideas by the Member States and the Parliament, in particular by 
the latter’s then still relatively young Sub-committee on Human Rights. A meeting of all major 
actors in late 1990 had overall revealed considerable agreement among all actors on the emerging 
policy.560  
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In hindsight, the most remarkable feature of SEC(91) 61final is that it, at a very early 
stage in the development of the policy, addressed a whole range of questions that continued to be 
crucial until today. Examples include the issue of coherence between different EC policies, 
consistency with the actions of the Member States, the importance of good governance reform 
(which it called “transparency and accountability of government”), and the role of civil society. It 
stipulated that “(D)emocracy cannot be imposed from outside nor can it take root without 
domestic structures” and that the EC should not aim at promoting a “European ‘model’ of 
democracy…but should offer those countries the benefit of its own experience”. It suggested 
that democratization and/or democracy involved the respect for fundamental rights, the opening 
of political dialogue, free elections, and a pluralist society, which was of course a selective 
enumeration.561 As regards motives for the new EC policy, the communication mentioned, quite 
uniquely, the demand by European public opinion to take human rights seriously.562  
COM(91) 61 final also elaborated on the instruments of democracy and human rights 
promotion. It introduced the distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ tools that should later 
also be adopted by the Council and explicitly added political conditionality, dialogues, and human 
rights and democracy assistance, which it called “support for democratic adjustment”, to the list 
of tools. It did not go into detail as regards the possible programmes of assistance, their 
geographical or thematic focus and overall did not really suggest making it a primary tool in the 
promotion of democracy and human rights.  
 
ii. The European Council 
 
The subsequent June 1991 Luxembourg European Council adopted a ‘Declaration on Human 
Rights’, which for the first time confirmed that human rights were not only one of the 
cornerstones of European cooperation but also of the external relations of the EC and its 
Member States at the level of heads of state and government of the Member States.563 It stressed 
that this implied an “attachment to the principles of parliamentary democracy and the primacy of 
law”, confirming that the topic of democracy was part of the human rights agenda.  
 The declaration gave strong political support to the ongoing real policy-shift and 
approved of the use of more intrusive policy instruments like political conditionality clauses. It 
did, however, not elaborate on democracy assistance as new EC tool. It confirmed the link 
between human rights, democracy, and development and mentioned that respect for human 
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rights and the presence of a democratic system of government was an “essential prerequisite of 
sustained social and economic development”. While not explicitly providing a definition of 
democracy it referred to pluralism, a constitutional framework, responsible government, free and 
fair elections, and the recognition of the “legitimate importance of the individual in a society” as 
crucial elements of a democratic system.  
 
iii. The European Parliament 
 
In November 1991 the European Parliament largely welcomed the Commission’s 
communication SEC(91) 61 final, which was in line with its own policy preferences.564 Indeed, 
the Parliament had long called on the Commission to develop such communication.565 The most 
interesting aspects of the resolution was the call on the Commission to elaborate criteria and 
means for assessing the respect for democracy and human rights and to determine in which 
circumstances which types of sanctions would be applied.566 It thereby highlighted the potential 
problem of objectivity in the use of negative tools. Surprisingly, the Parliament did not discuss 
and elaborate on democracy assistance, although it was at that time the main promoter of this 
tool. 
Indeed, the Parliament continued its own efforts of building EC democracy and human 
rights assistance programmes and envisaged two new programmes in the 1992 budget. First, it 
established a new budget line for human rights and democracy promotion for developing 
countries, which should be implemented in view of SEC(91) 61 final. No specific thematic focus 
was defined. Secondly, it determined that 5 million Euros of the overall amount allocated to the 
Phare programme, that is, the main socio-economic assistance programme for Central and 
Eastern European countries that had started in 1990, should to be used for democracy support 
projects in these countries.567 The funds should in particular be used for parliamentary 
institutions and civic education, however, not for partisan activities or election-related 
assistance.568 The lines constituted the first examples of EC democracy assistance beyond Latin 
America and marked the beginning of the creation of programmes for all major world regions. 
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iv. The Council 
 
The various documents and discussions throughout 1991 culminated in the adoption of the 28 
November 1991 resolution on ‘human rights, democracy and development’ by the Council and 
the ‘Member States meeting in the Council’. The resolution should become the guiding policy-
making declaration for democracy promotion for the EC and its Member States throughout the 
following decade and even beyond. It should be mentioned though, that the resolution’s main 
focus was on new aspects of development policy and that it also included sections on good 
governance and military spending. The Council therefore developed the policy of democracy and 
human rights promotion as part of development policy. This was, on the one hand, justified by 
the perceived positive link between two fields and, on the other hand, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
influenced by questions of EC competence to act in the field of human rights and 
democratization. 
 The resolution – further on referred to as 28 November 1991 resolution – was quite 
comprehensive and included many issues that had also featured in some of the above discussed 
documents. It confirmed that human rights were cornerstones of EC integration and of EC 
external relations and stressed that this included an attachment to the principles of ‘representative 
democracy’ as well as, as novelty to earlier documents, the rule of law.569 It generally noticed the 
complexity of democratization processes, which could take a long time, was driven by local 
actors, and could only be supported from abroad.  
 The largest part of the resolution was devoted to instruments of democracy promotion. 
Differentiating between the suggested positive and negative approach, it declared a clear 
preference for the positive, encouraging approach. It elaborated on various instruments that 
should further be developed, including open and constructive dialogues, conditionality clauses, 
and incentive conditionality.570 It discussed the steps to be taken in the case of grave and 
persistent human rights violations and interruption of democratic processes, provided a list of 
negative measures, called for objectivity and confirmed the Uganda guidelines of 1977, that is, the 
rule to divert aid away from governmental channels to the population.571  
 Important for the subject of this thesis, the 28 November 1991 resolution also expressly 
identified democracy and human rights assistance as major positive tool of the new EU policy. It, 
however, disregarded the existing budget lines of the Parliament and rather called for the 
mainstream development programmes to devote funds to the objectives of human rights and 
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democratization.572 Existing and new assistance regulations should therefore be adjusted to these 
objectives. The Council stated that both, projects suggested by governments as well as projects 
suggested and implemented by NGO, would be supported.573 It suggested possible fields of 
support, like elections, the setting-up new democratic institutions, the strengthening the rule of 
law, the judiciary, the administration of justice, crime prevention and the treatment of offenders, 
and for the promotion of the role of NGOs.574 A year later, when considering the 
implementation of the 28 November 1991 resolution during 1992, the Council added the 
promotion of a free press and other media, the participation of minorities in political processes, 
and support to political exiles wishing to return to their country of origin to the list, which gave 
more weight to the ‘political’ features of EC democracy assistance.575  
 It has been mentioned above that the 28 November 1991 resolution also elaborated on 
the concept of good governance, which should continue to remain an important element of 
development policy until today and should later become a core field of democracy promotion. 
Importantly, the 28 November resolution of the Council and Member States introduced the 
broad understanding of this concept, which encompassed a democratic system of government, 
human rights, the rule of law, as well as sound public administration and economic and social 
policies.576  
 
Overall, following the soft turn towards a policy of external democracy and human rights 
promotion in 1986, in 1991 a much stronger move was made in that direction. Various important 
statements at the highest political level, including by the European Council and Council, 
confirmed that democracy and human rights promotion were new objectives of EC external 
action and should be pursued through a mix of positive and negative tools. It culminated in the 
express mentioning of the objectives in the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. Overall, for conceptual 
reasons as well as for reasons of unclear competences, the EC policy of human rights and 
democracy promotion was developed within the framework of development policy. Democracy 
assistance was one of the various tools discussed in 1991, when the new policy skeleton was 
fleshed out. The Council confirmed its use in November 1991 within the framework of 
mainstream development programmes. At the same time, the Parliament continued to create 
external human rights and democracy programmes for specific geographical regions.  
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3. 1993-1996: The Parallel Development of Democracy Assistance in Mainstream  
Development Programmes and Specific Programmes 
 
The 28 November 1991 resolution of the Council and the Parliament’s decision to continue 
inserting human rights and democracy assistance budget lines into the EC budget laid the 
foundation for the parallel development of democracy assistance programmes within the 
mainstream development programmes and as part of specific programmes. This parallel system 
continues to be characteristic of EU democracy assistance today.  
 
a) Democracy Assistance as Part of Development Programmes and within CFSP 
 
Following the Council resolution of 28 November 1991, which had envisaged democracy 
assistance as part of general development programmes, the various assistance regulations and, in 
the case of the ACP countries, the external agreements underlying these programmes, started to 
be adapted to the new policy objectives. The beginning was made with the main assistance 
regulation for Latin America and Asia of 1992 (the ALA regulation), which was comparatively 
outspoken on this policy goal and reflected the more easy implementation of the new policy 
objectives in receptive states and regions.577 Most other regulations were endowed with relevant 
provisions in the mid-1990s. Most notably, Tacis 1996 included an unequivocal reference to 
democracy promotion;578 the revision of Lomé IV in 1995 resulted in strengthened provisions on 
democracy promotion; and the launch of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ in 1995 brought a 
political dimension to EU-Mediterranean relations, with the new MEDA programme (1996) 
explicitly foreseeing democracy promotion and assistance (even if, only generally and vaguely).579 
All in all, in 1996 all external assistance regulations and the revised Lomé Convention referred to 
the objective of democracy promotion and foresaw, albeit to different extents, democracy 
assistance.  
Pending these amendments or the adoption of new regulations democracy assistance 
could already be provided under the various programmes as long as this could somehow be 
justified by the text of the regulation, for example, through a broad interpretation of objectives 
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like institutional reform. At times the Parliament demanded, in its remarks to the respective 
budget lines, that some of the funds committed for mainstream programmes should be used for 
democratization-related objectives.580 Overall, as shown in Chapter 8, commitments for 
democracy assistance under the mainstream programmes increased very slowly. Only by 1999 did 
commitments under the mainstream programmes exceed commitments under the specific 
programmes established by the Parliament and only by 2004 was there a visible increase in 
expenditure. 
Brief reference should at this point also be made to the very limited democracy assistance 
activities under CFSP. The TEU, which had entered into force in November 1993 stipulated 
democracy promotion also as objective of the newly established CFSP. The Council aimed at 
using the new competences provided by the TEU to become active in the field. It deployed an 
EU election observation and assistance mission to the first multi-party elections in Russia in 
December 1993581 and to the first multi-racial elections in South Africa in April 1994.582 Lacking 
coherence, some of the actions were funded from first, others from second pillar funds.583 
Overall, they constituted a third framework for the provision of democracy assistance, which 
differed from the mainstream and specific programmes. Chapter 4 will show that they were 
legally problematic due to ex-Article 47 TEU, which demanded the TEU not to encroach upon 
the supranational pillar. In any case, they remained confined to few examples in the electoral field 
and to the 1990s.  
 
b) The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
 
Next to developing democracy assistance within development cooperation, the European 
Parliament continued to build its specific democracy and human rights assistance programmes 
and, in particular, to give it more visibility. This should be done through the creation of a 
common framework, which would encompass all existing and future specific programmes. The 
first suggestion for such framework was made in the Parliament’s resolution on a ‘European 
Democracy Initiative’ of June 1992.584 Inspired by the NED and the work of the German 
political foundations, to which the document referred to, the focus was on democracy rather than 
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human rights assistance. Human rights were, however, definitely included as well. The resolution 
was brief and lacked much in substantive content, like the definition of some common principles. 
It devoted, however, some time to outlining possible fields of support and mentioned support to 
parliamentary institutions, civic education, human rights, and civil society development. 
Assistance should be strictly provided on a non-party basis and should also not be disbursed to 
actors that held views contrary to key declarations of the Parliament, like on racism, xenophobia, 
women’s rights or religious freedom.585 NGOs and other non-for-profit groups should be eligible 
recipients, however, not governmental bodies. Surprisingly, the list was shorter than that of the 
Council in the 28 November 1991 resolution and its follow-up and, in particular, failed to refer to 
media support. With the exception of recipients of aid, the thematic focus of the specific and the 
mainstream programmes did not therefore differ. 
 Concrete actions to develop the ‘European Democracy Initiative’ further followed swiftly. 
The 1993 budget included an Article with the title ‘European Democracy Initiative’,586 without, 
however, allocating funds or enlisting other lines under this Article, except for a small line on the 
freedom of expression.587 In the following 1994 budget, the ‘European Democracy Initiative’ was 
renamed into ‘European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights’ or 
EIDHR, which did more justice to the fact that the initiative would also encompass the various 
existing human rights programmes and that some specific programmes encompassed both 
human rights and democracy, like the budget line for developing countries. The initiative was also 
upgraded to a separate Chapter – Chapter B7-52 – rather than just an Article and all existing 
specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes were shifted into the new Chapter 
B7-52.588 In 1997 the EIDHR was again upgraded to a separate Title – Title B7-7 – and the 
individual programmes became separate chapters of this title.  
 Further, the Parliament continued to add new budget lines for democracy and human 
rights assistance programmes into the budget, or increased the allocations for existing lines. The 
1994 budget first included a separate line for the Tacis Democracy Programme benefitting the 
states of the former Soviet Union589 and a Peace-building and Democracy Programme for the 
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former Yugoslavia. The 1996 budget introduced MEDA Democracy.590 By 1996, the Parliament’s 
specific democracy assistance programmes therefore covered all major world regions, with the 
major exception of Asia, where softer tools were initially favoured591 and for which a specific 
democracy assistance line was only created in 1998. Further, next to the regional programmes, 
during 1993 and 1996 several human rights lines, either concerning specific topics, like torture, or 
specific countries, like Turkey, were created.592 Overall, while the main, regionally focused 
democracy and human rights programmes were relatively stable, there was some volatility in the 
case of the second group. During 1993 and 1996 the combined budget of all democracy and 
human rights programmes nearly doubled and increased from about 44 to 85 million Euros. 
While the Parliament was the main driving actor in the development of the specific 
democracy assistance programmes, the Commission was implementing them and had to develop 
the necessary procedures. As different units responsible for specific geographical regions and the 
Commission’s Delegations were involved in the implementation processes, within a short period 
of time very diverse procedures had developed. Differences particularly related to the 
identification of beneficiaries (spontaneous applications versus calls for proposals), applications 
forms, the requirement of having a European partner or not, and criteria for the examination of 
projects. In 1994 the Commission started to harmonize some, but not all of these issues, 
especially by introducing common criteria for the submission of projects and common criteria for 
selecting projects.593 A leading role in this process was taken by the Standing Inter-departmental 
Human Rights Coordination Group, that had been founded in 1991, consisted of members of 
numerous Commission Directorates-General (DGs) and should ensure internal coordination and 
consistency as regards Community human rights policies.594 Next to facilitating the 
implementation of assistance through the harmonization of procedures, the process had more 
fundamental implications. It eventually, in the late 1990s/early 2000s, strongly facilitated the 
transformation of the numerous specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes 
into a single EIDHR programme.  
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c) Developing a Strategy for the EC’s External Human Rights and  
Democratization Policy 
 
In the mid-1990s, Commission also for the first time assessed the development of the EC’s 
human rights and democracy promotion policy and aimed to set out a strategy to better achieve 
its goals.595 It published its suggestions, most of which were welcomed by the other institutions, 
in COM(95) 567 final on ‘The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights 
Policy: From Rome to Maastricht and Beyond’.596 The document addressed the topic as 
independent policy, detached from development issues, unlike for example SEC(91) 61 final and 
other key documents published in 1991. The focus of COM(95) 567 final was rather on human 
rights, however, democracy promotion was as well encompassed. It did not specifically provide 
suggestions on how the tool of assistance, referred to as “financial allocations”, should further be 
developed. Nevertheless, the outlined three proposals for further action affected the further 
development of assistance and, in particular, the EIDHR. 
After a reiteration of some basic principles of the policy, like the indivisibility of human 
rights, the interdependence of human rights, democracy, and development, and the preference 
for a positive over a negative approach in human rights promotion, the Commission described 
initiatives under various tools, including assistance. It provided a list of 15-odd fields of 
engagement, like elections, civil society development, the media, good governance and the rule of 
law, all of which had already, although never as comprehensively, been mentioned in earlier 
documents. The list provided the blueprint for the later EIDHR regulations. It was not clarified 
though, whether some of these topics would only or rather be addressed under the mainstream 
or specific programmes.  
As indicated, COM(95) 567 final made three suggestions for the further development of 
the policy. First, against the backdrop of conflicts in the Western Balkans, the Commission 
suggested to engage more strongly in conflict prevention. Some conflict-related projects soon 
started to be financed under the EIDHR programmes, especially in the budget line for former 
Yugoslavia and, later, by the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM, 2001).597 Additionally, the future 
EIDHR regulations, first adopted in 1999, encompassed conflict prevention as one of the 
thematic fields of support. Secondly, in line with the growing international interest in election 
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support, the Commission argued that electoral support was one of the most effective tools of 
democracy promotion and made proposals to intensify action on election assistance as well as 
election observation. The suggestions for election observation were already relatively concrete 
and should soon give rise to specific activities, like the development of a common framework for 
EU election observation missions and the training of observers.598 Further, in 1997 a new budget 
line for election assistance and observation was inserted into Chapter B7-7 (EIDHR), whose 
initially low appropriations soon increased so strongly that the Parliament had to call for a 
limitation in the use of EIDHR funds for election observation.599 In 2000, the Commission 
published a separate communication on electoral support.600  
The third and last set of suggestions for further development concerned issues of 
programming and implementation as well as the improvement of individual tools. The most 
remarkable aspect of these suggestions is that they have reappeared again and again ever since 
COM(95) 567 final, including at the present time, suggesting that the underlying problems and 
concerns have not yet been sufficiently tackled. This in particular refers to the issue of the need 
for an in-depth analysis of the local situation in order to develop a targeted strategy for a state, 
the learning from evaluations, mechanisms for more rapid responses, for more transparency and 
interaction among all institutions at all stages of implementation, as well as the need to ensure 
consistency between EC and Member States’ activities. When speaking about improving 
individual instruments, COM(95) 567 final called for ensuring complementarity between 
mainstream and specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes in order to avoid 
duplication and to ensure continuity, without, however, in detail outlining ways for ensuring 
complementarity. When reflecting in more detail about their relationship, it suggested the use of 
the specific programmes for pilot, preparatory measures that could, if successful, be taken over 
by mainstream programmes. Reference should also be made to the call for an increased use of 
incentive conditionality, which is a different type of EU democracy promotion instrument, but 
can imply, however, the increased provision of democracy assistance.  
 Overall, during the subsequent years the proposals made by the Commission were 
implemented, like through a stronger focus on crisis management and electoral observation and 
assistance, the creation of the RRM and contingency reserve in the EIDHR to respond to 
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unforeseen needs, and the systematic inclusion of human rights clauses in external agreements.601 
Problems in implementation were addressed, but have stayed on the agenda ever since.  
 
In summary, from 1992 on the EC amended development assistance regulations to include the 
objective of democracy promotion and to foresee assistance. Concurrently, the Parliament 
continued to develop its specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes, which by 
1996 covered all world regions except Asia. It also created a common framework for all these 
programmes – the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights’ or 
EIDHR – that should until today remain the acronym for the EU’s specific democracy and 
human rights assistance programme. The mainstream and specific democracy assistance 
programmes had differences, like the role of the target states’ governments, but no distinctive 
character had yet developed. In particular, their thematic focus would appear to be identical. 
 
4. 1997-2002: The Consolidation of the EIDHR 
 
The late 1990s were crucial for the development of the EIDHR. It first faced a major challenge 
by some Member States, but was then provided with a legal basis in secondary law, turned into a 
single programme, and developed a specific character. The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 
and in force since 1999, strengthened overall the position of democracy and human rights in 
primary law. It did not have direct consequences for democracy assistance, but provided a 
stronger basis for EU democracy promotion. 
 
a) Challenging the Legality of the Specific Democracy Assistance Programmes602 
 
Following the creation of a single framework for all specific human rights and democracy 
programmes, the Parliament wanted to see the next step in the development of the EIDHR. It 
called on the Commission to provide a legislative proposal for a basic regulation for the various 
programmes, which had so far been implemented on the basis of the budget only. An act of 
secondary law would have provided the covered programmes with a more secure, longer-term 
foundation. The Commission, under no legal obligation to respond, did not act immediately. It 
was in favour of the programmes, however, in 1995 considered the relevant programmes to be 
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pilot actions that could eventually be subsumed under mainstream development programmes.603 
As such, they did not necessarily need a legal basis in secondary law, but could be implemented 
on the basis of the budget only. Lack of a clear legal framework also gave more freedom to the 
Commission in the implementation of the programmes. However, pressure began to mount, as 
Member States overall got increasingly critical with the Commission’s interpretation of ‘pilot’ 
and/or ‘preparatory’ actions. With a crucial case pending before the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ),604 which concerned EC programmes on poverty within the Member States, the 
Commission eventually also submitted a proposal for an EIDHR regulation in July 1997.605 
 The proposal, which definitely had several deficiencies and appeared hastily drafted, 
resulted in a major dispute between the Commission and the Council Legal Service on the scope 
of EC human rights competences (‘EIDHR dispute’). The dispute formed part of broader 
discussions on this topic, which emerged around the question of EC accession to the ECHR and 
also led to a case before the ECJ in which EC competence to include political conditionality 
clauses in external agreements was challenged. Some observers have argued that the crucial issue 
was EC competence in the field of human rights as regards the Member States, rather than the 
external dimension.606 The complex arguments of both sides in the EIDHR dispute are discussed 
in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say here that the Council Legal Service, pushed by some Member States 
and in particular the UK, basically argued that the EC did not have competence to adopt a 
regulation for independent democracy and human rights assistance programmes, like those under 
the umbrella of the EIDHR. It could only provide democracy and human rights assistance as part 
of ‘development cooperation measures’, in particular, the mainstream programme. Additionally, 
and going even further, the Council Legal Service also argued that any ‘political aid’, like electoral 
assistance, could only be provided under the second pillar – CFSP – and not by the EC in the 
framework of development policy. Such an interpretation stood in stark conflict to the actual 
practice of that time, both as regards the EIDHR programmes as well as democracy assistance 
und mainstream programmes, and definitely put some constraints on the EC’s external 
democratization policy.  
The dispute was eventually solved, largely in favour of a broad interpretation of EC 
human rights and democracy-related competences in EC external relations. In April 1999 the 
Council adopted two regulations that from then on provided the legal basis for the numerous 
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specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes: Regulation No. 975/1999,607 
covering developing countries, and Regulation No. 976/1999,608 covering all other third 
countries. The regulations are from now on referred to as 1999 EIDHR regulation for 
developing and third countries, respectively. The adoption of two identical rather than one single 
regulation was necessary because of the provisions of the ECT that did not allow for a different 
option. The decision of the ECJ in the mentioned crucial case on the definition of ‘pilot’ and 
‘preparatory’ measures – Case C-106/96 – in 1998 definitely speeded up the adoption process, as 
it endangered the further provision of assistance without secondary legal basis. The EIDHR 
regulations were initially valid until 31 December 2004, and then prolonged until 31 December 
2006.609  
The EIDHR regulations did not establish a single EIDHR programme, but constituted a 
further step in that direction. It was the first major policy-making document of secondary law on 
democracy assistance, at least as regards the specific programmes, and laid down some principles 
and common rules, including for the thematic scope of the programmes, eligible applicants, 
which as well as some procedural issues. The Council refrained from providing a statement of 
principle on some underlying concept of democracy as well as on some specific approach of 
democracy assistance to be pursued. Indeed, it did not really strongly develop a specific character 
of the EIDHR programmes in difference to the mainstream assistance programmes.  
 
b) The Transformation of the EIDHR 
 
By 1999 the EU budget envisaged about twelve different specific human rights and democracy 
assistance programmes that were implemented under the umbrella of the EIDHR. Some of them 
had a broad thematic and specific geographical focus and addressed a world region, a more 
confined region (like Southern Africa, 1998), or a specific country (Nigeria, 1999). Other 
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programmes had a more specific thematic focus, like on electoral support (starting with 
1997/1998), international criminal tribunals, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1997). 
Table A, provided in the Appendix, provides details on the exact development of these numerous 
programmes.  
The EIDHR regulations did not explicitly envisage any change to this structure of 
numerous programmes based on different budget lines, but was perfectly compatible with it. In 
other words, the EIDHR regulations did not per se create a single EIDHR programme. 
Nevertheless, already in 1999 the Commission started to embark upon a process of gradually 
transforming the numerous lines into such a single EIDHR programme with global applicability. 
The move was accepted by the other institutions. The Commission’s main motivation for this 
process was questions of management and aid implementation, as a single programme, a single 
programming document, and a single set of procedures would allow a quicker delivery of 
assistance, while using fewer Commission staff.  
The transformation of the EIDHR has in this respect also to be seen as part of a broader 
reform process in external aid, which had been started by the Commission of Jacques Santer, but 
was even more vigorously pursued by Romano Prodi,610 after numerous evaluations published in 
the late 1990s and 2000 drew a rather negative picture of EU aid programming and 
implementation.611 Major elements of the reform process were the stronger weight given to 
strategic programming, including through the introduction of a common framework for regional, 
country-focused, and thematic Strategy Papers (SPs), the creation of EuropeAid, which was 
entirely responsible for the implementation of assistance programmes (beyond programming), 
and the ‘devolution’ of powers and responsibilities to Commission – or, since Lisbon, Union – 
Delegations in third countries. 
The transformation process of the EIDHR, which took place from 1999 to 2001, 
expressed itself in three issues. First, the last remaining procedural differences in the 
implementation of the various programmes were abolished and, basically, the Phare and Tacis 
Democracy Programme-model was introduced for all. This involved, in particular, the use of calls 
for proposals612 and the use of the three project types, namely, macro projects, micro projects, or 
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targeted projects. In 1999 the first geographically quite comprehensive EIDHR call for proposals 
for macro projects was held, which covered all world regions except Latin America and the 
Mediterranean.613 It was followed by the first truly global call for macro projects in 2001.614 In the 
same year also the micro-project facility, first used in Phare countries in 1994, started to be 
extended to countries beyond the former Communist world, in particular also to China.615  
Secondly, in 2001 the EU budget for the first time allocated funds to broadly defined 
thematic fields, like democracy and human rights. As transitional arrangement, only the remarks 
to the relevant budget lines also allocated funds to individual regions or topics (Title B7-7 - 
EIDHR). From 2002 on, Title B7-7 only consisted of one broadly defined thematic line – for 
democracy and human rights – as well as very few, specific lines.616 The major implication of this 
change was that decisions on the regional distribution and, in part, on the thematic distribution 
were no longer taken by the Parliament in the budgetary process, but rather by the Commission 
and Council during programming.  
Thirdly, in 2001 the Commission first published a single EIDHR programming paper that 
addressed all previous separate lines in a single strategic document.617 Overall, programming had 
been neglected in the case of the specific democracy and human rights programmes during the 
1990s, with few programmes indeed developing short-to-medium term programming papers. 
Better, strategic programming, which was also one of the main suggestions of the broader 
external aid reform agenda, had to be welcomed. The development of a single EIDHR 
programming document made it very difficult to develop country-specific responses for each and 
every country covered by the EIDHR, as a single document could impossibly include individual 
strategies for more than 100 states.  
 
c) Identifying a Distinctive Character for the EIDHR 
 
During the process of transforming the EIDHR also questions on its specific character came to 
the fore, in particular, after criticism by the European Court of Auditors. In a special report on 
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EU democracy and human rights assistance of 2000, the Court could not identify a distinct 
identity of the EC’s special democracy and human rights programmes as compared to democracy 
assistance under mainstream programmes, and called for integrating the EIDHR into the 
mainstream programmes.618 Indeed, while the EIDHR programmes from the beginning on had 
some distinctive features, these had never been accentuated and were, in particular, also not really 
visible in the text of the EIDHR. In particular, it was hard to discern different thematic foci. 
 Aiming to preserve the EIDHR, the Commission responded swiftly to the Court of 
Auditor’s critique. On the one hand, it argued, just as in COM(95) 567 final, that the EIDHR 
could be used for testing assistance in new fields that could then be taken over by mainstream 
programmes (‘pilot projects’). On the other hand, the Commission pointed to specific features of 
the EIDHR, which had always been present but needed to be developed and expressed more 
clearly. Most notably, the implementation of the EIDHR did not require a formal agreement with 
the third state’s government, but provided funds directly to NGOs and other recipients.619 On 
the contrary, the programming of mainstream programmes envisaged cooperation and agreement 
with target states’ governments. The absence of this characteristic predetermined the EIDHR to 
work with partners that were not traditional partners in mainstream programmes, namely NGOs 
and, although secondarily, international organizations. Further, it allowed the EIDHR to fund 
projects in countries where the government opposed democracy assistance and would not accept 
it as part of development aid. It also allowed the EIDHR to implement projects where no general 
development programmes were implemented, for example where they had been suspended or 
where, due to crisis situations, no agreement could yet be made with a representative 
government. Finally, due to this feature, it was also the best possible source for the funding of 
certain activities, like EU election observation missions, which required a strong degree of 
independence from the third state’s government.620 
The EIDHR was subsequently developed further in the outlined direction. When the 
EIDHR regulations were amended and prolonged in 2004, provisions on EIDHR programming 
were inserted, which explicitly excluded governmental participation in the programming 
process.621 This does not mean though that third states are not aware or informed about the 
programme, or that the EU does not seek tacit agreement or acceptance in order to facilitate 
implementation. Further, the nature of the EIDHR as civil society programme was increasingly 
stressed. Already the EIDHR call for proposals for macro projects of 2001 limited the scope of 
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eligible applicants compared with the 1999 EIDHR call, by no longer mentioning public 
authorities, even if they were in principle eligible under the 1999 EIDHR regulations. The 2006 
EIDHR regulation wrote this shift clearly into secondary law. It stressed that the EIDHR was 
primarily a civil society instrument, to be implemented and to focus on civil society development, 
and no longer mentioned public authorities as eligible applicants and restricted the eligibility of 
parliaments.622 Data on EIDHR implementation throughout the 1990s confirms this 
development, with increasing flows to civil society development and elections and decreasing 
flows to sectors like the judiciary, public institutions, anti-corruption measures, and 
parliaments.623 However, a strong overlap in the thematic focus of both types of programmes, 
EIDHR and mainstream programmes, remain characteristic of EU democracy assistance. Despite 
the elaboration of specific features of the EIDHR, it was also after 2001 not possible to clearly 
attribute the EIDHR and the political and mainstream programmes to Thomas Carother’s 
developmental approach of democracy assistance.  
 
d) Rendering the EIDHR More Strategic 
 
Beyond the changes to the EIDHR outlined in previous paragraphs, two further modifications 
were introduced in 2001. Like some of the other reforms, they responded to the critique of the 
Court of Auditors and of independent experts, who had traced ineffective EC external human 
rights and democracy assistance policies to an unfocused, broad approach, in particular as regards 
the EIDHR. 
First, rather than covering a large number of third states, the EIDHR should, except for 
some global campaigns, concentrate on a limited number of focus countries, where most projects 
should take place. The selection of focus countries did, however, not prove a successful strategy 
and was soon again abandoned in favour of the earlier broader geographical focus. Secondly, 
rather than covering a broad thematic spectrum of projects, the EIDHR should focus on a 
limited number of thematic priority areas. This definition of thematic priorities has remained a 
feature of EIDHR programming until today, but was not without problems.  
The selection of thematic priority areas was useful for those themes, which the EU 
wanted to promote at a global level through global campaign, like raising support for the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). It was problematic as regards support to democratization 
processes in individual countries. The argument, recognized by the EC, that each state faced 
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different problems, followed its idiosyncratic path to democracy, and required a specific 
response, called for the selection of thematic foci for individual countries rather than the 
definition of a limited number of global priorities that would then be pursued in all states. Global 
priorities suggested the use of a one-size-fits-all strategy valid for all countries without sufficient 
regard being given to the specific needs of the target states.  
Without explicitly mentioning them, the Commission addressed these limitations from 
the beginning. On the one hand, the selection of thematic priorities was not done in a top-down 
fashion in Brussels, but on the basis of input from Commission Delegations. This should lead to 
the result that the global priorities were nothing more than the sum of the target states’ priorities 
and that the global EIDHR strategy incorporated the required numerous individual country 
strategies. In practice, such global strategy could of course never do justice to the required needs 
of all covered states or replace individual, tailor-made approaches. On the other hand, should the 
global EIDHR strategy not prove suitable or sub-optimal for a particular state, delegations were 
given the possibility to adjust the priorities to local circumstance in the case of local calls for 
proposals. In other words, delegations could identify different priorities from the ones in the 
EIDHR programming documents. This could also result in weaker actions than intended by the 
Commission headquarters.624 Overall, this possibility was an implicit recognition of the limitations 
of the global approach. It should be added that many of the so-called priorities of the EIDHR 
were not priorities at all, as they were extremely broadly formulated. This, of course, strongly 
reduced the strategic character of EIDHR programming documents. 
The absence of democracy- and human rights-specific country strategy papers that define 
thematic priorities for particular states has only more recently been a core point of discussion 
among the EU institutions. The issue is now being addressed through the elaboration of general 
country-focused ‘human rights strategies’ for most, and eventually all third states. Their exact 
impact on EIDHR programming and the question of general priorities cannot yet be determined.  
 The just outlined suggestions on EIDHR strategy-making were published in the 
Commission’s second major communication on the EC’s external human rights and 
democratization policy: COM(2001) 252 final on ‘The European Union’s Role in Promoting 
Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries’.625 This document did not aim to rewrite 
the policy, but, again, just to suggest some improvements and to outline reforms already being 
implemented. It was strongly inspired by the Report of the Comité des Sages to the European 
institutions on the future human rights policy of the EU of 1998 and applied some of that 
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report’s core ideas specifically to the external dimension.626 Both, Council and Parliament highly 
welcomed the Commission’s suggestions.  
While a major part of the communication was indeed concerned with the EIDHR and 
proposals to render it more strategic, other sections dealt with the questions of coherence and 
consistency in EU human rights and democratization policy, that had already been raised in 1991 
and 1995. The term coherence was applied to the EC context, that is, to the consistent use of 
different EC instruments of democracy promotion and to consistent EC policies. The term 
consistency rather applied to the relationship between EC and Member States’ policies. Means to 
ensure both were more intensive cooperation by institutions and other actors at all stages. 
Further, COM(2001) 252 final introduced the idea of “mainstreaming” human rights and 
democracy concerns into all EC policies. This should, initially, in particular be realized through 
increasing activities under two existing democracy promotion instruments: dialogues and 
assistance. Existing political dialogues should systematically address human rights issues and 
more specific human rights dialogues should be set up. Purpose, procedure, and principles for 
these dialogues were in more detail laid down in special guidelines by the Council.627 Importantly, 
dialogues should also serve for identifying possible fields for democracy and human rights 
assistance. Mainstreaming as regards assistance mainly called for increasing commitments for the 
field under the general development programmes. COM(2001) 252 final also called for an 
increasing use of the tool of incentive conditionality, that is, to reward positive performance as 
regards the protection of human rights with more aid. Finally, it rejected the idea of setting up a 
separate European Human Rights Agency, either as monitoring or implementing body in the 
field of external human rights and democracy promotion. The Commission considered existing 
sources of information as sufficient and the newly founded EuropeAid Cooperation Office as a 
more appropriate body to implement EC assistance programmes.  
It has been mentioned above that the European Parliament and the Council welcomed 
COM(2001) 252 final and supported its proposals. Going beyond the text of this communication, 
the Council stipulated to explore the idea on an EU ‘Common Strategy on Human Rights and 
Democratization’, which would, as common strategy by the European Council in the sense of ex-
Article 12 and 13 TEU, outline principles and guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy that would, however, also affect all external policies. It was never adopted, but the idea 
would later resurface.    
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e) Focusing on Election Support 
 
While the EC started to embark upon the mentioned major reform of the management of 
external assistance in the late 1990s, it hardly engaged in more detail with thematic issues and/or 
individual sub-fields of democracy assistance. For example, it aimed at promoting civil society but 
did not elaborate on the concept in order to devise clearer strategies on how to proceed. Such 
exercises, a foundation for informed policy-making and implementation, only gradually and in an 
unsystematic fashion started to be carried out during the 2000s.628  
 An exception to the lack of more detailed thematic engagement in the late 1990s was the 
EC’s intensive discussion of election support, which COM(95) 467 final had identified as a major 
future priority.629 By the late 1990s, commitments for election assistance had increased and more 
and more EU Election Observation Missions (EU EOMs) were deployed, however, in an ad hoc 
and inconsistent fashion, which increasingly led to critique and also had some negative 
international repercussions.630 COM(2000) 191 final provided a plan on how both types of 
democracy support, which were by then conceptually clearly distinguished, should be developed 
further and improved.631 Overall, the publication more strongly focused on election observation, 
for which the Council had already decided some policy guidelines in 1998 and early 1999.632 
While making numerous suggestions on individual features of election observation, the 
Commission also suggested ‘supranationalizing’ EU EOMs and concentrating its management in 
the Commission’s hands. The Council was critical of the prospect of a reduced role in EU EOMs 
an only approved the reforms after ensuring its participation in the selection of countries to 
which EU EOMs would be sent and stipulating that it retained the right to become active under 
CFSP.633 Similarly, the Parliament insisted on one of its members acting as chief observer in EU 
EOMs.634 Overall, the discussions were reminiscent of the EIDHR dispute. A further 
consequence of the reforms was the exclusive use of EIDHR funds for EU EOMs.635 The 
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growing commitments for election observation had negative consequences for EIDHR 
democracy assistance, as its relative share of the EIDHR consequently decreased.  
 The Commission envisaged a similar structure for election assistance as for EU EOMs, 
that is, the deployment, upon request, of a team of experts that would ‘assist’ the government of 
a third state or its central election commissions in the preparation and execution of different 
types of electoral processes. The Council, however, preferred election assistance to be part of 
mainstream development programmes and to be planned and implemented in the framework of 
existing tools and procedures. The Commission’s intervention module and guidelines for election 
assistance therefore never became operational. A delayed result of the conceptual engagement 
with election assistance was the development of a guidebook on election assistance by Europeaid, 
that should assist Commission staff in the formulation and identification of election assistance 
programmes.636  
 To defend itself from criticism of electoral ‘fallacy’, the Commission clarified from the 
start that free and fair elections were just one – albeit an important – step in democratization 
processes, but would not suffice to make a country democratic. 
 
f) Addressing Conceptual Issues (in the ACP Context) 
 
So far, none of the institutions had explicitly and intensively addressed conceptual questions 
concerning the ideas the EC was promoting, in particular as regards democracy. Numerous core 
documents in the field had made references to elements or basic principles of the democratic 
system of government the EU envisaged to support in third states, like to elections, civil society, 
free media, political pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law, without, however, defining 
some of these partly ambiguous sub-concepts further or elaborating on their relationship and 
comparative relevance.637 Some documents mentioned qualifiers, like ‘parliamentary’ or 
‘representative’ democracy, again without defining them in more detail.638 A major reason for the 
hesitation appears to be the fear of being criticized for promoting a specific, in particular, a 
‘European model’ of democracy, which the Commission declined to do already in 1991 and to 
which the other institutions agreed.639 Rather, each country was to develop its own model, which 
best suited local circumstances.640 
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 In a hitherto unique exercise, the Commission embarked upon elaborating the four 
concepts democracy, rule of law, human rights, and good governance in some more detail in 
1998.641 The result was not necessarily entirely clear, comprehensive, and unambiguous, however, 
it exposed the concepts in a clearer way than any earlier document. The Commission aimed 
particularly at clarifying the concepts for EC-ACP relations in view of the revised Lomé IV 
Convention (of 1995) and the planned Cotonou Agreement (of 2000). The latter eventually 
indeed included many provisions that could be traced back to the Commission’s deliberations. 
However, it strongly appears that the Commission intended its statements to have broader 
relevance and application.642 
As regards democracy, the Commission first clarified that it was preferable to speak of 
‘democratic principles’ rather than ‘democracy’ in order to stress that there were more models of 
democracy, all of which were based on a set of core principles which could be considered 
universally recognized. The EC aimed at promoting these underlying principles rather than a 
specific model. Differentiating between three ‘fundamental characteristics’ – legitimacy, legality, 
and effective application – the Commission proceeded with outlining the essential principles of 
democracy, which can be summarized as follows: 
Legitimacy: Public authority derives from citizens selecting leaders in free and fair  
elections; 
Legality: refers to the rule of law, which implies that there is an appropriate, constitutional 
and regulatory system that applies to all citizens, and that all internationally recognized 
human rights are protected; 
Effective Application: involves human rights promotion and protection, there is a separation 
of powers, participation at national, regional, and local level (consultation and 
administrative decentralization), political and institutional pluralism (political parties, civil 
society, independent media), and transparency and integrity of public institutions.  
A separate section elaborates on the concept of the rule of law in more detail. It suggests a broad 
meaning, encompassing the formal and material dimension, and refers to the division of power, 
an independent judiciary, access to justice, a prison system respecting the human rights, and a 
police force acting within the law. Human rights are broadly and generally defined as all rights 
included in international and regional agreements. Good governance was defined as broadly as in 
the 28 November 1991 resolution of the Council and Member States. It encompassed a 
democratic, human rights-protecting system of government, next to the management of “public 
                                                     
641 Commission Communication to the Council and the Parliament, Democratization, the Rule of Law, Respect for 
Human Rights and Good Governance: the Challenges of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP 
states, COM(98) 146. 




affairs in a transparent, accountable, participative and equitable manner showing due regards for 
human rights and the rule of law”.643 
Overall, the outline of the concept of democracy did not reveal any new, surprising 
issues. The large majority of the elements had already featured in earlier publications. The only 
issues that had not been accorded a prominent position before was the idea of decentralization, 
in particular, the participation in policy-making processes not only at national, but also regional 
and local level. In the development context, the idea of decentralization was considered central 
for increasing the effectiveness of socio-economic assistance, as involving the local population in 
policy-decisions should improved assistance projects. However, in other dimensions, like in the 
context of the Council of Europe, which elaborated a separate Charter on local self-government, 
decentralization has a much more fundamental purpose and is seen as realizing the idea of 
democracy.644 
 In the same document in which the Commission outlined the concept of democracy, it 
also made some statements on EU democracy assistance. It mentioned that democratization was 
a long and complex process involving all forces in society and requiring reform at different levels 
– the state and civil society. It also required a genuine political resolve by leaders and ownership 
by citizens or, at least, their substantial participation.645 It stressed differences in various states, 
which needed to be taken into account in specific, targeted programmes.646 However, the 
Commission also argued that several issues may be considered priorities in all states and can 
therefore be considered a standard block of EU democracy assistance. The provided list 
enumerated more or less the same topics that had been mentioned in other documents before: 
constitutional reform, judicial reform, administrative decentralization, support for legislative 
power, budget supervision and monitoring, regional human rights systems.647 
 
In summary, the period of the late 1990s and early 2000s was crucial for the development of the 
EIDHR. During that time, it was confirmed as a crucial external democracy promotion 
instrument and some of its features were accentuated and further developed to give it a unique 
identity. By 2001, the EIDH operated as single, external programme covering all world regions. 
While this increased its visibility and simplified its management, it had the disadvantage that it 
further removed EC practice from the development of individual country strategy papers for 
democracy and human rights assistance.  
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5. 2003-2006: The Growth of Democracy Assistance in Mainstream Programmes 
 
In November 1991 the Council had decided that democracy assistance would be provided as an 
element of mainstream development programmes. Subsequently, assistance programmes were 
adjusted accordingly and commitments under mainstream programmes increased, albeit rather 
slowly. Between 2000 and 2005 EU democracy assistance as part of mainstream programmes 
surged as part of a new interest in good governance and special initiatives to that end.  
 
a) Confirming the Role of Democracy in Development 
 
Two crucial policy documents in the field of the EC’s development policy published in 2000 and 
2006 confirmed the EC’s belief that democracy mattered for successful socio-economic 
development. First, in November 2000 the Council and the Commission adopted a joint 
statement on ‘[T]he European Community’s Development Policy’, which became the crucial 
policy document for the subsequent years.648 It mentioned that the EC aimed at promoting 
‘sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development’, which included the 
‘promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance’. The statement 
did not elaborate in detail on democracy assistance, but identified ‘institutional capacity building’, 
including support for the working democratic institutions, good governance, the fight against 
corruption, and the rule of law, as one of six priority areas of EC assistance.  
Secondly, in early 2006 the Council, the Member States meeting within the Council, the 
Parliament and the Commission adopted the ‘European Consensus on Development’, which was 
to become the guiding policy document for the EC’s and the Member States’ development 
policies from that date.649 The first part of the document more generally outlined the EU’s vision 
of development; the second part more specifically concerned EC development policy. 
Democratization was seen as element of sustainable development and as essential condition for 
successful socio-economic development. Democracy was declared to be a ‘common value’ of the 
relations between the EU and developing countries that should be promoted in various ways. 
Some of the more specific policy suggestions related to the stronger use of dialogues, including 
for the purpose of identifying fields of democracy assistance, the importance of the participation 
of civil society in democracy promotion, and the increasing ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights and 
                                                     
648 Statement by the Council and the Commission: The European Community’s Development Policy, 2304th Council 
Meeting, Doc. 12929/00, 10.11.2000. 
649 European Parliament, Council, Commission, Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of the 
governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on 




democracy, in particular through increasing commitments for democracy assistance under 
mainstream development programmes. The Consensus did not specifically address democracy 
assistance, but referred to election and parliamentary support as examples thereof. Overall, the 
Consensus provided a very strong basis for EC democracy promotion and its further 
development, especially as part of mainstream development programmes.  
 
b) The Governance Agenda 
 
Next to the just discussed general documents in the field of EC development policy, the 
increasing focus on good governance from 2003 on played an important role for the increase in 
commitments for democracy assistance as part of mainstream development programmes during 
the nouthies and beyond. The topic of governance and good governance was of course not a new 
one, but had formed part of EC development policy since 1991. Many subsequent policy 
documents had referred to it and some external agreements accorded it a prominent position, like 
the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which made it a ‘fundamental element’ – not an essential 
element though.650 Influenced by the new focus on governance by many international 
development actors as well as the discussion on governance reform within the EU in the early 
2000s, in 2003 the Commission elevated the issue to a core new topic in the EC’s development 
policy, which was welcomed by the Council and the Parliament.651 Good governance should be 
promoted through several existing tools, such as increased discussions of governance issues in 
political dialogues, or through increased assistance for reforming key aspects of governance. 
Additionally, important new initiatives were launched, like specific governance initiatives and 
facilities that combined elements of incentive conditionality and assistance and, in part, reserved 
fixed shares of available development budgets for assistance in the field of governance reform. 
Another important feature of these new initiatives was a more intensive engagement with the 
thematic elements of governance and, consequently, the fields of assistance.  
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 The reason why democracy assistance benefited from this new focus on good governance 
was the conceptual overlap of the two topics. Good governance had always been defined broadly 
and thereby encompassed a democratic system of government, even if the concepts in many 
documents feature alongside each other and therefore suggest more separate meanings. COM(98) 
146, which not only intensively engaged with the concept of democracy but also with 
governance, defined governance as describing “the exercise of political, economic and 
administrative power in the management of public affairs”. Based on this definition, good 
governance was the management of “public affairs in a transparent, accountable, participative 
and equitable manner showing due regard for human rights and the rule of law”. It was 
considered to have two dimensions, the so-called ‘political dimension’, which related to strictly 
political action, including the system of government, and the – somewhat ambiguously called – 
‘institutional dimension’ that related to the management of economic and social resources.652 
Documents developed in the framework of the mentioned governance initiatives in the mid-
2000s explicitly enumerated principles of constitutional democracy (including the separation of 
powers, the role of parliaments, political pluralism), electoral processes, and fundamental 
democratic freedoms as core fields of good governance.653 Overall, the promotion of good 
governance therefore includes the promotion of democracy. 
 
i. The Democracy Facility  
 
The development of governance facilities was preceded by one very specific effort for promoting 
democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean that had a very short life span. In 2003, 
following a relatively negative report on the state of democracy in the Arab world by UNDP, the 
Commission made several proposals for rendering its democracy promotion policy in the region 
more effective.654 Many of the issues were repetitions of earlier ideas, like more discussions on 
human rights issues in dialogues, more democracy assistance under MEDA, and more coherent 
and consistent policies. The Commission also made two important new proposals, however. 
First, it called for a better assessment of the situation in third states and called on heads of 
Delegations to draw up so-called Human Rights Fact Sheets, which would also receive input 
from the Council Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM). Secondly, it suggested a new 
incentive conditionality tool that would provide additional assistance to those states that 
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committed themselves to carry out reforms in the field of human rights and democratization. The 
implementation of this – later – so-called Democracy Facility involved the drafting, in 
cooperation with the national authorities of the target states, of national Action Plans or 
Strategies on Human Rights and Democracy. These plans were to identify reform needs, goals, 
and clear guidelines and benchmarks for reaching them.655 Countries willing to agree on such plan 
and to implement them would receive extra funding on top of regular MEDA funds. The 
Democracy Facility was only implemented during the last year of operation of the MEDA 
programme, when two countries received additional funding (Morocco and Egypt).656 It was 
already repealed in 2007 by the ENPI Governance Facility.657 
  
ii. The ACP Governance Initiative 
 
In 2006 the Commission first outlined details on ongoing efforts to establish a so-called ACP 
Governance Initiative that should, similar to the Democracy Facility, provide additional 
assistance to states willing to carry out reforms in key areas of – this time – governance.658 
Incentive conditionality or the promise to receive more assistance in exchange for reforms was 
not new in EC-ACP relations. Already between 1995 and 2000 the EC provided extra funding 
for ‘institutional and administrative reform’ under the EDF for countries willing to engage in 
such reforms.  
 The ACP Governance Initiative, which is still being used, operates in a similar way as the 
outlined Democracy Facility. The Commission establishes a so-called governance profile for a 
third state, which outlines the situation and trends in a particular state in nine core areas of 
governance. The template for such profile has been developed by the Commission, which drew 
from a similar model used in the World Bank. The finalized profile is then discussed with the 
government of the target state, which should consequently elaborate a ‘development plan’ – now, 
a so-called ‘Governance Action Plan’ (GAP) – that identifies the recipient state’s reform 
strategy.659 The GAP is annexed to the EU’s general aid programming document for that 
particular state, the Country Strategy Paper. The Commission’s decision on whether and how 
much extra funding a state receives is based on the governance profile and the GAP. The 
additional funds have to be use for the suggested reforms in the field of governance. The 
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Commission has stressed the element of discussing the reform agenda of GAPs, which it 
considers a crucially important exercise in the process. Accordingly, it has also not stressed the 
incentive part of the tool, but spread assistance broadly among most countries, so that they can 
implement the agenda of the GAP.  
 Overall, while the ACP Governance Initiative is an incentive instrument, its 
implementation renders it highly important for the instrument of democracy, human right, and 
good governance assistance. It reserves a stable share of the EDF for governance reform and, 
moreover, elaborates a detailed strategy for each state. Indeed, between 2008 and 2013 about 2.7 
billion Euros were earmarked for the Governance Initiative.  
 
iii. The ENPI Governance Facility 
 
In parallel to the development of a governance tool for ACP states, the Commission also 
elaborated a specific governance tool for the states covered by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) that was launched in 2003.660 As incentive tool that promises more assistance as 
reward for implemented reforms, the ENPI Governance Facility shares several features of the 
ACP Governance Initiative, but also has some special, different elements. It stresses the incentive 
component over assistance and the rewards progress over planned reform agendas.  
 The Governance Facility is firmly integrated into the ENP and largely operates on the 
basis of the various ENP documents. Rather than developing specific GAPs, the ENP Action 
Plans take their place. These document outline the reforms an ENP partner state intends to 
implement in the medium-term. They do not include separate sections on governance reform, 
however, address governance issues in various chapters, in particular in the section on ‘Enhanced 
political dialogue and reform’.661 When deciding whether a country should receive extra funding 
in addition to its general share of ENPI funds, the Commission primarily analyses its regular 
Progress Reports on ENP Action Plans in order to assess a country’s progress. Because, as 
mentioned, ENP Action Plans and Progress Reports do not systematically address governance 
issues, the Commission uses a set of 50-odd indicators for governance and checks the situation in 
each.  
 Between 2007 and 2013 about 300 million Euros were earmarked for the ENPI 
Governance Facility. Unlike the case of the ACP Governance Initiative, funds are not spread 
widely, but, out of principle, not more than two states should benefit under the programme in 
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one year. The envisaged extra funding is therefore considerably higher than under the ACP 
initiative. Moreover, while it is encouraged to use the funds for governance reform, this is not a 
precondition for the receipt of the incentive tranche. 
 
iv. Democracy as Part of Governance Profiles and Indicators 
 
It has been argued that the ACP Governance Initiative, while being an incentive instrument, can 
also be considered a democracy, human rights, and good governance assistance tool. It reserves a 
stable and considerably high share of EDF funds – between 2007 and 2013, about 12% of the 
entire amount – for governance assistance projects. Further, it provides this assistance on the 
basis of detailed strategic documents, elaborated by the target states’ governments, on the basis of 
assessments by the Commission.  
 The mentioned governance profiles elaborated by the Commission give quite a detailed 
insight into the Commission’s idea of what a democratic system of government, which the EC 
assists to develop and consolidate, entails. Further, compared to the Commission’s elaboration of 
the concept of democracy in COM(98) 146, the governance profiles is less abstract, but very 
concrete. Overall, the Commission assesses the situation in nine fields of governance. Two of the 
nine core fields of governance relate directly to democracy: (1) ‘Political/democratic governance’ 
and (2) political governance/rule of law. Both are subdivided into various thematic sub-sections. 
In the case of the first, the Commission assesses a country’s situation as regards: (A) human 
rights, asking, amongst others, whether the major international and regional human rights 
conventions have been signed and ratified and whether public “watchdog” institutions, like 
Ombudsmen, function effectively; (B) fundamental freedoms, asking whether freedoms like the 
freedom of movement, expression, thought and religion, assembly and association are guaranteed 
and exercised; (C) the electoral process, analyzing, in quite some detail, elements of the last major 
election, like the voter registration system, the validation of election results, and the existence of 
local observer organizations; (D) principles of constitutional democracy, encompassing questions 
regarding the constitutional separation of powers, the exercise of powers by the parliament 
(control of executive, budgetary and legislative powers), the existence of political pluralism, in 
particular through representative political parties, and the civilian and democratic control over the 
security apparatus. The second block, relating to the rule of law, assessed the situation as regards 
the type or types of judicial systems, the independence of the judiciary, the performance of the 
judicial system, access to justice and the rights to a fair trial.  
Other identified core fields of governance relate to government effectiveness, economic 




fundamental ILO conventions had been ratified, whether there were HIV/Aids policies, and 
whether there were efforts in the sector of gender equality), the regional and international context 
(for example, migration policies), and the quality of dialogue with the EU (which mainly relates to 
aid programming, including the involvement of civil society). Some of these other sectors may 
touch on the democratic system, in particular the social dimension and the dialogue, but do not 
define it.  
The 50-odd indicators used in the case of ENP states overall cover the same sectors. 
Overall, the enumeration of the elements of democracy as part of good governance reveals no 
surprising features, except for its comprehensiveness and detail. At its core, the EU envisages the 
construction of liberal democracies that consist of the minimum procedural conditions identified 
by Robert Dahl: free and fair elections, freedom of information and expression, and the freedom 
of association, which are guaranteed in a rule of law system that consists of an independent 
judiciary and protects a broad range of human rights. Different from documents more closely 
related to the EIDHR, the governance profiles do not put a particular emphasis on the role of 
civil society in democratic processes.  
 
From 2003 on the foundations were laid for a further increase of democracy assistance under 
mainstream development programmes. This happened in the framework of a renewed, strong 
interest in good governance, which, conceptually, incorporated a democratic system of 
government. The EU developed and put in place at least two major new governance tools: the 
ACP Governance Initiative and the ENPI Governance Facility. Both are incentive tools that 
promise for assistance in exchange for reforms in clearly defined fields of governance. The ACP 
Governance Initiative is highly important for democracy assistance, as it envisages a considerable 
share of EDF funds (about 12% or 2.7 billion Euros during 2008 and 2013) to be used for good 
governance reform, including democracy assistance and works on the basis of detailed country 





6. 2007: Overhauling External Assistance Programmes 
 
a) A Simplification of the EU’s External Aid Programmes 
 
The reduction in the number of assistance programmes was one of the last items on the list of 
the major reform of EU aid policy implemented since 2000. Throughout 2004 and 2006 the new, 
future structure of external assistance programmes was discussed within and among the major 
EU institutions. Several different models circulated, sometimes also within one institution.662 One 
of the major disputes concerned the scope of the new neighbourhood programme, which was 
deliberated as part of the then emerging European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Changing ideas 
for this programme also required an adjustment of some of the others in order to form a 
coherent system. Eventually, legal questions with regards to competence were solved, and 
political agreement was reached on each of the new programmes. On 1 January 2007, the whole 
set of new regulations entered into force.  
The new, considerably simplified structure operates with seven major assistance 
regulations. Four new geographical programmes replace the older development programmes, in 
particular Tacis and MEDA, and together cover all third states: the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
(IPA),663 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI),664 the Development 
Cooperation Instrument (DCI),665 and the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized and 
Other High-income Countries and Territories (ICI).666 Additionally, the Council and Commission 
adopted a new thematic programme, which applies to all third states and is mainly defined by its 
substantive focus: the Instrument for Stability (IfS).667 Existing regulations for two further 
thematic programmes, macro-economic and humanitarian assistance, remained in force. 
Assistance to ACP countries remained covered by the Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, and 
financed by the EDF.  
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 Chapter 7 analyses the democracy promotion-related provisions of these regulations in 
more detail and shows that the topic features prominently in each, except for the ICI regulation. 
The new regulations therefore continued the trend of increasingly anchoring democracy 
promotion and assistance in mainstream development assistance programmes.  
 
b) The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
 
As part of the reform of the external aid programmes the EIDHR regulations also needed to be 
addressed. After having been prolonged in 2004, they were due to expire at the end of 2006. 
Their future or rather its future, as an amendment to primary law by the Treaty of Nice, made the 
adoption of a single regulation for all third states possible and caused major disagreements 
between the EU institutions in the process of reforming the external aid structure.  
Taking the call for a simplification of the system of assistance programmes seriously, in 
2004 the Commission proposed to no longer adopt a separate EIDHR regulation but to continue 
the programme as one of the new, so-called thematic programmes under the DCI.668 
Consequently the EIDHR programme would have been based on the DCI regulation, which 
would have defined all relevant aspects of the EIDHR, like its thematic scope and programming 
process, just like the DCI regulation currently regulates five thematic programmes, including 
migration, the environment and food security.669 Obviously, due to lack of space the provisions 
would not have been as detailed as in the EIDHR regulations. In principle, such an arrangement 
would have allowed the Commission to continue with the implementation of the EIDHR, just as 
before. There would have been a separate programming process for the EIDHR without 
involvement of the target states’ authorities, albeit with the involvement the DCI committee in 
the programming process rather than the separate Democracy and Human Rights committee 
established by the 1999 EIDHR regulations. As thematic programme under the DCI regulation, 
the EIDHR would have applied to all third states and not only to those under the mainstream 
DCI programme.670 
 However, the European Parliament was strictly against the proposed structure and in 
mid-2005 called for the adoption of a separate EIDHR regulation.671 It argued that the 
absorption of the EIDHR by the DCI would lead to a “dismantling and dilution” of the 
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programme and that it would no longer be able to operate independently from the target states’ 
governments.672 While these were the official arguments of the Parliament, its critical stance also 
derived from the fact that the EIDHR was its creation that it intended to preserve as important 
flagship of the EU’s external democratization policy. Arguably, a separate legal basis would 
strengthen the position of the EIDHR in EU external policies and give it more visibility. Further, 
the Parliament lamented the considerable reduction in numbers of assistance regulations that 
decreased its possibilities to influence and control legislative acts.  
As the Parliament could co-decide many of the new assistance regulations, like the DCI, 
it had considerable leverage over the Commission and Council to accept at least some of its 
demands concerning the EIDHR. The Commission did not, however, respond immediately to 
the Parliament’s request. It first proceeded with the publication of COM(2006) 23 final on the 
‘Thematic Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide’ that 
provided the first more detailed account of the objectives, scope and operation of a thematic 
programme on democracy and human rights.673 Concurrently, a consultation document on the 
future EIDHR was published for the interested public, in particular civil society. It did not, 
however, invite for discussion on the EIDHR’s character as independent or thematic 
programme, but rather focused on the substantive focus of the EIDHR programme.674 
Discussions among the institutions on the overall structure of future external assistance and on 
the character of the EIDHR continued throughout the first half of 2006. Finally, as part of an 
overall package, the Parliament was successful in ensuring the adoption of a separate EIDHR 
regulation, and in June 2006 the Commission submitted a relevant proposal.675 The new EIDHR 
regulation was adopted in December 2006 after the Parliament’s first reading and with the 
Council accepting most of the Parliament’s suggested amendments.676 
In line with all other new geographical and thematic assistance programmes, the new 
EIDHR regulation renamed the programme in ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights”. The same acronym as before could be retained – EIDHR. Overall, the new regulation 
did not lead to a shift in EIDHR policy, but rather wrote into secondary law what had been 
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pursued under the EIDHR during years preceding its adoption and what had been envisaged in 
COM(2001) 252 final. Most importantly, the new regulation more explicitly addresses the specific 
character of the EIDHR as instrument complementary to the mainstream development 
programmes. It stresses its independence from target states’ governments, which are not involved 
in programming (recital 1) and its focus on civil society as target and partners in implementation 
(amongst others, Article 1(a) and (b)). 
 
c) Initiatives of the European Parliament 
 
Next to the Parliament’s efforts concerning the EIDHR and numerous specific policy 
recommendations made in resolutions, especially the Parliament’s annual resolution on human 
rights in the world, two further specific efforts by that institution warrant mention.677 
In February 2006 the ‘Democracy Caucus of the European Parliament’, an informal, all-
party group of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) founded in 2005 and interested in 
and committed to the promotion of democracy worldwide, initiated actions to explore the 
establishment of a ‘European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership’. It should draw 
on existing models in Europe and the US, in particular the NED, but be adjusted to the 
particular circumstances of the EU.678 Similar to the NED, it was envisaged to serve as 
knowledge hub for activities related to European democracy assistance and as additional grant-
making institution, in particular for complementary measures that are not covered by existing EU 
programmes, including the EIDHR and mainstream programmes. The MEPs especially thought 
of more ‘political’ assistance’, such as work with political parties.  
Although the Caucus had envisaged a body with stronger links to the European 
Parliament, European civil society actors, which were asked to elaborate a more concrete 
proposal for the new body, preferred a more independent structure.679 In April 2008, private 
individuals active in various political foundations or civil society organizations in different EU 
Member States founded the ‘European Partnership for Democracy’, mentioned in Chapter 2, as 
independent foundation under Dutch law. The idea for the establishment of a ‘European 
Endowment for Democracy’ would resurface some years later upon the initiative of some of the 
Member States, in particular Poland, and be realized.  
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In 2007 the European Parliament decided to add a further component to its portfolio of 
activities: direct engagement in parliamentary support. It established the Office for Promotion of 
Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD),680 which, since 2008, assists in the establishment and 
development of parliaments in newly emerging democracies as well as regional parliaments, in 
particular through capacity development measures.681 Support is provided upon demand, 
following a needs assessment mission, and in dialogue with the target parliament. It can consist of 
advice and technical assistance, tailored training, exchanges of experiences, seminars, study-visits, 
and longer-term fellowships. The main target groups are parliamentary officials and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, parliamentarians. The body also financed studies, reports and other publications 
and publishes them on-line. To some extent the OPPD therefore carries out similar activities as 
the American NED.  
 
In 2007 a whole set of new external assistance programmes entered into force. With few 
exceptions, the new regulations mentioned the objective of democracy promotion and envisaged 
democracy assistance, thereby confirming the provision of such assistance through mainstream 
development programmes. At the same time, the new EIDHR regulation also entered into force. 
It renamed the programme into European Instrument rather than European Initiative for 
democracy and human rights. Overall, the new regulation did not lead to fundamental changes in 
the programme, but just wrote into secondary law what had been policy since about 2001.  
 
7. 2009: Putting Democracy Promotion on the Agenda 
 
During 2009 EU democracy promotion was discussed with an intensity hardly experienced 
before. Remarkably, the focus was nearly entirely on EU democracy promotion as a separate, 
independent objective, disassociated from development, good governance, and human rights. It 
should result in the first Council conclusions exclusively devoted to the topic.  
 
a) 2009: A Consensus on EU Democracy? 
 
The reason for the sudden focus on EU democracy assistance is difficult to ascertain, but seems 
to have been caused by increasing reports of a backlash against democracy promotion efforts by 
Western actors, in particular by rising powers like Russia and China. Further, it was feared that 
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the financial crisis would weaken the role of democracy promoters as compared to these powers. 
Additionally, the EU had built an increasingly comprehensive range of democracy promotion 
instruments, which were more and more difficult to grasp and to coordinate with each other. 
Questions of ensuring consistency, albeit a topic since 1991 and highlighted in COM(2001) 252 
final, appeared particularly critical in view of the Lisbon Treaty, which changed provisions as 
regards the pursuit of objectives under the supranational and the CFSP pillars. 
 Against this backdrop, the French Presidency proposed the adoption of a comprehensive 
document on ‘European democracy support’ that would outline an overarching policy framework 
for EU democracy promotion for all pillars, instruments and institutions and provide common 
principles and guidelines to ensure better coherence and effectiveness of EU policies.682 Such 
ideas had last circulated in the aftermath of COM(2001) 252 final, when the Council had 
deliberated a Common Strategy on the policy. The Czech and the Swedish Presidencies 
developed the French idea further, in particular during a special conference on the issue 
convened in Prague in March 2009, which involved various EU institutions and non-state 
actors.683 At that occasion the idea of an ‘EU Consensus on Democracy’ as tripartite agreement 
by the Member States meeting in the Council, the Commission, and the Parliament and similar to 
the European Consensus on Development also emerged.  
 Upon the request of the Czech Presidency, in July the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council together presented a joint paper on ‘Democracy Building in EU 
External Relations’.684 It provided a comprehensive overview of all current EU democracy 
promotion activities und all former pillars and made some, albeit few, recommendations for 
improving the policy. Basically all of these had been mentioned in earlier communications, like 
the need for an in-depth analysis of the local situation, tailor-made strategies rather than a one-
size-fits-all solution, the importance of dialogue and better coordination though intensive 
interaction.685 The most striking message of the joint paper was the explicit recognition that 
democracy was not the only objective of EU external action. Other objectives, like security or 
trade, could trump the democracy agenda, however, only if these were not just short-term 
objectives. In any case, even if the EU did not push for democracy in particular circumstances, it 
should avoid harming or undermining the prospects of democratization in a particular region. 
                                                     
682 European Partnership for Democracy, Report from Roundtable on European Consensus on Democracy (8.12.2008). 
683 Joint Swedish/Czech Issues Paper, Democracy Building in EU’s External Relations, Informal Meeting of EU 
Development Ministers, Prague, 29 January 2009; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Conference 
“Building Consensus about EU Policies on Democracy Support”, 27.2.2009; European Partnership for Democracy, 
Report from the Conference “Building Consensus about EU Policies on Democracy Support”, March 9 and 10 2009, Prague, 
Czech Republic (2009).  
684 European Commission, Joint Paper Commission/Council General Secretariat on Democracy Building in EU 
External Relations, SEC(2009) 1095 final, 27.7.2009. 




 The Parliament highly welcomed the ongoing debates and made several suggestions for 
the further development of the policy.686 Several thereof had featured in earlier resolutions by that 
institution. Most notably, it called for a concrete definition of democracy as reference point for 
EU action. Based on suggestions by OPPD, it argued that the EU should employ the ‘definition’ 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in one of its resolutions on democracy promotion of 
2004.687 This would have the advantage of making EU action part of worldwide efforts for 
democracy promotion and would not allow criticism for a Euro-centric approach. The 
Parliament did not agree with the Commission and Council General Secretariat on priorities in 
EU external action and, while not going into detail, stressed the positive externalities of 
democratization for other priorities, like development, security, and stability.  
The Parliament also made some very specific suggestions, which would later indeed be 
followed up. Following up on requests by the Commission and Council Secretariat for better 
country analysis and tailored strategies, it called for the elaboration of ‘Country Strategies on 
Human Rights and Democracy’ for each state that would guide all EU actions on democracy 
promotion in a particular state. Further, it called for a stronger focus on political aid as part of 
EIDHR assistance, in particular, by increasing support for civil society, political foundations, the 
media, the independent judiciary, post-EU EOM support, and for political parties and 
parliaments. Parliaments of target states as well as local and regional authorities would be more 
strongly involved in the programming exercises of the EIDHR and mainstream programmes.  
 The final result of the intensive discussions, which also caused much interest within 
European civil society engaged in democracy promotion, fell short of the proposed idea of an 
‘EU Consensus on Democracy’. After intensive discussions in the Council working parties,688 in 
mid-November 2009, the Council adopted conclusions on ‘Democracy Support in the EU’s 
External Relations’ as well as an ‘EU Agenda for Action on Democracy Support in EU External 
Relations’.689 The document definitely aimed at becoming some kind of central policy guiding 
instrument for EU democracy promotion, as it provided a list of ‘main common values, norms 
and central principles’ and some details on procedural issues in the implementation of democracy 
promotion efforts. For a central policy document the conclusions were, however, too 
incomprehensive, vague, unstructured, and lacked to comprehensively address core issues, like 
motivations and conceptions.  
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The Council did not follow the Parliament’s suggestion of adopted a guiding definition of 
democracy. It re-stipulated, as it had done before, that there is no single model of democracy and 
that the EU would not promote a specific model. At the same time, it declared democracy to be a 
universal value. Obviously, its terminology was here influenced by the Treaty of Nice, which 
largely replaced the earlier used term ‘principles’ by the term ‘values’. Further, as common value, 
all democracies share common features. The Council did not provide a comprehensive 
enumeration of these features, but only referred the respect for a broad range of human rights, 
including on anti-discrimination, as such common element. Some other paragraphs, included in 
different parts of the conclusions, apparently also refer to elements of democracy and mention 
elections, accountable rulers, parliaments, political parties, the independent media and civil 
society.  
The Council addressed other principal issues of the policy. It stressed the principle of 
partnership and dialogue with the target state, which should ensure a shared understanding of the 
concepts and agreement on measures. Further, the principles of local ownership applied. The aim 
should therefore be to support locally driven processes and to involve all parts of society in third 
states in democracy building. Also, in difficult partnerships the EU should seek dialogue and find 
entry points for action. As regards democracy assistance, the Council called for a special focus on 
parliaments, political parties and institutions, the independent media and civil society, which 
suggested a slight shift to the political approach, just as called for by the Parliament. The Council 
mentioned the instrumental character of democratization for poverty reduction and sustainable 
development as the main motivation for EU democracy support, while neglecting to mention 
ethical motives.  
Based on these more general stipulations, the Council identified six fields for further 
action, basically all of which have featured in earlier documents. It recalled the existence of 
various documents that provided detailed assessments of the local situation, like ACP governance 
profiles, and called for improving country analysis, in particular in Country Strategy Papers 
(CSPs), drawn up for the mainstream assistance programming documents. It did not, however, 
envisage specific human rights and democracy strategy papers. It called for a regular discussion of 
democracy-related issues in political dialogues, a more coherent use of different dialogues in cases 
where different types of dialogues are held, and the increased involvement of non-state actors in 
dialogues. It called for more coherence between different actors and instruments at all levels, 
headquarters and at country level, as well as from country analysis to evaluation, without, 
however, providing concrete suggestions. It particularly mentioned the need to ensure coherence 
between thematic and mainstream assistance programmes, which is relevant for democracy 




rights, and rule of law in all possible external activities, for more efforts in democracy promotion 
in the international dimension, like the UN, and for more EU visibility in the field of democracy 
support.  
A year after the conclusions were adopted, the Council accepted twelve pilot countries in 
which the Agenda for EU democracy support should initially be implemented.690 Overall, given 
that hardly any of the proposed actions constituted a major novelty or effort that had not, at least 
to some extent, being pursued before, it appears questionable why the Agenda needed to be 
tested in pilot countries rather than being implemented in all third states immediately.  
 
The initiative of the French Presidency of late 2008 concerning democracy promotion was 
important as it focused on the policy to a degree not achieved before. The suggested 
improvements for the policy were not new, however, should from then on be pursued with more 
rigour. As regards democracy assistance, the Council conclusions on democracy support 
envisaged a stronger focus on sectors that can be attributed to the political approach and called 
for a more complementary use of EIDHR and mainstream funds. 
 
8. The Repercussions of the Arab Spring 
 
a) New Initiatives for Core Regions 
 
The immediate response of the Commission and High Representative to the Arab Spring was the 
proposal for a ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity for the Southern 
Mediterranean’, published in COM(2011) 200 final in early March 2011.691 It called for a 
“qualitative step forward in the relations” between the EU and the Mediterranean states and 
made several suggestion to this end, like the conclusion of agreements on trade liberalization on 
still protected areas (agriculture, fisheries) and on trade in services.692 The offers were, however, 
conditional upon efforts and progress in democratic and broader governance reform.  
Democracy and democratization occupied an important role in the communication. First, 
the envisaged ‘Partnership’ was based on and should uphold and promote the common values of 
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the EU and the partner states, including, democracy.693 Secondly, the holding of monitored, free 
and fair elections should be an ‘entry qualification’ and therefore minimum condition for entry 
into the Partnership.694 Finally and relevant for democracy assistance, COM(2011) 200 final 
envisaged increased assistance in the sectors of democracy and human rights, especially on the 
already known topics of elections, civil society, judicial reform, constitutional and administrative 
reform. Highlighting the role of civil society in the Arab Spring, the maximization of assistance 
for civil society organizations was particularly stressed and also immediately implemented 
through two local calls for proposals in Tunisia and Egypt in March 2011.695 Reference was also 
made to a special ‘Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility’ that should slightly later be presented in 
more detail in a separate communication concerning the ENP, and should, in particular, develop 
the advocacy capacity of civil society organizations in order to play a crucial role in the ongoing 
reform processes in the target states.696 COM (2011) 200 final also referred to the importance of 
political parties and platforms of civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations. It 
stressed that Member States and EU political parties, foundations and NGOs should support 
such efforts, but suggested that possibly this could also be done by the EU. It was one of the 
examples of the recent more explicit recognition of the importance of political parties in 
democracy and the willingness of the EU to also engage in party support, albeit on a non-partisan 
basis. The new Partnership would mainly be financed from the ENPI budget.697  
 Many of the basic features of the approach outlined in COM(2011) 200 final reappeared 
in the geographically more broadly-focused communication of May 2011 on reforming the ENP: 
“A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” (COM(2011) 303.698 It aimed at reforming the 
ENP that had lost appeal and appeared to be widely ineffective. Basic features of the new ENP 
were a differentiated, incentive-based approach that promised, among others, more assistance for 
socio-economic and political reform, trade, investment, and people mobility in exchange for 
commitments and real progress in political reforms.  
Again, democracy played a key role in the communication. The Commission introduced a 
new term: ‘deep democracy’. ‘Deep democracy’ was defined as that kind of democracy “that lasts 
because the right to vote is accompanied by rights to exercise free speech, form competing 
political parties, receive impartial justice from independent judges, security from accountable 
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police and armed forces, access to a competent and non-corrupt civil service – and other civil and 
human rights that many Europeans take for granted, such as the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion”. A separate paragraph added “freedom of association, expression and assembly and 
a free press and media” and the “right to a fair trial”. Overall, the provided definition of deep 
democracy was quite comprehensive and clear, in particular in comparison to earlier documents. 
The adjective ‘deep’, however, does not really seem to have added anything new to earlier 
definitions of democracy. The text of COM(2011) 303 suggests that the Commission wanted to 
stress that efforts need to go beyond the establishment of electoral democracy; however, the EU 
had never only concentrated on elections and building electoral democracy. Overall, the usage of 
the term ‘deep’ democracy is therefore largely a catchword that aims to underline the renewed 
efforts under the ENP. 
 COM(2011) 303 suggested four further developments of existing tools of democracy 
promotion, at least two of which concerned democracy assistance. First, it highlighted the role of 
civil society for democratization and suggested the creation of the already mentioned special Civil 
Society Facility. It should support civil society organizations to emerge and play their foreseen 
role in democracy (i.e. to hold governments accountable, contribute to policy making, and 
express concerns). The Commission stressed the need to develop advocacy and monitoring 
capacities of NGOs, which suggests a stronger focus on the political approach of democracy 
assistance. Secondly, COM(2011) 303 stressed the role of political parties, non-registered NGOs 
and trade unions. It preferred, however, that work with political parties should be carried out by 
other actors than the Commission, in particular the envisaged European Endowment for 
Democracy. The third suggestion related to the role of new technology and social networks in 
democratization. It called for the development of news tools in order to assist civil society, in 
specific cases, to have access to the internet and independent media. The fourth recommendation 
of COM(2011) 303 envisaged – as several times before – a reinforced political dialogue with third 
states’ governments.699 
 
b) 2011: European Parliament Resolution on EU External Policies in  
Favour of Democratization 
 
Ever since the intensive efforts in 2009 concerning the EU consensus on democracy promotion, 
the topic had remained on the agenda of the European Parliament. In 2010 its Sub-committee on 
Human Rights decided to launch a comprehensive review of the EU’s actions in the field. It was 
then, in the middle of this exercise, overtaken by the events in the Arab world that would not 
                                                     




only encourage carrying out its review, but also fundamentally affect its assessment. The 
Parliament concluded its review with a strong critique of the EU’s weak engagement in the 
Mediterranean, which had favoured security and stability over democracy promotion, especially in 
view of fighting migration. Further, it demanded a ‘paradigm shift’ in EU policies to the region as 
well as more generally as regards democracy and human rights promotion.700 
 The so-called ‘paradigm shift’, which definitely contained some innovative elements but 
was far from suggesting fundamental changes, referred to two issues. First, the Parliament called 
for democracy and human rights promotion to become real and sincere priorities in EU external 
relations, underpinned by serious human rights policies within the Union. Secondly, it demanded 
that EU democracy promotion – or rather democracy assistance – pursued a double-track 
approach: the developmental and the political approach. As regards the first approach, the EU 
should support socio-economic development and, using the example of some Mediterranean 
states, ensure that this did not only lead to a higher national GDP but to more social justice and a 
more equal distribution of wealth. It did not intend such assistance to be provided through the 
EIDHR, but through mainstream programmes. As regards the second approach, the Parliament 
called for more support for newly and democratically elected parliaments, non-extremist social 
movements, political parties, the independent media, and civil society organizations. It argued 
that the EU itself should also engage in more sensitive political fields of support, like political 
party development, in particular through the EIDHR. The Commission and High Representative 
had only two months earlier expressed a different view. The Parliament obviously borrowed the 
notions ‘political’ and ‘developmental approach’ from Thomas Carothers, however, gave them 
partly a different meaning than that analyst.701 In particular, Carother’s understanding of 
developmental approach not only encompassed socio-economic support, but also support to civil 
society and state institutions, as long as they aimed at a gradual and controlled democratization 
process.  
 Next to these two major demands the resolution contained a whole range of other, 
individual suggestions on policy developments, most of which had been voiced before, like use of 
a differentiated approach while retaining objective criteria for assessing countries’ performance, 
the call for dialogues with target states even in cases of difficult partnerships, the increased 
involvement of civil society in dialogues and strategic planning for assistance, the use of tailor-
made approached and the drafting of ‘human rights strategy papers’, that should be general 
policy-making documents for EU policies in individual countries. Additionally, the Parliament 
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deplored the fact that sanctions and other ‘negative’ tools, like the reduction of aid, were rarely 
used, even if there was clear evidence of human rights violations or violation of democratic 
principles.  
 
c) The European Endowment for Democracy (EED) 
 
This evolutionary account has shown that the US has frequently played a leading role in 
developing tools for the policy of democracy and human rights promotion, like reports on 
human rights and conditionality. European governments and the EU have definitely been 
inspired by the US to develop similar tools. A European Endowment for Democracy (EED) is 
the most recent addition to these examples, even if the final shape of the EED, as it appears now, 
is in some respects different from the NED. Ideas on creating a European endowment for 
democracy already circulated in the early-mid 2000s, but lost force when European civil society 
preferred the creation of a more independent, civil society-dominated organization, the EPD. 
More recently, following pro-democracy struggles in Tunisia and Egypt as well as the ‘last 
dictatorship in Europe’, Belarus, the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski made new 
suggestions concerning the establishment of an EED during the Polish EU Presidency in the first 
half of 2011.702 Due to the Arab Spring, the idea was met with much interest and the Foreign 
Affairs Council endorsed it in June 2011 and asked the Commission to elaborate a more detailed 
proposal. On 1 December 2011 the Council endorsed the elaborated plans and on 15 December 
2011, after a final round of discussions in Coreper, the Member States agreed on the creation of 
the European Endowment for Democracy.703  
As decision-making by the Member States suggests, the EED is planned to be created 
outside the EU institutional structure, as an international trust fund with legal personality under 
the law of one of the Member States. Unlike the American NED, which receives an annual 
budget from Congress, the EED will be funded from voluntary contributions by the Member 
States, but will also be able to apply for funding from the EU budget. It will be governed by a 
board, composed of Member States representatives and, upon invitation, of relevant EU 
institutions, in particular the Commission and the Council. Similar to the NED, it should mainly 
provide grants, directly or via partners, like political foundations and will operate a ‘European 
invitation programme’ for young leaders from democratizing states. Regular exchanges between 
                                                     
702 Open Society Institute – Brussels, How Could a European Endowment for Democracy Add Value?, Discussion Paper1 
(September 2011), R. von Meijenfeldt, A European Foundation for Democracy: What is needed, FRIDE Policy Brief No. 93 
(September 2011).  
703 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on the European Endowment for Democracy, 3130th 




the EED, EU institutions, and other actors should ensure complementarity and cooperation and 
avoid conflict and duplication in activities. The major novelty of the EED, next to its set-up, lies 
in the planned focus of its assistance.  
The focus of EED assistance will be different from that of the EIDHR and mainstream 
programmes. It has a more targeted and short-term focus and should specifically address the 
transition process and societies struggling for democratization, initially, mainly in the ENP 
region. Similarly, although a wide range of groups can receive funding, the EED should 
specifically target actors centrally involved in the democratization process. The Council mentions, 
in particular, pro-democracy movements and pro-democracy actors “in favour of a pluralistic 
multiparty system on democratic ground”, young leaders, independent media and journalists 
including bloggers, social media activists – a focus that directly resulted from the events during 
the Arab Spring – and NGOs and foundations in exile, as primary target groups, provided that all 
adhere to the principle of non-violence and that assistance is non-partisan.704  
All in all, the EED can, if implemented in the planned way, fill a gap in EU external 
assistance that could, however, also have been filled through projects under the EIDHR. 
Apparently, political projects should also continue to be kept apart from EU activities, while at 
the same time retaining some link with the Union through allowing funding by the Union and 
having the EU institutions on the governing board. It remains to be seen whether the EED will 
be able to achieve a profile similar to the NED and does not just become one further actor in a 
sector that is struggling for funding and having its view heard.  
 
d) COM(2011) 886 final: Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart  
of EU External Action 
 
In December 2011, the Commission published its first major communication on the EU’s 
external human rights and democratization policy since COM(2001) 252 final: Human Rights and 
Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action.705 The name of the document shows that, unlike 
the various documents in the field published since 2009, the Commission has again adopted the 
more traditional terminology of a human rights and democracy policy. The publication was 
caused by several factors, in particular the time span of ten years since the last major Commission 
communication on the policy, the more limited role played by the Commission in the course of 
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the discussions on EU democracy support in 2009, the increased awareness of new challenges to 
democracy promotion in the form of attacks on the universal nature of human rights, and 
technical advances that allow censorship and surveillance and might compromise human rights, 
the critique of weak EU democracy promotion in the Arab countries during the 1990s and 2000s, 
and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which created a stronger legal basis in primary law for EU 
democracy promotion. It aimed at starting a discussion on how the EU’s policy could be 
improved and, in particular, in the Commission’s terminology, be rendered more coherent, 
effective, active, clear and strategic.706 Obviously, it applied to human rights and democracy 
promotion more generally, not only to democracy assistance. However, several of the issues were 
of particular relevance for the development of the tool of assistance. 
 Initially, the Commission briefly addressed some basic and conceptual issues and 
questions of motivations for the policy. In response to the mentioned challenges to human rights, 
it called for the EU to reaffirm its commitment to the universality, indivisibility, and 
interdependence of human rights, in particular, as regards those rights laid down in the 
international bill of rights. Human rights and democracy “should be taken into account in foreign 
policy decision making at every stage” and must run as “silver thread” throughout EU external 
policies.707 This does not call for an absolute prioritization, but accords the objective of 
democracy and human rights promotion a more important position than other foreign policy 
objectives. Overall, the Commission therefore moved back from the statements made in the Joint 
document with the Council General Secretariat published in summer 2009, in which the overall 
role of human rights and democracy promotion was somewhat compromised by the explicit 
recognition of the importance of other objectives. Further, COM(2011) 886 final defined 
democracy as “universal value based on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their 
own political systems”, that was underpinned by the three “empowering freedoms” of 
expression, association and assembly. The rule of law was essential for not only the protection of 
human rights, but also of democratic principles.  
 The suggestions for improving EU action and performance largely repeated earlier 
approaches and efforts. The Commission proposed changes in three dimensions. First, it 
suggested overhauling delivery mechanisms. The most important innovation here was the 
drafting of so-called ‘human rights strategies’ for individual states. These aim at outlining country 
specific priorities and objectives and should become something like a guiding source for EU 
action in a particular third state, either for democracy and human rights-specific action, like 
assistance and dialogues, as well as in the implementation of other policies, like trade and security 
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policy. No details were provided on the exact process for drafting the human rights strategies, 
but by December 2011 the Commission was already in the process of drafting about 150 of these 
papers. It was only mentioned that the papers should bring together all resources of EU 
Delegations as well as the Member States and also take account of the views of civil society. 
According to the Commission, the papers should replace or complement a “top-down approach” 
that established worldwide priorities for a human rights strategy in Brussels and then applied 
them throughout the world by a more targeted, “tailor-made approach”. This did not mean that 
the overall objectives or principles of the EU’s policy were changed or altered, but just that more 
attention was given to the local context. It remains to be seen to which extent the existence of 
these strategies will also lead to changes in EIDHR programming. 
 At the same time, some global campaigns should continue to be carried out. The High 
Commissioner suggested focusing on judicial reform and the right to fair trial, the rights of 
women, and the rights of the child during the period 2013-2015. Further COM(2011) 886 final 
stressed the role of civil society in third states and the EU and called for continuing support to 
civil society groups in democratizing states and, in particular, also in states were there was no 
democratic progress. Interestingly, the communication also called for EU engagement with 
“peaceful political opposition”, which forms part of the more recent shift to a more political 
approach. Specific protection and action for human rights defenders along the lines of the 
relevant EU Guidelines on human rights defenders was also envisaged.  
 The second set of suggestions for improving EU action was termed “a joined up 
approach to policy” had two main purposes. On the one hand, it aimed at ensuring that the 
objective of human rights and democracy promotion was seriously taken into account in various 
external policies or internal policies with an external dimension. On the other hand, it called for a 
more coherent use of the various instruments of democracy and human rights promotion. 
Particular emphasis was laid on creating synergies between political and developmental aspects of 
democracy assistance.708 
 
e) Proposal for a New EIDHR Regulation Post-2013 
 
In December 2011, the Commission also published its first proposal for a new EIDHR 
regulation under the future financial framework 2014-2020 that will have to be adopted before 
the end of 2013.709 The envisaged new regulation is relatively short, in particular as regards the 
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current legal instrument, and leaves many questions as regards how the Commission envisages 
the EIDHR to develop open. In any case, it suggests a considerable increase in annual budgetary 
commitments for the EIDHR: an overall amount of 1 578 million Euros should be available for 
the period 2014-2020, that is, 225 million Euros annually for the EIDHR compared to about 158 
million in 2011. Further, while it intends to retain the current thematic scope for activities, it also 
suggests to implement some of the reform ideas suggested in COM(2011) 886 final, like a more 
flexible use of the available funds, the focus on specific worldwide campaigns, an increased focus 
on human rights defenders through the use of a specific EU Human Rights Defenders 
Mechanism, and a more coherent use of various types of support provided under the EIDHR, 
like of electoral observation and assistance. All in all, it remains to be seen though how the 
Parliament and the Council will shape the Commission’s proposal and how the instrument will 




Chapter 3 has introduced the tool of EU democracy assistance and has shed light on several 
crucial issues on the topic, which should be summarized here. Initially, it appears useful to 
mention that the reconstruction of the emergence and evolution of EU democracy assistance is 
rendered difficult by the fact that the various crucial policy documents do not all form part of a 
single ‘discursive framework’, that is, a body of discussions and documents that focus on a 
specific topic and aim at its development and regulation. Rather, democracy promotion and 
democracy assistance have been developed in the context of various such discursive frameworks 
or more specific sub-frameworks thereof. First, there is a body of texts relating to the EU’s 
external human rights and democratization policy. Many of the central policy documents on EU 
democracy assistance, like the Commission’s three major communications on the EU’s external 
human rights and democratization policy710 and the legal texts of the EIDHR regulations, pertain 
to this framework (only). It concerns, as expressed in its title, not only democracy, but also 
human rights. Some of the early documents of this framework indeed only referred to human 
rights issues in the title, but then clearly also covered democracy promotion in the text. In the 
1990s and, even more from 2009 on, a sub-framework of this broader framework has developed, 
which specifically concentrates on democracy promotion. This sub-framework comprises, for 
example, the Council conclusions on ‘Democracy Support in EU’s External Relations’ of 
November 2009. It obviously constitutes the thematically most focused framework for external 
democracy promotion. Secondly, for several reasons that relate to a conceptual overlap, questions 
                                                     




of EU competences, and the structure and language of primary law, also the discursive 
framework on development has from the beginning on been highly important for EU democracy 
promotion and assistance. Some of the most crucial documents on democracy promotion, like 
the 28 November 1991 resolution on ‘human rights, democracy, and development’, pertain to 
this discursive framework on development. From the early-mid 2000s on, a sub-framework of 
development has increasingly been given attention, which is also of relevance for EU democracy 
assistance: good governance. It has, more than any other framework, identified elements of 
democracy and (potential) democracy assistance and reserved stable budgets for good governance 
support and, as part of it, possibly democracy assistance. Finally, to cover democracy promotion 
and assistance comprehensively, it is necessary to also look at individual, specific external policies, 
like the ENP, in the framework of which specific actions for democracy assistance have been 
devised. A recent case in point is the suggested Civil Society Facility for the Mediterranean. 
Overall, Chapter 3 has drawn from all these discursive frameworks in order to construct the 
evolution and major elements of EU democracy assistance. 
Before looking at democracy assistance in more detail, some comments should be made 
on EU human rights and democracy promotion more generally. Chapter 3 has in some sections 
made reference to the development, to various instruments, and to central principles of this 
policy. It has shown that the European Parliament started to be interested in human rights-
related topics in the EC and abroad in the 1970s and initiated a human rights-related programme 
in 1978. Overall, the EC did not, however, pursue an external human rights and democracy 
promotion policy until the late 1980s/early 1990s. A soft shift was performed in 1986, which 
declared human rights violations in third states to be of concern to the EC, but was not backed 
up by strong instruments. A real policy shift only occurred in 1990/1991 and therefore after the 
fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence 
of the new development credo that linked socio-economic and political development. The EC 
was very quick in putting the numerous tools it still uses to pursue the policy in place: sanctions, 
conditionality, and various positive measures, and has developed them further during the 
subsequent years. Some new tools were added later, like Special Representatives, others were 
strongly upgraded, like incentive conditionality. Overall, the policy has remained an important 
external field of engagement ever since, pursed through the use of the numerous mentioned 
tools. Democracy and human rights concern were never intended to always trump other external, 
potentially conflicting policies, like trade and security. At the same time, it should always be taken 
into account. In effect this meant that the policy would be pursued with different intensities, that 
is, in particular through the use of and stress on different instruments, depending on the presence 




 The EU has expressed some principles to underlie its actions in the field of human rights 
and democracy promotion: (1) the universality of human rights, which has been reconfirmed 
more recently in response to attacks on the universal nature by numerous actors; (2) the 
interdependence of all kind of rights, even if there is little evidence that social rights have been 
given as much attention as civil rights; (3) democracy as universal value, without, however, 
elaborating on it in more detail; (4) the linkage between socio-economic and political 
development, which has mainly justified the complementation of socio-economic development 
aid by a politically-focused component rather than vice versa; (5) successful democratization 
needs to be a locally-carried and -driven process that can only be facilitated and not imposed by 
external actors; (6) there are numerous legitimate models of democracy and each state has to find 
its own version; the EU does not impose a specific model, in particular not a European model; 
(7) to give preference to a positive, encouraging approach, that is, to prefer tools like assistance, 
dialogue, incentive conditionality, and diplomatic measures, over a negative approach, that should 
only exceptionally be applied; and (8) the principle of partnership and dialogue with target state’s 
governments and civil society, which builds on principles (5) and (7). Actions against the will of 
target state’s governments are not excluded in difficult partnerships, but are the exception rather 
than the rule.  
 Many documents of various EU institutions refer to individual motives that underlie EU 
democracy and human rights promotion. Hardly any thereof, however, neatly summarizes these 
various motivations or provides a more detailed discussion of individual factors and their exact 
relation with democracy and democratization. Overall, the EU therefore makes relatively 
simplified, general arguments about these links. There are also no real differences visible among 
the various institutions. The most frequent reference relates to the positive relations between 
sustainable socio-economic development, including the EU’s primary objective of poverty 
reduction, and democratization. Democracy and/or democratization are considered necessary 
conditions of successful development. The EU also frequently states that democracies are more 
peaceful, politically stable, and secure partners, which solve conflicts in civil and democratic ways 
and are therefore less prone to conflicts or wars. Both of these factors include instrumental and 
normative motivations, that is, expected positive externalities for the EU itself as well as positive 
results for the local population. It is hard, from the available documents, to determine which 
prevails. References to purely moral motivations are less frequently made. The Commission only 
once explicitly mentioned “moral imperatives” to promote democracy in third states.711 At the 
same time, however, the ethical motives appear to be inherent in the discourse of the universality 
of human rights and democracy, which is one of the principles of EU human rights and 
                                                     




democracy promotion. In 1991 the Commission also mentioned the demand of European public 
opinion for the start of an external human rights and democracy policy as one factor. 
Additionally, the EU has definitely also been pushed into its role by the fact that all major 
international donors are active in democracy promotion. It therefore also puts particular 
emphasis on ensuring sufficient visibility for its actions. Finally, it has also been suggested that 
some actors, in particular the Parliament, have strongly pushed for action in the field to promote 
its own role and position. In any case, just like in the case of many actors, EU democracy 
promotion appears to be driven by various motivations of instrumental and normative origin. 
 The following paragraphs should be devoted to democracy assistance and address the 
most crucial issues on the democracy assistance exposed in Chapter 3. First, the chapter has 
shown that the European Parliament has created the first – at least partial – external democracy 
assistance programme in 1985 and therefore before the official start of EC external democracy 
and human rights promotion. Various factors played together to make this programme – an 
NGO programme for Chile – real, including lobbying by Chilean opposition politicians, the 
interest in human rights promotion by the Parliament, the examples of the US, and the budgetary 
power of the Parliament to devote funds to such programme. EC democracy assistance provided 
upon the agreement of all institutions, in particular also the Council, was only envisaged in late 
1991, as one of the tools of the then new external human rights and democratization policy.  
 Ever since 1991 democracy assistance has remained an important element of the EU’s 
portfolio of instruments of external democracy promotion. Indeed, there has never been a time 
when democracy assistance, in particular its character or mode of operation to facilitate 
democratic change, has been questioned as such. At the same time, none of the institutions has 
ever in more detail elaborated on the particular characteristics and value of democracy assistance, 
except that it pertained to the EC’s preferred ‘positive’ approach to democracy promotion. The 
constant and also increasing interest in democracy assistance has expressed itself in a 
geographical spread of activities. By the mid-1990s democracy assistance could be provided on 
the basis of all geographically-focused mainstream development programmes and by 1998 
specific EIDHR democracy assistance programmes were in place for all major world regions. 
Over the last years, the EU has also started to set up several new facilities to provide, amongst 
others, democracy assistance, like the ACP governance initiative. The geographical spread and 
growth in programmes has been accompanied by a strong increase in aid budgets for democracy 
assistance, which can, at least as regards the EIDHR, be expected to also grow in the coming 
years.  
The fact that democracy assistance did not loose appeal since 1991 did not mean that 




institutions involved in the development of the instrument. Chapter 3 has highlighted two major 
disputes between the institutions that directly concerned EU democracy assistance. In 1997 the 
Council Legal Service and the Commission fought over the scope of EC competences to carry 
out democracy assistance programmes and in 2006 the Commission and the Parliament disagreed 
on the future legal basis for the future EIDHR. Both were solved in favour of a stronger basis 
for democracy assistance. Additionally, several other issues on the instrument gave rise to 
discussion and subsequently to reforms of the tool. A major topic was the structure of EU 
democracy assistance, that is, the number and types of programmes, initiatives, and facilities used 
to fund democracy assistance projects and their relationship with each other. Further, in the late 
1990s a series of evaluations painted a rather gloomy picture of the impact of EU development 
aid efforts, including democracy assistance. A major reform followed that affected many aspects 
of democracy assistance, in particular the programming process and aid implementation. Finally, 
the question of the approach to be followed in EU democracy assistance has become increasingly 
discussed during the late 2000s, after having been neglected for many years.  
Overall, the evolution of democracy assistance since the early 1990s has not followed a 
master-plan but was rather characterized by gradual, step-by-step developments, caused and 
influenced by various factors. Many developments can be traced to ideas and preferences of 
individual actors and the persistence of these actors to pursue a certain path. For example, the 
role of the European Parliament was crucial for the initiation and development of the EU’s 
specific democracy assistance programmes and that of the Council for the policy changes in 
2009. Evaluations by external experts, contracted by the Commission to carry out assessments of 
EU programmes, and reports by the European Court of Auditors played a crucial role for many 
reforms concerning democracy assistance, like the major reform in aid management from 2000 
onwards. Next to these evaluations, the Commission also suggested reforms as result of its own 
experiences in the implementation of assistance programmes (‘learning by doing’), like the need 
for quick response mechanisms, which were introduced in 1999. Developments in target states or 
regions at times had an impact on policy developments, like the focus on conflict-related issues as 
result of the Balkan crisis in the early 1990s and the numerous policy initiatives following the 
Arab Spring. At times, the role of other actors in democracy promotion was influential, like to 
concentrate on specific topics due a declared preference by the UN. The structure and focus of 
US democracy assistance, in particular the existence of the NED, has several times caused high 
interest in the EU. More recently, it has also been possible to identify an impact of academic and 
policy analysis on the further development of EU democracy assistance.  
Secondly, numerous actors have been involved in the start and development of EU 




Once democracy promotion had become an accepted EC external policy in 1990/1991, it was 
developed further within the EC framework – and soon the EU framework – by all EC/EU 
institutions. On the one hand, each institution pursued its constitutionally foreseen role in the 
development of the policy tool and shaped it in this way, like the Commission as executive 
institution and initiator of policy reforms and implementing institution and the Council and 
Parliament as legislative bodies, which adopted assistance regulations. On the other hand, several 
institutions have at times expressed an enhanced interest in the topic and made special efforts to 
develop democracy promotion and, as part of it, assistance further. This is not only true of the 
Parliament, which has ever since the mid-1980s remained interested in the topic and not only 
made comments on the policy in its annual report on human rights but also in several special 
reports and resolutions on individual topics, but also for the Council, which has launched the 
intensive discussions on democracy promotion that led to the conclusions on democracy support 
in 2009. All in all, while the role of particular institutions has been outstanding during certain 
times in the development of EU democracy assistance, overall the development of the tool is the 
result of the engagement of all institutions.712 
Thirdly, Chapter 3 has exposed that there are two major types of programmes that fund 
democracy assistance projects. Additionally, more recently, some specific facilities or initiatives 
were devised or envisaged that operate under one of the basic programmes. On the one hand, 
there is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). It can be traced 
back to the mentioned NGO programme for Chile of 1986. Convinced of the positive results of 
that programme the Parliament created numerous similar budget lines for other states and 
regions from 1990 on. By the mid to late-1990s specific democracy and human rights assistance 
programmes existed for all major world regions. In 1993 the Parliament began to assemble all 
these lines in a separate Chapter and, later, a separate Title of the EU budget under the heading: 
European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights (EIDHR). In April 1999 
the numerous specific programmes first received a legal basis in secondary law. In 2006 the 
second EIDHR regulation was adopted and the programme re-named into European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights, retaining the same acronym. In December 2011 the 
Commission published a proposal for a successor regulation that will overall continue along the 
same lines. A key characteristics of the EIDHR programme(s) was from the beginning the lack of 
need for agreement with a target state’s government and the direct cooperation with assistance 
recipients. 
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On the other hand, in November 1991 the Council decided to provide EC democracy 
assistance as part of mainstream development programmes. From 1992 on, the numerous 
mainstream development assistance regulations started to be adjusted to this new objective, 
which was completed in 1996. Expenditure for democracy assistance under mainstream 
programmes, however, increased rather slowly. From 2001 on increasing efforts were therefore 
made to ensure more engagement. The idea of ‘mainstreaming’ was born to ensure, amongst 
others, the increasing devotion of funds to democracy assistance under mainstream programmes. 
It was facilitated by the introduction of uniform programming documents for all assistance 
programmes – the so-called Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) – that necessarily included a section 
on political developments and thereby regularly put the issue on the agenda. At the same time, 
the tool of (political) dialogue was increasingly used and should contribute not only to regularly 
discuss issues of (lack of) democratization but also to identify democracy assistance projects. 
Overall, as Chapter 8 will show in more detail, in terms of financial commitments and 
expenditure, mainstream programmes eventually started to by far outweigh funding under the 
EIDHR.  
Besides the EIDHR and mainstream programmes, the EC has started to develop specific 
facilities that envisage democracy assistance. Most notably, these are the ACP Governance 
Initiative, the ENPI Governance Facility, and the recently envisaged Civil Society Facility. While 
the last is a democracy assistance tool, the first two instruments combine features of incentive 
conditionality and good governance assistance, including democracy assistance. Both good 
governance tools are funded from mainstream development budgets and operate with the 
agreement and cooperation of the target states’ government. 
 As indicated above, the parallel development of democracy assistance as part of the 
EIDHR and the mainstream development programmes, as well as later the addition of specific 
facilities, had not been planned a priori. It was the result of separate decisions by the Parliament – 
in 1986 and, especially, from 1990 on – to create specific budget lines for democracy (and human 
rights) assistance and by the Council – in 1991 – to devote funds available under mainstream 
programmes to the same end. Once institutionalized, it proved to be very difficult to abolish the 
system, in particular the various specific programmes. Attempts to do so, like the challenge to the 
EIDHR by the Council Legal Service in 1997, failed.  
In order to justify the parallel existence of the EIDHR programmes and democracy 
assistance under mainstream programmes, their relationship and distinctive features had to be 
developed. To a certain extent distinctive characteristics were present from the beginning on, in 
particular the fact that EIDHR programmes did not envisage involvement of the target state’s 




development policy. The thematic focus of both types of programmes did not, however, differ 
fundamentally during the first decade of democracy assistance and as late as in 2000 the Court of 
Auditors called for the transfer of the EIDHR into the mainstream programmes due to the lack 
of distinctive characteristics. In order to retain the EIDHR, such special characteristics had to be 
worked out and stressed and the lack of involvement of target states was taken as starting point 
for this process: the focus on civil society was further strengthened and focus on state institutions 
and the rule of law reduced.  
Fourthly, Chapter 3 has in various sections touched the question of the EU’s preferred 
approach to democracy assistance. Chapter 2 has introduced Thomas Carother’s distinction 
between the developmental approach and the political approach to democracy assistance, which 
mainly makes distinctions on the basis of the thematic focus as well as the time perspective of 
assistance and which provides a useful structure to also analyze EU policy. Preliminarily it should 
be observed that there have of course been discussions on the thematic focus of EU assistance 
and on the capacity to be able to intervene quickly, which relate to questions of the EU’s 
approach to democracy assistance. However, these discussions have not used the language of 
different ‘approaches’ and have also lacked a real awareness of fundamental differences in various 
paths. A change has occurred more recently, when the European Parliament started to explicitly 
employ the terms ‘political approach’ and ‘developmental approach’ coined by Thomas Carothers 
– although defining them in part differently – and all institutions began discussions on the need 
for a more political focus of EU assistance.  
Overall it is rather difficult to extract a clear EU approach to democracy assistance or 
clear EU approaches for individual types of programmes from the policy documents analyzed in 
Chapter 3, in particular due to the above mentioned lack of an explicit EU language on 
approaches until more recently and in part due to the lack of details on thematic focus areas in 
the analyzed documents. From the available information it nevertheless seems possible to argue 
that the EU has overall – as regards mainstream development programmes and the EIDHR – 
strongly favoured the developmental approach over the political approach. It has envisaged 
assistance to a broad range of actors and thematic areas, including various types of civil society 
organizations, state institutions at local, regional, and national level, and rule of law reform. 
Democracy assistance has overall been closely linked to human rights promotion and good 
governance reform, as programmes frequently covered all. Although mid-term reviews and 
annual action programmes are foreseen that allow adjustments to changing situations, democracy 
assistance as part of mainstream development programmes is planned for a period of seven years 
ahead and the EIDHR is planned for period of three to four years ahead. Further, overall the EU 




in confrontation with it. All these features suggest that EU democracy assistance should lead to 
and support a slow and gradual process of democratic change, carried by a large range of actors 
within civil society and the state apparatus, which is typical for the developmental approach. It 
should also be stressed though that EU democracy assistance has since 1991 been separate from 
socio-economic assistance and the developmental approach in EU democracy assistance is not 
one of the more extreme forms related to the modernization approach. 
The preference for the developmental approach and distance to a clearly political 
approach became also strongly visible during the last years, when several actors, in particular the 
Parliament, pushed for a stronger political focus of democracy assistance, in particular support to 
developing political party systems, and when the Arab Spring called for support for politically 
active civil society organizations and for the quick disbursement of funds to respond to 
unforeseen events. The Commission made some hints to possibly start engaging in political party 
work. The Council preferred establishing the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), 
which is planned to focus on the ‘political approach’, outside the EU structure, thereby 
confirming its preference for the EU to retain some distance to this approach. 
The political approach has, however, not been entirely absent during the last decades, in 
particular in the case of the EIDHR. It mainly envisaged assistance to be provided to civil society 
organizations and for their development, which included assistance to regime-critical 
organizations working for the promotion of civil and political rights. From the mid-2000s on the 
EIDHR funded specific support actions for human rights defenders, which includes individuals 
fighting for political change. From 2006 on political foundations, which are involved in political 
party development, were explicitly mentioned as eligible recipients of EIDHR funds. Further, the 
EIDHR has since 1999 foreseen procedures for the quick disbursement of funds, which allows 
the EU to provide aid quickly in times of (unforeseen) regime changes, like during the colour 
revolutions and the Arab Spring. Some EU programmes were specifically established to allow for 
quick reaction in times of crisis, including changes of political regimes. Overall, all these elements 
point to the existence of the political approach in EU democracy assistance. It was, however, 
without doubt secondary and not very much stressed by the EU. 
 Fifthly, Chapter 3 has also shed light on the model of democracy underlying EU action. 
Primarily it needs to be said that, while the EU institutions have always agreed on the elements of 
democracy the EU promotes abroad, there has been much discussion on whether it should 
publicly express a definition of democracy. At times the demands for such publication were 
stronger, at times, in view of lack of agreement, some voices called for an abandonment of the 
idea in favour of a concentration on implementing the policy of democracy promotion. The 




intends to promote abroad. Rather than developing a notion by itself, in 2009 it suggested that 
the EU should adhere to a ‘definition’ proposed by the UN General Assembly, which, however, 
unsurprisingly was relatively broad and general. The Council has overall distanced itself from the 
idea of expressing a clear definition and usually, as much as this was possible, tried to avoid it. 
Rather, it has preferred to speak of universal, common principles that all democracies share and 
that the EU promotes. The Commission has pursued some middle-path as regards stipulating a 
clear definition of democracy. It has, due to its role as executive institution tasked with the 
implementation of democracy assistance programmes more than other institution engaged with 
definitional elements of democracy and has therefore in numerous occasions defined it, but has 
refrained from explicitly presenting its conceptions as EU definition or model of democracy.  
 The main reason for the uneasy approach to the question of the EU’s notion of 
democracy in external democracy promotion derives from the basic idea or principle of EU 
democracy promotion that the EU should not and does not intend to develop or even impose a 
specific model in a third states, in particular not a “European model”, but that there are many 
equally legitimate democratic models and that each state has to choose and develop the model 
that best fits its historical, cultural, social, economic and other characteristics. In this sense, the 
EU just intends to facilitate locally rooted processes of change. At the same time, however, the 
EU has an interest in a delimited range of possible models it is willing to support in third states, 
as not every model a third state considers as democracy is necessarily also judged as democratic 
by the EU or by international, like UN, standards. Additionally, democracy assistance, defined as 
direct assistance to actors, institutions and processes of an emerging or new democratic system of 
government, also requires the selection of certain topics that will be supported.  
 The Council tried to reconcile this principle and the mentioned constraints by arguing 
that all democracies shared common features, the development of which the EU supported. 
While the Council refrained from explicitly providing a clear and comprehensive list of these 
features, in some documents it referred to elections, accountable rulers, parliaments, political 
parties, the independent media, civil society, and the respect for a broad range of human rights. 
 It has been mentioned above that the Commission has exercised less constraint in 
publishing lists of thematic features of democracy that underlie EU action in democracy 
promotion and, in particular, assistance. To some extent it needed to further develop elements of 
democracy in order to implement specific programmes and, in particular, facilities, like the ACP 
Governance Initiative, which requires a detailed analysis by the Commission of all aspects of 
democracy in a particular target state. In COM(98) 146 the Commission provided a rather 
‘academic’ definition of democracy that defined it via three ‘fundamental characteristics’, 




processes in democracy. More recent documents contain more direct definitions, but their 
comprehensiveness varies (COM(2011) 303 final and COM(2011) 886 final). Overall, the 
following elements appear in the majority of definitions of democracy by the Commission: free 
and fair elections, parliaments, the freedom of expression (including the free press and free 
media), freedom of association (or political pluralism) which gives rise to civil society and 
political parties, the freedom of assembly, the rule of law (including the independence of the 
judiciary and access to justice), accountable governments, the separation of powers, and 
transparent and non-corrupt administrations. Reference is often also made to the protection of a 
broader range of human rights than those central for a democratic system, in particular civil 
rights.713 Some definitions, but not all, have also made reference to the concept of 
decentralization.  
 It should also be mentioned that some, albeit few, EU documents refer to specific models 
of democracy, in particular parliamentary democracy,714 representative democracy,715 and 
participatory democracy716. They lack defining these conceptions of democracy though, which 
renders it difficult to exactly determine their meaning, given various possible interpretations in 
the academic literature and examples in practice. Further, the relationship between the mentioned 
models, which partly appear in conflict with each other, is unclear. Overall, these expressly 
mentioned terms do therefore not really inform about notions of democracy used by the EU. 
 Both the notion of democracy suggested by the Council’s common principles of 
democracy and the various definitions provided by the Commission point to the basic liberal 
model of democracy. There is no evidence that it intentionally promotes any of the other, more 
specific models that have been presented in Chapter 1, nor any others models suggested in the 
academic literature more broadly. It has explicitly excluded a preference for the elitist model of 
democracy and has introduced safeguards to limit election-related support, in particular for EU 
EOMs. Further, the importance accorded to civil society strongly suggests a rejection of the elitist 
model. At the same time, despite the strong focus on civil society development, in particular by 
the EIDHR, the recent call for a Civil Society Facility, and the call for involving civil society in 
the implementation of EU assistance, it does not appear that the EU is promoting some form of 
participatory democracy or pluralist democracy as outlined in Chapter 1. It intends to develop 
civil society in order to perform its role in liberal democracy, such as contributing to policy-
making and operating as watch-dog, and to work next to parliament and government, rather than 
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to push back or replace these institutions.717 Finally, there is no evidence of the promotion of 
social democracy through democracy assistance. There are some hints to the social dimension of 
EU action in the principle of the universality of human rights as well as in the good governance 
programmes, however, the EU has not established clear enough links between the social and 
political dimension to suggest that it promotes social democracy.  
 Finally, brief reference should be made to the most important unresolved problems in 
EU democracy assistance. Many questions and reform suggestions concerning EU democracy 
promotion have occurred again and again during the last two decades of policy implementation. 
One recurring issue has been the need for a better informational basis of the local situation in 
order to devise responses in policy, including assistance. The EU has always had knowledge of 
local situations in its headquarters and its Delegations, however, it was not collected and 
presented systematically and therefore risked getting lost with changes in the administrative 
structure and personnel. In 2001, the Commission rejected drafting uniform reports on human 
rights like the US State Department. Since then, various formats for the systematic presentation 
of the local situation have emerged in different geographical framework, like human rights fact 
sheets, ACP governance profiles, and ENPI country reports. Only most recently, in 2011 has the 
Commission started to draft so-called human rights strategies for individual countries that should 
provide a common framework for EU policies. 
 A second major recurring problem has been the need to ensure coherence between 
different EU policies and EU democracy promotion and between different EU democracy 
promotion instruments. On the one hand, the problem has become more pressing over the last 
decade with the growing number of tools of democracy promotion and/or more intensive use of 
individual tools within the supranational as well as the CFSP pillar. On the other hand, increasing 
attention given to the topic and increasing calls for ensuring consistency have led to a larger 
awareness of the issue among Commission staff involved in the implementation of democracy 
promotion. The requirement that strategic papers for individual programmes mention activities 
under different tools has helped to take action under different tools or programmes into account. 
The human rights strategies will hopefully further add to these efforts. 
 The last existing challenge identified in Chapter 3 is the lack of country-focused 
programming documents in the case of the EIDHR. Ever since the early 2000s, when the 
programme was implemented on the basis of EIDHR strategic programming documents, it 
envisaged global priorities that should be pursued at a global level as well as in all target states. 
The global priorities were established on the basis of input from Delegations in the numerous 
target states, were formulated broadly to allow adjustments to local priorities, and allowed 
                                                     




Delegations to adjust priorities. Real EIDHR country-focused strategy papers were not drafted 
and country-focused EIDHR strategies therefore absent. It remains to be seen to what extent the 
new country-focused human rights strategies will affect this issue. In any case, EIDHR country 
strategy papers are needed as long as the EIDHR is providing assistance that also forms part of 













Chapter 4 concentrates on major issues surrounding EU competence for the provision of 
democracy assistance, that is, the existence and scope of EU powers to act in the field, and the 
relevant legal bases or concrete provisions in primary law that give, in various ways, rise to those 
powers and regulate their execution. The importance of competence questions in EU law is well 
known: as organization of ‘attributed competences’ or of ‘conferred powers’ the EU can only act 
within the powers transferred to it from the Member States.718 As such, competence constitutes a 
fundamental condition of the legality of EU law and its absence can lead to the annulment of an 
act by the ECJ.719 Further, Chapter 3 has already shown that disputes on competence, that is, on 
powers and influence, have been a frequent feature of the development of EU human rights and 
democratization policy throughout the 1990s.  
 Chapter 4 has two main aims. First, it constitutes the legal complement to the 
evolutionary account on EU democracy assistance given in Chapter 3 and provides, in particular, 
a more detailed discussion of the there referred to EIDHR dispute. Secondly, it adds to the 
construction of the strategy of EU democracy assistance by analyzing the contribution primary 
law has made and makes in this respect. In pursuing these aims, Chapter 4 broadly follows a 
chronological approach and first discusses the pre-Lisbon legal framework and then the currently 
applicable provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Detailed treatment of the pre-Lisbon framework 
does not only result from the evolutionary perspective of the Chapter, but also allows a much 
better understanding of the current legal framework, its novelties and continuing shortcomings, 
which can to a large degree be explained by the gradual development of EU competences in the 
sector since the early 1990s. 
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The following further delimitations in analysis apply. As the Treaties do not explicitly 
distinguish between assistance and other instruments but only refer to democracy promotion as 
such (or rather to “developing and consolidating democracy”), the discussion frequently relates to 
this broader concept. It does not, however, in detail discuss competences for tools other than 
assistance, which has been done in other works.720 Similarly, as the Treaties usually treat 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law together, so too does the discussion in this Chapter 
frequently, without, however, providing a detailed treatment of EU competences beyond 
democracy assistance. Further, the focus of the Chapter is on the supranational provisions as EU 
democracy assistance is primarily provided in this dimension. CFSP provisions are only briefly 
addressed and then, in particular, with a view to inter-pillar relations. Finally, when discussing the 
pre-Lisbon framework, Chapter 4 more precisely distinguishes between competences under the 
EC-Treaty (ECT) and the EU-Treaty than other Chapters, which usually only refer to EU 
democracy assistance.  
 
II. The Pre-Lisbon Legal Framework 
 
1. The EC-Treaty 
 
a) An Overview of the Legal Bases relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
From the early 2000s on, the EC-Treaty contained two express substantive legal bases for the 
provision of EU democracy assistance: Article 177(2) ECT and Article 181a(1) ECT. 
Additionally, each of these Articles had a related procedural provision that provided details on 
the applicable procedures in law-making (Article 179 ECT and Article 181a(2) ECT). Article 
177(2) ECT was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht (signed in February 1992/in force since 
November 1993) and remained, with the exception of its related procedural rules,721 unchanged 
until the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in December 2007/in force since December 2009). Article 
181a(1), basically copying Article 177(2) ECT, was inserted into the ECT by the Treaty of Nice 
(signed in February 2001/in force since February 2003) and also remained unchanged until the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  
The two provisions did not form part of a separate, specific section on democracy 
promotion, but of two different, broader policies, namely, of ‘development cooperation’ (Title 
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XX ECT) and of ‘economic, financial and technical cooperation’ (Title XXI ECT), which 
together regulated, except for the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), basically all 
external assistance and/or cooperation policies.722 The general substantive scope of both Titles is 
in principle equal, including as regards democracy promotion, and their major different relates to 
their geographic or geo-political scope (or ratione “personae”): Title XX relates to ‘developing 
countries’ and Title XXI to ‘third’ countries.723 
 For the following detailed discussion of the provisions, it is useful to cite Titles XX and 







1.Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies 
pursued by the Member States, shall foster: 
- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries,… 
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy, 
- the campaign against poverty…. 
2.Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy 
and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
3.The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives 




The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 177 in the policies that it implements 




1.….the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall adopt the measures 
necessary to further the objectives referred to in Article 177. Such measures may take the form of multiannual 
programmes. 
2.… 
3.The provisions of this Article shall not affect cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in the 




1.The Community and the Member States shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall 
consult each other on their aid programmes,… 




                                                     
722 The EC’s relations with the OCT’s were regulated in Part Four of the ECT (Arts. 182-188 ECT). Although no 
provision of that part explicitly referred to democracy and human rights promotion, it could be provided due to a 
broad interpretation of ‘economic and social development’, as suggested by the ECJ in Case C-268/94, Portugal v. 
Council [1996] ECR I-6177 (see below, at II. 1) b) i.). In practice, EU democracy assistance was hardly provided in 
OCTs, as they frequently had, due to their constitutional links with EU Member States, (some) democratic 
structures. (http://eeas.europa.eu/oct/index_en.htm (last accessed on 19.1.2011).  




Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the Member States shall cooperate with third 
countries and with the competent international organisations. The arrangements for Community cooperation may be 
the subject of agreements between the Community and the third parties concerned, which shall be negotiated and 
concluded in accordance with Article 300. 
 
The previous paragraph shall be without prejudice to Member States' competence to negotiate in international bodies 
and to conclude international agreements.” 
 
“TITLE XXI 





1.Without prejudice to the other provisions of the this Treaty, and in particular of Title XX, the Community shall 
carry out, within its spheres of competence, economic, financial and technical cooperation measures with third 
countries. Such measures shall be complementary to those carried out by the Member States and consistent with the 
development policy of the Community. 
 
Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy 
and the rule of law, and to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
2.The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament, shall adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of paragraph 1…”. 
 
 
It is important to stress that besides Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) ECT, the EC-Treaty lacked a 
more general reference to democracy and human rights promotion and protection in third states. 
Indeed, Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) ECT were the only ECT provisions that expressly mentioned 
the concepts. On the one hand, the EC-Treaty did not mention democracy promotion as ‘general 
objective’ of EC external action, as was alluded to in Article 177(2) ECT (...“shall contribute to 
the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy”...) and as did Article 11(1) 
TEU (pre-Lisbon)724 for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In fact, the EC-
Treaty did not include any provision, which concisely and comprehensively listed all objectives of 
EC external policy. Further, it did not even contain a separate Title on ‘EC external policies’, but 
the various provisions on external action were spread out all over the Treaty.725 On the other 
hand, more generally, democracy and human rights promotion and protection were not 
enumerated among the tasks and activities of the Community, usually referred to as ‘objectives’, 
listed in Articles 2 and 3 ECT.726  
                                                     
724 If references are made to the TEU before the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, this is indicated by 
mentioning the term ‘(pre-Lisbon)’ after the respective Article.  
725 For example, Art. 133 ECT (the common commercial policy), Art. 310 ECT (association agreements), Art. 182 
ECT (the association of overseas countries and territories, Art. 170 ECT (research and technological development), 
and Art. 174 ECT (environment). See: A. Dashwood, ‘The Attribution of External Relations Competence’, in: A. 
Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of E.C. External Relations (2000), at 119. 
726 On the reasons for this absence and general development of the EU’s human rights policy since the 1950s see: 
Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed.), at 317f; de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the 
European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, at 863; P. Eeckhout, External Relations of the European 




It should be mentioned that one provision, albeit with important limitations, extended the 
objective of democracy promotion beyond Title XX: Article 178 ECT, which required the EC to 
take the objectives stipulated in Article 177 ECT into account in all internal and external policies 
that were likely to affect developing countries, like in its agricultural policy and commercial 
policy. However, ‘taking into account’ indicated a weaker obligation, in the sense of ‘considering’ 
or ‘thinking of’, than contributing to achieving an objective as stipulated in Article 177(2) ECT.727 
Articles 178 ECT did therefore not create an EC obligation to actively pursue democracy 
promotion and could not provide the legal basis for any self-standing democracy promotion 
measures. Further, it was restricted to developing countries, as Title XXI, albeit surprisingly, lacks 
a similar provision.  
For the further discussion it is important to mention that before the insertion of Articles 
177(2) ECT (at Maastricht) and 181a(1) ECT (at Nice) into the EC-Treaty, EC-lawmakers had, in 
the absence of the existence of express or implied legal bases, to make recourse to the subsidiary 
powers provision of Article 308 ECT.728 The latter Article, which played a gap-filling role without 
extending the scope of EC competences,729 provided powers  
 
“(I)f action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common 
market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers…”. 
 
The provision served, for example, as legal basis for the EIDHR regulation concerning non-
developing countries, adopted in April 1999.730 Moreover, in absence of an express and implied 
basis for general (socio-economic) assistance regulations, with or without a democratization-
related focus, Article 308 ECT also provided the relevant basis for such acts, like the ALA-
regulation,731 adopted in February 1992, as well as the various Tacis regulations adopted between 
1993 and 2000.732  
Although the focus of this section is on the EC-Treaty, the EU-Treaty cannot be entirely 
disregarded, as, on the one hand, its ‘common provisions’ (Title I, Articles 1-7 TEU) and ‘final 
provisions’ (Title VIII, Articles 46-53 TEU) were of relevance for all three pillars, therefore also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Need of a Human Rights Policy: The EU and Human Rights, in P. Alston, with M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds), The 
EU and Human Rights (1999), at 6. 
727 In Portugal v. Council the ECJ equated the phrases ‘to contribute to the general objective…’.and ‘to take into 
account’. Such reading was widely criticized though in the academic literature and can only be explained by the 
strong dispute surrounding the question on human rights-related competences. Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, 
para. 23.  
728 In the case of implied powers, EC competence flows from the existence of a given power, or in a – by the ECJ 
also accepted – broader view from a given objective or function, which implies the existence of any power 
reasonably necessary to attain it. See Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed.), at 123f. 
729 Opinion 2/94, paras 30 and 35.  
730 1999 EIDHR regulation for developing countries.  
731 Council Regulation No 443/92.  
732 For example, the last Tacis regulation: Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 




for the supranational EC, and, on the other hand, the provisions of the intergovernmental pillars 
proved relevant in the interpretation of EC law.  
All in all, it is well known that the EU-Treaty, in particular since the reforms introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in October 1997/in force since May 1999), was more 
outspoken on the topic of human rights, democracy and other related concepts than the EC-
Treaty.733 Various EU-Treaty provisions referred to the concepts. In particular, Article 6(1) TEU 
(pre-Lisbon) broadly declared, since Amsterdam, that  
 
“(T)he Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.” 
 
Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) established, already since the Treaty of Maastricht,734 the obligation 
that 
 
“(T)he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”. 
 
Only the Treaty of Amsterdam, through Article 46(d) TEU (pre-Lisbon), formally endowed the 
ECJ with the necessary powers to ensure the observance of Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) within 
the sphere of its jurisdiction. However, while these express legal mandates in primary law were 
important, in practice, the ECJ had already since the late 1960s/early 1970s, without any 
constitutional foundation, started to protect ‘fundamental rights’ as ‘general principles of 
Community law’ and thereby with its jurisprudence, in general with the approval of the political 
institutions and Member States, established and developed an important element of human rights 
protection in EC law.735 At the same time, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the political institutions 
themselves expressly declared their intention to maintain self-restraint and to respect 
fundamental rights in the exercise of their powers in 1977.736  
Further, Articles 49 TEU (pre-Lisbon) stipulated, since the amendments by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, that only European states that respected “the principles set out in Article 6(1) may 
apply to become a member of the Union” and therefore provided the formal, legal foundation 
for ‘EU political membership conditionality’, which had since the first enlargements been applied 
                                                     
733 See, for example, Nowak, ‘Human Rights ‘Conditionality’ in Relation to Entry to and Full Participation in, the 
EU’, at 697f.  
734 Art. F(2) TEU (pre-Amsterdam). 
735 See, for example, de Witte, ‘The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of 
Human Rights’, at 864f; Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd ed.), at 319f.  
736 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission (Luxembourg, 5 April 1977), OJ 




but had been never explicitly included in the Treaty.737 Article 7 TEU (pre-Lisbon), introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and refined by the Treaty of Nice, provided the Member States and the 
EU institutions with a quite complex mechanism that aimed at ensuring the continued respect of 
the principles outlined in Article 6(1) TEU (pre-Lisbon) by EU Member States.738  
Finally, the TEU’s Title on CFSP (Title V, TEU pre-Lisbon) listed in Article 11 TEU 
(pre-Lisbon) the goals of this common foreign and security policy, which included, in paragraph 
1, fifth indent, the objective  
 
“to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.  
 
Despite the numerous provisions referring to human rights and democracy in the TEU (pre 
Lisbon) it needs to be stressed though that also the EU-Treaty, just like the EC-Treaty, did not 
mention democracy promotion as one of the general objectives of the Union, which are listed in 
Article 2 TEU (pre-Lisbon). 
All in all, the overview of democracy-related provisions in pre-Lisbon primary law 
exposes that, despite the very limited references to the concepts of democracy and human rights 
in the EC-Treaty and, in particular, the fact that democracy and human rights were not expressly 
mentioned as objectives of the EC or of its external policies, there were nevertheless two Articles 
that expressly authorized the provision of EU democracy assistance: Articles 177(2) and 181a 
ECT. Additionally, successive Treaty reforms gradually increased the number of references to the 
concepts of democracy and human rights in the EU-Treaty, thereby, as will be seen further 
below, facilitating an interpretation that suggested broader human rights and democracy-related 
competences of the EC and EU.  
The following Table, based on the pre-Lisbon three-pillar model, summarizes the 
mentioned legal bases of the EC- and EU-Treaties, relevant for democracy promotion (and 
assistance). 
                                                     
737 Document on The European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973; 
Declaration on Democracy, Copenhagen European Council; G. Pridham, ‘The Politics of the European Community, 
Transnational Networks and Democratic Transition in Southern Europe’, in G. Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: 
The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (1991), at 215; L. Whitehead, ‘Democracy by 
Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Politics Perspective’, in G. Pridham (ed.), Encouraging Democracy: 
The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (1991), at 50; M. Bulterman, ‘European Union 
Membership and Political Conditionality’, in M. Bulterman, A. Hendriks, and J. Smith (eds), To Beahr in Our Minds: 
Essays on Human Rights from the Heart of the Netherlands (1998), at 128.  




Table 8: Democracy Promotion-relevant Provisions of the ECT and TEU 
 
TEU 
Article 6(1): foundational principles of the Union 
Article 6(2): fundamental rights as general principles of EC law 
Article 7: mechanism to ensure Member States’ respect for foundational principles 
Article 49: respect for foundational principles as condition for EU membership  
ECT  CFSP (TEU)  JPCC (TEU) 
Article 177(2):development 
cooperation shall contribute to the 
general objective of developing and 
consolidating democracy  
Article 11(1): democracy 
promotion as goal of CFSP  
   
Article 181a: economic, financial 
and technical cooperation shall 
contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating 
democracy     
 
b) An Analysis of the Legal Bases relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
i. Democracy Assistance as Tool of EC Democracy Promotion under Articles  
177(2) and 181a(1)? 
 
Because Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) ECT only referred to the wider concept of democracy 
promotion without systematically listing tools or instruments (…“shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy”…), the question emerges whether the tool 
of democracy assistance was indeed, as suggested above, covered by the provisions. 
 As will be seen throughout the Chapter, the broad formulation of Article 177(2) ECT739 
allowed and gave rise to various discussions and disputes on different aspects of its scope, in 
particular also on the tools it covered. Most notably, in Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council, Portugal 
challenged the use of Article 177(2) ECT (and 181 ECT) as legal basis for a political 
conditionality clause in a development agreement with India. Portugal’s main legal argument was 
that ‘essential element clauses’, which was the type of EU conditionality clause used from the 
mid-1990s on,740 may lead to “certain means of action” that lay beyond the only ‘general 
objective’ of human rights protection foreseen in Article 177(2) ECT and that could only be 
based on the subsidiary power clause of Article 308 ECT.741 It is known that Portugal’s 
motivations in the case were political: it hoped to be able to veto a planned agreement with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for one of its member’s – Indonesia’s – 
human rights abuses in East Timor. For the veto it required the use of unanimous voting rules 
                                                     
739 Much of the following discussion focuses on the provisions of Title XX only, as Title XXI was only inserted into 
the ECT by the Treaty of Nice.  
740 COM(95) 216 final. 




that the use of Article 308 ECT would involve. Portugal v. Council was eventually decided in favour 
of a broad interpretation of Article 177(2) ECT, which accepted that the provision could be used 
as basis for ‘essential element clauses’.742 Nevertheless, the very complex legal argumentation in 
the judgment by the ECJ and the decision in full Court were proof of an existing, deeply-rooted 
disagreement on the scope of EU human rights competences, which included real and 
fundamental questions on the tools covered by such a policy, and did not simply concern the 
individual interests of one Member State on one issue. 
 However, different to the conditionality clauses, it was never challenged that the EC 
could in principle provide democracy assistance under Article 177(2) ECT. The famous dispute 
surrounding the adoption of the EC’s first democracy assistance regulations, the EIDHR dispute, 
discussed in more detail below, concerned the question of which kinds of democracy assistance 
projects could be financed under Article 177(2) ECT and whether Article 179 ECT could provide 
the basis for a separate, independent democracy assistance programme or required a link to a 
development measure. Also those Member States, in particular the UK, and the Council Legal 
Service, which overall favoured a more limited interpretation of Article 177(2) ECT in the 
EIDHR dispute, did not contest that the provisions of Title XX in general covered the tool of 
assistance.  
 The text of the EC-Treaty gave also support to the argument that Article 177(2) ECT 
covered EU democracy assistance. Articles 179 ECT expressly referred to the possibility of 
adopting ‘multiannual programmes’ and Article 180 ECT referred to the obligation of the EC 
and its Member States to consult on ‘aid programmes’, thereby suggesting that democracy 
assistance, which consisted of projects and programmes, was covered by the Treaty. It should be 
said that, during the EIDHR dispute, the Council Legal Service attempted to show that Article 
179 ECT did not apply to Article 177(2) ECT but to Article 177(1) ECT only, remained, 
however, unsuccessful in such interpretation of the provisions of Title XX.743 
 At the same time, however, the Treaty did not create an obligation of the EC to use 
certain democracy and human rights promotion instruments, like democracy assistance. Articles 
177(2) and 181a ECT created a general EC obligation to contribute, within its cooperation 
policies, to the democratization of target states. In other words, while not all development 
cooperation measures had to pursue human rights- and democracy-related objectives, the EC had 
                                                     
742 On the case see: S. Peers, ‘Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, (development policy) [1996] ECR I-6177 (Full 
Court)’, 35 Common Market Law Review (1998), at 541 and S. Peers, ‘Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s 
Development Policy? The Impact of Portugal v. Council’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of 
E.C. External Relations (2000), at 100.  
743 The Council Legal Service, Opinion of the Legal Service, Subject: Commission proposal for a Council Regulation 
(EC) on the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and 




to actively engage in some form of democracy promotion.744 How it pursued the objective of 
democratization, that is, through which tools or to which extent, was left to the discretion of EU 
policy-makers and was not predetermined in primary law. As regards the use of instruments, the 
EU could therefore choose to facilitate democratization through various instruments, as it has 
done since the early 1990s, but also to concentrate on one or fewer tools. Also Articles 179 ECT 
and 180 ECT, through their reference to programmes, did not create an obligation to necessarily 
use the tool of democracy assistance. Article 179 ECT only speaks of the possibility of 
multiannual programmes. Article 180 ECT, which creates an obligation of consultation among 
donors, presupposes the implementation of aid programmes and therefore strongly suggests their 
use, however, cannot be interpreted as necessarily requiring the implementation of democracy 
assistance, as assistance can also be socio-economic assistance or as there may be important 
reasons that during a particular period of time no democracy assistance is being provided.  
 The hesitance to provide an explicit and systematic enumeration of the instruments of 
democracy promotion in Article 177(2) ECT and, consequently in Article 181a ECT, appears to 
be less the result of the early stage of development of the policy in the early 1990s, but rather the 
deliberate choice of the Treaty-makers. The large majority of tools was known in the early 1990s 
and could therefore have been expressly mentioned. However, as the policy was relatively new, 
the Treaty-makers preferred to give considerable freedoms to policy makers to allow adjustments 
to international developments in the field should they occur. Further, other external policy fields 
were also not in detail regulated in primary law, like socio-economic development cooperation, 
the main topic of Title XX. The use of individual tools, like ‘programmes’ (Article 179 and 180 
ECT) and agreements (Article181 ECT), is only unsystematically and nearly accidentally 
mentioned in different provisions.  
 All in all, while the EC-Treaty did not expressly enumerate the various tools the EC could 
and/or should use to promote democracy abroad, it was never disputed that it could in principle 
fund democracy assistance programmes and projects. At the same time, primary law did not 
impose an obligation on policy makers to use the tool of assistance, but left a large margin of 
discretion in the choice of the tools. From the viewpoint of democracy promotion policy, a 
clearer and more detailed, non-exhaustive enumeration of tools, including assistance, would have 
been preferable, not only to avoid disputes like in Portugal v. Council, but also to ensure the 
employment of the tool.  
  
                                                     
744 Some authors have interpreted Art. 177(2) ECT more restrictively and suggested that the provisions only means 




ii. Explaining the Double-Tracked Legal Basis and Absence of a  
Separate, Specific Section on Democracy Promotion 
 
The reason why the EC-Treaty contains two separate legal bases for democracy assistance rather 
than a separate Title or Chapter on democracy promotion and therefore a single legal basis with 
an international geographical scope is less the result of a specific plan of the Treaty-makers than 
the nearly accidental consequence of a choice made, influenced by various conditions, at 
Maastricht in the early 1990s.745  
As indicated, in response to the widely celebrated third wave of democracy and the start 
of international and EU democracy promotion activities, the Treaty of Maastricht firstly 
introduced an explicit reference to democracy and human rights promotion into the EC-Treaty. 
Rather than creating a separate Title though, the relevant provision was placed, as ex-Article 
130u(2) ECT (later Article 177(2) ECT), in the equally new Title on development policy (ex-Title 
XVII, later Title XX).  
 Several factors appear to have determined this choice. First and most importantly, there 
was a lack of political acceptability for a separate EC-Treaty Title on democracy and human 
rights promotion in external relations. The main reason for this seems to have been the – for 
Member States more disputed – question on the scope of EC-internal human rights-related 
competences.746 Inserting the provision on democracy promotion in the Title on development 
cooperation, next to using an ambiguous wording (‘contribute…to the general objective’), 
conveniently allowed – at least initially – the circumvention of the problem of being too 
expressive on EC human rights competences while taking into account the political imperative of 
an explicit recognition of democracy promotion.  
 Secondly, the structure of the Treaty, in particular the absence of a separate Part or Title 
on ‘external policies’, definitely also inhibited the creation of a separate Title or Chapter on 
democracy and human rights promotion. Had external policy-relevant provisions been 
encapsulated in a single section (Part or Title), the Treaty-makers could more easily have inserted 
a reference to democracy promotion with world-wide geographic scope and therefore (possibly) 
created a single legal basis for democracy assistance acts already in 1992. Hesitations about too 
explicit a set of references to EC human rights competences might also, however, in this case 
have led to a slightly unclear wording of the provision. 
                                                     
745 The structure of the EC-Treaty, which was divided into Parts, Titles, and Chapters, would have required a 
separate Title on democracy and human rights promotion. Only, if there had been a separate Title on ‘external 
policies’, it would have been possible to introduce a separate Chapter on democracy and human rights promotion. 




 Thirdly, conceptual and practical links between the concepts of development and 
democratization made the inclusion of the reference to democracy promotion in ex-Title XVII 
an acceptable choice. This choice was, fourthly, supported by the fact that the Title on 
development cooperation was being newly inserted. Inserting a reference as part of a new Title 
was, as less extensive intrusion into the Treaty, more easily acceptable than inserting an entirely 
new Title.  
 The – for this discussion – most important consequence of the treaty makers’ choice to 
insert the reference to democracy and human rights promotion into ex-Title XVII (on 
development cooperation) was the creation of a double legal basis for EC democracy assistance. 
As Ex-Title XVII could only be used for developing countries, democracy assistance for third 
countries had, in absence of express or implied powers, to be based on the residual powers 
provision of ex-Article 235 ECT (Article 308 ECT) – recall that Article 181a ECT was only 
inserted in 2001 (Treaty of Nice). Subsequent Treaty reforms have only consolidated this 
bifurcation. 
 Initially, the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht were widely applauded 
though, in particular because ex-Article 130u(2) ECT constituted the first (and till Nice only) 
explicit mentioning of the terms human rights and democracy in the EC-Treaty. Even the use of 
the residual powers clause for democracy assistance to third countries and the related differences 
in the applicable procedural provisions, discussed shortly below in sub-section iv.), appeared 
justified by the longer history of EC development policy as compared to the relatively novelty of 
engagement in other states, like former Communist countries. Only the enormous growth of 
assistance to third countries throughout the 1990s, which increased the awareness of the gap in 
the ECT of an express legal basis for cooperation with these states, and the introduction of the 
co-decision procedure in Article 179 ECT by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which accentuated the 
different procedures used for Article 179 and 308 ECT, eventually created pressure for changes.  
Eventually, in 2001, the Treaty of Nice introduced a separate, express Title on ‘economic, 
financial and technical cooperation with third countries’ (Title XXI). By basically copying Article 
177(2) ECT in Article 181a(1) second paragraph ECT, it expressly consolidated the double legal 
basis for democracy assistance. The creation of a separate Title on democracy promotion was not 
contemplated at Nice, as, on the one hand, the Treaty-makers appeared satisfied with the existing 
double-track structure, and, on the other hand, the Treaty of Nice only constituted a minor treaty 
reform. 
 All in all, it was the initial contingent choice, taken at Maastricht in 1991, of not creating a 
separate Title on democracy promotion but of inserting an explicit reference to democracy 




insertion of Title XXI through the Treaty of Nice in 2001, that led to the existence of two 
separate legal basis for democracy assistance in primary law rather than the existence of a separate 
Title on democracy promotion (including assistance) with a universal geographical scope. The 
discussion of the Treaty of Lisbon will show that Maastricht had an enduring legacy as also the 
current legal framework continues along these lines. 
 
iii. The Geographical Scope (ratione ‘personae’) of Articles 177(2) and 181a(1) ECT 
 
As indicated, the EC-Treaty differentiated between two types of ‘states of cooperation’: 
‘developing counties’ and ‘third’ countries, for which different treaty provisions applied.747 
Unfortunately, the EC-Treaty neither listed the countries with respect to each category nor 
provided a definition that would allow a clear allocation. Attempts to develop a definition from 
the stipulated objectives of development cooperation (Article 177(1) ECT), like that countries 
had to be ‘not economically and socially developed’ and ‘not integrated in the world economy’ 
were not able to provide concrete results.748 The wording of Titles XX and XXI only suggested 
that Title XX was the primary category, while Title XXI, as catch-all or residuary title, comprised 
all states that did not fall within Title XX.  
Given the lack of a clear definition in the Treaty and ECJ ruling on the question, it is 
necessary to analyze how the EU institutions used the relevant provisions in practice in order to 
develop a categorization and to induce some underlying principles.749 This exercise shows some 
minor, but nevertheless relevant changes in EU practice since the reform of external assistance 
instruments, which applied from January 2007 on.  
It is also important to mention, that the general substantive scopes of Titles XX and XXI 
are in principal equal, that is, the Titles only differ in their geographical and not in their material 
scopes.750 There is therefore just one line and not two lines of division between the two Titles. 
                                                     
747 When speaking about countries covered by Title XXI, it is preferable to use the term ‘third country’ to ‘non-
developing’ country that is also sometimes used in the literature. The reason is that several of the countries falling 
into the group of Title XXI are indeed ‘developing’ according to most international definitions of ‘development’ and 
are also in other EC-policies, like the GSP-system, treated as such rather than being non-developing countries.  
748 E. Riedel and M. Will, ‘Human Rights Clauses in External Agreements of the EC’, in P. Alston, with M. Bustelo 
and J. Heenan (eds), The EU and Human Rights (1999), at 733-4. 
749 The following numbers are provided on the basis of analysis of EC assistance acts as well as information on the 
Commission website. 
750 While structure and wording of the ECT allowed two different interpretations of the general substantive scopes 
of Titles XX and XXI – equal scopes or two distinct, even if largely overlapping, scopes – the issue was expressly 
addressed during reform of the EC external assistance instruments in the early-mid 2000s and solved in favour of an 
equal interpretation of the scopes. The Commission had suggested different scopes, arguing, in particular, that 
‘economic cooperation’ with developing countries was not covered by the concept of development envisaged in Title 
XX but required the use of Title XXI. However, Council and Parliament favoured the interpretation that the material 
scope of Titles XX and XXI was identical. See: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 




Specific development cooperation and economic, financial, and technical cooperation policies 
and measures may still differ in practice. 
 
Before the Reform of EC External Assistance Instruments (before 1 January 2007) 
Until the recent reform in EC external assistance the EC by and large attributed the following 
states to the group of Title XX or developing countries:751 48 African, 15 Caribbean, and 15 
Pacific states (that is, in total, 78 ACP states), 18 states in Central and Southern America, between 
20 and 24 states in Asia, as well as some countries in the Near and Middle East. All others were 
(consequently) Title XXI or third countries. Of these third states, the following were assistance-
recipients: all – until their accession to the EU – approximately 14 former Communist states of 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, the 12 – non-CEEC –752 successor states to the 
Soviet Union, as well as the approximately ten Middle-Eastern and Mediterranean states of 
Northern Africa. A second group of third states was constituted by six industrialized states, that 
is, the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Korea, and Japan, in which the EU implemented 
cooperation projects but which did not receive democracy or other assistance.  
 Unfortunately, no single factor determined this division in EC practice before 2007, but 
several factors appeared influential. It is clear that the EU did not strictly apply any concrete and 
objective criteria, like GDP or GNI per capita levels, in order to allocate countries to one group 
or the other.753 At the same time, however, levels of socio-economic development played some, 
even if not always a decisive role in the allocation. The overwhelming majority of states in the 
group of Title XX (developing) countries were indeed widely considered to be developing 
countries, for example according to the OECD/DAC list of ODA recipients, and clearly 
                                                                                                                                                                      
629 of 29.9.2004; European Parliament, Committee on Development, Second Report on the proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development 
cooperation and economic cooperation (COM(2004)629), A6-0109/2006final, in particular the Opinion of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs on the Legal Basis, at 68-71; Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the common 
position of the Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
a financing instrument for development cooperation, COM(2006) 628 final, 24.10.2006, at 4; Council of the 
European Union, Statement of the Council’s Reasons, Subject: Common position adopted by the Council on 23 
October 2006 with a view to the adoption of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (119444/06 ADD1, 23.10.2006), at 4; European 
Parliament, Committee on Development, Draft Recommendation for Second Reading on the Council common 
position for adopting a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument 
for development cooperation (11944/2/2006-C6-0357/2006-2004/0220(COD)), PROVISIONAL 
2004/0220(COD), 26.10.2006, at 7. 
751 In some cases only approximate numbers can be given or the given numbers might vary in individual years over 
the entire period, in particular if there was unclear EC practice, like if an adopted legal act predated the Treaty of 
Maastricht and was therefore based on ex-Art. 235 ECT, and/or if political changes led to the creation of new states 
in a particular region.  
752 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were from the early 1990s on treated as part of the group of CEEC. 
753 S. Peers, ‘EC Frameworks of International Relations: Co-operation, Partnership and Association’, in A. 




industrialized or developed countries, like Western states, were never subsumed under Title XX. 
At the same time, however, also many developing countries, and also many with lower levels of 
development, were allocated to Title XXI, like states in Central Asia.  
 One further factor was the evolution of EC development policy and the gradual 
emergence, over several decades, of a group of countries that was the focus of this policy.754 
When Title XX was inserted into the EC-Treaty in 1991, it was clear that this group consisted of 
the ACP, Latin American, and Asian states. Assistance to former Communist states was a new 
phenomenon and the countries were internationally conceived as countries ‘in transition’ rather 
than as traditional developing countries, suggesting different problems and requiring different 
solutions.  
This historical-conceptual explanation cannot explain though why the Mediterranean 
states, which had received EC support from the early 1980s on, were excluded from Title XX. 
Differences in the form of granting aid – Mediterranean countries received assistance on the 
basis of bi-lateral protocols rather than assistance regulations – appear unable to explain it. One 
possible reason for their exclusion in 1991, but also for a general tendency to keep Title XX 
limited to the EU’s traditional aid recipients, were power-related considerations linked to 
different procedural rules of Titles XX, Article 308 ECT, and (much later) Title XXI and the 
desire of (individual) Member States to keep as much control of aid policies as possible.755  
 Finally, there was a tendency to keep individual regions homogenous and to treat 
countries of the same region, which were addressed by a single regional instrument, like Tacis or 
MEDA, as part of the same group, thereby creating a simple and clear structure or pattern in EU 
external relations. The case of Palestine is particularly demonstrative here: While Palestine had 
been treated as ‘developing’ in individual acts,756 it was made a Title-XXI state under the MEDA-
programme.757  
 All in all, before 2007, the EC’s differentiation between Title XX and Title XXI countries 
was based on a mix of socio-economic, historical, conceptual, power-related and structural 
factors. 
                                                     
754 On the history of development policy see, for example, K. Arts, Integrating Human Rights into Development 
Cooperation: The Case of the Lomé Convention (1998), at 97f, and L. Bartels, ‘Trade and Development Policy of the 
European Union’, in M. Cremona, Developments in EU External Relations Law (2008), at 128f.  
755 See sub-section iv. for the detailed discussion of procedural issues.  
756 Council Regulation (EC) No 1734/94 of 11 July 1994 on financial and technical cooperation with the Occupied 
Territories, OJ 1994 L182/4, last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2110/2005 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 14 December 2005 on access to Community external assistance, OJ L 2005 L344/1. 
757 As will be discussed in more detail below, the MEDA regulation could impossibly have been based on ex-Arts 
130w and 235 ECT, as their procedural rules were incompatible. This did not justify a simple transfer to Palestine to 
the group of non-developing countries though. The correct procedure would have been to adopt a separate ‘MEDA’ 




After the Reform of EC External Assistance Instruments (since 1 January 2007) 
The adoption of a whole series of new assistance instruments in late 2006 revealed a slightly 
different division between developing (Title XX) and third (Title XXI) states. The following 
countries are now considered developing countries: the 78 ACP states, four to six countries in the 
Near and Middle East,758 18 in Central and Southern America, 19 in Asia, as well as, as most 
remarkable novelty, the five former Soviet states of Central Asia.759 The following countries are 
considered third countries: the seven to eight pre-accession states in South-Eastern Europe,760 
Russia, Israel, and 17 so-called ‘industrialized and other high income states’, which include four 
Western countries, including the US, seven states in Asia, including Japan, Korea and Singapore, 
and six states in the Middle East, including Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.761 The main 
novelty in this category of industrialized states is the clear allocation of countries that have passed 
a certain level of development, like Singapore, to the group of third countries. At the same time, 
however, it is unclear into which group the three Southern Caucasian states, the three western 
NIS (without Russia), and nine states of the Mediterranean and Near East fall under the new 
system. 
The reason for the lack of clarity as regards the classification of the just mentioned states 
derives from the fact that no individual acts have been adopted toward these countries on the 
basis of either Article 179 or 181a ECT and that the ENPI regulation, which regulates assistance 
to these states, is based on both, Articles 179 and 181a ECT, without specifying which country 
belongs to which group. On the one hand, it could be that the mentioned countries were from 
2007 on considered to be developing countries and that the use of Article 181a ECT was 
necessitated by the inclusion of Russia and Israel in the ENPI.762 In support of such 
interpretation reference can be made to the fact that, first, also the five Central Asian States, 
which had so far been in the same group as the other former Soviet states, had been shifted to 
the group of developing countries, secondly, that the reference to Article 179 ECT in the ENPI 
regulation would otherwise have been unnecessary as all 15 mentioned states were previously, as 
aid recipients under Tacis and MEDA, considered to be third states, and thirdly, that the EU, as 
will be discussed in some more detail shortly below, has from 2007 on established a link between 
Title XX and the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients, which includes all 15 states. 
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On the other hand, and this seems to be the more likely situation, it could be that all 
mentioned 15 states (with some special rules for Palestine) continue to be considered third, Title 
XXI countries. There is simply no real evidence for a shift of the mentioned states to Title XX 
and there are important counterarguments to be made against the above arguments supporting 
such shift. First, the fact that the five Central Asian states were moved to the category of Title 
XX states does not necessarily imply that all other former Soviet states and the Mediterranean 
states were moved as well. Rather, Central Asia had to be moved to the category of developing 
countries to adjust the categorization of states to the (new) system of external assistance 
instruments and to retain homogeneous groups: the DCI (used for developing countries only) 
was the only possible assistance instrument for Central Asia, at it was excluded from the ENP. At 
the same time, there was a strong wish to base the DCI regulation on Title XX (development 
policy) only.763 All in all, the shift of Central Asia constituted an exception rather than a new rule 
of treating all former Soviet and Mediterranean states as developing countries.  
Secondly, the decision to base the ENPI regulation on both, Article 181a ECT and 
Article 179 ECT, was not necessitated by the fact that the Caucasian, western NIS and 
Mediterranean states were developing countries, but was rather a political choice of the EU 
institutions to more extensively involve the European Parliament through the co-decision 
procedure (envisaged in Article 179 ECT but not in Article 181a ECT). This concession to the 
Parliament was important in view of the relevance of the ENPI, the Parliament’s overall critical 
view on the limitations of its powers due to the reduction of external assistance instruments, and 
the planned increase of parliamentary powers in the case of cooperation with third countries in 
the draft Constitutional Treaty. The – albeit nowhere expressly mentioned – legal justification for 
basing the ENPI regulation on both, Article 179 ECT and 181a ECT, rather than on Article 181a 
ECT only, can only have been the inclusion of Palestine, which had been treated as developing 
country in individual EU acts, that were also repealed by the ENPI regulation.764  
Finally, the mentioned link between the OECD/DAC list of aid recipients and Title XX 
is not as far-reaching as suggested above. It is true that the DCI regulation for the first time 
explicitly established a set of linkages between EU development aid and OECD criteria for 
development policies.765 One element thereof is the requirement that recipients under the DCI 
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need to be listed as developing countries in the OECD/DAC list of ODA recipients.766 In other 
words, in order to receive assistance under the DCI and by implication, to be developing in the 
sense of Title XX, countries have to be included in the OECD/DAC list. Once they graduate 
from this list, they are no longer eligible under the DCI and, by implication, also no longer 
developing countries in the sense of Title XX but third states in the sense of Title XXI.767 
However, the created link between the OECD/DAC list and the DCI does not at all suggest that 
all countries on the OECD/DAC list are necessarily developing countries in the sense of Title 
XX. Rather, the OECD/DAC list includes both, countries pertaining to Title XX and countries 
pertaining to Title XXI, like the applicant states for EU-membership. All in all, it therefore rather 
seems that Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, the Southern Caucasian states, and the nine states of 
the MEDA area are Title XXI countries.  
On the whole, under the EU’s new system of differentiating between Title XX and Title 
XXI states objective factors play a more important role than before. As mentioned, in order to be 
a developing country (Title XX), a country has to be included in the OECD/DAC list of ODA 
recipients. If a country is excluded from that list, it is also excluded from Title XX. However, this 
rule does not entirely determine the EU’s categorization, as not all states included in the 
OECD/DAC list are Title XX states. Whether a state is therefore developing or a third country, 
continues also to be determined by the mix of historical, conceptual, structural, and (inter- and 
intra-institutional) power-related factors outlined above. The reform of 2007 has therefore only 
partially introduced clearer and more objective factors.  
Although of more general interest than for democracy assistance only, the discussion 
necessarily provokes the questions regarding the necessity and usefulness of separating between 
two groups of countries in primary law. A single category of ‘third states’, established by a single 
Title, possibly called ‘cooperation policies’ or ‘development and other cooperation policies’, 
would avoid the need to differentiate between states, while still allowing to pursue separate, 
targeted policies towards individual countries or regions. Some external policies, like trade policy, 
do also not operate with different categories of countries, even if they adjust trade instruments to 
the particularities of the targeted states, like in the case of agreements and the general system of 
preferences (GSP). 
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iv. Different Procedural Rules of Articles 179, 181a and 308 ECT 
 
It has been mentioned that differences in procedural rules and therefore in powers of Member 
States and EU institutions not infrequently strongly affected the evolution of primary law and its 
interpretation as regards democracy assistance. This section briefly addresses the procedures of 
Articles 179, 181a and 308 ECT in order to render the differences, in particular as regards the 
Council and the Parliament, clearer, without going into detail of the individual legislative 
procedures though. Additionally, it addresses the question of using multiple legal bases for single 
legislative acts and the relevance of procedural rules in this respect. 
 
Differences in Procedural Rules  
When the Treaty of Maastricht inserted the title on development cooperation into the EC-Treaty, 
ex-Article 130w ECT (Article 179 ECT) foresaw the use of the co-operation procedure, regulated 
in ex-Article 189c ECT (Article 252 ECT), for the adoption of assistance-related acts. This, in 
1991 widely used procedure did not provide for the most extensive influence of the Parliament 
possible at that time, which would have been foreseen by the co-decision procedure. However, it 
gave the Parliament some possibility to affect the material content of a measure by making voting 
requirements in the Council more difficult: Instead of deciding by qualified majority, the Council 
had to act unanimously if it did not accept amendments suggested by the Parliament or decided 
against a negative vote of the Parliament. The co-operation procedure was, for example, used for 
the adoption of the EIDHR regulation concerning developing countries in April 1999 as well as 
for some specific development programmes for individual developing countries, like for Palestine 
and South Africa.768  
 At the same time, democracy assistance regulations and general development-related acts 
for third countries had, until the insertion of Title XXI by the Treaty of Nice, to be based on the 
subsidiary powers clause of ex-Article 235 (Article 308 ECT).769 Rather than referring to one of 
the ECT’s legislative procedures, Article 308 ECT itself mentioned its procedural rules and 
basically foresaw unanimous vote in the Council and consultation of the European Parliament. 
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While this consultation had to be real or genuine and not merely formal,770 the Council was 
neither bound by the Parliament’s opinion nor could the latter institution exert pressure on the 
Council through rendering voting requirements more difficult, as Article 308 ECT anyway 
foresaw unanimous vote in the Council. The Commission and the Council therefore dominated 
the procedure, while each Member States retained the power to block a measure. The procedure 
was, for example, used for the adoption of the EIDHR regulation concerning third states in April 
1999. The European Parliament’s powers therefore differed as regards the adoption of two 
identical regulations, just because they were targeting different countries or regions. 
Returning to the provisions of Title XX, the Treaty of Amsterdam, as part of a general 
replacement of the co-operation procedure by the co-decision procedure, also introduced the co-
decision procedure into Article 179 ECT.771 The procedure, stipulated in Article 251 ECT, was 
designed to prevent a measure being adopted without the approval of the Council and of the 
Parliament and placed emphasis on the reaching of a jointly approved text, not at last through the 
use of ‘conciliation committees’ and of informal ‘trialogues’ that support finding a compromise.772 
Of all available procedures, it gave the Parliament the most extensive possibilities to influence a 
legislative act, in particular also as regards its material content. The co-decision procedure was 
used for the extension of the EIDHR regulation for developing countries in 2004, the adoption 
of the 2006 EIDHR regulation, and the DCI regulation as well as the ENPI regulation.  
Finally, when Title XXI was inserted into the EC-Treaty through the Treaty of Nice, 
Article 181a ECT foresaw yet another procedure to be followed in the adoption of democracy 
assistance regulations. Article 181a ECT did not, like Article 179 ECT, foresee the co-decision 
procedure for the adoption of assistance regulations, but stipulated its own, specific procedural 
rules: It envisaged the consultation of the European Parliament and qualified majority vote in the 
Council. While the Nice Treaty finally created the long-desired express legal base for assistance-
act for third countries, it did not change the role of the Parliament in the adoption of these acts. 
Just like under Article 308 ECT, the role of the Parliament remained consultative only. However, 
by introducing qualified majority vote, the new provision of Article 181a ECT removed the 
possibility of Member States to veto acts, as had been possible under Article 308 ECT. The 
procedures of Article 181a(2) ECT were followed in the case of the 2004 regulation that 
amended and, in particular, extended the EIDHR for third countries for the period 2005 and 
2006.  
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On the whole, the overview shows that throughout the period 1992 and 2009 the 
applicable procedural provisions as regards the adoption of democracy assistance regulations 
were frequently changed. Nevertheless, the role of the European Parliament always remained 
stronger in the case of developing and weaker in the case of third countries, indicating some 
hesitation on part of the Member States to concede powers to the Parliament as regards third 
states and leading to the somewhat absurd situation that the latter institution had considerably 
different powers in the adoption of the EIDHR as regards developing and the (identical) EIDHR 
as regards third states. All in all, during the entire period, the powers of the Parliament vis-à-vis 
the Council increased.  
 
The Use of Multiple Legal Bases with Different Procedural Rules  
The existence of different procedural rules for acts relating to developing and third states raises 
the question of the possibility of a joint use for the adoption of democracy assistance regulations 
with a worldwide geographical scope, like of a single EIDHR regulation, and the question of 
which rules apply in such cases. 
The question on dual (or multiple) legal bases is not unique to the case at stake and the 
joint use has, under certain conditions, been accepted in EU law. Different from the EIDHR 
case, in which the dual legal basis results from the different geographical scopes of Articles 179 
and 181a ECT, it usually stems from dual (or multiple) substantive scopes of the legal acts. The 
solutions to the resulting problems are the same though.  
All in all, in EU law the general rule is to choose a single legal basis, while the choice 
should rest “on objective factors amenable to judicial review” and, in particular, result from “the 
aim and content of the measure”.773 If a measure has a twofold purpose and none of the two is 
principal or dominant while the other is ‘merely incidental’, exceptionally a dual legal basis must 
be chosen.774 However, this use of dual basis also requires that the procedures laid down for each 
legal basis are compatible with each other.775 The ECJ has explicitly ruled that both, the 
cooperation and the co-decision procedures, are incompatible with the consultation procedure, if 
the latter foresees unanimous voting in the Council.776 The underlying reasoning is that otherwise 
the Parliament’s powers and thereby fundamental democratic principles would be 
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compromised.777 In case of compatibility, the procedure is followed that gives the Parliament 
more extensive rights.  
This explains why, in April 1999, the EC adopted two separate, but basically identical, 
EIDHR regulations for developing and third countries: the co-operation procedure of ex-Article 
130w ECT (Article 179 ECT) was incompatible with the unanimous vote foreseen in ex-Article 
235 ECT (308 ECT). It also explains why the 1996 MEDA regulation, which also covered 
‘developing’ Palestine, could never have been adopted on both ex-Articles 235 (Article 308 ECT) 
and 130w ECT (Article 179 ECT). As indicated, in that case Palestine was simply shifted to the 
category of third states and the regulation based on ex-Article 235 ECT only.778 Further, the 
discussion explains why, upon the insertion of Article 181a ECT into the EC-Treaty, it was 
possible to adopt a single EIDHR regulation in 2006: the co-decision procedure applicable in the 
case of Article 179 ECT was compatible with the procedure of Article 181a ECT, which foresaw 
qualified majority voting in the Council. Similarly, the ENPI-regulation could be based on both, 
Articles 179 and 181a ECT. In both cases, the co-decision procedure applied.  
 
v. Independent Democracy Assistance Programmes or Democracy Assistance  
 as Part of General Development Assistance Programmes Only? 
 
This section is concerned with one aspect of the scope of Article 177(2) ECT and questions 
whether Article 177(2) ECT (together with Article 179 ECT) could provide a sufficient legal basis 
for the adoption of an independent democracy assistance regulation à la EIDHR regulation or 
could, due to its position as sub-section of the Title on development cooperation, only justify the 
inclusion of democracy assistance in general development assistance regulations. The issue was 
one of the main topics of the mentioned EIDHR dispute and is proof of the limitations of the 
EC-Treaty’s structure and wording concerning democracy promotion as well as of the critical 
views of some actors in the evolution of the EU’s external democratization policy in the 1990s. 
As the dispute took place before the inclusion of Title XXI, the discussion focuses on Title XX 
and Article 308 ECT. The results are, however, equally relevant for Article 181a ECT.  
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A Restrictive Interpretation of the ECT 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Commission’s first proposal for an EIDHR regulation of July 
1997779 prompted a highly critical Opinion by the Council Legal Service in October of the same 
year,780 which was apparently in particular pushed for by the UK.781 Next to suggesting a 
restrictive substantive scope of Articles 177(2) and 308 ECT, discussed in the next section,782 it 
also argued that that Article 177(2) ECT was not an appropriate basis for democracy and human 
rights assistance as “stand-alone actions” or a regulation which “aimed solely” at realizing human 
rights- and democratization-related objectives.783 Rather, it could only be used for a regulation 
whose “main object” was traditional (socio-economic) development cooperation and which also 
concentrated on human rights and democracy, even if it had “a particular incidence on human 
rights”.784 Democracy and human rights assistance had to be “part of an integrated development 
policy”.785 The Opinion only very generally mentioned ‘a development agreement’ or ‘a new 
development regulation’ as examples. By this, however, it seemingly meant regulations like ALA, 
that focused on socio-economic development but also envisaged democracy assistance.786 
To support its arguments, the Council Legal Service first focused on the structure and 
wording of Title XX. It stressed that, while Article 177(1) ECT outlined three (sub-)goals of 
development cooperation, Article 177(2) ECT only stipulated that “Community policy in this area 
shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy…”.787 This 
division and difference in wording indicated that democracy (and human rights) promotion were 
not themselves goals of development cooperation, but constituted different, separate goals. 
These different goals could not be furthered by Article 179 ECT, as latter would only apply to 
“measures in the sphere of development cooperation”.788 The Council Legal Service then 
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supported this interpretation with two citations from Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council, a 
judgment that, despite accepting Article 181 ECT as proper basis for political conditionality 
clauses, was, as mentioned, handed down against the background of major battles over EC 
human rights competences. First, the judgment equated the phrase “shall contribute to the 
general objective…” with “to take account of the objective of respect for human rights [and 
democratic principles]…” (paragraph 23 of the judgment).789 For the Council Legal Service, the 
phrase “take account of” indicated that the promotion of human rights did not in itself constitute 
a development policy measure.790 Secondly, the judgment stipulated, while accepting that Article 
181 ECT was a proper legal basis for political conditionality clauses, that “the question of respect 
for human rights and democratic principles is not a specific field of cooperation provided for by 
the Agreement” (paragraph 28 of the judgment).791 For the Legal Service it appeared that, “if 
such had been the case, the Court might well have considered that ... [Article 181 ECT] was not 
the proper legal basis” and that, accordingly, also the possibility of using ... [Article 179 ECT] for 
a regulation aimed ‘solely’ at realizing the objective of democratization was questionable.792  
After excluding that Article 177(2) and 179 ECT could serve as basis for the EIDHR, the 
Council Legal Service analyzed whether Article 308 ECT could be used instead (for Title XX and 
other states).793 It basically suggested, in parallel to the interpretation of the provisions of Title 
XX, that Article 308 ECT could only be used as legal basis for a regulation, which was targeting 
third (not Title XX) states and which had a general socio-economic focus but also included some 
(albeit substantively limited) human rights and democracy aspects, like Tacis and MEDA.794 It 
could not, however, serve as legal basis “for an independent programme” for democracy and 
human rights assistance or an act “the principle objective of which is generally” the promotion of 
democratization – neither for Title XX nor for third states.795  
In support of its arguments, the Council Legal Service referred to Opinion 2/94, in which 
the Court had denied EC competence, based on ex-Article 235 ECT (308 ECT), for accession to 
the ECHR. It first cited a crucial statement from the judgment, that “(N)o Treaty provision 
confers on the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights…”.796 
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Then it recalled that ex-Article 235 ECT “cannot serve as basis for widening the scope of 
Community powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole and, in particular, by those that define the tasks and the activities of the Community”.797 It 
went on to stress that Articles 2 and 3 of the EC-Treaty did not mention the observance and 
promotion of human rights as EC tasks and activities, suggesting that the third criterion of 
Article 308 ECT, that is, that ‘human rights and democratization’ were EC objectives, was not 
fulfilled.798 The Council Legal Service justified the use of Article 308 ECT for general assistance 
regulations with a democracy and human rights focus by mentioning that certain democracy- and 
human rights-related actions were necessary to achieve the aim of “economic reconstruction” 
and, as element of the economic aspects, were covered by the scope of Article 308 ECT.799  
What would the acceptance of the Council Legal Service’s interpretation of primary law 
have meant for EU democracy assistance? On the one hand, it would have changed little for 
democracy assistance under general development programmes like ALA and Tacis, which could 
have continued to provide and even increase aid in the sector (albeit respecting the more limited 
substantive focus, discussed below). On the other hand, it would have put democracy assistance 
in the third sector in danger. As mentioned, recipient states’ governments are involved in the 
programming of general development programmes, while they are not in the case of the EIDHR. 
Critical governments could therefore have considerably restricted the provision of democracy 
assistance, especially to independent, critical groups. Only some major changes in EC procedural 
rules on aid implementation, ensuring allocation to civil society also in the framework of general 
programmes, would have been able to ensure the continued support of NGOs and other groups. 
However, on the whole the restrictive interpretation suggested by the Council’s Legal Service 
contradicted the very policy that had, with the Council’s support (in particular through the 
adoption of the annual budget, which was the basis for the numerous EIDHR programmes) 
developed throughout the 1990s. It can only be understood as part of a broader conflict on EC 
human rights competences, in particular, as regards the encroachment upon the sphere of the 
Member States.  
 
A Broad Interpretation of the ECT 
The Opinion of the Council Legal Service caused much critique by the Commission and 
Parliament and amongst the academic community and concerned civil society. It was eventually 
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not followed. As is well known, self-standing democracy and human rights assistance regulations, 
the EIDHR regulations, were eventually in April 1999.  
The legal arguments in support of using Article 179 ECT as a basis for an independent 
democracy assistance regulation suggested that Article 177 ECT did not treat human rights and 
democracy promotion (Article 177(2) ECT) as inferior or ancillary to traditional development 
objectives (Article 177(1) ECT) and that Article 179 ECT could therefore be used as procedural 
legal basis for an act realizing the goals of Article 177(2) ECT as much as it could be used for 
Article 177(1) ECT. Indeed, the inclusion in a separate sub-paragraph stressed the importance the 
EC attributed to the topic rather than indicating some inferior role. Further, the particular 
structure of Article 177 ECT and wording of Article 177(2) ECT showed the goals of democracy 
and human right promotion were not only an objective of development cooperation but also a 
broader, more general objective of the EC and EU that was to be pursued through various 
policies, in particular also through trade policy and the CFSP.  
As regards the Legal Service’s use of paragraph 23 of Portugal v. Council, which equated ‘to 
contribute’ with ‘to take account of’, some authors rightly criticized the reference to only part of 
the text in the judgment.800 Paragraph 23 was only the starting point of a reasoning that 
subsequently stressed the “importance...[of] respect for human rights and democratic principles” 
(paragraph 24), that spoke of ‘subordinating’ development cooperation to human rights 
protection (paragraph 26), and that finally accepted the legality of ‘essential element clauses’ 
under Article 177(2) ECT. Indeed, Portugal v. Council did not restrict but rather broadly interpreted 
Article 177(2) ECT – of course only as regards conditionality clauses. Other authors accept the 
Council Legal Service’s reading of paragraph 23 of Portugal v. Council, but, at a more fundamental 
level, criticized the Court’s interpretation of Article 177(2) ECT in paragraph 23 of the judgment 
and finally came to the same conclusion.801  
The Council Legal Service’s use of paragraph 28 of the judgment, which stipulated that 
human rights and democracy were no explicit fields of cooperation in the planned agreement 
with India, was also misleading and taken out of context. Although the sense of paragraph 28 in 
Portugal v. Council is indeed difficult to grasp,802 it appears that the Court only wanted to rebut one 
of Portugal’s arguments, but not to exclude the use of Article 179 ECT for provisions on human 
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rights-related cooperation.803 If this was not the intention of the Court, it is also not possible to 
argue, as did the Council Legal Service, that, had human rights and democracy been a field of 
cooperation, the Court would not have accepted the use of Article 179 ECT.  
 As regards Article 308 ECT, the opponents of the Council Legal Service’s Opinion rightly 
argued that all three conditions of the provisions were fulfilled, in particular that external 
democracy and human rights promotion were objectives of the EC.804 Surely, they were not 
enumerated in Articles 2 and 3 ECT, however, the increasing references to human rights and 
democracy in the EC- and EU-Treaties (see the overview in section II.1.a) above), in particular, 
the mentioning of a ‘general objective’ of developing and consolidating democracy in Article 
177(2) ECT, the numerous declarations on the topic made by the institutions, as well as the 
growing body of ECJ-jurisprudence, pointed to the existence of democracy and human rights as 
(‘transverse’) EC objectives more generally, and of democracy promotion as objective of EC 
external action more specifically.805 As regards Opinion 2/94 it was shown that the Court had not 
denied competence to accede to the ECHR because of the lack of human rights being EC 
objectives, but because of the institutional implications of such accession.806 Some authors even 
inferred from the Court’s silence on the question on ‘objectives’ that it accepted human rights to 
be an objective of the EC.807 The argument based on the Court’s statement on the lack of “any 
general power to enact rules on human rights” was misleading, as the Court made this stipulation 
before it went on to analyze Article 308 ECT. There would not have been any sense in 
continuing the analysis, had the statement also referred to the subsidiary powers provision. 
 As indicated, these counter-arguments were eventually more convincing and it was 
accepted that Articles 179 ECT and 308 ECT could provide the legal basis for self-standing – 
EIDHR – regulations. However, more than just comparing legal arguments, the dispute in 
essence required a basic political decision and agreement among the various institutions and the 
Member States on yet another aspect of the general scope of EC human rights competences. One 
of the few traces of the Council Legal Service’s demands was the unusually long and complicated 
                                                     
803 It is suggested here that, in order to understand the meaning of para. 28, it needs to be read in connection with 
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cooperation presupposes specific means of action”. In paras 26-28 the Court basically says that the only means of 
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be an important factor for such suspension or termination, and that the inclusion of a clause does not require that 
human rights are also a field of cooperation.  
804 Peers, ‘Fragmentation or Evasion in the Community’s Development Policy’, at 101; A. Dashwood, ‘The Limits of 
the European Community Powers’, European Law Review 21 (1996), at 123.  
805 Brandtner and Rosas, at 472; See also Weiler and Fries, surpa n., at 159-60; Alston and Weiler, at 26, who more 
elaborately speak of a ‘prudent use’ of Art. 308 ECT, in particular taking into account Opinion 2/94.  
806 Fierro, at 269; Weiler and Fries, at 159-60. A. Arnull, ‘Left to its Own Devices? Opinion 2/94 and the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of E.C. 
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titles of the 1999 EIDHR regulations, which read, in the case of the regulation concerning 
developing countries: “Council Regulation.…laying down the requirements for the 
implementation of development cooperation operations which contribute to the general objective 
of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and to that of respecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in third countries”.808 
 
vi. The Substantive Scope of Article 177(2) ECT and 181a ECT  
 
The focus now shifts to the substantive scope of Articles 177(2) ECT and 181a ECT and 
questions whether the fact that these provisions were embedded in the EC-Treaty’s titles on 
development cooperation and economic, financial, and technical cooperation limited the kinds of 
democracy assistance they covered. As mentioned above, this question was a second major point 
of argument during the EIDHR dispute. The dispute focused Articles 177(2) ECT and 308 ECT, 
however, as it is generally assumed that the substantive scope, including as regards democracy 
promotion, of Articles 177(2) ECT and 181a ECT are the same, the arguments are also valid for 
the latter provision. 
 
Development-Related Democracy Assistance Only? 
Next to suggesting that Articles 179 ECT could only justify the adoption of general development 
regulations with a democracy and human rights focus but not acts like the EIDHR, in its 
Opinion on the EIDHR proposal the Council Legal Service also argued that the type of 
democracy assistance that could be provided under such general development programmes was 
limited to democracy assistance that materially fell within the scope of development policy or was 
“part of an integrated development policy”.809 Due to obvious difficulties in a precise 
determination, the Legal Service hesitated in its suggestions of which kinds of democracy 
assistance fulfilled this criterion,810 but mentioned that projects focusing on disadvantaged 
groups, like minorities, children, and women, such on education, including of civil society, on 
good governance, as well as on the administration of justice and police could be attributed to 
development cooperation and were therefore covered by Title XX.811 At the same time, measures 
that fell outside the scope of development policy could not at all be assisted under the EC-Treaty, 
but only under the EU-Treaty.812 More concretely, projects that more directly concerned the 
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political regime and government, that more directly supported democratic change, including 
election-related assistance, that supported representative bodies, politically-focused civil society, 
and the media, could not be financed through a programme based on Article 179 or 308 ECT, 
but exclusively through a CFSP measure.813 Overall, the envisaged division was along the lines of 
Carothers’ developmental and the political approach to democracy assistance, introduced in 
Chapter 2. 
The Council Legal Service then argued that also Article 308 ECT could not make up for 
this limited scope of Article 177(2) ECT and justify the provision of a broader range of 
democracy assistance support measures – neither for Title XX nor for non-Title XX countries. It 
interpreted the scope of Article 308 ECT in parallel to that of Article 177(2) ECT, as only 
authorizing such kind of democracy assistance – for countries not covered by Title XX – that 
could be considered part of development policy or that was “necessary to achieve” the aim of 
“economic reconstruction”.814 Any other – political – democracy assistance, was beyond the 
scope of Article 308 ECT and could only be provided under the CFSP provisions of the TEU.  
 As regards the legal arguments underpinning the Council Legal Service’s interpretation 
reference can be made to the previous section and the arguments supporting a limited 
interpretation of Articles 177(2), 179 and 308 ECT as regards the adoption of a regulation like 
the EIDHR. These arguments focused on the structure and wording of the Treaty and drew 
from Portugal v. Council and Opinion 2/92. The crucial point of the arguments was that democracy 
promotion, unlike socio-economic development, was not an objective of Title XX and that the 
latter could therefore only justify the provision of democracy assistance that was covered by the 
concept of development.  
 Such limited interpretation of the scope of Articles 177(2) and 308 ECT stood in stark 
contrast to EC practice of that time and, if followed, would have required fundamental changes 
in the EC democracy assistance: Existing EIDHR programmes would have needed to re-focus 
their measures to more development-related types of assistance and CFSP-based, political 
democracy assistance, then hardy implemented, would have needed to be created and enhanced. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation suggested by the Council Legal Service highlighted the 
limitations of EC primary law as regards democracy promotion, which did not give it a Title or 
Chapter of its own, but made it part of two conceptually different fields. Although the limited 
interpretation had to be/was rejected by supporters of a strong EU human rights policy, it would 
have created more pressure for a clearer, broader legal basis in primary law.  
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A Broad Material Scope for EC Democracy Assistance 
Supporters of a broad substantive scope of Article 177(2) ECT argued that, rather than that 
Article 177(2) ECT was limited by its inclusion in Title XX, its mentioning in Title XX 
broadened the scope of the classic, economically-focused concept of development by a more 
political dimension. Consequently, a broad substantive range of democracy assistance could be 
provided on the basis of Article 177(2) ECT (and, in parallel, on the basis of Article 308 ECT for 
third countries).  
 The legal arguments supporting such broad interpretation were broadly the same as those 
used to support the view that Article 179 ECT (and Article 308 ECT) justified the adoption of a 
self-standing EIDHR regulation and those that were used to rebut arguments denying such 
competence (see the previous section). Most notably, the structure and wording of Title XX and 
Article 177(2) ECT supported and stressed the importance of democracy and human rights in EC 
external relations rather than downgrading and subordinating it under traditional development 
cooperation. The external promotion of democracy was, without limitations, an objective of the 
EU and Article 308 ECT therefore applicable. The citations from ECJ case law and opinions was 
taken out of context or misinterpreted by the Council Legal Service. In addition to these legal 
arguments, there were severe problems of delimiting development-related from non-
development-related, more political democracy assistance and, even more, to show why some 
measures that were not considered development-related by the Council Legal Service, like 
election assistance aiming to ensure the emergence of a representative and accountable 
government, should be less able to foster development than other measures. The two categories 
are useful in theory to demonstrate different approaches by various actors, but are difficult to 
find in practice in the policies of individual donors.  
 The broad interpretation was also in line with the prevailing broad interpretation of the 
concept of development policy in Portugal v. Council.815 It included, according to the Court, 
different subject matters, like intellectual property, culture, and tourism, as long as these were 
actually able to contribute to the socio-economic development of disadvantaged states. Limits 
were reached if the foreseen activities imposed such ‘extensive’ or ‘specific’ obligations on the 
EC, that a more specific competence was required,816 like such to adopt new legislation or 
submitting itself to an international legal regime.817 As regards democracy assistance, it had since 
the late 1980s/early 1990s been widely accepted that democratization positively contributed to or 
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816 Portugal v. Council, at paras 37 and 39. Peers, ‘Fragmentation and Evasion in the Community’s Development 
Policy’, at 102-3.  




was even a precondition of socio-economic development. Democracy assistance, broadly 
defined, was therefore a subject matter covered by the concept of development. This must, a 
fortiori, have been the case due to the explicit mentioning of democratization in Article 177(2) 
ECT. 
 The broad interpretation of the substantive scope of the ECT eventually prevailed in the 
EIDHR dispute: the adopted EIDHR regulations mentioned, in Article 2, a broad scope of 
engagement in the sectors of democratization and human rights. Importantly, the non-exhaustive 
list of concrete fields of action in these broader fields included activities pertaining to the 
development and political approach. Some authors were critical of too broad an interpretation of 
Article 177(2) ECT, in particular of the inclusion of conflict prevention and conflict resolution-
related measures,818 which was, however, recently confirmed by the ECJ.819 Weiler and Fries 
suggest that the broad interpretation was part of a compromise and, in particular, a concession to 
the Commission, which aimed at having competence to engage in a broad field of action, in 
exchange for deleting any reference to an EC human rights policy with regard to the Member 
States from the planned regulation.820 However, the broad interpretation was also in line with EC 
policy, which had been developed with the approval of all institutions, including the Council, 
since the late 1980s/early 1990s and there were, as mentioned, real problems of delimiting 
development and non-development-related democracy assistance. As mentioned above, while 
such broad interpretation was welcomed by supporters of a strong EC engagement in democracy 
assistance, the more limited interpretation would in the long run have rather highlighted the 
deficiencies in primary law as regards democracy promotion.  
 
vii. The Determination of the Substantive Scope of Democracy  
Promotion in Primary Law 
 
Articles 177(2) and 181a ECT very succinctly referred to ‘developing and consolidating 
democracy’ and therefore neither provided a definition of democracy nor details on an EU 
strategy of democracy assistance. None of the other provisions of primary law did so expressly, 
either. However, some of these other provisions nevertheless gave, while not offering concrete 
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definitions and detailed strategies, important points of reference for EU policy-making and 
implementation. 
Most important in this respect was Article 177(3) ECT821 that obliged the EC and its 
Member States, when implementing development cooperation, to “comply with the 
commitments”, including legally binding as well as political commitments, and to “take account 
of the objectives approved” in the context of the UN and other competent international 
organizations.822 The provision provokes the question on democracy promotion-related 
documents developed in the mentioned international frameworks. Beyond legally binding treaties 
that include political rights, like the ICCPR and ECHR and its Protocols, organizations like the 
UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, have over the last two decades built up quite 
comprehensive sets of – mainly politically-binding – documents on democracy and democracy 
promotion.823 Some of them attempted to define essential elements of democracy, others 
provided states with recommendations on democracy promotion. It also seems that, despite the 
complex nature of relations of the EU with the respective organizations and multiple forms of 
approval, the EU, if not committed itself, at least approved the majority of these texts.824  
However, different from the opinion of some authors,825 it does not appear though, that 
the mentioned frameworks produced clear definitions of democracy or precise strategies of 
democratization. Usually they made reference to open and undefined (sub-)concepts, like human 
rights or the rule of law, or restricted themselves to a sheer uncountable enumeration of potential 
fields of support.826 Due to this indeterminacy, no ‘import’ of precise external definitions and 
strategies into EU policy-making took place. However, Article 177(3) ECT definitely obliged the 
EU to take the numerous internationally developed documents, which the EU approved in 
                                                     
821 Unfortunately, Title XXI did not contain a similar provision, however, if Art. 177(3) ECT was of relevance for 
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822 Zimmermann A., Kommentar zu Artikel 177 EG-Vertrag, H. von der Groeben and J. Schwarze (eds), Kommentar 
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documents, see P. Leino, ‘The Journey Towards all that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and ‘Common Values’ 
as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law’, in: M. Cremona and B. de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: 




various documents, like statements or declarations or policy documents, into account in policy-
formulation and implementation.827 
Article 6(1) TEU (pre-Lisbon), one of the few provisions of primary law that expressly 
mentioned democracy, was problematic in defining the concepts of democracy and democracy 
promotion in EC external relations. First, the provision, which stated that “(T)he Union is 
founded on the principles of… democracy…”, did not further elaborate on the content of that 
principle. Secondly, even if a body of democratic elements of the EU system could be derived 
from various Articles of the Treaty, including those on EU citizenship, the European Parliament, 
and on access to documents, it did not amount to a comprehensive conception of democracy, 
remained confronted with the critique of the EU’s democratic deficit828 and with the sui generis 
nature of the EU as being an entity different from states. Finally, primary law lacked an explicit 
provision that required the EU to replicate internal democratic feature in the definition of its 
external policies. At most, reference can be made to the obligation imposed on the Union 
institutions of ensuring consistency in the various activities carried out by the Union (Article 3 
TEU (pre-Lisbon)). However, while the application of this principle as regards the internal 
functioning of the Union and an external policy is already slightly problematic, as Article 3 TEU 
(pre-Lisbon) was primarily intended for ensuring consistent ‘policies’, ensuring consistency does 
not require having entirely identical internal and external policies. However, a strong political 
argument can be made, that internal democratic features of the EU system needed to also be 
considered in the external dimension. In other words, if certain institutions and procedures are 
considered to be expressions of democracy within the EU, they could, most likely also be so in 
other political systems.  
 Similarly, also Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) was problematic as reference point for the 
substantive elements of the EU’s external democratization policy. It required the EU to respect 
fundamental rights as guaranteed in the ECHR and as they resulted from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, which was, as last resort, controlled by the ECJ.829 The 
provision of course also applied to the external dimension and required, for example, that EU 
assistance regulations and administrative acts based thereupon did not violate fundamental rights, 
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828 D. Chryssochoou: ‘Europe’s Contested Democracy’, in M. Cini and N. Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, European Union 
Politics (3rd ed., 2010), at 377f.  
829 On ECJ fundamental rights jurisprudence and its limits see Craig and de Búrca, EU Law: Cases, Text and Materials 
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for example by not being discriminatory in respect of potential recipients or by not tolerating 
human rights violations during the implementation of an EU-funded development project, like if 
a project on economic development involved child labour or infrastructure projects facilitated 
forced labour.  
However, it is highly questionable whether Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) also informed 
the substantive content of the EU’s external human rights and democracy promotion policy, that 
is, whether this policy should actively promote all fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR 
and as they resulted from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States 
(irrespective whether they had already been expressly recognized in the ECJ’s case law or not). It 
appears that the rather restrictive and negative wording of Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon), which 
only stipulated that the EU “shall respect fundamental rights”, does not support such approach. 
Consequently, again only a strong political argument can be made that the fundamental rights 
envisaged in Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) also informed the EU’s external policies. This leaves 
the problem though of the lack of an explicit catalogue of rights envisaged in ex-Article 6(2) TEU 
and, as part of this problem, of precise conceptions of democracy envisaged therein.  
 Finally, it is questionable whether stronger arguments can be made as regards the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed by the three main EU institutions on 7 December 
2000 and slightly amended on 12 December 2007, as basis for the substantive content of the 
EU’s external democratization policy. Primarily it should be mentioned that the Charter definitely 
related (and still relates) to the EU’s internal and external dimension, as much as Article 6(2) 
TEU (pre Lisbon) applied to both.830 Different from Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon), the Charter 
provided an explicit list of fundamental rights that required protection in the EU and therefore 
constituted a more accessible instrument that could guide external policy. Further, Article 51(1) 
of the Charter, which regulated the field of application, stated that the institutions, bodies, 
offices, and agencies of the Union shall “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof” [emphasis added] in accordance with their respective powers. This more 
positive formulation provided a stronger basis than Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) for arguing 
that external policies, implemented on the basis of powers provided in Treaty-provisions, should 
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– although not only, but at least – promote the rights included in the Charter.831 In other words, 
the Charter should guide or serve as a key point of reference in external policies.832 
 Three main problems remained though. Until the entering into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Charter was not a legally binding document, even if the practice of numerous EU 
institutions over the last decade indicated that it had some ‘legal effect’.833 As long as it was only 
‘solemnly proclaimed’, only strong political arguments could be made as regards its reference role 
for EU external policy. Further, the Charter did not provide a separate Title on democratic rights 
but relevant provisions were spread out over several Titles, including under ‘Freedoms’, ‘Citizen’s 
Rights’, and ‘Justice’. While it therefore provided substantive input, it also did not clearly 
circumscribe an EU definition of democracy. Finally, as indicated, the Charter did not constitute 
an exhaustive enumeration of fundamental rights to be protected in the EU, but the Court, via 
ex-Article 6(2) TEU, could recognize additional rights.  
 On the whole, neither any of the EC-Treaty’s provisions nor the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights provided a concrete definition of democracy relevant for the EC external 
dimension and guidelines for the EU’s strategy of democracy assistance. At the same time, 
however, 177(3) ECT obliged the EC to take international documents on the topic, which it 
approved in the context of the UN or other organizations, into account. Further, strong political 
arguments could be made that internal democratic features of the EC/EU should be reflected in 
the external dimension (Article 6(1) TEU (pre-Lisbon)) and that the fundamental rights that 
should be respected on the basis of Article 6(2) TEU (pre-Lisbon) and that are included in the 
EU Charter should also be promoted in the external dimension. Nevertheless, also these sources 
did not provide precise conceptions of democracy and democracy assistance. 
 
c) Shared Competence of the EC and Member States in Democracy Assistance 
 
i. ‘Complementary’ Competence 
 
It has been mentioned that not only the EC but also its Member States are active in the field of 
democracy assistance. The legal justification for the activities of both was the shared nature of 
EC competence in the fields covered by Titles XX and XXI. This shared nature of competence, 
which had been a feature of EC development policy from the beginning on,834 was implicitly 
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mentioned in some provisions of Title XX, like Article 179 and 180 ECT, and expressly 
stipulated in Article 177(1) which stated that “Community policy in the sphere of development 
cooperation….shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States” (emphasis 
added).835 
The particular form of shared competence envisaged in Titles XX and XXI, that is, 
‘complementary’ competence, in principle implied that both the EC and the Member States could 
carry out their own development and democracy assistance policies. Both could act in exactly the 
same field, carry out the same and/or similar programmes and projects, conclude agreements or 
engage in other forms of cooperation with third states or international organizations. There was 
no compartmentalization, in the sense that competence for some kind of action, either in terms 
of instruments or in terms of the material scope, went on the supranational level, while that for 
others remained with the Member States. Rather, competence was ‘parallel’,836 ‘overlapping’,837 or 
‘concurrent’838, allowing the EC and the Member States equally to act in all possible ways and in 
all substantive fields. Although the wording of Article 177(1) ECT (...EC policy “shall be 
complementary” to that of the Member States...) appeared to suggest some hierarchy in favour of 
the Member States and Article 180(1) third sentence ECT (...“Member States shall contribute...to 
the implementation of Community aid programmes”) appeared to favour EC policy, several 
other provisions, in particular Article 180(1) first sentence ECT (on both actors’ obligation of 
coordination and consultation), Article 180 (1) second sentence ECT (on joint actions), and 
Article 179 ECT (a general enabling provision for EC action) rather support the view that there 
was no principal subordination but that both competences and polices were ‘equal’.839  
Based on these basic features, several further rules and principles defined and/or 
(potentially) affected the character of complementary competence in development policy and 
democracy assistance. First, as indicated, parallel competence not simply allowed the devising and 
implementation of independent and unrelated policies, but Article 180(1) ECT stipulated an 
obligation for the EC and the Member States to “coordinate their policies” and to “consult each 
other on their aid programmes”. Primary law gave few hints on where and how this should occur 
and only mentioned “international organisations” and “international conferences”, next to 
allowing the Commission “to take any useful initiative to promote the coordination” (Article 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘Exclusive, Concurrent and Shared Competence’, in A. Dashwood and C. Hillion (eds), The General Law of E.C. 
External Relations (2000), at 193; MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett, at 64, fn. 143. 
835 For Title XXI see in particular Art. 181(1) ECT.  
836 MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett, at 343.  
837 M. Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of an Integrated Policy’, in P. Craig 
and G. de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Law (1999), at 158.  
838 MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett, at 343. Of all terms, ‘concurrent’ appears to be the most problematic, it has been 
used to describe different forms of shared competence. See, for example, Cremona, at 153 and O’Keeffe, at 193. 




180(2) ECT).840 Although a similar provision is missing in Title XXI, the duty of coordination 
must also have applied in the framework of economic, financial, and technical cooperation.  
Secondly, reference must be made to the general Community principle of Member States’ 
‘loyalty’, expressed in Article 10 ECT. It requires the Member States to “take all appropriate 
measures…to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from 
action taken by the institutions of the Community”, to “facilitate the achievement of the 
Community’s tasks” and to “abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the objectives of this Treaty”.841 In essence, the principle restricts the freedom of action and the 
powers of the Member States, while reserving preference for EC action and policies, and has 
therefore been characterised an extended application of the principle of supremacy of the 
Community legal order over national law.842 However, while it has definitely played a role in the 
case of – legally binding – EC external agreements,843 its role in the case of democracy assistance 
was questionable. It is difficult to imagine how Member State democracy assistance could 
jeopardize EC democracy assistance. The Member States and the EC work within the same basic 
broad notions of liberal democracy and democratization and even if individual projects suggest 
opposing solutions to the same problem, for example, two projects envisage different electoral 
systems for one country, it still needs to be established whether they jeopardize each other rather 
than, coordination provided, they enrich each other. At the same time, however, the principle 
could play some role when individual Member States and the EU decide to pursue conflicting 
democracy promotion policies. If, for example, the EU applies a policy of negative conditionality, 
cutting any democracy assistance to authoritarian governments, the policy might be jeopardized if 
a Member States continues to provide such assistance to the same government. The loyalty 
principle might indeed oblige the Member State not to do so.  
Thirdly, the AERT doctrine, which is able to replace shared competence by exclusive 
one, should briefly be considered.844 It basically foresees that, when the EC adopts internal 
provisions laying down ‘common rules’, the Member States are precluded from undertaking, 
individually or collectively, obligations with third countries that would undermine or affect those 
rules or alter their scope.845 ‘Common rules’ are considered to be such which either completely or 
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‘exhaustively’ regulate a matter or area or such that ‘to a large extent’ regulate an area with a view 
to achieving harmonization, for example by fixing standards. ‘Minimum requirements’, at the 
same time, would not fall into this category.846 That the principle also applies in cases of 
‘complementary’, shared, competence results from case law, but a fortiori from Declaration 10, 
annexed to the TEU,847 which stipulates that “the provisions of …[Article 181] do not affect the 
principles resulting from the judgment handed down by the Court of Justice in the AETR 
case”.848 Again, the practical relevance of the principle in the field of democracy assistance was 
small, as the nature of democracy assistance, just like development policy, does not operate with 
‘common rules’. Additionally, as discussed for the loyalty principle, it is highly unlikely whether 
Member States actions would be able to violate these common rules. 
 Finally, the Bangladesh and EDF (or Lomé VI)849 cases should be mentioned, which 
provided further important insights into the exercise of shared powers, in particular the 
administration of aid. The Bangladesh case concerned a special aid package for Bangladesh, which 
had, upon a plan from the Commission, been adopted by the Member States ‘meeting within the 
Council’.850 The funding came from the Member States, but the Commission could, at the 
discretion of each Member States, administer and implement the programme and in any case 
played a coordinating role. The Parliament considered that such arrangement involving 
supranational institutions required overall recourse to supranational rules.851 However, the ECJ 
pointed out that shared, complementary competence meant that the Member States could 
exercise their powers either outside the Council, but also ‘collectively in the Council’. Any links to 
supranational institutions in the preparation and implementation of aid did not change the act’s 
characterisation as intergovernmental and did not require recourse to EC law.  
The not long afterwards decided EDF (or Lomé VI) case concerned aid provision under 
the quite complex system under which the EC and the Member States provided assistance to the 
group of ACP states through a mix of supranational and intergovernmental procedures (‘hybrid 
system’).852 Most notably, the Lomé Convention, a mixed agreement concluded by the EC, its 
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Member States and the ACP states, generally regulated ‘financial cooperation’, while its ‘Financial 
Protocol’ set out the overall amount of so-called ‘Community aid’, that is, all aid provided under 
the Convention. An Internal Agreement of the Member States established the (seventh) EDF, 
which constituted the intergovernmental budget for the envisaged ‘Community aid’. Details of 
the implementation of assistance were laid down in a special ‘financial regulation’, adopted by 
qualified majority by the Council on the basis of a Commission draft and after delivery of an 
opinion by the European Investment Fund. As in the Bangladesh case, the Parliament claimed a 
violation of its prerogatives, recourse to supranational rules, but lost the case.853 The Court largely 
confirmed its Bangladesh ruling. It distinguished between the competence to enter into 
commitments and to perform those and stated that while the EC and the Member States, as 
signatories of the Lomé Convention, were together obliged to grant “the Community’s financial 
assistance”, this did not have immediate consequences for the implementation of these 
commitments.854 Shared, parallel competences conceded the Member States broad discretion in 
the choice of the system of aid provision, including the choice of the source and method of 
financing, like bilateral funding through the EDF, and the partial use of EC procedures as well as 
the ‘recruitment’ of EC institutions.  
 To conclude, complementary competence allowed both, the EC and the Member States, 
to engage in the field of democracy assistance on an equal footing. Several specific and general 
rules and principles aimed at promoting harmonious, conflict-free, and possibly joint activities of 
all actors, in particular the duty of coordination and consultation (Article 180 ECT) and the 
general ‘loyalty’ principle (Article 10 ECT). At the same time, shared, complementary 
competence gave the Member States considerable freedom as regards the choice of the system of 
aid administration.  
 
ii. The Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
 
Two further principles, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Article 5 ECT), need to 
be taken into account in all cases of shared, including complementary competence. Different 
from the previous discussion on the existence of EC competence, they concern the exercise of EC 
competence.855 As such, they are able to affect the scope of EC action, although, just as with the 
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principle of loyalty and the AERT doctrine, the very character of (democracy) assistance, renders 
them less compulsive.  
Article 5 ECT introduced the principles, which were only after Amsterdam treated as 
separate, but linked principles, and provided basic definitions. Article 5(2) ECT stipulated that 
the EC shall only act “if and in so far the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States” and can “by reason of the scale or effects…be better achieved 
by the Community”. The Commission has called that the ‘comparative efficiency test’.856 Article 
5(3) ECT continued that “Community action shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty”, which brings in the proportionality test. An inter-institutional 
agreement on subsidiarity of 1993 and a Protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam further 
defined their content and partly regulated their application.857 For example, the Protocol 
envisaged, where appropriate and except in cases of particular urgency or confidentiality, the 
publication of consultation documents before the adoption of new pieces of legislation and the 
publication of explanatory memoranda that clearly proof compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.858 
 As regards the application of the principles in the case of democracy assistance, the 
Commission’s explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the 2006 EIDHR 
regulation only very succinctly referred to the fact that several EIDHR-covered activities had a 
global nature and therefore require a transnational approach.859 There are several other reasons 
though, that make the EIDHR regulation and democracy assistance under general development 
regulations meet the comparative efficiency test, all of which are linked to its ‘European’ 
character. It does not as easily allow criticism that individual national models (of democracy) are 
promoted and is overall perceived as more ‘neutral’ than assistance from Member States, in 
particular from such with a colonial history.860 Further, as the EU is a more powerful actor than 
most individual Member States, it can also provide more security to individual assistance 
recipients as regards their authoritarian governments. Passing the proportionality test is 
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unproblematic, as there is a much higher demand for democracy assistance in many states than 
the EU is providing and even can provide.  
 
2. The EU-Treaty  
 
As mentioned above, next to the EC-Treaty, the EU-Treaty also contained references to 
democracy and human rights and, in particular, mentioned democracy promotion as an objective 
of the EU’s CFSP. This section looks in more detail at the TEU before Lisbon, at CFSP-based 
democracy assistance, and, in particular, at the relationship between the first, supranational (EC) 
and the second, intergovernmental (CFSP) pillar. Could EC and EU/CFSP democracy assistance 
coexist just like EC and Member States activities, only limited by obligations of coordination, or 
did one Treaty have preference over the other? 
 
a) An Overview of the Legal Basis relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
The major TEU (pre-Lisbon) provisions relevant for the following discussion should briefly be 
cited.  
 While the EU-Treaty, just like the EC-Treaty, did not declare democracy and human 
rights to be general objectives of the EU, their promotion was an express objective of the 
Union’s foreign and security policy. Article 11 (1) TEU (pre-Lisbon) stipulated that  
 
“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy …, the objectives of which shall be:  
— to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests,…,  
— to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways,  
— to preserve peace and strengthen international security…,  
— to promote international cooperation,  
— to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” 
 
Article 11(1) fifth indent TEU (pre-Lisbon) was part of the TEU since the creation of the Union, 
that is, since the adoption of the TEU at Maastricht. It uses a very similar wording as Article 
177(2) ECT, which was also included into the TEU at Maastricht, avoids, however, the 
ambiguous phrase of “contribute to the general objective” [emphasis added] (Article 177(2) ECT). 
Nevertheless, democracy-related activities under the CFSP pillar must be seen as one element of 
such general policy, which was pursued in various frameworks and EC and EU policies. 
Importantly, unlike the ECT, the TEU (pre-Lisbon) did not distinguish between different types 




 For the discussion of inter-pillar relations, Articles 2, 3 and 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) were 
relevant. Article 2 fifth indent stipulated: 
 
“The Union shall set itself the following objectives: 
… 
– to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on it…”. 
 
The relevant part of Article 3 TEU (pre-Lisbon) provided: 
 
“The Union shall…attain its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.”  
 
Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) stipulated that  
 
“… nothing in this Treaty [i.e. the TEU] shall affect the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the 
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them.” 
 
b) An Analysis of the Legal Bases Relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
i. Democracy Assistance as Tool of CFSP-based Democracy Promotion? 
 
Neither Article 11(1) fifth indent TEU (pre-Lisbon) nor any other provision of the TEU 
elaborated expressively and comprehensively on the tools the EU could/should use to promote 
the objective of democratizing third states. In practice, a whole range of instruments was 
employed on the basis of Article 11(1) TEU and the necessary procedural provision discussed 
shortly below. Indeed, usually only this procedural provision was cited in the act establishing an 
instrument and the link to Article 11(1) fifth indent (pre-Lisbon) had to be deduced from the text 
of the act. 
Most notable EU tools of democracy promotion were various diplomatic measures, like 
statements, declarations, and démarches towards individual states or regions by the Council.861 
Further, all three of the European Council’s common strategies (Article 13(2) TEU) – on Russia, 
Ukraine, and the Mediterranean – stressed the relevance of democracy promotion in the 
countries or regions they targeted, next to having many other objectives.862 Similarly, the EU’s 
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‘Special Representatives’ for particular regions or states (Article 18 (5) TEU) often included a 
mandate concerning democratization, like in the case of Central Asia, the Great Lake Region, and 
the Middle East Peace Process.863 Finally, the objective of democracy promotion gave rise to 
various CFSP-based election monitoring missions carried out throughout the 1990s, for example, 
the EU election observation mission to the Russian parliamentary elections in 1993, which was 
established by the first Joint Action ever adopted under the then new TEU.864  
In Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (ECOWAS) the ECJ made clear that also assistance 
was in principle a permissible tool under the TEU and was not per se limited to Title XX of the 
ECT.865 However, as will be elaborated in more detail shortly below, it was only justified under 
the provisions of CFSP, if it was provided to mainly pursue CFSP objectives.  
There are indeed rather few examples of TEU-based democracy assistance. The first type 
of activity was various election assistance projects carried out during the early-mid 1990s. 
Frequently, these formed part of broader missions that also encompassed election monitoring – 
at that time no strict division was made between these two types of actions – and, at times, the 
assistance element was the predominant aspect. Most notably, in 1993 and 1994 the EU 
supported the transition process in South Africa with a CFSP-based election assistance 
programme.866 By the later 1990s, in particular once the 1999 EIDHR regulations were adopted, 
the Commission increasingly insisted that all election-related activities, including observation and 
assistance, should only be carried out within the first pillar.867 This was, after initial protest by the 
Council,868 done from 2001 on. 
The second type of TEU-based democracy assistance was the more recent EU ‘rule of 
law missions’, most notably EUJUST THEMIS benefitting Georgia,869 EUJUST LEX focusing 
on Iraq,870 and EULEX KOSOVO871. These missions either aimed at reforming elements of the 
criminal justice sector, like in Georgia and Iraq, or, more broadly, at establishing a proper justice 
system, like in Kosovo. In terms of such substantive focus these missions had a strong overlap or 
even identity with traditional rule of law projects and programmes carried out under the 
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EIDHR872 or under general development programmes (often under the heading of institutional 
reform873). One major difference was, however, that the missions formed part of the EU’s civilian 
crisis management (CCM) effort pertaining to the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP)874 and therefore primarily aimed at improving the security situation in a particular 
country (Articles 11(2) second indent TEU and Article 17(2) TEU pre-Lisbon). Rule of law 
(democracy) promotion was therefore just an intermediary or secondary aim in efforts to achieve 
the broader objective of security. It should also briefly be mentioned that some other ESDP 
missions, like police missions, had at times very small democracy and human rights components, 
like ensuring civilian control of the security sector or human rights training for police-officers, 
which were very minor and ancillary though.875 
 
ii. Procedural Rules 
 
The major differences between the first and second pillar related to the existence of different 
legal instruments and procedural rules for their adoption, providing different powers to 
institutions. Just as within the supranational pillar, these differences could explain some of the 
indicated problems of inter-pillar relations, that will be looked at in the next section. 
 Of the available legal CFSP instruments – common strategies, joint actions, and common 
positions – the joint action, which “shall address specific situations where operational action by 
the Union is deemed to be required” (Articles 12 and 14(1) TEU (pre-Lisbon)), was the most 
appropriate tool for the provision of EU democracy assistance and was indeed used for the 
various above-mentioned activities. It could be initiated by a Member State (Article 22 TEU (pre-
Lisbon)), directly or via the Council Presidency, the Political or Security Committee (Article 25 
TEU (pre-Lisbon)), a TEU-based committee of Member States’ representatives and the so-called 
‘back-bone’ of EU foreign policy, and the Commission (Article 22 TEU (pre-Lisbon)). It was 
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decided upon by the Council, in general acting by unanimous vote (Article 23(1) TEU (pre-
Lisbon)), except if the joint action was taken on the basis of a common strategy and therefore 
just implemented a more basic decision, in the case of which qualified majority applied.876 This 
was never the case as regards democracy assistance-related acts though. 
 The Parliament’s involvement in CFSP was limited to rights of consultation, regular 
information, and to make recommendations (Article 21 TEU (pre-Lisbon)). While its views 
should “duly [be] taken into consideration” (Article 21 TEU (pre-Lisbon)), it was not involved in 
decision-making on joint actions. It could, however, exercise some influence over joint actions 
via its role in the budgetary procedure. According to Article 28(3) TEU (pre-Lisbon) all 
operational expenditure for joint actions was financed from the EC budget, except that with 
defence implications and if the Council decided otherwise, which happened rarely.877 With CFSP 
measures being non-compulsory expenditure, the Parliament’s influence was even stronger as it 
had the last word in the budgetary process.878 An inter-institutional agreement on budgetary 
discipline and sound financial management further strengthened the Parliament’s role by 
increasing its rights of early and regulation information on planned and implemented joint 
actions.879 However, despite these budgetary powers, all in all, the role and powers of the 
Parliament, like that of the Commission, were evidently much more limited than within the 
supranational pillar.  
Finally, as indicated, the ECJ’s jurisdiction did not cover the second pillar. However, it 
successfully claimed, based on Article 46 and 47 TEU, powers to rule on pillar-delimitations, 
arguing that it had an obligation to determine whether action adopted under an 
intergovernmental pillar did not encroach upon Community powers.880  
 
c) Inter-pillar Delimitation 
 
Questions on inter-pillar delimitations were among the most contentious over the last decade and 
led to a series of case law, most notably for this discussion, to Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council 
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(ECOWAS),881 which specifically concerned Title XX (on development cooperation) of the ECT 
and Title V (on CFSP) of the TEU.882 The answer to the question on whether ECT and CFSP-
based democracy assistance could co-exist next to each other like EC and Member States 
democracy assistance was already briefly mentioned: EU-Treaty-based democracy assistance was 
limited to cases in which democratization was not the main or primary aim of an activity, but a 
secondary or incidental aim only. The following paragraphs shed more light on the underlying 
legal rules and their interpretation. 
 
i. Article 47 TEU: The Collision Rule 
 
A literal interpretation of Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon), which stipulated that “nothing in…[the 
TEU] shall affect [the ECT]” and of Articles 2 and 3 TEU (pre-Lisbon), which mentioned that 
the Union shall maintain, respect and build upon the acquis communautaire, suggested a ‘fixed 
boundary’ between EC and EU competences and a strong preference for the supranational pillar, 
in the sense that the EU could only act if the EC could not.883 Commission and Parliament were 
in favour of such reading of the Articles and also the ECJ confirmed such an interpretation. In 
two cases concerning the delimitation of competences between the first and the third pillar, Case 
C-176/3 Environmental Crimes884 and Case C-440/05 Ship-Source Pollution885, it ruled that, if, on the 
basis of the aim and content of a measure, it could be established that its purpose was the 
implementation of a policy that the ECT conferred on the Community and that it could properly 
have been adopted on the basis of the ECT, a third pillar measure encroached upon EC powers 
and violated Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon). In consequence, the ECJ annulled the respective third 
pillar legal acts.  
 The Council and some Member States were of the opinion that Article 47 TEU (pre-
Lisbon) aimed at protecting a ‘balance of power’ established by the Treaties, allowing both, the 
supranational and the intergovernmental regimes to co-exist alongside each other.886 Similarly, 
several commentators called for a more accommodating interpretation of Article 47 TEU (pre-
Lisbon), stressing cooperation rather than conflict and competition.887 They argued that this was 
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in particular necessary for the implementation of single, ‘integrated’ policies in areas where 
competences were divided and EC and EU action was necessary, like in the field of security.888 
They also pointed to the absurd situation a limited interpretation created in comparison to fields 
of parallel, complementary competences: In fields of EC competence, like in the case of Title 
XX, the Member States could act collectively outside the EC/EU framework, possibly also using 
EC mechanisms, but were precluded to act collectively under the TEU.  
 
ii. Case C-91/05 Commission v. Council (ECOWAS or Small Arms Light Weapons) 
 
Different from the above-cited cases, Case C-91/05 specifically concerned the delimitation of 
powers between Title XX ECT and Title V TEU (Pre-Lisbon).889 The case arose when both, the 
Council and the Commission became active in the sector of combating the accumulation and 
spread of small arms and light weapons. On the one hand, in February 2003 the Commission and 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) signed, on the basis of the Cotonou 
Agreement, a regional support strategy and a regional indicative programme envisaging arms 
control as part of a broader regional conflict prevention and good governance policy. In 2004 
concrete proposals for operations in the sector followed. On the other hand, in July 2002 the 
Council adopted a CFSP decision that focused on the Union’s role in combating the 
accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons and in December 2004 it followed up 
with an implementing joint action that envisaged technical and financial assistance in the sector 
of light arms control, in particular as regards an ECOWAS moratorium on small arms and light 
weapons.  
According to the Commission, which was supported by the Parliament, the Council’s acts 
infringed Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) as the measures could have been adopted under the ECT 
because, in essence, combating the proliferation of small arms and light weapons was an integral 
part of development policy, as development could only be achieved if there was a minimum 
degree of stability.890 The Council, supported by six Member States, disputed such interpretation 
and basically argued that the fight against small arms and light weapons and for peace and 
security more generally, lay beyond the scope of Title XX ECT and only within Title V TEU 
(pre-Lisbon). A too broad interpretation of Title XX ECT, in the sense that already an incidental 
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effect on development was sufficient to bring a measure within its scope, would render EC 
competence without limits, CFSP provisions without effect, and threaten the principle of 
conferred powers and the constitutional structure of the pillar system. The UK also argued that 
the concurrent nature of competence of Title XX ECT needed to be taken into account and that 
EU action did not pre-empt EC action.891 
 The ECJ first reiterated that measures adopted on the basis of the TEU infringed Article 
47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) if they, on account of their aims and content, had as their main purpose the 
implementation of a policy conferred by the ECT on the Community, and if they could properly 
have been adopted on the basis of the ECT.892 This was also true in cases of parallel or 
concurrent competence and irrespective of whether EC action prevented or limited EC action.893 
The Court then confirmed its already established broad interpretation of the concept of 
development cooperation, stating that measures combating small arms and light weapons were in 
principle covered as they could contribute to socio-economic development (by reducing or 
eliminating obstacles to such development).894 However, they could nevertheless only be adopted 
under the ECT, if, by virtue of aims and content, the measures fell within the scope of 
competence conferred by the ECT on the EC, which was not the case, if their main purpose was 
implementing the CFSP.895 Further, the Court clarified that Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) 
precluded that measures that pursued two or more objectives falling within development 
cooperation and within CFSP, none being the major or merely incidental one, could be based on 
two legal bases.896 As Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) precluded the adoption, on the basis of the 
TEU, of a measure that could have been adopted on the basis of the ECT, the Union could also 
not have recourse to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order to adopt provisions which also 
fell within a competence conferred by the ECT on the Community.897 
 Based on this preliminary analysis, the Court then applied its traditional ‘centre of gravity’ 
test to the case and determined whether the decision and joint action at stake, by virtue of their 
aim and content, fell within the scope of competence conferred by the ECT on the EC. It carried 
out a detailed analysis, in particular of the aims of both documents, and came to the conclusion 
that the contested decision contained two main components, neither of which was incidental to 
the other, one falling within development cooperation the other within CFSP.898 Given that the 
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measure also fell within development policy, the Council could not adopt the act, had violated 
Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) and the decision was annulled.899 
 On the one hand, the Court confirmed its previous case law on Article 47 TEU (pre-
Lisbon). Article 47 TEU created a fixed boundary between EC and EU competence, not allowing 
mixed cross-pillar acts.900 Further, Article 47 TEU was infringed not only if a measure fell within 
EC competence and could have been adopted by the EC, but also if a measure had two main 
purposes of which one fell within the first pillar while the second fell within CFSP.901 On the 
other hand, the judgment also stated limits of EC powers vis-à-vis the EU. It stipulated clearly 
that even if a subject matter contributed to achieving EC objectives, it only fell within EC 
competence if it mainly pursued EC and not EU objectives. Therefore, in fields pertaining to the 
EC and EU, the real, underlying main purpose of a measure had to be determined through a 
detailed analysis of the text of the act at stake as well as other, related policy documents. Further, 
different from the interpretation of the judgment by some authors,902 it is suggested here that the 
EC was also prevented from adopting a measure that concurrently pursued EC and EU 
objectives, such as the joint action at stake, as the CFSP elements lay beyond its scope of 
competence.903 All in all, it strongly appears that in the ECOWAS judgment the ECJ gave hints 
of how is would solve conflicts under the future Lisbon legal regime, which replaced Article 47 
TEU (pre-Lisbon) by a provision that protected both the supranational and CFSP ‘pillars’: the 
solution was a strict application of the ‘centre of gravity’ test, with main purposes being decisive, 
while incidental, secondary aims remained irrelevant. The law-making institutions were called 
upon to be very clear in their formulation of a relevant legal and policy document. Mixed-pillar 
acts might remain impossible due to incompatible procedural rules.  
 
iii. Implications for TEU-based Democracy Assistance 
 
In order to test the legality of the various rule of law missions mentioned above, it was equally 
necessary to establish the main purpose of the measures. The more problematic issue as regards 
those missions than in the ECOWAS case was that the promotion of the rule of law constituted 
express objectives of both, the EC-Treaty (Articles 177(2) and 181a ECT) and the EU-Treaty 
(Article 11(1) fifth indent) and that the missions therefore prima facie concurrently pursued an 
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objective that was an EC and a CFSP objective. Indeed, next to the CFSP-based rule of law 
missions the EC implemented several substantively similar or even identical EC measures.904  
However, a more detailed analysis of the texts of the joint actions establishing the rule of 
law missions as well as of other EU policy documents, in particular of those pertaining to the 
EU’s CCM activities, showed that the main purpose of the missions related to security- and 
stability-related objectives and therefore CFSP objectives (Article 11(1) second and third indent 
TEU rather than fifth indent).905 Rule of law development only constituted an intermediate, 
secondary or incidental aim that was not decisive for the establishment of EC or EU 
competence. In such a case, even if the measure contributed to achieving an EC objective (rule of 
law development or even development cooperation), it needed to be adopted on the basis of the 
CFSP provisions, because it primarily pursued a CFSP objective.906 All in all, the general view of 
the EU institutions and of some commentators was that the rule of law missions did not violate 
Article 47 TEU.907 
 The question emerges whether and under what conditions the provision of democracy 
assistance would have been legal under the TEU. Again, the case was difficult, as democracy 
promotion was an explicit objective of both the ECT and the TEU. The centre of gravity test had 
to be applied to determine on the basis of an analysis of aim and content the main purpose of a 
measure. If the main purpose was democratization per se or (socio-economic) development (Title 
XX and XXI ECT) to which democracy assistance would contribute, Article 47 TEU (pre-
Lisbon) prevented the EU from providing democracy assistance, as a measure fell within EC 
competence and could have been provided by the EC. If it could be established that democracy 
promotion was not the main but merely an incidental aim while the main aim was clearly a CFSP 
objective, like strengthening international security, the EU could adopt a relevant act that also 
envisaged democracy assistance. This explains the very limited provision of democracy assistance 
under the second pillar.  
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3. Summary of the Analysis of the Pre-Lisbon Legal Framework 
 
The legal bases for the provision of democracy assistance in the EC-Treaty evolved gradually 
during the period 1991 to 2001, with the three main developments being: (1) the insertion of 
Article 177(2) ECT into primary law by the Treaty of Maastricht; (2) the 1997-1999 EIDHR 
dispute, which resulted in a broad interpretation of the scope of Article 177(2) ECT; and (3) the 
insertion of Article 181a ECT by the Treaty of Nice.  
By 2001 the ECT therefore consisted of two express provisions that provided the legal 
bases for the adoption of regulations that envisaged the provision of democracy assistance. 
Article 177(2) ECT was part of the Title on ‘development cooperation’ and authorized EC 
democracy assistance for developing countries, while Article 181a ECT formed part of the Title 
on ‘economic, financial, and technical cooperation’ and authorized democracy assistance for third 
countries. Unfortunately, the exact allocation of countries to the two groups was never based on 
objective factors only but was also always influenced by a whole range of other factors, even after 
a reform in 2006. Further, the procedural provisions linked to Articles 177(2) and 181a ECT 
always differed, first being incompatible and eventually still creating the absurd situation that the 
European Parliament had less power as regards democracy assistance for third countries than for 
developing countries. However, Articles 177(2) ECT and 181a ECT were interpreted very 
broadly by the EC institutions as authorizing not only the provision of democracy assistance in 
the framework of general development or cooperation regulations and policies, like Tacis or the 
ENPI, but also on the basis of specific, self-standing EIDHR regulations. Further, they were 
interpreted broadly as allowing a basically unlimited number of types of activities, ranging from 
so-called political aid to more development- or governance-related aid.  
At the same time, the wording of both cited Articles was very succinct and they did not 
provide any further details on the EU’s strategy of democracy assistance, like on the substantive 
focus, geographical concentration, and concept of democracy guiding EU action. Some other 
EC-Treaty provisions gave some indications on elements of the strategy, however, also did not 
amount to explicit, clear and comprehensive strategies. Primary law, while providing the 
necessary competence and legal basis for EC actions, left a large margin of discretion to the 
political institutions to elaborate concrete strategies of democracy assistance towards individual 
regions and countries.  
 Beyond the EC framework, following Article 47 TEU, EU democracy assistance was 
limited to cases when the particular EU act mainly pursued non-EC objectives, like security 
objectives in the case of the various EU rule of law missions, or when democracy assistance was 




always, next to EC actions, provide democracy assistance, just limited by the obligation of both 
the EC and the Member States to coordinate their actions.  
 
III. The Current Legal Framework 
 
On 1 December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, which, introducing most of the 
reforms envisaged in the failed Constitutional Treaty, brought some important changes to the 
previous legal framework while also leaving much as it was. Most notably, it established a single 
‘Union’ that replaced and succeeded the EC and is now regulated in the amended TEU as well as 
in the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’ (TFEU), an amended version of the 
EC-Treaty. The TEU contains the more general provisions, like on Union values and aims, 
institutions, and revision procedures and also stipulates the ‘general provisions on the Union’s 
external action’ as well as the ‘specific provisions on CFSP’. Importantly, the latter continues to 
use intergovernmental rules (“partial depillarization”).908 The TFEU contains the more detailed 
provisions for individual policy fields, including on external action, as well as on institutional and 
procedural aspects. The following sections analyze the relevant reforms and non-reforms 
concerning democracy assistance, focusing first on supranational and then on intergovernmental, 
CFSP-based democracy assistance.  
 
1. Supranational Democracy Assistance: The TFEU and the TEU 
 
a) An Overview of the Legal Bases Relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
One of the major novelties of the current legal framework is that democracy is now explicitly 
mentioned as guiding principle of and democracy promotion as objective of EU external action. 
Title V of the TEU contains the relevant provisions, which should be cited in some detail. It 
should also briefly be mentioned that the existence of separate, comprehensive Parts and Titles 
on the EU’s external dimension, both, in the TEU and TFEU, itself constitutes a further major 
novelty and improvement of the legal framework. The TEU provides: 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION AND SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON 
THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
 
Chapter 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION 
 
Article 21 
1.The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own 
creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of 
law,…human rights and fundamental freedoms,... . 
 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries…which share the principles 
referred to in the first subparagraph. 
 
2.The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions,…, in order to: 
(a)safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 
(b)consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; 
(c)preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security,… 
… 
3.The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development 
and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title and by Part Five of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and of the external aspects of its other policies. 
… 
Chapter 2 
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
… 
Article 23 
The Union’s action on the international scene, pursuant to this Chapter, shall be guided by the principles, shall 
pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in Chapter 1.” 
 
As before, however, primary law does not contain a separate section, in particular Title, on the 
policy of democracy promotion.909 Individual democracy promotion-related acts continue having 
to be based on provisions of other, expressly mentioned external policy fields, in particular CFSP, 
trade policy, and cooperation policies (Article 21 (3) TEU). For democracy assistance, the 
relevant provisions are, as before, those of the Chapters on ‘development cooperation’ and of 
‘economic, financial, and technical cooperation with third countries’. Their only difference lies, as 
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before, in their geographical scope: developing and third countries. Unlike before, the two 
Chapters do, for one exception, no longer expressly mention the objectives of the respective 
policies, but just refer to the general list of aims of EU external action of Article 21 TEU. The 
relevant provisions of the TFEU are included in Part V, Title III TFEU: 
 
“PART FIVE 
THE UNION’S EXTERNAL ACTION 
… 
Title III 






1.Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles 
and objectives of the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member 
States complement and reinforce each other. 
 
Union development cooperation policy shall have as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the 
eradication of poverty. The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies 
that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.  
 
2.The Community and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives 
they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations. 
 
Article 209 
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
measures necessary for the implementation of development cooperation policy, which may relate to multiannual 




1.In order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, the Community and the Member States 
shall coordinate their policies on development cooperation and shall consult each other on their aid 
programmes,…They may undertake joint action. Member States shall contribute if necessary to the implementation 
of Union aid programmes. 
 






ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES 
 
Article 212 
1.Without prejudice to the other provision of the Treaties, and in particular Articles 208 to 211, the Union shall carry 
out economic, financial and technical cooperation measures, including assistance, in particular financial assistance, 
with third countries other than developing countries. Such measures shall be consistent with the development policy 
of the Union and shall be carried out within the framework of the principles and objectives of its external action. 
The Union’s operation and those of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.  
 
2.The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
the measures necessary for the implementation of paragraph 1.” 
 
A brief reference should also be made to some other TEU provisions that explicitly or implicitly 
refer to democracy or democracy promotion and that, while not being legal bases for concrete 
actions, provide general support to the policy of democracy promotion. Article 2 TEU stipulates, 
similar to Article 6(1) of the TEU (pre-Lisbon), but replacing ‘principles’ with ‘values’, that 
 
“(T)he Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights for persons belonging to minorities…”. 
 
Article 3 TEU is devoted to the aims of the Union and stipulates, more generally, in paragraph 1 
that  
 
“(The) Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.” 
 
Article 3(5) TEU makes clear that this also applies to the Union’s relations with the wider world:  
 
“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests … shall contribute 
to…the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
development of international law,…”.  
 
However, while mentioning most of the more specific aims of EU external action enumerated in 
Article 21 TEU, Article 3(5) TEU does not expressly refer to democracy promotion but only 
indirectly refer to it under the concept of the Union’s values.  
Further, the TEU includes a specific Title on ‘democratic principles’ (Title II, Articles 9-
12 TEU), which, among others, summarizes the provisions on EU citizenship. It is basically 
exclusively targeting the EU-internal dimension, but can nevertheless give some inputs into 




TEU requires that only European states which respect the foundational values of the Union 
(stipulated in Article 2 TEU) and are committed to promote them – in the internal and external 
dimensions (Article 3(5) TEU) – may apply and become a member of the Union.  
On the whole, since the reforms of the Treaty of Lisbon, primary law provides a stronger 
foundation for a policy of EU democracy promotion. Most notably, democracy is expressly 
declared to be a guiding principle of EU external action and democracy promotion as an explicit 
objective thereof. Previously disputed questions, like whether a trade policy act can include a 
democracy and human rights clause, are now without doubt to be answered in the affirmative. 
However, while the general provisions on principles and objectives definitely provide the basis 
for an external democratization policy of the EU, primary law still does not give such policy its 
own Title in the TFEU. Individual acts have to be based on provisions pertaining to expressly 
mentioned external policy fields. As regards democracy assistance, these are, as before, the 
Chapters on development cooperation and on economic, financial, and technical cooperation 
with third countries.  
The following Table summarises all democracy promotion- and assistance-relevant 
provisions of the TEU and TFEU: 
 
Table 9: Democracy Promotion- and Democracy Assistance-relevant Provisions of the TEU and TFEU 
 
TEU  TFEU 
Title I: Common Provisions 
 
Article 2: foundational values of the Union: 
…democracy... 
Article 3(1): the Union’s aim is to promote its values 
Article 3(5): the Union’s aim in its relations with the 
wider world is to promote its values 
Part V: The Union’s External Action 
 
Article 209: development cooperation shall pursue 
objectives of Article 21 TEU 
Article 212: economic, financial, and technical 
cooperation shall pursue objectives of Article 21 
TEU 
Title II: Provisions on Democratic Principles 
Title V: General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and 
Specific Provisions on CFSP 
 
Article 21(1): democracy as guiding principle of EU 
external action 
Article 21(2): democracy promotion as objective of EU 
external action 
Article 21(3): democracy promotion shall be pursued in 
CFSP, external policies, and external dimension of 
internal policies 
 








b) An Analysis of the Legal Bases Relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
The following sections systematically address the same questions as Part II of this Chapter and 
mainly concentrate on changes or lack of changes in result of the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
i. Democracy Assistance as Tool of EU Democracy Promotion under  
Articles 209 and 212 TFEU? 
 
The above overview has shown that also the TFEU does not contain a separate Title on EU 
democracy promotion, which would list, in a non-exhaustive way, the tools of an external 
democratization policy. Rather, the relevant legal acts of secondary law providing the basis for 
concrete democracy promotion actions have to be based on provisions of other, expressly 
mentioned policy fields – regulations authorizing democracy assistance on Article 209, pertaining 
to the Chapter on development cooperation, and/or on Article 212(2) TFEU, pertaining to the 
Chapter on economic, financial, and technical cooperation. There is no doubt that these Articles 
can provide the basis for ‘assistance’ actions, in particular also because Article 209 expressly 
mentions ‘multiannual cooperation programmes’ and ‘programmes with a thematic approach’. 
Article 212 TFEU is, like its predecessor (Article 181a ECT), less elaborate, however, definitely 
has a similar scope. All in all, while it has also not been disputed before, Article 209 and 212 
TFEU authorize the adoption of general development assistance regulations with a democracy 
focus as well as specific regulations like the EIDHR.  
 
ii. The Double-Tracked Legal Basis and Absence of a Separate Section on  
Democracy Promotion 
 
As mentioned, the new legal framework contains an important novelty and improvement by 
expressly declaring democracy to be a guiding principle of and democracy promotion an express 
aim of EU external action. The Treaty-makers considered this amendment to the previous regime 
sufficient, first, to more clearly stipulate that democracy promotion was a Union objective and, 
secondly, to ensure that the various democracy promotion activities had a proper legal basis. 
They did not think that it was necessary to provide the policy with a separate Title and at no 
point during the discussions leading to the Constitutional Treaty and, via the Reform Treaty, to 
the Lisbon Treaty considered this. Indeed, the current framework does constitute a sufficient 
basis for the broad range of instruments used by the Union, even if a separate Title on democracy 




 One consequence of the fact that EU democracy promotion acts have to be based on 
provisions of expressly mentioned fields is that, for democracy assistance, also in future a dual 
legal basis exists in primary law, as the TFEU continues to distinguish between two types of 
cooperation policies, development cooperation and economic, financial, and technical 
cooperation, with different geographical scopes.  
 
iii. The Geographical Scope (ratione ‘personae’) of Articles 208, 209 and 212 TFEU 
 
Just as under the pre-Lisbon legal framework, also the current Chapters on development 
cooperation and economic, financial, and technical cooperation do not provide explicit 
definitions of which countries are covered by which provisions. Like before, the practice of the 
EU institutions remains decisive and the allocation is carried out on the basis of a mix of 
objective, historical, conceptual, structural, and institutional (power-related) factors. All in all, for 
the current time, the division introduced by the various new assistance regulations that entered 
into force on 1.1.2007, presented above, remains valid.  
 
iv. Procedural Rules of Articles 209 and 212 TFEU 
 
A major improvement of the new legal framework is the introduction of the same procedural 
rules in the case of development cooperation and other cooperation policy (see Article 209 and 
212 TFEU). Irrespective if targeting developing or third countries, democracy assistance-relevant 
regulations are therefore now to be adopted according to the new, so-called ‘ordinary legislative 
procedure’, which is regulated in Article 294 TFEU. The procedure is in principal identical with 
the previous co-decision procedure,910 which had been applicable in the case of developing 
countries since the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 179 ECT). The introduction of the ordinary 
legislative procedure also in the case of third countries therefore, in particular, strengthens the 
role of the European Parliament with respect to third countries.  
 
v. The Scope of Articles 208 and 212 TFEU 
 
Primary law continues to be rather succinct on the scope, in particular, the material scope of EU 
democracy promotion. Like the provisions under the ECT and TEU pre-Lisbon, it only speaks 
of ‘democracy’ and to ‘consolidate and support democracy’ (Article 21(2)(b) TEU), without 
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providing any further conceptual details. However, it can be assumed that the broad 
interpretation of these concepts that developed under the previous regime continues to prevail 
also under the current legal regime. This means, first, that specific, self-standing democracy 
assistance regulations, like the EIDHR, can be adopted on the basis of Articles 209 and 212 
TFEU. Indeed, Article 209 TFEU expressly mentions ‘thematic’ programmes, which provides 
further support for such interpretation. Secondly, a basically unlimited range of different types of 
democracy assistance can be provided on the basis of such regulations. In particular, as argued 
during the EIDHR dispute, the fact that the legal bases for democracy assistance are part of two 
different cooperation policies, does not limit its scope.  
 Further, as under the previous legal framework, various provisions of primary law appear 
relevant and give important inputs into EU democracy assistance.911 Reference shall be made to 
Article 208(2) TFEU that is identical with Article 177(3) ECT and obliges the Union to take 
international documents, which it approved, into account in policy formulation and 
implementation. Strong political arguments can be made that the various democratic features of 
the EU system, many of which are now summarized in Title II TEU (‘Provisions on Democratic 
Principles’), shall inform external democratization policies. Finally, the various rights and 
principles mentioned EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, now part of EU primary law, shall be 
promoted (also) in the external dimension (Article 51(1) EUCFR). However, a major limitation of 
all mentioned documents and provisions is, as elaborated in some more detail in Section 
II.1.b)vii., that they also do not provide clear and detailed conceptions of democracy and 
democratization.  
 
c) Shared Competence, Subsidiarity and Proportionality  
 
The areas of development cooperation and economic, financial, and technical cooperation 
continue to be fields of shared, parallel competence, in which the Union and the Member States 
can carry out activities and conduct policies without that Union action results in Member States 
being prevented from acting (Articles 2(2) and 4(4) TFEU). Articles 210 TFEU and, although 
with less detail, Article 212(1) TFEU, stipulate more specific obligations of coordination and 
consultation in order to promote the complementarity and efficiency of their action, mentioning, 
as its predecessors, the framework of international organizations and conferences as exemplary 
frameworks for such efforts and giving special responsibility to the Commission to take initiatives 
(Article 210 (1) and (2) TFEU). A more general, expressly mentioned ‘principle of sincere 
cooperation’ obliges the Union and the Member States to assist each other (also Articles 4(3) 
                                                     




TEU). Further, as before, the AERT doctrine and the principle of loyalty (Articles 4(3) TEU) 
apply, but will most likely, due to the very character of democracy assistance, be of limited 
relevance in practice. The rulings in the Bangladesh and EDF cases also remain relevant.  
 At the same time, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality continue to govern 
“the use of Union competences” (Article 5 TEU). More detailed rules on their application are 
now included in a new Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality.912 A new feature is the increased role of national parliaments in the control of 
whether the principles are being observed.913  
 
2. CFSP-Based Democracy Assistance 
 
As indicated, the Union’s CFSP continues to be ruled by specific provisions of the TEU that are 
of a more intergovernmental nature than those which apply in the case of all other EU policies. 
This section briefly addresses these rules and its relationship with supranational EU democracy 
assistance.  
 
a) An Overview of the Legal Bases Relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
The crucial provisions that stipulate that democracy promotion should – also – be pursued 
through CFSP activities are Articles 21 and 23 TEU. Article 23 TEU, pertaining to the TEU’s 
Chapter on CFSP, stipulates that  
 
“(T)he Union’s actions on the international scene, pursuant to this Chapter [i.e. CFSP], shall be guided by the 
principles, shall pursue the objectives of, and be conducted in accordance with, the general provisions laid down in 
Chapter 1 [i.e. the general provisions on the Union’s external action]”. 
 
Article 21 TEU contains the general provisions on EU external action and declares democracy to 
be a guiding principle and democracy promotion to be an objective of EU external action (Article 
21(1) and (2) TEU). Most notably, Article 21(3) TEU stipulates that  
 
“(T)he Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development 
and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action covered by this Title [that is, the CFSP]…”.  
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For the delimitation of competences between supranational and intergovernmental Union actions 
an amended ‘collision rule’ has been included in the TEU, which now protects both, the 
supranational and the intergovernmental ‘pillars’ from encroachment by each other. Other 
provisions of the TEU pre-Lisbon that were relevant for inter-pillar delimitations, in particular 
Articles 2 and 3 TEU (pre-Lisbon), have not been retained in current primary law. Article 40 
TEU reads: 
 
“The implementation of the…[CFSP] shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of powers of 
the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 
[TFEU].  
 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall not affect the application of the procedures 
and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences 
under this Chapter”.  
 
b) Analysis of the Legal Bases Relevant for Democracy Assistance 
 
i. Democracy Assistance as Tool of CFSP-based Democracy Promotion 
 
Just as under the previous legal framework, the TEU does not list the various tools that 
can/should be used to implement the Union’s CFSP. However, democracy assistance can also 
today be provided under the provisions of CFSP, as long as, as will be discussed further below, 
its main aim is the implementation of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. The 
major current examples of CFSP-based EU democracy assistance continue to be the two EU rule 
of law missions EUJUST LEX Iraq914 and EULEX KOSOVO915.  
 
ii. Procedural Rules 
 
Of the various new CFSP instruments – general guidelines, actions, positions, arrangements for 
the implementation of actions and positions, all of which are adopted through decisions – the 
‘action’, which is basically the successor of the joint action, is the most suitable for CFSP-based 
democracy assistance (Article 25 and 28 TEU). It has also been used in 2010 to prolong the 
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currently implemented EU rule of law missions. It is, as indicated, adopted by a decision of the 
Council, in general deciding by unanimous vote, except if the action is just implementing another 
action and therefore based on a decision that has been decided unanimously or is based on a 
proposal by the High Representative (Article 31(2) TEU), in the cases of which qualified majority 
applies. As before, special rules exist for Member States that do not wish to participate in the 
adoption of an action (Article 31(1) second paragraph TEU) or oppose the adoption by qualified 
majority (Article 31(2) TEU). The adoption of an action can be suggested by the Political and 
Security Committee (Article 38 TEU), a Member State, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission (Article 30 
TEU).  
 The European Parliament’s formal role in CFSP continues to be limited to rights of 
consultation, questioning, and making recommendations (Article 36 TEU), with obligations of 
information now falling on the High Representative. It also continues to have a say though the 
budgetary procedure, as administrative and operational expenditure arising in the case of CFSP 
activities are also now charged to the Union budget (Article 41 TEU). However, overall, as under 
the previous regime, the Parliament’s and the Commission’s role remain rather limited as 
compared to their powers under the supranational ‘pillar’.916 Similarly, the ECJ’s jurisdiction 
under CFSP is limited to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU and to review the legality of 
sanctions against private and legal persons adopted under CFSP rules (Article 275 TFEU).  
 
iii. ‘Inter-Pillar’ Delimitation 
 
Just as under the previous legal framework, the further existence of a more intergovernmental 
CFSP, which in principle pursues the same objectives as also all other, supranational Union 
external policies (Article 21 TEU), has the potential to give rise to ‘pillar’ conflicts. Article 40 
TEU is the primary provision to regulate the relationship between CFSP and the supranational 
elements of Union competences. It considerably differs from its predecessor, Article 47 TEU, by 
protecting both the supranational policies and CFSP from encroachment by each other. Overall, 
many writers have expressed concern of how on the basis of Article 40 TEU, conflicts will be 
resolved.917 
 Based on the approach of the ECJ in the ECOWAS case, it can be expected that a strict 
‘centre of gravity’ test will also in future be the key criterion to determine whether an act has to 
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be adopted on the basis of provisions of Title V, Chapter 2 TEU or provisions of Part V of the 
TFEU. If analysis of aim and content of a measure exposes that its main purpose is the 
implementation of the CFSP, a CFSP act has to be adopted, if the main purpose is the 
implementation of one of the supranational external policies, the act has to be based on the 
TFEU. Incidental or secondary aims are not relevant. For example, if election assistance mainly 
aims at contributing to a long-term political and socio-economic support strategy, it will have to 
be provided as a TFEU-based action, while, if its purpose is ensuring the stability and security in 
a third state (without developmental aims) it will have to be provided as CFSP-based action. 
Overall, it can be expected that it will be difficult to draw a clear line between these aims and 
there will definitely be activities that could be provided under both, the TFEU and the TEU. 
Additionally, the institutions will therefore have to be very careful in choosing a clear wording in 
the acts to be adopted, so that the main purpose will be clear. In the case of two main purposes 
pertaining to both CFSP and a supranational external policy, the act cannot be adopted but a 
single main purpose has to be identified and/or the act has to be split. Joint acts appear also now 
impossible, on the one hand, due to Article 40 TEU, which prevents mutual encroachment, just 
like Article 47 TEU (pre-Lisbon) has prevented encroachment by the intergovernmental on the 
supranational pillar, on the other hand, due to the incompatibility of procedural rules. At the 
same time, whether conflicts will really emerge will fundamentally depend on the institutions and, 
in particular, also on the High Representative, who occupies a “double hat” role.918  
 
3. Summary of the Analysis of the Current Legal Framework 
 
The analysis has shown that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced several changes to the previous legal 
framework, while also leaving a lot as it was. Democracy is now mentioned as a guiding principle 
of and democracy promotion as an aim of EU external action, which constitutes an important 
innovation. However, the policy is not regulated in a separate Title or Chapter but continues to 
be pursued in the framework of the various expressly mentioned external policies. For 
(supranational) democracy assistance, this implies that it also now has two legal bases in the 
TFEU: Article 209, which pertains to development cooperation, and 212(2) TFEU, which 
pertains to economic, financial, and technical cooperation, with the only difference being the 
geographical scope of the provisions. Like before, primary law does not regulate this scope, but 
the practice of the institutions, which is influenced by a whole range of factors, remains decisive. 
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A clear improvement of the current legal framework is the use of the same procedural rules – the 
ordinary legislative procedure – for Articles 209 and 212(2) TFEU. The scope of the just cited 
provisions appears to be interpreted as broadly as before; first, authorizing the inclusion of 
democracy assistance elements in general assistance regulations and the adoption of specific 
regulations, like the EIDHR, and secondly, allowing a basically unlimited scope of type of 
activities. However, none of the TFEU’s or TEU’s provisions provides detailed conceptions of 
democracy and democratization, even if several provision do provides inputs. Overall, like 
before, primary law remains brief on regulating the policy of democracy promotion and leaves a 
large margin of discretion to the policy makers.  
 As a field of shared, parallel competence, Member States continue to be able to engage in 
democracy assistance just as the Union does. At the same time, democracy assistance can also be 
provided under the Union’s CFSP, as long as the main purpose is pursuing CFSP objectives.  
 
III. Conclusion  
 
Chapter 4 has aimed, on the one hand, to complement the evolutionary account of EU 
democracy assistance presented in Chapter 3 by a legal account of how primary law relevant for 
the field has developed over the last two decades and, on the other hand, to expose the 
contribution of primary law to the EU’s strategy of democracy assistance.  
As regards the most important details of the development of primary law, reference can 
be made to the summaries provided in Sections II.3. and III.3.. Suffice it to say that, before 
Lisbon, primary law gave preference to first pillar democracy assistance and that by 2001 the EC-
Treaty consisted of two express legal bases that authorized the inclusion of democracy assistance 
elements in general assistance regulation as well as well as the adoption of specific regulations like 
the EIDHR. A broad interpretation of the provisions allowed EC engagement on a basically 
unlimited range of democracy-related topics.  
Three main features characterize the evolution of primary law. First, the legal bases for 
democracy assistance have developed gradually. Each of the four treaty reforms of the last two 
decades has in a major or minor way affected them, either by inserting an express legal basis 
(Maastricht and Nice), reformulating it (Lisbon), or changing procedural rules (Amsterdam and 
Nice). Secondly, early contingent choices taken during the ICG 1990-1991 have had an enduring 
legacy that continues to affect current primary law. The prevailing absence of a separate Chapter 
on democracy promotion and dual legal basis for democracy assistance can be traced back to the 
decision of inserting the reference to democracy promotion into the title on development 




fundamental disagreements on EC competences in the field of human rights and democracy that 
dominated the 1990s. Only a very broad and generous interpretation of the relevant Treaty 
provisions allowed the EC to pursue a comprehensive policy of assistance.  
The analysis has also exposed the rather limited contribution of primary law to the 
strategy of EU democracy assistance. It has provided the legal authorization to act, has, by being 
interpreted broadly, allowed a broad range of different type of actions through general and 
specific programmes, and is responsible for the existence of supranational and CFSP-based 
assistance. Some provisions give input into the substantive elements of assistance, in particular 
through reference to international documents or through the EUCFR. But these do not offer 
clear concepts and strategies. All in all, primary law has left an extremely large margin of 
discretion to policy makers of when, where, and how to use democracy assistance as tool of 
democracy promotion.  
Despite the existence of a secure legal basis in primary law for democracy assistance, a 
major shortcoming of the legal framework has always been the lack of a separate Title or Chapter 
on democracy promotion (possibly including human rights promotion) with a universal 
geographical scope. On the one hand, such Title appears relevant for reasons of principle. Since 
the early 1990s democracy promotion has developed into an important, self-standing external EC 
policy, with its own history, tools, rationale, and objectives. Any policy with the relevance, 
elaboration, and extent of EC democracy promotion should have its own constitutional basis in 
EC primary law, which stipulates objectives, tools and principles. On the other hand, a separate, 
explicit title would constitute a better guarantee for a strong external democratization (and 
human rights) policy. This would be especially so if it would clearly formulate the EC objective of 
democracy promotion, in a non-exhaustive way list the various tools the EC should employ in 
pursuing this policy, and outline the principles and conceptions to be used. Tool of democracy 
promotion would include all known positive and negative tools enumerated in Chapter 1, like 
assistance, dialogues, conditionality clauses, and sanctions. Principles of democracy promotion 
would include basic issues, like the recognition that democracy is the only legitimate form of 
government and results from universally accepted human rights, that there is agreement on the 
core concept of democracy and on essential minimum features, that individual countries have and 
should develop their own specific models within the scope of the accepted minimum conditions. 
More specific issues would be the preference for the positive approach and the use of negative 
tools as last resort only, the recognition that democratization is a domestically rooted process that 
can only be facilitated by external donors, which implies strong cooperation with local actors, the 
recognition to work with both governments and civil society. The existence of a specific Title on 




sub-objective of other policies. Indeed, a comprehensive policy even requires it to be pursued 
both through and in other policies, like trade policy and development policy. However, the 
objectives, tools and principles should be stipulated in a separate title with a universal scope, and 















Chapter 5 focuses on the institutional and procedural dimension of EU democracy assistance 
provided under the EIDHR and the EU’s mainstream development programmes. It presents and 
analyses the various stages of an entire policy cycle of democracy assistance and aims, in 
particular, at identifying the most important decisions taken during each stage, the types of 
instruments adopted during each stage, the role of actors involved in the drafting and adoption of 
these instruments, and the underlying procedural rules that regulate EU policy-making and 
policy-implementation. On the one hand, the discussion intends to provide a basic and general 
outline of the policy cycle in EU democracy assistance and of the overall role and relative powers 
of the involved actors in individual stages, in particular, of EU institutions, target states’ 
governments, and European and local, that is, target state-based civil society organizations. On 
the other hand, the analysis also intends to give detailed information on some individual stages, in 
particular on decision-making procedures in processes crucial for development aid and usually 
little discussed, like the adoption of Strategy Papers. Chapter 5 does not attempt to theorize EU 
policy-making and to support and/or dismiss specific approaches to European integration or to 
analyze EU policy-making from a particular theoretical perspective or approach.919  
The focus of the chapter on the institutional and procedural dimension constitutes in 
itself an important theme in the study of democracy assistance that should not be missing in this 
thesis. Further, institutional and procedural factors can and do have important implications for 
the substantive dimension of democracy assistance, as the involvement or non-involvement of 
authoritarian governments, of civil society, and of parliaments obviously can and does shape the 
material scope of assistance. At the same time, Chapter 5 also introduces many terms, 
documents, actors, and steps in policy implementation that are further looked at in later chapters 
and therefore facilitates reading these following chapters.  
 Given that there are some crucial differences between the EIDHR and mainstream 
development programmes, in particular in implementation, some of the following sections look 
                                                     
919 For such perspectives see, for example, M. A. Pollack, ‘Theorizing EU Policy-Making’, in H. Wallace, M. A. 




at these programmes separately. In other sections, all external programmes are discussed 
together. It should also be mentioned that the analysis concentrates on the presentation of the 
current framework and only briefly mentions some of the major reforms carried out in the sector 
over the last two decades. Overall, the following discussion is due to limits of space restricted to 
the main procedural and institutional questions, leaving aside detailed issues of aid 
implementation, like contracting procedures. 
 
II. An Analysis of the Institutional and Procedural Dimension of EU Democracy Assistance 
 
The ‘policy cycle’ is an analytical tool that provides an ideal-typical description of all the major, 
chronological stages in the lifetime of a policy and thereby facilitates its analysis. According to a 
standard version, it begins with an initial idea for action in a certain field (agenda setting or 
problem identification), proceeds with the formulation of more concrete goals and basic policy 
guidelines (policy formulation), that require development of more detailed guidelines and 
eventually result in decisions on concrete actions (adoption), which are implemented (technical 
implementation), and are eventually evaluated internally or externally (evaluation). To close the 
circle, the final evaluations of projects should feed back into policy-making.920 The first two 
stages or the definition of basic principles and guidelines of a policy or a policy-instrument can 
also be referred to as policy-making. The remaining stages and therefore the development of 
more detailed, secondary guidelines and their actual application in practice through decisions on 
concrete actions belong to the field of policy implementation. Importantly, crucial decisions on 
the substantive dimension of the policy are also taken during this second stage, which therefore 
not only consists of the more limited, technical process of implementing concrete projects in the 
target states (technical implementation).921 Frequently, but not always, studies treat the stage of 
evaluation as a third, separate element of the policy cycle.922 Following Commission practice, it 
should, despite its specific features, here be covered by the stage of implementation.  
 
1. Policy-making in EU Democracy Assistance 
 
Policy-making is usually a complex process nationally. It is even more so at the European level, 
where a larger number of actors and interests play a role and intervene in different ways and 
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921 See also, for example, M. Hill and P. Hupe, Implementing Public Policy (2002), at 8; Bicchi, ‘Dilemmas of 
Implementation’, at 978.  




through different tools at different times to shape outcomes.923 EU policy-making is diverse and 
differs from policy field to policy field. Not only are the major differences between the 
intergovernmental field of CFSP and the supranationalized fields, policy-making also differs 
among policy fields within the (former) supranational pillar, due to different legislative 
procedures and the existence of special policy-making procedures with specific roles for EU 
institutions and other bodies.924 EU policy-making also changes over time, given changes in roles 
and powers of EU institutions through Treaty amendments, the increasing involvement of 
traditionally excluded actors, like civil society and national parliaments, and/or the emergence of 
entirely new modes of governance, like the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).925  
 Like most thematic areas, the field of democracy assistance also has particular features 
unique or specific to it, for example that it is a field characterized by parallel, shared competence 
and that various third actors outside the EU are involved at the level of implementation. 
However, as regards policy-making in democracy assistance, it appears that the process largely 
corresponds to the classic, although revised, so-called ‘Community method’ or ‘supranational 
method’ and does not show features of new modes of governance.926 This means, in a nutshell, 
that the two legislative EU institutions – Council and European Parliament –, supported by the 
Commission in its particular role as initiator of EU law, take core policy-making decisions in 
secondary law, which are developed further through non-legally binding acts by these institutions, 
and are subsequently implemented by the Commission. Civil society is invited to submit opinions 
and views, but has no formal role to play.  
The following discussion of EU policy-making in democracy assistance is structured 
along the various policy-making instruments that result from the policy-making process and 
express the basic principles and guidelines mentioned. The role of individual institutions and 
bodies is discussed in the framework of these instruments. The focus is, in particular, on  
(a) primary law; 
(b) secondary law; 
(c) Commission communications (COMs) endorsed by the Council and the Parliament; and 
(d) European Council, Council and European Parliament declarations, conclusions and 
resolutions.  
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As opposed to implementation, no clear, subsequent stages can be distinguished in policy-
making, except that secondary law rests on primary law. The other mentioned, non-legally 
binding instruments can and do appear at any time during the policy-making process. The 
following order used in presenting crucial policy documents is therefore, except for the 
mentioned relationship between primary and secondary law, not chronological. 
 
a) Primary Law 
 
Primary law or the ‘constitutional law’ of the European Union, expressed in the various Treaties 
– until 1st December 2009 in the ECT and TEU and since then in the TEU and the TFEU – is 
here mentioned as first policy-making instrument as it lays down some, albeit few, basic 
principles and guidelines for the policy. It is, however, of course a very special policy-making 
instrument that stands beyond the regular EU policy-making process, as primary law is the result 
of negotiations of the Member States as masters of the Treaties (Article 48 TEU) rather than of 
cooperation of the EU institutions in a regular EU policy-making process on the basis of powers 
provided by the Treaties. Before Lisbon, primary law foresaw that treaty-making mainly occurred 
during intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) (ex-Article 48 TEU). During the last decade more 
inclusive procedures developed, which were eventually also to some extent entered into the TEU 
(Article 48 TEU). Now, IGCs are preceded by so-called Conventions, composed of members of 
the European Parliament, national parliaments, government representatives, and members of the 
Commission, which prepare recommendations for this body. Further, although not foreseen in 
primary law, interested individuals and civil society are invited to communicate their views.927 At 
the end of the process it is Member States, which take the final decision on the treaties.  
 Primary law, already discussed in much more detail in Chapter 5, is at the same time of 
fundamental as well as of limited relevance for EU democracy assistance. It is highly important as 
it, since the Treaty of Maastricht, provides the EU with the explicit competence to pursue a 
policy of democracy promotion that includes the use of the tool of democracy assistance (see in 
particular Articles 3(5) TEU, Article 21(1) and (2)(b) TEU, and Articles 208, 209 and 212 TFEU). 
Primary law also lays down that this competence is shared with the EU Member States and, 
indeed, is a form of parallel, shared competence (Article 4(4) TFEU). Further, primary law calls 
on the Council and/or the Council and the Parliament to adopt secondary legislation to 
implement the objective of democracy promotion (“…shall adopt the measures necessary…” 
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(Article 179 ECT, Article 209 TFEU) and regulates the legislative procedures that have to be 
followed in the adoption of relevant EU legal acts. 
 However, beyond these aspects primary law is quiet on substantive features of democracy 
assistance and modes of implementation. Some provisions in the Treaties indirectly give some 
input into the substantive dimension; however, also only very vaguely and generally. This 
generality and vagueness is similar to other external fields, like development policy, humanitarian 
aid, and, although to a more limited extent, the common commercial policy, and is therefore not 
specific to human rights and democracy promotion.928 The vagueness is, however, entirely 
different to the regulation of most internal policy fields in the Treaties.929 All in all, while primary 
law is fundamental in establishing and defining EU competence, it does not provide any further 
details as to the content of such a policy. 
  
b) Secondary Law 
 
Secondary legislation consists of acts adopted by the EU institutions on the basis of the 
competences and the legislative procedures foreseen in primary law. It consists of unilateral acts 
of secondary law, that is, regulations, directives, or decisions (Article 288 TFEU), and agreements 
(Article 216 TFEU). Recommendations and opinions, also mentioned in Article 288 TFEU and 
communications (COMs), White Papers, and Green Papers, not at all referred to in the Treaties 
but used frequently, are due to their non-legally binding nature not considered secondary law. 
In order to – based on primary law – further regulate details on the provision of EU 
democracy assistance, the institutions overall made recourse to regulations, which are due to their 
character and the character of the other instruments the most suitable legal instrument for such a 
purpose (“binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States” (Article 288 TFEU, 
second paragraph)). In some cases, democracy assistance is also in some detail regulated in 
agreements, in particular in the case of the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP states.930 More 
detailed rules on implementation are, however, also in that case laid down in a specific ‘financial 
regulation’ applicable to the European Development Fund (EDF), the budget source for ACP 
aid.931 
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The drafting and adoption of secondary law constitutes EU policy-making proper, 
involving the various EU institutions in formal and informal ways and has, as will be seen shortly 
below, considerably contributed to laying down more detailed rules and principles for the 
implementation of EU democracy assistance. Overall, the various democracy assistance-specific 
regulations and development regulations with a focus on democracy assistance therefore 
constitute key documents in the policy-making process.  
 
i. The Necessity of Secondary Legislation 
 
There are two reasons why the EU institutions have to adopt secondary law to authorize and 
further regulate the provision of EU democracy assistance. First, the ECT and TFEU explicitly 
foresaw/foresee the adoption of further ‘measures necessary for the implementation of’ the 
policy (Article 179 ECT, Article 209 TFEU), even if this provision is rather generally formulated. 
Secondly, if EU action involves expenditure, this requires an entry of an appropriation into the 
EU budget as well as, in principle, the adoption of a so-called basic act of secondary law that 
foresees/regulates action in a particular thematic field. Exceptions are only possible for certain 
types of pilot and preparatory measures. 
 The second rule only gradually started to be handled more strictly in the course of the 
later 1990s. As mentioned, EU democracy assistance was until 1999 provided on the basis of the 
EU budget only, that is, without a basic act. This was possible because the then applicable general 
Financial Regulation of 1977 envisaged that only ‘significant’ Community expenditure required, 
next to entry into the EU budget, the prior adoption of a basic act.932 By implication, ‘non-
significant’ action could be provided on the basis of the budget only. As neither the Financial 
Regulation of 1977 nor any of the institutions’ declarations or inter-institutional agreements on 
budgetary procedure further defined the terms ‘significant’ and ‘non-significant’ expenditure, the 
latter was interpreted broadly and an increasing number of programmes were implemented 
without basic legislation, like the EIDHR forerunner programmes, that is, the programmes that 
would in 1994 be assembled under the umbrella of the EIDHR and eventually be transformed 
into the EIDHR programme. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the institutions were initially 
unclear about the future of these various EIDHR forerunner programmes and eventually a legal 
dispute on EC competences further delayed the adoption of a regulation in the mid-late 1990s. 
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In any case, in 1996 the UK, increasingly critical of the Commission’s interpretation of 
the term ‘non-significant’, legally challenged an EC-funded programme on social exclusion.933 
The ensuing decision of the ECJ in May 1998 clarified that ‘significant’ expenditure was the rule 
and ‘non-significant’ was the exception that had to be interpreted strictly and proven in each 
case.934 It suggested that only measures that prepared future actions or were pilot projects could 
be considered ‘non-significant’, while the amounts committed and the duration of a programme 
were not decisive, as had been suggested by the Commission.935 The decision speeded up the 
process of adopting many regulations, including the first EIDHR regulation in April 1999, as 
many programmes risked not receiving further funding, even if the Court restricted the effects of 
its judgment.936 As discussed in Chapter 8, the various mainstream programmes were adjusted to 
the new objective of democracy promotion throughout the first half of the 1990s.  
It should only briefly be added that a new interinstitutional agreement on budgetary 
discipline of May 1999 explicitly clarified the cases in which expenditure was possible without 
basic legislation and replaced the term ‘significant’ with the terms ‘pilot schemes’ and ‘preparatory 
actions’ and in some more detail defined their nature.937 This rule was in 2002 taken over into the 
new Financial Regulation.938  
 
ii. The EIDHR Regulations 
 
It has been mentioned that in April 1999 the Council finally adopted the first two EIDHR 
regulations that provided the necessary basic act in secondary law for the provision of EIDHR 
funds.939 They were slightly amended in late 2004, in particular as regards the introduction of the 
programming documents and processes and extended for the period 2005 to 2006.940 Since 1 
January 2006, a new EIDHR regulation provides the basis for action in the field, which will, in 
conformity with the multiannual financial framework, expire at the end of 2013.941 It was slightly 
                                                     
933 Case C-106/96 United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2729. 
934 Ibid, para. 30. 
935 Ibid, para. 34.  
936 Alston and Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy’, at. 
937 Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
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From now on referred to as 1999 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline.  
938 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
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amended in December 2011, in order to ensure consistency in all external aid regulations as 
regards the use of EU funds for paying taxes, duties or charges in beneficiary countries.942  
 The EIDHR regulations are the core documents in EU policy-making as regards EIDHR 
democracy assistance, providing a number of basic propositions or principles – although they do 
not explicitly call these ‘principles’ – and guidelines for the further implementation of EIDHR 
projects. No other document summarizes these principles and guidelines in an equally 
comprehensive fashion and, in particular, has been agreed by – at least in the case of the 2006 
regulation – both legislative institutions.  
 
The Substantive Content of the EIDHR Regulations 
Neither primary law nor the Financial Regulation lay down in what detail a regulation like the 
EIDHR has to further regulate the implementation of EU democracy assistance. In the case of 
the EIDHR regulations, the institutions decided to be specific and open at the same time, laying 
down several basic guidelines in quite some detail, while at the same time also leaving scope to 
adjust the programme to specific situations and circumstances and developments at the level of 
implementation. Both the 1999 and 2006 versions of the regulations are very similar in the scope 
of issues they address, although the 2006 regulation is in several sections much more detailed 
than its predecessor, in particular as regards the rules of origin. The following issues are regulated 
in the EIDHR regulations: 
(1) the thematic scope of EU democracy assistance. This is detailed at length in all 
regulations, but also non-exhaustive; 
(2) the eligible recipients of EIDHR grants. A wide range of eligible actors are explicitly 
mentioned, also, however, allowing for others to receive funds; 
(3) the ‘principles’ to ensure complementarity, coherence, and consistency in EU external 
action, with the activities of the Member States and those of other actors;  
(4) the types of measures or projects that can be funded, like regular, programmed projects, 
and special measures and ad hoc measures adopted on the basis of speedier procedures;  
(5) the procedures to be followed in aid implementation, in particular, in the programming 
process and comitology943; 
(6) rights of information of the European Parliament, rule on Commission reporting and 
evaluation; and  
(7) rules of participation under the programme and rule of origins for supplies and materials 
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purchased in the framework of an EIDHR contract. 
It has been mentioned that the regulations themselves do not explicitly speak of principles, 
although they definitely include some basic propositions, like the already mentioned principle of 
complementarity, coherence, and consistency. Additionally, the regulations allude to the principle 
of indivisibility of human rights, which derives from the stated objective of promoting all kinds 
of human rights (for example, Article 2(1)(b) of the 2006 EIDHR regulation) and the principles 
of participatory and representative as well as parliamentary democracy, which are expressly 
mentioned (Article 2(1)(a) of the 2006 EIDHR regulation), without, however, providing more 
detailed definitions of these concepts. 
 
Procedures for the Adoption of the EIDHR Regulations 
The question emerges which institutions adopted the above outlined basic rules and principles, as 
primary law envisages various types of legislative procedures. Even after Lisbon introduced one 
ordinary legislative procedure, EU law still foresees several special legislative procedures.944 
Chapter 5 discusses the applicable procedural rules and the reason for adopting two, basically 
identical regulations rather than one in 1999, in more detail. Suffice it to say at this point that 
frequent changes of the procedural rules led to a situation where most EIDHR regulations 
adopted so far were adopted on the basis of different procedural rules. The 1999 EIDHR 
regulation for developing countries was adopted using the co-operation procedure (Article 252 
ECT), while the concurrently adopted 1999 EIDHR regulation for third countries required the 
consultation procedure with unanimous vote in the Council (Article 308). As the institutions 
wanted to adopt two identical regulations, in effect unanimous agreement also had to be achieved 
in the Council as regards the EIDHR regulation for developing countries. The amendment to the 
1999 EIDHR regulation for developing countries adopted in 2004 was based on the cooperation 
procedure (Article 251 ECT), while the concurrently adopted amendment to the EIDHR 
regulation for other countries used the consultation procedure with majority voting in the 
Council (Article 181a(2) ECT). The 2006 EIDHR regulation had to make recourse to the 
cooperation procedure (Article 251 ECT). The most recent amendment to the 2006 EIDHR 
regulation, which introduced only a minor change as regards the use of funds for taxes, was 
adopted on the basis of the new ordinary legislative procedure (294 ECT), which is a slightly 
revised version of the cooperation procedure. It involved, due to the insistence of the European 
Parliament in being strongly involved in implementation, a conciliation committee. Upon its 
expiry at the end of 2013, a successor instrument, which has been proposed in COM(2011) 
                                                     




844final of December 2011, will have to be adopted on the basis of the ordinary legislative 
procedure. 
 Overall, the adoption of the 1999 EIDHR regulations was mainly an issue of the 
Commission and the Council, with the Parliament being a minor, secondary actor. This was 
visible, on the one hand, in the basic dispute on EC competences in the field of human rights 
that surrounded the adoption of the EIDHR regulation, and that was mainly carried out between 
the Commission and the Council.945 On the other hand, it also expressed itself in the drafting of 
the substantive provisions of the 1999 EIDHR regulations. The Commission could influence the 
programme through its right of initiative, that is, to make the initial legislative proposal for the 
future legislative act, which can be amended, but is of course hardly ever entirely changed.946 The 
Commission could also act as interlocutor for the Parliament, by changing its original proposal in 
the course of the legislative process in order to integrate the wishes of the European Parliament. 
It did so in respect of some demands, for example as regards the explicit inclusion of the death 
penalty in the thematic scope of the programme, but not as regards all demands, like the stronger 
involvement of the Parliament in implementation.947 However, at the final stage of discussions, 
the Council decided on the 1999 EIDHR regulations alone. In particular, it did not accept the 
amendments suggested by the Parliament at the end of its second reading. 
In the discussions preceding the adoption of the 2006 EIDHR regulation, which related 
to the enactment of a separate EIDHR regulation rather than regulating it in the DCI, all three 
institutions played a key role and pushed for their views. Indeed, it appears that the 
disagreements existed mainly between the Commission and the Parliament, with the Commission 
favouring the EIDHR as thematic programme under the DCI and the Parliament favouring a 
separate programme based on a separate regulation. Only after many months of negotiation and 
persistence did the Commission bend to the demands of the Parliament.948 The Parliament also 
used its power of co-decision to influence the substantive content of the 2006 EIDHR 
regulation. Issues like the very explicit character of the EIDHR regulation as civil society support 
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instrument and the inclusion of parliaments as eligible applicants can be traced to the wishes of 
the Parliament. Indeed, the Council accepted the overwhelming majority of the Parliament’s 
suggested amendments to the Commission’s first proposal and adopted the act after the 
Parliament’s first reading. It also needs to be stressed though that the Parliament did not, unlike 
1999, push issues, which were not acceptable to the other institutions, like increased powers at 
the stage of implementation.  
On the whole, EU law-making is always an inter-active process involving the three 
primary institutions in formal and informal ways, while the particular legislative process regulates 
their power of influence. Overall, in 1999 the Commission and the Council played the key role in 
the adoption of the regulations, while in 2006 all three institutions were influential, in particular 
the Parliament.  
 
iii. The Mainstream and Specific Assistance Programmes 
 
It has been mentioned that EU democracy assistance is also, and increasingly, provided through 
the numerous EU mainstream and specific development assistance programmes, like ALA, Tacis, 
DCI, and IfS. In order to satisfy the requirement of a basic act for the provision of funds entered 
into the EU budget, these regulations also have to foresee the provision of democratization-
related assistance. More recently, the ECJ repeated this requirement in the Philippine Border Mission 
case, in which it confirmed its broad interpretation of the concept of development in primary law, 
however, it was also made clear that in order to provide specific assistance under a regulation, 
that regulation needs to explicitly foresee this particular type of assistance.949 It cannot simply be 
assumed that a development aid regulation allows for all kinds of assistance that can be brought 
into the thematic scope of development aid.  
The analysis of the various mainstream programmes in Chapter 7 shows that already by 
the mid-1990s all mainstream development regulations basically included provisions on 
democracy promotion and assistance, where in the course of time, when new regulations were 
adopted or existing regulations were amended, the provisions became increasingly explicit and 
detailed. However, given that the various development programmes cover a much broader scope 
of thematic issues, like economic and social development, culture, industry, and the environment, 
democracy assistance was of course never regulated in the same detail as in the EIDHR 
regulations, as this would have resulted in extremely long and complex documents. Usually, a 
development regulation generally mentions the objective of democracy promotion and explicitly 
envisages the provision of democracy assistance. In the course of time, the regulations have also 
                                                     




increasingly mentioned, although non-exhaustively, some sub-fields of democracy assistance, like 
rule of law or civil society development, that should receive funding. Another democracy-related 
feature of most regulations is a political conditionality clause.  
 All other, general provisions of the mainstream development assistance regulations are 
relevant for democracy assistance. Most notably, these regulations also identify eligible applicants. 
The list is more comprehensive than under the EIDHR, as, next to non-state actors, in particular 
also the recipients states’ governments at national, regional, and local level can receive aid and, 
indeed, are the major recipients. The regulations do not in detail determine which bodies can 
receive funds for which areas of support, but are open on that issue. Further, the principles of 
complementarity and consistency, the programming process, the rights of the European 
Parliament, rules on reporting and evaluations, and rules of origin, are addressed in the majority 
of regulations, although, of course at times being regulated differently.  
 Just like the EIDHR regulations, various legislative procedures have been followed in 
adoption of the numerous mainstream assistance regulations, depending on the countries or 
regions addressed and the time of adoption. To name just a few, the ALA, Tacis, and MEDA 
regulations were adopted on the basis of ex-Article 235 or Article 308 ECT and therefore with a 
unanimous vote in the Council and consultation of the Parliament, while the ENPI and DCI 
regulations were adopted using the co-decision procedure. Overall, during the last two decades, 
the European Parliament increasingly played an important role in the adoption of external 
assistance regulations. In 2006, it co-decided the two major new assistance programme – ENPI 
and DCI – also considerably influenced the overall structure of external assistance and the 
substantive content of the regulations.  
 
iv. The EU Budget and the Financial Regulation 
 
Two further acts of secondary law are highly important for the provision of democracy 
assistance. First, as indicated, EU expenditure requires, next to an authorizing act of secondary 
law, the entry of the expenditure into the annual EU budget. Indeed, while the early EIDHR 
programmes had been implemented without basic legislative act, they had always been 
implemented on the basis of a financial allocation in the EU budget. The EU budget includes two 
types of allocations: so-called ‘commitment appropriations’ and ‘payment appropriations’. The 
first relates to the total costs of the legal commitments that can be entered into under a 
programme in the particular year in question, the second refers to the total payments that can be 




financial or an earlier financial year.950 The two appropriations normally differ and are therefore 
called ‘differentiated appropriations, as not all the funds are paid in the year of their commitment, 
but usually with some delay, and as overall not all commitments are paid because some parts, 
although few, are de-committed. As will be seen in Chapter 6, the EU budget provides an 
excellent source for tracing the development of the EIDHR budget.  
 The budget is has always been adopted on the basis of a special legislative procedure, that 
emphasizes the role of the each institution, that is, Commission, Council, and European 
Parliament. Although the Treaty of Lisbon has introduced some important innovations, like a 
budget-specific ‘conciliation committee’ and has abolished the differentiation between 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure,951 the basic process has always been and still is that 
the Commission prepares a draft budget and the Council and the Parliament jointly adopt the 
budget.952 Most importantly, the budgetary process is a field in which the Parliament has been 
able to gain increasing powers ever since the first budgetary treaties adopted in the 1970s.953 In 
particular, under the pre-Lisbon rules it had the last word on non-compulsory expenditure, which 
it frequently used to change sums assigned to specific programmes and to introduce new 
programmes.954 As shown in the evolutionary overview, of EU democracy assistance, it also did 
so in the case of EU human rights and democracy assistance and thereby crucially contributed to 
the development of this tool.  
 Reference should at this point also be made to the so-called ‘multiannual financial 
framework’, an agreement by the three budgetary institutions on expenditure ceilings in broadly 
defined fields for individual years and over a longer period of usually about seven years. The 
framework, so far adopted in the form of a non-legally binding interinstitutional agreement, has 
the purpose of rendering the budgetary development more stable and foreseeable.955 Democracy 
assistance is too specific a topic to be mentioned in the framework; however, the currently 
applicable ‘multiannual financial framework 2007 to 2013’ envisages a total budget of about 50 
billion Euros for actions that relate to the ‘EU as global player’.956 Further, for the same purpose 
of controlling budgetary developments, since the mid-1990s legislative acts with budgetary 
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implications include so-called ‘financial envelopes’, ‘financial reference amounts’, or ‘financial 
frameworks’ that indicate the envisaged total amount of funding for the entire duration of the 
programme.957 Regulated in inter-institutional agreements, they are not binding law, but still 
create some form of obligation, from which the institutions are only permitted to depart in cases 
of “new, objective, long-term circumstances”.958 Unlike the 1990s, when the budget for 
democracy assistance programmes increased strongly, the budgetary development of the EIDHR 
is now more controlled and annual increases of 50 and 100% would require serious justification, 
but is, of course, legally not impossible. Under the current multiannual financial framework 2007-
2013, the duration of the assistance programmes, like DCI and EIDHR, and therefore the 
financial envelopes envisaged in these programmes, have for the first time been adjusted to each 
other. All in all, the annual allocations for the EIDHR therefore have to be made in view of these 
broader limitations.  
 Secondly, reference needs to be made to the Financial Regulation, which provides more 
detailed guidelines on the adoption and the implementation of the EU budget and therefore also 
of EIDHR funds. It stipulates a set of budgetary principles, like annuality, sound financial 
management, transparency and specification, that is, that specific appropriations have to be made 
for specific objectives in separate chapters, titles, articles, and items, as well as a set of more 
detailed rules discussed shortly below.959 The currently applicable regulation (the 2002 Financial 
Regulation) was adopted by the Council with consultation of the Parliament in 2002, and 
replaced the earlier 1977 Financial Regulation.960 It is on purpose limited to providing more 
general principles and rules, while more specific rules are laid down in a Commission 
regulation.961 
 The most relevant sections of the Financial Regulation for this discussion are Part II, 
Title IV on external action and Part I, Title VI on grants. Title IV of Part II provides some 
general rules for expenditure in development aid and regulates which other titles of the regulation 
apply to external aid. Amongst others, it clarifies that assistance can be implemented on a 
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centralized basis by the Commission, if specific conditions are met also on a decentralized basis 
by third countries, or in cooperation with international organizations (Articles 162 - 164 of the 
Financial Regulation 2002). In the case of implementation by third states, the Commission must 
retain the possibility of scrutinizing the actions (Article 165). Article 169 of the Financial 
Regulation lays down that an EU grant can only be used to cover 100% of the costs of a project, 
if that is essential for its implementation.  
Title VI of Part I on grants stipulates several important rules for the provision of EU 
grants that are, in particular, also relevant for the framework of the various external assistance 
programmes. Most notably, it confirms the principle of transparency in the provision of grants 
and introduces the rule of equal treatment (Article 109 of the Financial Regulation 2002). Several 
of the subsequently mentioned rules further determine how these principles should be achieved. 
For example, grants cannot be cumulated, that is, in principle only one grant can be provided per 
project and one beneficiary can only receive one grant per budget year. Exceptions can be made 
in basic acts (Article 111 of the Financial Regulation 2002). The principal procedure of project 
identification is the open call for proposals (Article 110). Only in cases of urgency, if the 
beneficiary leaves no choice, for example if a recipient is a unique actor, such as an UN agency, 
or if a basic act identifies a grant recipient, as in the case of human rights defenders, can a grant 
be provided without a call (Article 110). The Commission needs to adopt annual work or action 
programmes, which envisage individual projects or programmes, except for urgent or specific 
other cases (Article 110). Award criteria need to be published in advance, so as to allow a fair 
chance of all applicants (Article 115). As stipulated, in principle there is the rule of co-financing 
(Article 110), except if this would jeopardize a project (Article 110, 113 and 169). Finally, since 
2006, not only natural persons and registered legal persons can apply, but also entities that are not 
registered, as long as a representative has the capacity to undertake legal obligations and assumes 
financial liability (Article 114). This change was suggested in the wake of the adoption of the 2006 
EIDHR Regulation, and has particular relevance for regime-critical civil society organizations that 
are not formally registered but want to apply for funding under the EIDHR.  
 
c) Commission Communications 
 
The discussion now shifts to non-legally binding documents that can appear at any time before 
and after the adoption of secondary law, but can be equally important. Indeed, in the early 1990s, 
when the EU had not yet adopted the EIDHR regulations, it was these non-legally binding 




communications, usually published as COMs,962 which are the primary means through which the 
Commission formally communicates its ideas, views, and suggestions to the other institutions, in 
particular to the European Parliament and the Council, as well as to the wider public. It is also 
the principal means through which it expresses its role as one of the executive institutions of the 
EU, either by making policy suggestions or by reporting on implementation.963 The considerably 
high number of communications published by the Commission in the field of democracy 
promotion indicates its strong and active role in the policy cycle. The various policy-making 
COMs in the field can be assigned to two major categories. 
First, based on its sole right of initiative (Article 17 TEU),964 the Commission starts a 
legislative process with the publication of a legislative proposal, basically always published as a 
communication.965 It can amend such a proposal until the final adoption of the act by the 
legislative branch through the publication of a new or amended proposal. In the case of the 1999 
EDHR regulations it submitted several amended proposals in order to integrate some suggestions 
of the European Parliament, which could not co-decide the measures, or to respond to demands 
by the Council and therefore to facilitate the adoption of the act, not at least because the Council 
would have had to decide by unanimity if it changed the Commission proposal.966 At times, the 
Commission has also used its sole right of initiative to withhold publishing legislative proposals, 
as was the case in the early-mid 1990s for the various democracy and human rights programmes. 
Despite calls from the Parliament for such a proposal, which only politically but not legally oblige 
the Commission to act, the Commission only very late – in 1997 – and when the provision of 
assistance without basic act became increasingly critical and even challenged before the ECJ, 
prepared a relevant communication.967  
Overall, Commission communications are not developed out of thin air. On the one 
hand, in the field of external assistance there is a preparatory phase in which pilot and 
preparatory measures are implemented. The first EIDHR proposal published in July 1997 
strongly drew from the practice developed in these programmes from the early 1990s on.968 On 
the other hand, the Commission is usually aware of the approximate position and wishes of the 
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Council/the Member States, which it derives from Council conclusions and European Parliament 
resolutions and informal discussions, and also tries to integrate the views of other institutions, 
except where these are unacceptable to the Commission. The Commission has, for example, in 
the case of the EIDHR regulations, repeatedly rejected demands by the European Parliament. 
Since the late 1990s, the Commission is also obliged to carry out a public consultation 
process, except in cases of urgency or confidentiality, which should give civil society actors a 
chance to contribute to the policy-making process.969 The Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced this 
obligation in primary law (Article 11 TEU).970 It was done in the case of the preparation of the 
2006 EIDHR regulation, when the Commission published a consultation document on its 
website and invited EU- and third country-based civil society organizations to provide input for 
the new democracy and human rights instrument to be adopted, in particular, on the thematic 
objectives.971 Additionally, one meeting was organized with Brussels-based civil society networks 
and platforms of NGOs working in the field of human rights and democracy promotion and 
development assistance more generally for an exchange of views.972 Although the time-frame for 
consultation was with less than one month very short, there was considerable input from NGOs. 
Overall, these groups largely called for retaining the status quo, suggesting satisfaction with the 
thematic scope of EIDHR assistance as well as implementing procedures, however, also 
suggesting an adaptation of European civil society to EU instruments and procedures.973 The 
preservation of a broad thematic focus and the continuing focus on conflict prevention and 
resolution, albeit not as a major heading, in the 2006 regulation, can, for example, clearly be 
traced to civil society demands.974  
All in all, through its right of initiative, which is considered a core guarantee of the 
institutional balance of power in the EU political system, the Commission has considerable 
power to determine the content of a future legislative act. It is, however, not operating in a 
vacuum, but has to and also has interest in taking the views of the two legislative institutions and 
as well as of civil society into account.  
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The second group of democracy assistance-relevant Commission communications 
consists of core, thematic documents that aim at outlining aspects of the policy of EU democracy 
promotion and, in particular, of assistance unrelated to legislative process. These COMs usually 
provide an overview of the current state of affairs as well as, based on that, an outlook of how 
the Commission intends to or suggests developing the policy or tool further. Again, while these 
communications frequently firstly widely communicate ideas, the ideas do not necessarily 
originate in the Commission but also in other institutions, in particular the Parliament, and/or 
have already been tested out by the Commission in practice.  
All the major COMs belonging to this group have been addressed in the evolutionary 
overview and should only briefly be referred to here. Two communications and one inter-pillar 
document issued by the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council have in general 
addressed the policy of EU democracy promotion and also elaborated in more detail on EU 
democracy assistance: COM(95) 567 final, COM(2001) 252 final, and SEC(2009) 1095 final. 
Some communications have focused on democracy promotion and assistance in particular 
regions, like COM(98) 146 concerning the ACP states and COM(2003) 294 final and COM(2011) 
200 final on the Mediterranean. Only one communication related to an individual type of 
democracy assistance: COM(2000) 191 final on ‘EU Election Assistance and Observation’.  
Reference should only briefly be made to a third group of communications, which 
comprises a whole range of communications that deal with EU policies towards particular 
regions and in that framework address democracy promotion and assistance, without, however, 
dealing with it in more detail. A case in point is COM(2005) 636 final on ‘A stronger partnership 
between the European Union and Latin America’.975 
The publication of suggestions on policy changes as regards EU democracy assistance in 
Commission communications does, of course, not automatically lead to the intended policy 
reforms. Acceptance by the other institutions, in particular by the Council, is required and is 
usually expressed in Council conclusions and European Parliament resolutions. Such documents 
can also express disagreement, but rarely do so, as the Commission, as indicated, takes the views 
of the other institutions into account when preparing documents. An endorsed communication 
can be, next to secondary law, a core policy-making document, like, for example, COM(2001) 
252final. Without endorsement, the Commission risks being blocked by the Member States 
during the stage of implementation, in particular, through comitology or, but rarely, be taken 
before the Court of Justice for overstepping implementing powers. The latter is only possible, if 
suggested policy changes go beyond the particular scope of the relevant regulation, like in the 
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Philippine Border Mission case, where the Court ruled that the Commission could not provide 
security-related assistance under the ALA regulation, as this was not foreseen in that regulation.976  
 Commission communications are decided by the Commission collectively, or, if asked for 
by a member, by majority voting. Until recently, the draft texts for communications were 
prepared by the various thematically responsible units in the various Commission’s Directorates-
General (DGs). There was a lead unit, responsible for strategic questions on specific thematic 
issues, countries or regions, which had the main responsibility to draft documents and was mainly 
located in DG for External Relations (DG RELEX). During this drafting process, it widely 
consulted other, related units, in particular the services responsible for aid implementation. The 
recent introduction of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is separate from the 
Commission and the Council and works under the guidance of and to assist the Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has brought some changes.977 It basically 
absorbed the former DG External Relations, which included the majority of lead, strategic units. 
Now, the EEAS is involved in the preparation of Commission communications, including for 
legislative proposals concerning the basic regulations. In the case of some programmes, like the 
EIDHR, the responsible department in the EEAS, working under the High Representative, will 
have the main responsibility of developing proposals for the Commission. In this process, it has 
the obligation to cooperate and coordinate with the Commission services. In the case of other 
programmes, like the DCI and ENPI, the EEAS and the relevant Commission services, under 
the responsibility of the thematically responsible Commissioner, that is, the Commissioner for 
Development or the ENP, prepare a joint document that is submitted to the Commission for 
decision.978 
 
d) European Council and Council Conclusions and European Parliament Resolutions 
 
Next to the Commission, the European Council, the Council, and the European Parliament 
participate in the policy-making process not only, at least in the case of Council and Parliament, 
through their role in the legislative process, but also through the publication of non-legally 
binding documents. As indicated, these documents can initiate actions, respond to policy 
suggestions of other institutions, or in general contribute to ongoing deliberations.  
 The European Council, that is, the meeting of the heads of state or government of the 
Member States and the President of the European Commission, as well as, since the Treaty of 
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Lisbon, of the President of the European Council, has the special role of defining the Union’s 
political direction and priorities (Article 15(1) TEU).979 European Council conclusions, adopted at 
its two regular (as well as extraordinary) meetings during the course of a single presidency, are 
therefore usually general, direction-giving documents, leaving the more detailed formulation of 
policies to the other institutions. The European Council usually takes decisions by consensus, 
except if, in specific cases, the Treaty provides for unanimity or majority voting. For democracy 
promotion and, implicitly, assistance, European Council conclusions were mainly important 
during the early stage of the development of an external EU human rights and democratization 
policy, when it was decided at the highest political level that human rights issues in third 
countries should be a legitimate concern of the EU – then still EEC – and its Member States, 
that human right and democratization mattered for foreign policy and development, and that an 
external human rights and democratization policy should therefore be pursued.980 The concrete 
definition of the policy, its extent and tools, has since then been carried out by the other EU 
institutions. Beyond this early period, the European Council frequently comments on progress in 
or lack of democratization in third countries and in this framework calls for continuing or more 
EU support. It has, however, since the early 1990s not provided any major input into the policy 
tool of democracy assistance. 
The Council participates in policy-making through its decisions in the legislative process, 
however, also through the adoption of non-binding conclusions that express opinions, 
preferences, and critique and thereby feed into the policy-making process beyond the process of 
adopting secondary law. Numerous Council conclusions constitute responses to Commission 
communications. Usually these conclusions endorse Commission ideas, not at least because the 
Commission, aware of the interests of the other institutions, takes the various opinions into 
account in the drafting of COMs (as far as they are acceptable to the Commission). The regular 
endorsement does not mean though that Council resolutions on Commission communications 
are brief und adopted without discussion. In practice, Council conclusions are often lengthier 
documents, in some detail mention which policy suggestions of the Commission the Council 
approves and how the Council intends to developing the policy further.981 In any case, the 
conclusions are official signals to the Commission how to pursue a certain path further. At times, 
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the Council also publicly disagrees with the Commission in its conclusions. This happened, most 
notably, in the case of election observation. In order to build a coherent framework for EU 
EOMs, in 2000 the Commission suggested implementing all EU EOMs under the first pillar, 
foreseeing an important role for itself (COM(2000) 191final). The Council overall welcomed 
Commission efforts, however, did not entirely agree to the planned supranationalisation, but 
intended to reserve a more important position for itself. A compromise was eventually reached in 
informal discussions.982 
At times, although less frequently, Council conclusions are adopted during a policy-
making process initiated by one of the EU presidencies. The most recent case in point is the 
initiation of discussions on a European consensus on democracy support, first suggested during 
the French presidency in 2008 and developed further by the Czech and Swedish presidencies in 
2009. The document, which in particular aimed at increasing the coherence of all EU activities, 
had a strong inter-pillar focus. It resulted in the adoption, in November 2011, of Council 
conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations and an Action Programme, 
that called for further elaboration by the relevant Council bodies and the Commission and for an 
annual report on implementation. It has since been followed by further Council conclusions and 
implementation reports concerning the Action Programme. 
Finally, reference should be made to the EU’s ‘Annual Report on Human Rights’, since 
2010 called the EU’s ‘Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World’. First 
published in 1999, it is annually drafted by the Council’s Working Group on Human Rights – 
COHOM – and aims to provide an overview to the public and, in particular, to EU partner states 
and civil society, on all EU activities in the area of the Union’s external human rights and 
democratization policy. The report is a very comprehensive account of EU actions over a period 
of 12 months, discussing individual instruments, including the EIDHR, as well as, since more 
recently, actions in individual countries.983 The last reports also included a section on the 
European Parliament’s activities, made available by the Parliament. While the document provides 
a comprehensive overview it is, as its title suggests, a report on implemented actions rather than a 
document providing inputs for future policy developments.  
As regards the drafting of Council documents and decision-making, the central role of the 
just referred to Council’s Working Group on Human Rights, known as COHOM, has to be 
mentioned. It was established in 1987 and therefore under EPC and before the establishment of 
CFSP and consists of experts on human rights (and democracy issues) of the Member States. 
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While it originally usually only met twice a year, it now meets regularly and has the task of 
collecting information and discussing human rights issues as regards individual third states, to 
preparing activities within international organizations like the UN, to coordinating actions among 
the Member States, to discussing the EU’s human right and external democratization policy as a 
whole, and to submitting recommendations to the Council.984 Next to preparing the annual 
reports for the Council, it also prepares the Council conclusions on human rights and democracy-
related issues. COHOM’s views, opinions and documents are channeled via the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), that is, the meeting of Member States’ representatives 
at ambassadorial level, which coordinates the work of the numerous working parties and groups, 
including COHOM, prepares Council meetings, and also informally pre-decides issues, so that 
the Council only discusses contentious issues that have not been decided at the level of 
COREPER. At times, if CFSP issues are concerned, the Treaty-based Political and Security 
Committee (PSC, Article 38 TEU), whose task it is, among others, to monitor international 
developments in the area of CFSP, can also be asked by the Council to submit opinions.  
Finally, the European Parliament has always intensively engaged in policy-making as 
regards democracy promotion and assistance. Next to participation in the legislative process, it 
adopts non-binding resolutions. These can, as in the case of the Council, constitute responses to 
Commission communications making policy-suggestions, or responses to Council initiatives.985 
Usually, the Parliament’s resolutions are very comprehensive documents, frequently addressing a 
merely uncountable number of very detailed elements. The Parliament has also tended to be very 
outspoken and far-reaching in its demands, even if it has appeared obvious that these could not 
be realized in the immediate future, for example, to grant the Parliament similar powers as the 
Council in comitology or to supranationalize CFSP.986 Frequently, the Parliament also adopts 
own-motion resolutions irrespective of any initiative of another institution, like in July 2011 the 
resolution on ‘EU external policies in favour of democratisation’, which was, in particular, caused 
by the events in the Arab world in 2011. This resolution criticized the weak and wrong 
engagement of the Union in the Southern Mediterranean in the preceding period and called for 
real engagement in the area.987 Further, next to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights (and 
Democracy) in the World, to which the Parliament now contributes, the Parliament has annually 
drafted it own report on the same topic and adopted a related resolution since 1983. Since 2006, 
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the Parliament’s ‘Annual Report on Human Rights in the World’ has a broader focus, analyzing 
EU policy comprehensively and making policy suggestions for reform, as well as relating directly 
to the Council’s annual report.988 
 Furthermore the Parliament has a specialized unit dealing with human rights and 
democratization-related topics: the Subcommittee on Human Rights or DROI, which, 
established in 2004, is a sub-unit of the Foreign Affairs Committee and is composed of 32 
Members of the European Parliament, which are appointed for an entire legislative period. The 
sub-committee holds hearings and leads discussion on all human rights and democracy-related 
topics of concern to the Parliament and prepares reports and motions for resolutions to be tabled 
at plenary meetings. At times, other committees, like that on Development (DEVE), Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality can also be involved in human rights issues. Because democracy 
assistance involves a strong financial element, the Committee on Budget can also be brought into 
the picture. 
 
2. Policy Implementation 
 
On the basis of the outlined legally-binding and non-binding policy-documents, the EU has to 
take further steps to transform the annually available budget for the EIDHR and parts of the 
available budget under mainstream programmes into concrete projects. This task is in the 
relevant assistance regulations attributed to the Commission and constitutes one of its primary 
activities as executive institution of the European Union. In the process, other actors are 
involved as well. The various steps of the implementation process are looked at in the following 
sections of this chapter. Unlike the case of policy-making, it is possible to identify a chronology 
of steps that each or at least most programmes and projects go though. To begin, the three basic 
approaches to aid implementation followed by the EU as well as most other international donors, 
usually referred to as ‘aid delivery methods’, should briefly be introduced. As will be seen, specific 
features of the EIDHR and of the mainstream development programmes require or prefer the 
use of a specific aid delivery method.  
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a) Three Basic Modes of Aid Implementation 
 
Overall, the Commission currently works with three different aid delivery methods, which are 
implemented through one or more of three possible so-called ‘financing modalities’.989 First, there 
is the project approach, which constitutes the original form of aid delivery. It is implemented 
through individual projects, which are financed either through EU grant or procurement award 
procedures.990 The approach is characterized by a strong determining and controlling role of the 
EU, especially in the programming phase, as well as the use of EU rules and procedures, rather 
than those of the target state. These features have increasingly brought the project approach 
under pressure. In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, a declaration of major 
donors and developing countries adopted in the framework of the OECD in 2005, and other 
linked documents, reforms of the project approach aim at a more intensive involvement of 
recipients and better coordination with other donors to avoid double-funding, multiple 
procedures, and to create synergies.991 
 Secondly, there is the ‘macro or global approach’ in the case of which the EU supports a 
target country in the implementation of that country’s own national development plan or strategy 
by contributing financial resources to the national budget of that country (so-called budget 
support). The resources become an unidentifiable part of that budget and are spent by the 
authorities of the target state according to the national financial management system. While the 
EU keeps oversight of how the funds are being spent, it has no say as regards the decisions on 
and implementation of individual programmes and projects carried out by the target state. The 
provision of budget support is linked to strict conditions, including relevant initiatives to ensure 
and improve sound public financial management in the target state.992  
Thirdly, in the case of the ‘sector approach’, the EU supports a target state’s development 
programme in a certain sector (‘sector programme’). As with budget support, the recipient state 
plays a key role in the development and implementation of the programme, coordination is 
sought with other donors, and the focus is on an entire sector and therefore broad. Sector 
programmes can be financed through three means: sector budget support – the preferred option 
– which works basically in the same way as general budget support; common pool funding, in the 
case of which the different donors pay into a common basket that is either managed by the 
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government or by a donor according to the target country’s or the donors management system; 
or through projects, implemented according to EU procedures.993  
 Over the last decade, donors, including the EU, and developing countries have come to 
favour budget and sector support over the project approach.994 Due to their very nature, these 
approaches avoid the problems of the project approach, in particular the dominating role of the 
donor. Their positive features include a stronger local ownership by the target state, donor 
alignment with the target state’s development strategies, institutions, and procedures, together 
with a stronger engagement in local capacity development, and more cooperation and 
coordination among donors. All these features are considered a support to enhanced aid 
effectiveness. In 2008 about 39% and in 2009 about 28% of the EDF and EU budget for 
development assistance was envisaged for general and sector budget support measures, and there 
is strong interest in increasing this share.995  
 Nevertheless, the project approach continues to be a main form of aid delivery. There are 
situations where it is the most appropriate or indeed the only possible form of aid delivery, like 
when projects are implemented by non-governmental bodies, as in the case of the EIDHR, in 
post-crisis or emergency situation, or when the conditions for budget and sector support, 
dependent upon a stable financial framework, are not (yet) met.996 The Parliament has warned of 
providing budget support to authoritarian governments and has called for always supplementing 
budget support with projects that develop the oversight capacities of national parliaments and 
civil society actors.997 
 All in all, the EIDHR is exclusively implemented through the reformed project approach. 
Aid under mainstream development programmes is provided under the project, budget and 
sector approach. Given that many national development plans refer to reforms related to 
democratization – rule of law development, judicial reform, etc. – it can be assumed that parts of 
democracy assistance provided under the mainstream programmes have been paid as budget or 
sector support.998 The exact share of budget support, sector support, and projects of all 
democracy assistance is, however, not known.  
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b) The Standard Cycle of Operations 
 
For the discussion of the major stages of the stage of implementation, it is useful to introduce to 
the so-called Project Cycle Management (PCM) tool, a project design and management 
instrument for the project approach that has been used by the EU since the early 1990s. The tool 
has been developed and refined since then, but has essentially retained the same five major stages 
that each project, irrespective of its size, time-frame or thematic focus, has to run through in an 
entire cycle of implementation. Although referring to ‘project management’, the cycle also 
describes the regular stages followed during implementation in the case of the budget and sector 
approaches.999 The exact roles of the EU institutions, target states’ governments, and civil society, 
applicable rules, etc. during individual stages differ according to the chosen approach. The five 
stages are: 
 Programming; 
 Project Identification (with a financing decision); or 
 Formulation (with a financing decision); 
 (technical) Implementation (i.e. implementation in a more limited sense); 
 Evaluation & Audit.1000 
The PCM tool neatly fits into the policy cycle model outlined above, repeating the various steps 




Programming refers, broadly speaking, to the process of developing the EU’s strategy for 
providing assistance in third states during a particular period of time.1001 It is today widely 
considered a crucial phase in the project cycle and is quite an elaborate process during which 
several issues, like donor coordination, have to be addressed in order to ensure as much aid 
effectiveness and efficiency in delivery as possible. The Commission calls its central programming 
documents tools for ‘steering, managing and evaluating operations’.1002 
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i. Programming the EIDHR 
 
The Increasing Importance of Programming in the case of the EIDHR 
EU programming has undergone major changes over the last two decades, in particular as regards 
the EIDHR. Unlike mainstream development programmes, before the late 1990s the EU paid 
little attention to programming in the case of the EIDHR forerunner programmes. With the 
major exception of the Phare/Tacis Democracy Programme, for which the Commission set up a 
special Advisory Group that, besides other tasks, drafted programming guidelines,1003 hardly any 
EIDHR predecessor programme operated on the basis of some kind of programming 
document.1004 The programming documents of mainstream development programmes did not 
sufficiently cover human rights and democracy assistance as regards the EIDHR either.1005 
Surprisingly for its time of adoption, the 1999 EIDHR regulations also did not change this 
situation and explicitly demand the adoption of programming documents, but instead remaining 
largely silent on the topic. They only spoke of Commission ‘programmes intended to provide a 
coherent framework for action’ in specific countries, regions, or on specific topics, without, 
however, requiring that they should be established.1006 All in all, to the extent that some form of 
yearly or even multiannual planning took place before the late 1990s, it was largely intransparent, 
unstructured, and very diverse. 
 While this absence of programming was surprising, it can be explained by the minor 
importance attributed to strategic programming before the late 1990s, the unclear character and 
future of the EIDHR as pilot or independent programme, and the perceived conflict of 
programming and the demand-led approach. In any case, the general pressure for strategic 
programming became stronger, in particular in view of a perceived lack of aid effectiveness. 
Consequently the EIDHR was established as an independent programme that was going to stay. 
It was also accepted that the use of calls for proposal was compatible with a strategic framework. 
Next to Phare/Tacis Democracy, regional multiannual programming documents also started to 
be developed for Latin American countries, but did not become operational. Eventually, in 2001, 
the Commission published its first EIDHR programming document, entitled ‘Programming 
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Human Rights and Democracy – Exercise 2001’.1007 It has since then been followed by four 
further programming documents, covering different periods of time: 
 2002-2004 EIDHR Programming Document;1008 
 EIDHR Programming for 2005-2006;1009 
 Strategy Paper for 2007-2010;1010 
 Strategy Paper for 2011-2013.1011 
Most of these programming documents were supplemented by annual work programmes or 
action programmes.  
 
The Character of EIDHR Programming Documents 
Chapter 6 will show that each of the five programming documents adopted for the EIDHR since 
2001 differed in its particular approach to thematic and geographical priorities, and that the 
Commission experimented with various models until arriving at a satisfactory format, in 
particular as regards the details regarding the thematic focus in individual countries and regions. 
Overall, as regards their general character it can be observed that the programming documents 
focused on the EIDHR as a single, worldwide applicable programme and aimed at providing a 
strategy with worldwide validity for the implementation of that instrument. They therefore aimed 
at providing a single strategy of democratization for all target states and regions, rather than 
addressing each target country separately with a tailored, individual strategic programme.  
On the one hand, such a model makes perfect sense for global priorities and actions, for 
which global calls for proposals are held, for example in the case of a global campaign against the 
death penalty. On the other hand, it risks disregarding that there are differences in the problems 
and needs of individual target states. The definition of global priorities and responses can, but 
does not necessarily explicitly cover all problems and needs in all target states.  
The programming documents take account of this potential problem in three ways. The 
process of establishing priorities is not done in a top-down fashion, as the global EIDHR strategy 
papers suggest. The EU representations in the target states, civil society in Brussels and, although 
still limited, civil society in the target states, provide input into the definition of these global 
priorities. The global priorities are therefore, at least to some extent, the sum of all local priorities 
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and in principle, each applicant in a target state should fall under one of the selected priorities. 
Further, global and local EIDHR calls for proposals are in part defined very broadly and 
therefore cover a very broad spectrum of possible thematic foci of projects. It is therefore rather 
unlikely that a suggested project does not fall under one of the envisaged EIDHR priorities. 
Finally, in local calls for proposals the Delegations are explicitly entitled to adjust the global 
priorities to local circumstances and therefore to make changes to the broad priorities. 
More recently, the Commission has itself (implicitly) criticized the global programming 
exercise, which it calls a ‘one size fits all approach’.1012 It is now elaborating individual human 
rights strategies for, initially, 150 third states that will serve as guiding documents for all EU 
external democracy and human rights instruments and therefore also for the EIDHR, in 
particular, EIDHR programming. It remains to be seen to what extent these documents will also 
explicitly address questions of democratization and outline a democracy promotion strategy for 
individual states. Whether this will also result in changes to future EIDHR programming 
documents and replace the global approach by a mixed approach, which retains a global view for 
those aspects of the EIDHR that are promoted globally, and refers, at least as regards the 
substantive elements, to individual country strategies, has still to be seen.  
 
The Legal and Regulatory Basis for EIDHR Programming 
While the 1999 EIDHR regulations were silent on programming, the amendments to the 1999 
EIDHR regulations adopted in 2004 first introduced provisions on EIDHR programming into 
the EIDHR regulations. They foresaw the adoption of Multiannual Indicative Programmes 
(MIPs) and Annual Work Programmes (AWPs) and regulated their adoption.1013 This first express 
legal basis for programming was introduced after the Commission had started to develop 
programming documents in 2001 but was never followed up, as the 2005-2006 EIDHR 
programming document had already been drafted, when the amendments entered into force.  
The currently applicable 2006 EIDHR regulation devotes considerable space to the 
programming process, stressing its relevance. It renamed the EIDHR programming documents 
into Strategy Papers (SPs) and Annual Action Programmes (AAPs), which is more in line with 
other programming documents, and regulates their content and procedure of adoption (in 
particular, in Articles 4-6 of the 2006 EIDHR regulation) in more detail. 
 Of further relevance is the ‘Common Framework and Procedure for the Programming of 
Thematic and Horizontal Budget Lines’ – from now on referred to as the Common Framework 
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for Thematic Lines – of 2003 and, in an updated version, of 2006.1014 It supplements the EIDHR 
regulation in providing further details on the essential content of EIDHR strategy papers and by 
outlining the various phases in the adoption of these papers. The document was developed by 
the so-called ‘inter-service Quality Support Group’ (iQSG), a group of EU officials of various 
Directorates-General and services dealing with external relations, which was established in 2000, 
in the wake of reforming the assistance sector and with the specific objective of improving the 
quality of the programming process. The document is rooted in the ‘Common Framework for 
Country Strategy Papers’ of 2000, which provided more detailed rules for the adoption of 
Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) in the framework of mainstream assistance programmes.1015 
 
Types of Programming Documents and their Essential Content: Strategy Papers and Annual Action Programmes 
The two types of programming documents envisaged in the 2006 EIDHR regulation have already 
been mentioned: Strategy Papers (SPs) and Annual Action Programmes (AAPs). Unlike 
mainstream development programmes, no separate Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) 
are envisaged; however, the actually adopted SPs include such multiannual indicative 
programming as part of the SPs. 
Strategy Papers are the basic, general programming documents that shall, according to 
Article 5(1) of the 2006 EIDHR regulation, lay down the strategy of assistance under the 
regulation, its priorities, the international situation, and the activities of the main partners, that is, 
those of other donors. Article 5(2) of the same regulation requires that the Strategy Papers set out 
in more detail priority areas selected for financing, the specific objectives, and, introducing 
results-based management, the expected results and the performance indicators.1016 The SPs shall 
also provide an indicative financial allocation, both, overall and by priority area. The regulation 
leaves considerable freedom to the implementing bodies to determine the specificity and the 
number of selected objectives within the framework of the regulation. It also does not envisage a 
specific time frame for SPs, except that they should not go beyond the period of validity of the 
regulation (i.e. beyond 31.12.2013). The exact structure of SPs, which consist of six parts, has 
been outlined in the Common Framework for Thematic Lines and comprises, amongst others, a 
section on the EC policy agenda in the field of democracy and human rights promotion, the 
activities of other donors, the needs of the target states, the EU’s past actions, the EU’s response 
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strategy, and multiannual programming. Table 16 (Chapter 6) lists the various objectives chosen 
by the Commission in all programming documents adopted since 2001, which in the case of the 
last two SPs, covered four and three years, respectively.  
 Based on SPs, the Commission has to adopt so-called Annual Action Programmes 
(AAPs). These are more detailed documents, which, next to repeating much of the content of 
SPs, in particular objectives and expected results of activities, also list, in separate Action Fiches, 
the individual operations to be financed, the amount allocated for each operation, and an 
indicative timetable (Articles 6(1) of the 2006 EIDHR programme) for implementation and 
methods of implementation. Again, in line with results-based management, the objectives shall be 
measureable and have time-bound benchmarks (Article 6(2) of the 2006 EIDHR programme). 
Further, the Commission is again free to decide on the degree of specificity with which it 
addresses the intended actions. Some of the identified operations are entirely formulated projects, 
often already ongoing with the support of the EU, like the contribution to the European Inter-
University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization based in Venice. The majority of 
operations are planned programmes, whose individual projects only have to be identified, mainly 
through calls for proposals. The principal programmes here are the ‘Country Based Support 
Schemes’ (CBSS), the successors to the EIDHR micro-project schemes, which are implemented 
by the Delegations with little involvement from the Commission headquarters.1017 AAPs define 
the thematic foci of CBSSs, which apply to all countries worldwide in which the scheme is being 
implemented. However, as mentioned, the AAPs give the Delegations the possibility to adjust 
these generally defined objectives to local circumstances and to focus on certain thematic issues 
rather than others.1018 AAPs also regulate the methods of implementing CBSS, for example that 
calls for proposals have to be held, and specifies, which are the award criteria. 
 In principle, all measures funded under the EIDHR have to be covered by an SP and 
AAP. The EIDHR regulation provides for some exceptions to this rule. Most importantly, it 
allows for ‘special measures’, that is, projects responding to unforeseen needs and exceptional 
circumstances, like a revolution, an unexpected start of a transition, but also a sudden return to 
authoritarianism in the case of which funds can be released more quickly. Further, the 
Commission can provide small ‘ad hoc’ grants to defenders of human rights.1019 
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Procedures in the Adoption of Programming Documents 
According to the Commission’s Common Framework for Thematic Lines, the programming of 
SPs occurs in three stages: (1) the drawing up of the draft programming document; (2) quality 
control and comitology; and (3) the formal approval. Each stage contains various steps and 
involves various institutions, organizations, and bodies.1020 A similar, slightly less complex 
structure applies in the case of AAPs.1021 Overall, the Commission, as one of the primary 
executive institution of the EU, dominates the drafting of the SPs and AAPs. Nevertheless, the 
Member States and the European Parliament, as well as European and target country-based civil 
society organizations also play a role in the process.  
 
(1) Drawing up the draft programming document: 
 
(a) The Commission Headquarters 
 
There have been several restructurings within the Commission over the last two decades, which 
have also affected the EIDHR. The lead units on the EIDHR have several times changed their 
name/number and/or overall position. Importantly, since major reforms carried out under the 
Prodi Commission in 1999,1022 there have always been two lead units on the EIDHR. On the one 
hand, there is a political unit, responsible for strategic aspects of the programme, which was from 
1999 on part of DG External Relations and then emerged from a unit on Human Rights in DG 
External Relations and a special unit dealing with Democratization, Good Government and 
Institutional Reform in DG Development.1023 On the other hand, there is one operational unit, 
responsible for the implementation aspects of the EIDHR, which was, initially part of the 
‘Common Service Directorate’ (usually referred to under its French name, Service Commune 
Relex or SCR and introduced under the Santer Commission in 1998), and from 2001 on, of the 
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newly established EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO or EuropeAid). Before 1998, the 
various mentioned political units were also responsible for the management of programmes, 
which led, due to staff restrains, to an extensive use of external bodies, so-called Technical 
Assistance Offices (TAOs).1024 The Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent creation of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), working under the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, brought about the most recent changes. The political unit 
dealing with the EIDHR is now positioned in the EEAS, in the Department for Human Rights 
and Democracy,1025 while the unit responsible for the implementation of the EIDHR is 
positioned in the new DG Development and Cooperation – Europeaid, Directorate Human and 
Society Development (Unit 1 in DEVCO.DGA2.D).1026 
 The EIDHR programming process starts when the politically responsible unit on the 
EIDHR in the Commission services or now in the EEAS begins to elaborate the major priorities 
of the SPs. In developing priority areas, this lead unit has to consult a wide range of other 
services in the headquarters of the Commission in Brussels. These other units should provide 
input about ongoing and implemented activities in the field, that is, under the EIDHR as well as 
under other programmes, and suggest priorities for the future SP. The units that primarily 
respond to the lead unit are the geographical departments in the EEAS, or before, in DG 
RELEX and DG Development, and in DG Development and Cooperation – Europeaid, or, 
before in Europeaid, which have expert knowledge about political situations in the target 
countries and ongoing assistance programmes and projects. They are also in a prime position to 
ensure that information gained in the framework of the implementation of other democratization 
tools feeds into EIDHR programming, like weaknesses exposed during EU EOMs, information 
gained in human rights dialogues, or insights from the Special Representatives, which has 
increasingly been called for in the last three years and as part of efforts to ensure ‘inter-pillar’ 
coherence.  
 In the case of the drafting of AAPs the lead unit in Europeaid takes the initiative to 
elaborate the more detailed aspects of the programmes as well as the individual action fiches. The 
units in EEAS are no longer involved in a leading role. 
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(b) The Delegations 
 
At this stage the representations of the European Union in third countries come into play. While 
primary law only made scant reference to Commission delegations in third countries in ex-Article 
20 TEU, the Treaty of Lisbon now expressly establishes so-called Union Delegations that work 
under the authority of the High Representative and represent the EU abroad (Article 221 TEU). 
The number of Delegations has increased over the last decade to 136 in 2012. Additionally, the 
Delegations have increasingly received responsibilities and competences to implement external 
assistance programmes, in particular following the major reform in external assistance of the early 
2000s. This ‘deconcentration’ from Brussels to the Delegations is in line with the key principles 
of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and reflects the idea that aid effectiveness can be 
increased by a stronger and permanent presence in target, developing countries. EU Delegations 
have over the last decade also increasingly been staffed with human rights and democracy experts 
and, in part, established specific administrative units – focal points – for these themes.1027 
The Delegations in the target countries are involved in the EU’s programming process via 
the geographical units in the Commission headquarters, which are responsible for a particular 
country or region. These units have to request the specific Delegations for their inputs on 
priorities of support for the next EIDHR SP.1028 Their input is particularly important for the 
thematic priorities of the County Based Support Schemes (CBSSs), which are later on entirely 
administered by the Delegations rather than by the offices in Brussels. As mentioned, despite this 
decentralized implementation global priorities for all CBSSs worldwide are established by the 
Commission in the EIDHR SPs and AAPs. Delegation can subsequently diverge from these 
priorities and adjust them to the local context during implementation. Overall, this involvement 
of the Delegation ensures that the programming exercise is not simply a top-down exercise, but 
rests on strong input from the level of the countries concerned – even if it is still from within the 
Commission and not representatives of target states.  
 
(c) Civil Society 
 
The 2006 EIDHR regulation explicitly foresees that the Commission shall also involve civil 
society in the establishment of programming documents, in order for them to contribute to the 
exercise.1029 It is explicitly foreseen that this should also happen at the level of the target states.1030 
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At regards cooperation with civil society in Brussels, the Commission conducts a regular, 
informal dialogue with European NGOs and networks or platforms of civil society organizations 
working on human rights and democracy issues or on development more generally. There is no 
approved list of NGOs for this EU-civil society dialogue, but the major participating NGOs 
belong to the so-called Human Rights & Democracy Network (HRDN), an informal grouping of 
NGOs working at the EU level in the fields of human rights, democracy, and conflict prevention, 
that currently comprises of about 45 members. Additionally, the Commission invites the 
European Network of Political Foundations (ENOP), currently representing about 65 
foundations, the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO), a platform of about 30 NGOs 
working in the area of peacebulding, and ITUC, the main international trade union 
organization.1031 The dialogue with these civil society organizations takes place 1-2 times per year, 
when the Commission invites these networks and platforms and organizations belonging to these 
groupings to a meeting.1032 
The influence of civil society in drafting SPs, which are the more crucial strategic 
documents, would be important to assess. Unfortunately, the Commission has not published 
minutes of meetings on discussions about SPs. There is only a good record of annual meetings 
on AAPs as well as on some meetings on specific Action Fiches or calls for proposals.1033 These 
show a mixed result. On the one hand, there is, overall, a quite intensive exchange between the 
Commission and civil society organization on a broad range of issues which is due to the insider-
knowledge of the organizations, also highly appreciated by the Commission.1034 On the other 
hand, the meetings seem to be held at a point of time, when the planned operations have already 
been defined, no longer allowing NGOs to have a real input on the discussed AAP. Further, the 
meetings strongly appear as information sessions for European civil society, making it easier for 
the informed NGOs to apply under the next rounds of calls for proposals. Frequently, much 
time is spent for the Commission to justify certain decisions that have been taken. The NGOs 
and political foundations provide input, however, rather on technical than thematic issues, like on 
the time for launching calls or on shares of the overall project costs to be born by recipients.1035 
Requests in relation to the material focus of a call are also made, for example, demands for a 
stronger focus on and specific calls on the rights of the child, but could only be registered for 
future programming exercises.  
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 Civil society in the target states is involved in the programming process of SPs and AAPs 
when the Delegations, via the geographical units, submit information and suggestions to the lead 
EIDHR unit. Efforts have over the last years been made to ensure the involvement of local civil 
society in the programming process, by specific requests by the Commission headquarters to 
Delegations to carry out such consultations, and by providing additional funds for this purpose. 
However, it is not yet common practice for meetings between civil society and Delegations to 
take place everywhere.1036 
 
(d) The Member States 
 
In order to ensure coordination with other donors, the Commission also has to exchange 
information with the Member States at an early stage in the programming process. Again, this is 
done in Brussels, through the involvement of Member States’ experts posted to the Commission 
and through contacts with the permanent representations of the Member States in Brussels. In 
the target states, Union Delegations have meetings with representatives of the Member States’ 
diplomatic or development missions. Similarly, the Commission regularly exchanges views with 
the European Parliament in order to ensure that comments and requests by this institution can 
flow into the programming process. As will be seen in a moment, there is a more intensive 
involvement of the European Parliament at a later stage in the programming process.  
 Once the numerous mentioned actors have provided input on various aspects of the 
future programming document, the lead unit in the Commission prepares a first draft of the 
document and circulates it among the mentioned services in the Commission. A so-called 
‘thematic team meeting’ is held, bringing together all involved Commission units in order to get 
inputs into this draft document, which is, subsequently, revised. This leads to the finalization of 
the draft document by the lead unit.  
 
(2) Quality control and comitology 
 
In order to improve the quality of the programming process and programming documents, in 
September 2000, as part of the overall reform of external assistance, the various Commissioners 
responsible for external relations set up the already mentioned inter-service Quality Support 
Group (iQSG).1037 It consists of officials from the various DGs and services and has the task of 
ensuring that SPs meet established requirements and quality standards, for example that they 
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sufficiently address all issues that need to be addressed in a programming document, ensure 
complementarity with and coherence of all external assistance programmes.1038 Once this quality 
control has been made, the draft SP is sent to the responsible Member States’ committee and to 
the European Parliament. 
 As in the majority of policy fields, the Council retains control over the Commission’s use 
of implementing powers through the involvement of a Member States’ committee in the 
adoption of programming documents, that is, SPs and AAPs.1039 Article 17(1) of the 2006 
EIDHR regulation sets up the so-called ‘Democracy and Human Rights Committee’ or DHRC, 
which is composed of one representative of each Member State and is chaired by one – non-
voting – member of the Commission. For defining the particular type of committee, the same 
Article refers to the 1999 Comitology decision (Council Decision 1999/468/EC)1040 and 
determines that the mentioned committee is a management committee and that the procedures 
established for such committees in the just mentioned decision apply (in particular Article 4 and 7 
of Decision 1999/468/EC). Indeed, the general rules of the Comitology decision foresaw the 
management procedure for measures with substantial budgetary implications, as in the case of 
assistance.1041 On 1 March 2011 a new Comitology regulation, adopted on the basis of the Treaty 
of Lisbon by the Parliament and the Council, entered into force.1042 It replaced the management 
procedure by a so-called examination procedure, which from then on also applied to existing 
legislation, except for pending procedures.1043 Under the 1999 EIDHR regulations, the respective 
committee, which was then called the ‘Human Rights and Democracy Committee’, was a 
regulatory committee, which implied a stronger position for the Member States.1044  
 As mentioned, the DHRC receives the final draft of a SP and an AAP and discusses it in 
a time-frame established by the chairman of the Committee. Previously, under the 1999 EIDHR 
legal framework, the Committee had to decide on individual measures (beyond 1 million Euros) 
and on country- or regional programmes, as far as they existed, which meant a much higher 
workload, without being able to sufficiently influence the overall strategy. The Council therefore 
called for the relevant changes in the 2006 EIDHR regulation in order to be involved only in the 
programming of SPs and AAPs rather than to approve a long list of individual projects. 
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Decisions by the DHRC are taken by qualified majority, whereby the votes of each represented 
Member State are weighted according to the rules for qualified majority voting by the Council 
(Article 205(2) ECT, Art. 16(5) TEU, Article 238 TFEU, and Article 3 of the Protocol (No. 36) 
on Transitional Provisions annexed to the TEU).1045 Overall, practice during the period 2007-
2010, for which detailed data is available, shows that the DHRC basically never gave an 
unfavourable opinion on a draft Commission EIDHR document.1046 The reason is the 
engagement with the Member States during the drafting phase and the conscious efforts by the 
Commission, not least in view of comitology, to take the views of the Member States into 
account as a priority.1047  
In any case, the specificities of each of the various comitology procedures lie in the 
procedures that follow an unfavourable opinion by the committee on the Commission proposal. 
In the case of the management procedure the Commission could adopt its decision despite an 
unfavourable opinion of the DHRC (adopted by qualified majority). The role of the committee 
was considered to be that of ‘fire-warning’, without being able to extinguish the fire.1048 If this 
happened, the Commission had to communicate the disagreements to the Council, which could, 
within 30 days adopt a different decision. In the meantime the Commission could, but did not 
have to, defer the implementation of measures decided and go ahead with an SP or AAP. All in 
all, the Member States could therefore in principle replace the Commission’s decision with its 
own, however, only by a decision in the Council, not in the committee.1049  
According to the new examination procedure, the Commission is not allowed to take a 
decision, if the committee delivers a negative opinion. If the implementing act is considered 
necessary, the Commission can either submit an amended version of the draft implementing 
decision to the committee or submit the original draft to the newly introduced ‘appeal 
committee’. This committee basically replaced the Council, which is no longer directly involved 
in the examination procedure. The appeal committee is similarly composed as a regular 
committee and submits opinions in the same way as the regular committee. It can suggest 
amendments, which can or cannot be accepted by the chair of the committee, that is, the 
Commission representative. If the opinion of the ‘appeal committee’ is again negative, the 
Commission cannot adopt the act and it finally fails. All in all, the new procedures are, however, 
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due to the use of the appeals committee and the various possibilities to amend draft acts, geared 
towards achieving a jointly agreeable solution.1050 While the Council has no formal role during the 
examination procedure, it can, due to its new right of scrutiny, at any time indicate to the 
Commission that, in its view, the Commission exceeds its implementing powers.1051 The 
Commission has to inform the Council (and the Parliament) of its intended actions. This right 
only applies in cases where the basic act has been adopted following the ordinary procedure. 
The comitology decision and regulation foresee special rules for situations of urgency. A 
case in point is the urgent measures or ad hoc grants possible under the EIDHR programme, 
which allow for a quicker adoption of the decision by the Commission.1052 
 It has been mentioned that the Parliament’s view are already taken into account during 
the first stage of programming (Article 3(4) of the 2006 EIDHR regulation). Additionally, since 
2006 the Parliament is also involved in the stage of comitology, even if in a different way and not 
to the same extent as the Council. Already the 1999 Comitology Decision gave the Parliament the 
right to be informed about various aspects of the comitology proceedings and, in particular, in 
cases in which the instrument was decided under the co-decision procedure, like the 2006 
EIDHR regulation, to receive a copy of the draft measures to be adopted by the committee.1053 
The new Comitology regulation grants the European Parliament a more extensive right to 
information and the transmission of all draft implementing acts on which committees have to 
decide.1054 Further, just like the Council’s new general right of scrutiny inserted by the 2011 
Comitology regulation, the Parliament was given this right in 1999. It therefore can, if the 
legislative act was adopted under the codecision or the ordinary legislative procedure, at any stage 
express its opinion, that the Commission has exceeded the implementing powers it was granted 
in the basic act to the Commission.1055 The Commission, under no legal obligation to act in a 
specific way, only has to inform the other institutions of whether it intends to maintain, amend, 
or withdraw the draft implementing act.  
Overall, the Parliament has over the last decade and, in particular, since an increasing 
number of issues are decided under co-decision, pushed for a greater role for itself in comitology 
procedures, not least because the Parliament’s powers to control the adoption of implementing 
acts has not developed in the same way as its legislative powers. It suggested its own stronger 
involvement during the legislative procedure leading to the adoption of the 1999 EIDHR 
regulations, which was rejected by the Commission and Council and could, due to the use of the 
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consultation and cooperation procedures also not be pushed for by the Parliament.1056 When the 
2006 EIDHR regulation was drafted, the Parliament made a new effort of increasing its powers 
in implementation. One of the responsible parliamentary committees preparing a report, the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, suggested the introduction of a so-called ‘structured dialogue’ that 
would have involved the Parliament in the implementation of the EIDHR programme in a 
similar way to comitology.1057 Given the continued objections by the Commission and Council to 
such involvement, the plenum deleted the request in its final vote on the programme. More 
recently, has again tried to push for greater powers. It used a Commission proposal to amend the 
EIDHR regulation, which had to be adjusted as regards the question of the eligibility of using EU 
funds for taxes, to propose that SPs and AAPs should be considered ‘delegated acts’ according to 
Article 290 TFEU. In that case, the Parliament would on the basis of primary law be on an equal 
footing to the Council involved in the scrutiny of Commission implementing acts, like SPs and 
AAPs. The procedure, decided under the ordinary legislative procedure, made the establishment 
of a conciliation committee necessary. The eventually adopted regulation only made the necessary 
changes to the 2006 EIDHR regulation as regards taxes and duties, without accepting the 
Parliament’s demands as regards delegated acts. An attached statement by the Parliament and the 
Council made clear that the issue was not solved but postponed for the discussion during the 
adoption of new acts under the next multiannual financial framework.1058 
 
(3) The Formal Approval 
 
The final step in the process of adopting SPs and AAPs is the formal decision by the 
Commission. It usually takes a collective decision, except where one of its members calls for a 
vote, in which case the Commission decides by majority voting.1059  
 
All in all, the programming process is a complex and lengthy process, which is steered and 
decided by the Commission and, due to its powers also strongly influenced by this institution. 
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The various Commission DGs, services and Union Delegations have much expert knowledge 
that flows into the programming process; however, the Commission is required to receive and 
also interested in receiving inputs from various other actors, that is, European and local civil 
society, the Member States, and the European Parliament. Regular contacts with European 
NGOs and foundations allows these actors to have a voice on SPs and AAPs; it is questionable 
though, whether they really have a say on crucial issues, like the definition of thematic priorities 
or whether their input is limited to more technical aspects of implementation. Member States are 
involved through a management committee and, since 1 March 2011, an examination committee, 
but in practice hardly (if ever) object to suggested SPs and AAPs, not at last because the 
Commission takes Member States preferences a priori into account. The European Parliament 
and, since the entering into force of the new Comitology regulation in 2011, the Council can 
scrutinize the draft programming documents on whether they do not go beyond implementing 
powers of the Commission. 
 
ii. Programming the Mainstream Development Programmes 
 
The programming process of mainstream development programmes has many similarities with 
EIDHR programming, but also crucial differences, in particular as regards the involvement of the 
public authorities of the target states. Such involvement has always been a standard element of 
development aid, but has over the last decade even intensified as part of the effort to render aid 
more effective, like in the OECD framework.1060 Issues like the ownership of the development 
process and alignment to national development strategies are crucial here and also foresee, next 
to involving the final recipients of aid, like local businesses and civil society, a strong involvement 
of the target state’s government. 
The aim of this section is to briefly review the various stages of mainstream development 
aid programming, in particular, in order not to be repetitive, as regards those elements that differ 
from EIDHR programming. The high number of EU development programmes adopted and 
implemented during the last two decades does not allow a detailed discussion of each programme 
here. If provisions of individual regulations are exemplarily cited, reference should primarily be 
made to the DCI. It also covers the so-called thematic programmes that apply also in ENP states, 
in particular the thematic programme for ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’, 
which is one of the programmes that can be considered to contain a strong democratization-
related element.  
                                                     





Programming in the case of the Mainstream Development Programmes 
In the mainstream development programmes, the idea of strategic planning has been a topic 
much earlier than in the framework of the EIDHR. Basically all regulations adopted in the early 
1990s already made reference to the establishment of multiannual programming documents. The 
terminology used for the individual programming documents, their exact content, and their 
duration, however, differed from regulation to regulation. For example, the ALA regulation of 
1992 envisaged indicative, five-year programmes for each objective, country or, possibly, region; 
the 1996 MEDA programme spoke of three-year indicative programmes, which MEDA 2000 
replaced by six-year Strategy Papers and three-year national and regional indicative programmes; 
and the 1999 Tacis regulation introduced national and multi-country indicative programmes with 
a duration of three to four years and action programmes with a duration of one to two years. 
None of these earlier regulations regulated in detail the exact content of the strategic documents 
and their detailed rules for adoption.  
 As already indicated, in the mid-to-late 1990s the OECD reviews of EU development aid, 
different evaluations by independent experts, and the Court of Auditors increasingly criticized the 
lack of aid effectiveness and identified the lack of sufficient strategic planning as one cause.1061 
Consequently, as part of the broader reform of the management of the Commission’s external aid 
programmes, the programming process was accorded more importance also in the framework of 
the mainstream programmes.1062 A uniform model and common procedure for the programming 
process were suggested by the Commission and welcomed by the Council in 2000 and should be 
applied to basically all external assistance programmes as well as the implementation of the EDF 
– the Common Framework for Strategy Papers.1063 It has since then been updated and slightly 
revised in 2004, 2005 and in 2006, in particular with a view to introducing joint multiannual 
programming, that is, to allow a synchronization of EU and Member States’ programming cycles 
and coordination of their activities. The new document is accordingly entitled: Common 
Framework for Drafting Country Strategy Papers and Joint Multiannual Programming.1064 
 Given the large number of aid recipients, the overall number of SPs and other 
programming documents adopted over the last decade is high. Since the introduction of the 
Common Framework, two ‘rounds’ of adopting SPs can be distinguished. In the first half of the 
2000s, most SPs covered the period 2002-2006 or 2003-2006, although there were also some 
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covering shorter periods of time.1065 MIPs adopted during that time covered periods of 2-3 
years.1066 In the following round of programming, SPs overall outlined a strategy for the time 
frame 2006-2013, in conformity with the multiannual financial framework. MIPs were adopted 
for the period 2006-2010 and 2011-2013.1067 SPs for the thematic programmes, like relating to 
‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’, covered shorter periods (2006-2010, 
2011-2013), as they formally do not envisage MIPs. Overall, the EU has over the last decade 
drafted over 200 SPs, over 400 MIPs, and 1000-odd AAPs.  
 
The General Character of Mainstream Development Programming Documents 
SPs in mainstream development programmes are adopted for countries – Country Strategy 
Papers (CSPs) – and regions – Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) – and therefore have a focus on a 
clearly delimited area. At times, like in the case of Central Asia, one RSP regulates assistance to all 
five covered countries rather than just adding a regional component to several national 
programmes, as is usually the case with RSPs. Importantly, each CSP (and RSP) intends to 
outline a strategy for development, possibly including democracy assistance, in the particular state 
(or region) addressed.  
 Thematic programmes are more similar to the EIDHR. Although the individual 
operations will also be carried out in different countries or regions, the SPs for thematic 
programmes aim at identifying a single, international strategy with universal objectives that apply 
in all countries. 
 
The Legal and Regulatory Basis for Programming Mainstream Development Programmes 
Just like in the case of the EIDHR, the types, required content, and procedure for the adoption 
of strategic documents is regulated in the various acts of secondary law that establish the 
respective assistance programmes as well as the mentioned Common Framework for Strategy 
Papers of 2000 and 2006. 
Due to the process of standardization in programming since the early 2000s, the various 
regulations now foresee very similar, but not necessarily identical rules for programming 
documents and procedures. Differences occur when, for example, individual programmes have a 
special focus, like the cross-border programmes under the ENPI, which do not exist under other 
programmes, and originate in the fact that the ENPI covers countries at the outer borders of the 
Union.1068 The DCI regulation includes a separate Title (Title III) on programming, which 
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introduces the various types of programming documents to be adopted, sets out some 
programming principles, outlines the general character of the documents, their content, duration, 
and the rules for adoption (Article 18 – 22 of the DCI regulation). Different provisions refer to 
mainstream geographically focused programmes and to the various thematic programmes. The 
content and rules for adoption of annual action programmes is included in a separate title (Title 
IV, called ‘Implementation’).  
The Common Framework for Drafting Country Strategy Papers and Joint Multiannual 
Programming of 2006 provides more detailed rules on the exact content of SPs and the process 
of adoption. Of particular interest for democracy assistance is that each CSP has to devote a 
section to analyzing the political situation in the country concerned, which involves a discussion 
of the human rights situation and requires identifying “priorities and objectives permitting 
progress towards respect for fundamental human rights”. Further, the CSP has to discuss the 
“observance of democratic principles”, in particular as regards the last electoral process, but also 
beyond.1069 This required focus, while not able to ensure the inclusion of democracy assistance, 
necessarily, however, requires this topic to be considered. 
 
Types of Programming Documents and their Essential Content: Strategy Papers, Multiannual  
Indicative Programmes and Annual Action Programmes 
The basic programming documents of mainstream development programmes are the same as in 
the case of the EIDHR: Strategy Papers (SPs) and Annual Action Programmes (AAPs). 
Additionally, the mainstream development programmes explicitly foresee the adoption of 
Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs), which take, in terms of specificity, a position 
between SPs and AAPs. It has been mentioned that SPs and, consequently, MIPs and AAPs are 
adopted for countries (CSPs) and for regions (RSPs). Additionally, there are SPs and AAPs for 
the thematic programmes, but, similar to the EIDHR no MIPs. Just like in the case of the 
EIDHR, the Commission can fund ‘special measures’ that are not foreseen in programming 
documents, but only in unforeseen and duly justified cases related to natural disaster, civil strife 
or crises (for example, Article 23 of the DCI regulation). 
 The DCI regulation is brief on the content of SPs, which are foreseen for individual 
countries, regions as well as for each of the five thematic programmes. Their purpose is to 
provide a coherent framework for cooperation between the EU and the target state or region, 
broadly defined, within the purpose and scope of the DCI regulation. They should cover no 
more than the period of validity of the DCI regulation, that is, from 2006 to 2013 and should be 
reviewed at mid-term or ad hoc if necessary. The DCI also lays down some general rules for the 
                                                     




adoption and implementation of SPs, such as that the principles of aid effectiveness have to be 
applied and are to be based on dialogue with the partner country and or region, including the 
level of civil society and regional and local authorities.1070 Given that no MIPs are foreseen for the 
thematic programmes, the SPs for thematic programmes require a more detailed content and 
shall not only generally set out the strategy for the theme concerned, but also the EU’s priorities, 
the international situation, and the activities of the partners.1071 The exact content of each Strategy 
Paper is outlined in the Common Framework for Country Strategy Papers of 2000 and 2006. 
MIPs for geographic programmes under the DCI, drawn up on the basis of the SPs, shall 
set out the priority areas selected for funding, the specific objectives, the expected results, 
performance indicators, and an indicative financial allocation, both overall and by priority area. 
They shall be reviewed where necessary, for example if SPs are amended.1072 AAPs, next to 
repeating objectives and other elements of the MIPs, also contain a description of the operations 
to be financed and the management procedures.1073 
The DCI regulation allows for a quick procedure to review the various programming 
documents in emergency situations, including where there are threats to democracy and human 
rights, which makes a quick adjustment possible.1074 
 
Procedures in the Adoption of Programming Documents 
Programming in the case of mainstream development programmes follows the same three broad 
stages as EIDHR programming.  
First, there is the stage of drawing up the first version of the draft SP. The leading role is 
here played by the Union Delegation in the respective target state, which has the main 
responsibility for drawing up the draft SP. It works in close cooperation with the geographically 
responsible unit in the Commission headquarters in Brussels, that is, before the most recent 
restructuring, with the relevant units in DG RELEX and DG Development, since the reform, 
with the responsible departments in the EEAS. Just like in the case of EIDHR programming, this 
first stage involves extensive consultations with a broad range of actors. First and foremost – and 
different from the EIDHR – the SPs are established in cooperation with the target state’s 
government. Each recipient state has a responsible administrative body and person, specifically 
created or appointed to act as a reference point for development and assistance issues. Such 
National Coordinating Unit or Point is often situated in the Ministry of Finance, Development, 
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or Foreign Affairs, with the relevant minister being the responsible individual. Delegations keep a 
regular dialogue with these national contact points, as they constitute the key link to the target 
state’s government. Secondly, efforts of donor coordination and aims of joint programming 
necessitate close cooperation with Member States as well as other major donors present in the 
target country. Interactions with these happen locally in Union Delegations, in regular or 
especially organized meetings, or in the headquarters in Brussels, via Member States experts 
working in the Commission. Thirdly, over the last decade there have been intensive efforts to 
involve civil society as well as public authorities at regional and local level in the programming 
process, in particular of local NGOs.1075 In some regions, in particular the ACP region, these 
efforts have been stronger and have also been regularly assessed. For example, during the 
programming process of the 10th EDF, of about 64 countries analyzed, 33 had consulted non-
state actors and local authorities in the drafting process, while 31 had only informed them of the 
events at a later stage in the process.1076 A final draft SP is then circulated among the various 
Commission units of different DGs and services that can give further inputs, like DG 
Development and Cooperation – Europeaid and DG Trade. It leads to the finalization of the 
draft document by the responsible unit in Brussels.  
The second stage consists of quality control by the iQSG. It is followed by the 
comitology procedure. Each assistance regulation establishes its own committee, without naming 
it specifically, and regulates its role in programming. As regards some of the applicable rules, 
reference is made to the Comitology decision of 1999, which foresaw the use of the management 
procedure in the case of all implementing acts with substantial budgetary implications, as in the 
case of assistance regulations.1077 As discussed above, in 2011 this procedure was replaced by a 
so-called examination procedure, which from then on also applied to existing legislation, except 
for procedures pending.1078 For the particular roles and powers of individual actors, reference 
shall be made to the discussion of the EIDHR. 
The European Parliament is involved through its right of scrutiny, which it has since the 
adoption of the new assistance regulations under the co-decision procedure in 2006 – a 
precondition for the right – taken very seriously.1079 Rather than just pointing to issues that the 
Parliament considers an overstepping of its implementing powers, it has usually resent draft SPs 
to the Commission with a large number of suggested amendments and called for the withdrawal 
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of SPs when, for example, a single focus area was chosen or a high share of the funds were 
reserved for few objectives.1080 
 After quality control, comitology and the involvement of the Parliament, amendments are 
made to the draft SP or it is finalized by the Delegations in agreement with the governments of 
the recipient states.  
 Finally, there is the decision on the Strategy Paper by the Commission. The SPs are, in 
principle, not signed as an agreement with the target state’s government. However, the MIPs 
should, if possible, be subject to an agreement with the country or region.1081 
 
d) Project Identification and Formulation (with a Financing Decision) 
 
Project identification refers to the process of identifying project or programme ideas that are 
consistent with the SPs, to assess their relevance and feasibility, and to prepare financing 
proposals. Formulation relates to the process of preparing more detailed project designs, 
including detailed decisions on management arrangements, financing plans, monitoring, etc. 
There are differences between different programmes and projects types, which should be 
neglected here.1082 
 
i. Project Identification under the EIDHR  
 
The currently two prevailing forms of project identification under the EIDHR are, primarily, 
‘calls for proposals’, in the case of which the Commission publicly asks a clearly defined group of 
actors to suggest, until a certain date, projects that fall within a more or less broadly defined 
thematic scope, and, secondarily, identification by the Commission or by a selected partner 
(targeted projects), in the case of which project ideas emerge and are further developed by the 
Commission or any third party. Until the late 1990s a third mode of project selection – the 
provision of grants upon spontaneous applications by NGOs – was also used, in particular in 
Latin America, Africa, and the Mediterranean states.1083 It was appreciated for its flexibility and 
increased interaction between Commission Delegations and applicants. However, for lack of 
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transparency it was first restricted by the Commission in 1998 and, eventually, legally excluded by 
the Financial Regulation of 2002.1084  
The Financial Regulation 2002 also rendered calls for proposals the primary form of 
project identification.1085 Formulation by the Commission or the choice of a project developed by 
a third actor without a call were legally made exceptional instruments, only allowed “in duly 
substantiated exceptional cases of urgency or where the characteristics of the beneficiary leave no 
other choice for a given action”.1086 The 2006 EIDHR regulation uses this exception for allowing 
the Commission to adopt the already introduced special measures in case of exceptional 
circumstances, usually referred to as an urgent measures, and to provide ad hoc grants to human 
rights defenders as urgent protection mechanism.1087 Further, the provision is relied on when 
contributions are made to projects or funds of UN agencies, which classify as unique actors. The 
underlying motivations for the restrictions on targeted projects were increasing critique of the 
lack of transparency surrounding the Commission’s choice of projects and partners, including by 
the Court of Auditors.1088 
 The advantages of calls for proposals include the use of expertise of key actors in the field 
to identify problems and to offer possibly new and innovative solutions and methods of 
implementation (‘demand-led approach’).1089 The Commission has pointed to several other 
positive features of the model, such as ensuring ownership, a crucial factor for aid effectiveness, 
that they give visibility to EU action and to the topic of democratization more generally,1090 that 
they involve competition that improves the quality of projects, and that they mobilize a broad 
range of actors for democratization.1091 They are also a cost-effective way of project identification 
and are therefore, to a certain extent, an administrative necessity. Last but not least, calls for 
proposals ensure higher transparency in the provision of EU funds.1092 The obvious disadvantage 
of calls for proposals is the EU’s dependence on proposals and the inability to guarantee the 
implementation of projects in clearly identified areas. The advantage of targeted projects is the 
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just mentioned disadvantage of calls, that is, the ability to (quickly) address problems identified as 
particularly important.  
 As mentioned above, the strong use of calls for proposals in the implementation of the 
EIDHR meant that (potential) aid recipients were given an important role in this process. Even if 
the EU, in cooperation with consulted actors, like civil society organizations, determines thematic 
focus areas and allocated funds and took the final decision on projects (based on a framework of 
quality criteria), its decisions were conditioned by the submitted proposals.  
 
ii. Project Identification under the Mainstream Development Programmes 
 
Project identification under the mainstream programmes is more diverse. First, an increasing part 
of the available budget is delivered via budget and sector support, which leaves it to the recipient 
state to formulate individual programmes and projects, while the EU only remains involved at a 
general level. Secondly, the Commission, in particular the Delegation present in a country in 
question, identifies a programme or project in cooperation with the government or the target 
state. Third actors, like international organizations such as the OSCE or UN, can at this stage 
already be involved and would at a later stage also be made responsible for the further 
formulation and implementation of a programme or project. Thirdly, once a project is identified, 
the Commission or, in the case of decentralized management, the target state, launches a call for 
tenders to identify an actor that, on the basis of a service contract, further formulates details of a 
project and implements it. Fourthly, mainstream development aid can also foresee programmes 
that are eventually implemented through calls for proposals, just like the EIDHR. At times, 
individual projects, if they are comprehensive, can involve various of the just outlined models of 
project formulation.1093 
 
e) Technical Implementation (i.e. implementation in a more limited sense) 
 
Once projects are formulated, the Commission takes a financing decision and signs a contract 
with the implementing organization or body. Chapter 6 will analyze several aspects of this stage 
of technical implementation of the EIDHR in some more detail, in particular, project types, 
project sizes, and partners in implementation. Due to the enormous number of projects under 
the mainstream programmes, the fact that many of these programmes are implemented by the 
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target states and not by the EU, and the lack of detailed information, a similar analysis cannot be 
provided for democracy assistance under the mainstream programmes. 
 
f) Evaluation & Audit 
 
The last stage in the project cycle is the process of evaluation, that is, a systematic and objective 
assessment of an ongoing or completed project, its design, implementation and results.1094 
Evaluation is a complex topic that cannot be discussed here in detail. The major assistance 
regulations, like DCI and ENPI, and the 2006 EIDHR regulation, explicitly foresee that the 
Commission ‘regularly’ evaluates the respective programmes, where appropriate by means of 
independent external evaluators.1095 The Council and the Parliament can suggest such evaluations 
to be carried out, which the Commission should take into account when deciding about its 
annual work-programme concerning which programmes and project should be evaluated during a 
particular year. Results should be communicated to the Parliament and the relevant committee 
established by the regulation. Importantly, the regulations also explicitly call for the results to 
“feed back into programme design and resource allocation”.1096 The Commission has set up a 
unit responsible for evaluations, that has developed its own approaches and methodologies, 
which it expects those who evaluate EU programmes to follow.1097 As indicated, as not each 
programme and project can be evaluated each year, the Commission makes a choice in an annual 
work-programme, decided by various Commissioners, in particular those responsible for 
Development and the ENP, and, formerly, for External Relations.1098 
 Of the numerous reports on evaluations, funded by the EU but carried out by external, 
independent experts and published by the Commission (DG Development and Cooperation – 
Europeaid), either on the general website of the evaluation unit or in the specific section on the 
EIDHR,1099 very few explicitly and exclusively focused on EU democracy assistance, in particular 
from evaluations carried out more recently. Those which did, are four evaluations carried out in 
the late 1990s: the evaluation of the Phare/Tacis Democracy Programme (1997),1100 the 
evaluation of the MEDA Democracy Programme (1999),1101 the evaluation of the EIDHR micro-
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project facility (2001)1102 and, at least in part, the evaluation of ‘Positive Actions financed by the 
EC in the fields of Human Rights and Democracy in ACP States’ 1995-1999 (2000).1103 Further, 
in the early 2000s, the Commission commissioned the production of a kind of review report on 
all previous evaluations that related to external human rights and democracy support.1104 Several 
other reports only touch upon the topic of democracy assistance. First, the Commission has, next 
to the just referred to evaluation of positive actions on human rights and democracy in ACP 
states also asked for at least one further broad evaluation of EU human rights assistance, 
published in 2011, which also to a larger or minor extent addresses programmes and projects in 
the sector of democratization.1105 Secondly, over the last years, several studies on the 
implementation of the EIDHR programme in individual countries and one region have been 
carried out, in particular in Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Angola, Sri Lanka, and the Andean 
Community, which to some extent cover democracy assistance projects. They do not, however, 
provide a detailed study thereof, as the focus is usually on individual human rights projects.1106 
Thirdly, some evaluations of individual, larger projects cover democratization-related assistance, 
like a study on a joint EU-Council of Europe project in Russia and Ukraine.1107 Finally, various 
broader evaluations of mainstream programmes, like ALA, Tacis, MEDA, and of thematic 
programmes, like Tacis-LIEN and of Budget line B7-6000 (Co-financing with NGOs), at times 
shed some light on the democracy elements of that assistance programme, but usually only to a 
very minor extent.  
 Overall, there is strong need for specific, country focused analysis of EU democracy 
assistance, like a study on EU democracy assistance in Russia, Ukraine, Egypt etc., covering 
assistance under the EIDHR and mainstream programmes. Additionally, the specific democracy 
components of the EIDHR should be the subject of a separate evaluation, just as other thematic 
features of the EIDHR have given rise to assessments on subjects like human rights, the ICC and 
torture, as well as each mainstream programme. 
 The Court of Auditors, which has the task to audit the EU’s financial affairs, including 
the external assistance programmes, has published various special reports on individual assistance 
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programmes or thematic issues (on the basis of Art. 287(4) TEU). Not infrequently, criticism in 
such reports has provided an additional push for changes, like in the case of the major RELEX 
reform in the early 2000s.1108 There are few reports specifically dealing with democracy or human 
rights assistance, with the major exception of Special Report No 12/2000 on this topic, and a 
report on an election observation and assistance mission.1109 However, there are several reports 
dealing with question of aid implementation, which are of relevance to democracy assistance.1110 





Chapter 5 has focused on the major steps in the policy cycle of EU democracy assistance, 
distinguishing between the stage of policy-making and policy-implementation. Its main aim has 
been to provide a general overview of the various steps taken from the inception of the idea of 
democracy assistance to the final evaluation of a project, to identify the most crucial acts adopted 
at each stage, to highlight the role and relative importance of EU institutions and other actors in 
the process, and to do discuss the underlying procedures used for the adoption of these acts. 
 As regards policy-making in democracy assistance, Chapter 5 has exposed that the field of 
EU democracy promotion and assistance is not a field dominated by new forms of governance 
that have become increasingly widespread over the last fifteen years, but a field in which policy-
making very much occurs according to the classic, although ‘refined’ Community or 
supranational method. This implies, at a basic, underlying level, that the adoption of secondary 
law and the acts of adopted secondary legislation constitute crucial elements in EU policy-
making. The EIDHR regulation and the various mainstream development regulations provide, 
although not regulating everything in detail, important basic principles and guidelines on the 
policy and its implementation. Further, and this is what the concept of ‘Community method’ 
more directly refers to, law is made by the three EU institutions, Commission, Council, and the 
European Parliament, according to the traditional powers attributed to them in Treaties: The 
Commission initiates legislation through a legislative proposal and the two legislative institutions; 
Council and Parliament adopt an act of secondary law according to the foreseen legislative 
procedure. 
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Features of the ‘refined’ character of the outlined Community method are, first, the 
increasingly strong involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process, which has, 
especially been achieved through the introduction legislative procedures that increase the powers 
of that directly elected institution. The Parliament has clearly used its powers to influence the 
structure and content of assistance regulations, in particular the 2006 EIDHR regulation. 
Secondly, while civil society has always played a strong role in implementation, it has over the last 
decade also been increasingly integrated in the policy making process, in particular, through its 
consultation on the legislative proposal for the EIDHR.  
Law-making is not, however, the only process in democracy assistance-related policy 
making. The three above-mentioned institutions also provide input into policy-definition through 
non-legally binding conclusions, reports, and resolutions that have continued to add basic 
principles and guidelines on the policy in an inter-active process. Indeed, throughout most of the 
1990s, these non-binding documents were the only papers outlining the policy, as the first 
EIDHR regulations were only adopted in 1999. Chapter 5 has shown that all three institutions 
have contributed a high number of policy-papers, either in response to the initiative of others or 
upon their own and have in this way contributed to the development of the policy. There have 
been periods when the Commission and the Parliament have dominated the field; more recently 
the Council has shown strong interest in tabling policy-initiatives, although mainly with a focus 
on inter-pillar issues and questions of coherence, rather than on defining the policy tool of 
democracy assistance in more detail. 
The second main part of Chapter 5 has addressed the various stages of implementation in 
EU democracy assistance. It has initially introduced the currently used three types of aid delivery 
– the project, macro (or budget), and sector approach – and mentioned that the EIDHR is, due 
to its very character basically exclusively implemented through the project approach and 
therefore through programmes and projects in the formulation and implementation of which the 
EU retains a crucial role. Assistance provided through mainstream programmes can also be 
provided via the other two approaches, which largely foresee a transfer of funds into the budget 
of the target state and in general involve a stronger role of the recipient government. However, 
detailed data on how much democracy assistance is channeled through budget and sector support 
is unknown. 
Further, in outlining the various standard stages of an EU project, Chapter 5 has mainly 
concentrated on the programming phase. It was defined as the process of developing, on the 
basis of secondary law and non-binding policy documents, a more concrete EU strategy or plan 
for assistance during a particular period of time that involves, in particular, the selection of more 




specific goal. Programming has been accorded more importance and has been developed since 
the early 2000s, when strong critique of the lack of aid effectiveness was, amongst others, related 
to lack of strategic programming. One central element in this reform was the introduction of 
standard models for the programming of geographical and thematic programmes and quality 
control. Given important differences, the EIDHR and the mainstream programmes were looked 
at separately.  
Since the early 2000s EIDHR programming involves the adoption of strategic 
documents. Initially these were called ‘Programming’ documents; since 2007 the EU works with 
Strategy Papers (SP) with a duration of 3-4 years and Annual Action Programme (AAPs). In 
practice, SPs also include a section on multiannual programming. The EIDHR SPs have been 
drafted with a global perspective and aim to provide a strategy for the implementation of the 
EIDHR programme rather than to provide a whole range of individual, targeted democracy and 
human rights strategies for all target countries. In other words, the SP presents a number of 
thematic objectives that should be implemented in all target states worldwide. Possibilities to 
adjust this global strategy to local circumstances are provided through, first, a relatively broad 
definition of focus in the case of Country Based Support Schemes (CBSS), EIDHR sub-
programmes that are implemented by the Union Delegations, and secondly, by allowing 
Delegations to make adjustments. The Commission has recently indirectly criticized the – in its 
own words – ‘one size fits all approach’ and intends to draft individual human rights strategies 
for all third states that should serve as guiding tools. Their relevance for democracy assistance 
and EIDHR programming remains to be seen. It should be stressed though that the 
programming process, although this might appear, so is no top-down process, but that the global 
focus areas are determined on the basis of input from below. 
The drafting of SPs and AAPs is steered by the Commission and belongs to one of its key 
executive tasks. It launches the process and takes the final decision on the document. In the 
Commission itself, several units and services are contacted to participate in the drafting process, 
including the Union Delegations in the target countries. The Commission is obliged, by the 
EIDHR regulation, to involve several other actors. Consultation meetings with European civil 
society are held in Brussels. Rather than having a major say on substantive issues, the 
participating civil society organizations appear to be mainly involved as a group of prospective 
recipients of assistance. Their input is predominantly on technical issues, which are important, 
but less so for strategic issues. Civil society in the target state has to be involved through the 





Coordination is sought with Member States aid programming through contacts with the 
Member States in Brussels and in the target states. Additionally, a management committee and – 
since the most recent reform of comitology in March 2011 – an examination committee ‘assists’ 
the Commission and has to give an opinion on the draft SP and AAP. The Council and now, the 
new appeals committee, can block a Commission SP or AAP. In practice, that basically never 
happens. The Parliament has, since the 2006 EIDHR regulation was adopted with the use of the 
co-decision procedure, a right of scrutiny, which allows it to communicate to the Commission 
when it considers the Commission exceeds its implementing powers. Since March 2011, the 
Council has the same right.  
Mainstream development programmes, basically all of which envisage democracy 
assistance, are transformed into more detailed stategies in Strategy Papers (SPs), Multiannual 
Indicative Programmes (MIPs), and Annual Action Programmes (AAPs). Overall, there are many 
similarities with programming the EIDHR. The most important difference is that the target 
country’s government has to be involved in the programming exercise and indeed, is the core 
partner of the Delegation in the elaboration of the SPs, MIPs and AAPs. Usually, MIPs result in 
an agreement between the EU and the focus country.  
Next to the programming process, Chapter 5 has briefly addressed the other major stages 
of implementation. It has briefly mentioned that EIDHR projects are predominantly formulated 
in calls for proposals and therefore allow the final recipients of grants a strong voice in the final 
distribution of funds among thematic priority areas. Mainstream development projects are 
formulated in more diverse ways. Finally, the chapter has briefly pointed to the lack of 









Chapter 6: Democracy Assistance under the EIDHR: An Analysis of the EU’s Specific 








Chapter 6 analyses the EIDHR, the EU’s specific programme for EU democracy and human 
rights assistance and aims at exposing several key features of the EU’s overall strategy of 
democracy assistance that derive from the EIDHR. The Chapter addresses four broad topics. It 
first provides a quantitative account of the EIDHR that gives insight into the development of 
financial commitments and expenditure since the inception of EU activities in the fields covered 
by the EIDHR. The second topic addresses the thematic distribution of EIDHR funds, which is 
the core question of any democracy assistance strategy. It presents in which of the various sub-
fields of EIDHR democracy assistance the EU has concentrated its efforts and thereby exposes 
the EU’s primary approach to democracy assistance, i.e. whether, following Thomas Carothers’ 
categories introduced in Chapter 2, it is rather a political or developmental approach. Thirdly, 
Chapter 6 analyses the geographical focus of the EIDHR, addressing the distribution of funds 
among major world regions and countries. A last set of questions focuses on three topics relating 
to the stage of implementation of the EIDHR programme: project identification, project types 
and implementing partners.  
The Chapter adopts a ‘macro’ view, analysing the EIDHR in a global perspective as 
programme implemented in a large number of countries and presenting globally valid guidelines, 
substantive contents, and distributions, rather than a ‘micro’ perspective focusing on individual 
countries. Such a macro view has limitations, as aggregate, global data does not necessarily reflect 
the exact EU strategies in individual states, which are the main target of democratization policy. 
Nevertheless, the global perspective is also legitimate, as the EU works with globally valid 
EIDHR principles and guidelines that are in the phase of implementation translated into the 
national context. At the same time, the global perspective constitutes by itself a relevant part of 
the overall jigsaw of EU democracy promotion through assistance.  
The scope of the analysis covers in part the entire EIDHR, in particular if data is only 
available for the entire programme, and in part EIDHR democracy assistance only, that is, that 




issue. As regards the frame of analysis, the Chapter attempts to be as comprehensive as possible 
and to cover the period since the start of democracy assistance and 2011. However, the absence 
of available data provided by the EU has in many sections restricted the analysis to shorter 
periods of time, in particular to the period 2000 to 2006. Finally, it should be noted that lack of 
comprehensive, accurate and transparent reporting by the Commission during some periods 
renders some analysis of this Chapter very difficult. Overall, the Commission has fallen short of 
its obligations on reporting foreseen in Articles 18 and 19 of the various EIDHR regulations, in 
particular since 2006, when the new EIDHR regulation stipulated more detailed criteria on the 
details of reports. 
 
II. An Analysis of the EIDHR 
 
1. A General Quantitative Account of the EIDHR 
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, it is possible to distinguish between two types of quantitative data on 
EU assistance. First, there is data on how much money the EU is willing to or plans to provide 
each year for democracy and human rights assistance. It is to some extent expressed in the so-
called ‘financial envelopes’ included in assistance regulations, which mention the overall amount 
available for a programme during the time of duration of the respective regulation, and, even 
more importantly, in the so-called ‘commitment appropriations’ entered into the annual EU 
budget. These commitment appropriations are legal pledges by the EU to provide a certain 
amount of funding for a programme or certain activities during a particular financial year.1111 
Secondly, there is quantitative data on how much the EU has in fact spent for democracy and 
human rights assistance during particular years, (ideally) documented in regular implementation 
reports and/or project lists. 
 Both types of data are legitimate representations of EU activities. The first constitutes an 
important political signal by the three major EU institutions, which together decide on the 
budget, of the relevance accorded to EU democracy assistance. The second is relevant because it 
shows what the EU has actually been doing. Commitment data is comprehensive, transparent 
and easily available, while expenditure data is, due to problems in reporting, difficult to obtain.  
In principle, the two sets of data on planned and actual expenditure should – in the long 
run – largely be identical, as all committed funds should eventually be spent. Exceptions apply to 
the small part of funds that are de-committed either because changed circumstances in third 
                                                     





states render the implementation of a project impossible, or because the disbursement appears 
for administrative reasons highly unlikely, like when delays in implementation have resulted in 
high amounts of non-disbursed funds that stretch back many budgetary years. Although detailed 
data on de-committed EIDHR funds has not been published systematically, it overall appears to 
be rather small. One known example was the de-commitment of about 24 million Euros of the 
1998 budget, intended for micro projects,1112 which were not contracted in time due to 
administrative problems.1113  
It is important to stress that comparisons between the data on EIDHR commitments and 
expenditure are problematic. As mentioned, the implementation of a particular budget does not 
entirely happen during the same budgetary year, but usually stretches over a longer period of time 
and differs from project to project and from year to year.1114 According to the Commission, 
between 1999, 2000 and 2001 it took on average 3.85, 4.09, and 4.52 years respectively, to pay 
committed funds under the EIDHR. In 2002 the average time was reduced to 2.54 years,1115 and 
the more recent ‘2003-2006 project list of EIDHR signed contracts’ implicitly suggests an even 
shorter delay of 1-2 years only, which is also due to new financial rules.1116 Overall, with 
awareness of the difficulties in comparing commitment and expenditure data and taking an 
average time of delay of 2-3 years into account, it appears that at least during the period 1990-
2004 the large majority of committed funds were actually disbursed.  
 
a) EU Budgetary Commitments for the EIDHR 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, any lawful EU expenditure requires, next to the usually needed 
authorizing basic act of secondary law, to be entered into the EU budget, adopted annually in a 
special legislative procedure. Accordingly, any amount foreseen for EU democracy and human 
rights assistance has from the beginning on – even before the adoption of basic acts in 1999 – 
                                                     
1112 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the implementation of the European 
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000, SEC(2001) 801, 22 May 2001, at 71-2; EIDHR Programming 
document for 2005 and 2006, Annex 1, at 34. 
1113 According to the then applicable 1977 Financial Regulation, they had to be contracted by the end of the 
following year at the very latest. 
1114 On delays and RALs (‘reste à liquider’), which refers to outstanding unpaid commitments, see: European 
Commission, Annual Report 2004 on the European Community’s development policy and external assistance, at 138 
and European Commission Annual report 2003 on the European Community’s development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance in 2002, at 218f. 
1115 European Commission, Annual report 2003 on the European Community’s development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance in 2002, at 218f.  
1116 The Financial Regulation of 2002 foresees that not used appropriations are not transferred into the next budget 
and that contracted funds have to be disbursed until the end of the following year. 2002 Financial R 




been included as ‘commitment appropriations’ in the annual EU budget.1117 The entry for the 
EIDHR is made in the budget’s section on Commission ‘Expenditure’, however, its exact 
position has changed several times over the last two decades. Most importantly, between 1996 
and 2003, the EIDHR had its own, famous Title B7-7, which was part of Section B7 on ‘External 
Actions’ and was subdivided into Chapters, Articles, and Items. Since a major budget 
restructuring in 2004, the appropriations for the EIDHR are in Chapter 19 04, which forms part 
of Title 19 (‘External relations’) of the Commission’s budget, and which is, as before, subdivided 
into Articles and, sometimes, into Items.  
 Table 10 provides the ‘commitment appropriations’ entered into the EU budget for the 
EIDHR and its forerunners for the period from 1978, when appropriations were first entered for 
human rights projects, and 2011. Importantly, it is therefore not only concerned with democracy 
assistance per se, but with all sectors covered by the mentioned programmes, in particular also 
what the EU considers human rights and conflict-related programmes/projects. It needs to be 
stressed that it is impossible to provide data on budget commitments for EIDHR democracy 
assistance only, as the EU budget has hardly ever explicitly distinguished between democracy and 
human rights assistance. Table A, included in the Appendix, contains a more elaborate version of 
Table 10 and lists the titles of the various programmes funded each year and their individual 
allocations. 
Table 10 shows the significant increase of EU activities in the field of democracy and 
human rights promotion since their beginning in the late 1970s. EU commitments increased 
from 200.000 Euros for the EC’s first human rights-related projects in 1978 to 157.7 million for 
human rights and democracy-related EIDHR projects in 2011. They more than tripled between 
1994, when the ‘European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights’ first appeared as budget 
Chapter with individual headings, and 2011, in total augmenting from 45 to 157.7 million Euros. 
According to the financial envelopes discussed in the next section, annual allocations of about 
158 million Euros can also be expected until 2013. All in all, the increase between 1978 and 2011 
was, as regards the individual budget-lines for specific programmes and as regards the overall 
annual commitments for the EIDHR, a rather constant one. Once a budget line was inserted into 
the budget it usually remained equal during certain periods, grew by 50% or even 100% during 
other periods, but only very exceptionally considerably decreased or was abolished. In those few 
cases where budget-lines were abolished, they were usually incorporated into broader, 
                                                     
1117 The budget also includes so-called ‘payment appropriations’, which stipulate how much is authorized in cash or 
bank transfers to beneficiaries in a particular budgetary year for the particular programme/project for which a 
commitment appropriation is entered. The two types of appropriations normally differ (and are therefore called 
‘differentiated appropriations’) because multi-annual programmes are usually committed in the year they are decided 




geographical lines, which did therefore not lead to major overall reductions in the budget.1118 All 
in all, during the period 1978 and 2009 the EU committed about 2.1 billion Euros for the 
EIDHR and its forerunner programmes.  
 
Table 10: EIDHR Commitments in the EU Budgets 1978-2011 (in million ECUs/Euros)1119 
Year 
 




1978 293 0.2 
1979 293 0.2 
1980 293 0.2 
1981 293 0.2 
1982 293 0.2 
1983 293 0.2 
1984 293 0.35 
1985 293 0.35 
1986 293; 992 2.35 
1987 303; 992 2.37 
1988 303; 992 3.9 
1989 303; 992 6.3 
1990 303; 992; 3021 21.8 
1991 A-3030; B7-5073; B7-5078; B7-5076 17 
1992 A-3030; B7-5073; B7-5078; B7-5076; B7-6000 32.3 
1993 A-3030; B7-5073; B7-5078; B7-5079; B7-5076; B7-6000 44.4 
1994 Chapter B7-52 45.1 
1995 Chapter B7-52 60 
1996 Title B7-7 84.8 
1997 Title B7-7 78.6 
1998 Title B7-7 97 
1999 Title B7-7 98 
2000 Title B7-7 95 
2001 Title B7-7 102 
2002 Title B7-7 104 
2003 Title B7-7 106 
2004 Chapter 19 04 125 
2005 Chapter 19 04 118.6 
2006 Chapter 19 04 127.7 
2007 Chapter 19 04 130 
2008 Chapter 19 04 137.1 
2009 Chapter 19 04 148.4 
2010  Chapter 19 04 154.2 
2011 Chapter 19 04 157.7 
Total  2101.52 
 
                                                     
1118 See the unification of budget lines for Latin America in the early 1990s, Table A in the Appendix.  
1119 Source: EU budgets 1978-2008, as published in the OJ. For a list of the OJs see Table A, published in the 
Appendix to this thesis. Inexplicably, some secondary sources, like the Annual Commission implementation reports 
on development policy and external assistance in part provide slightly diverging numbers, while stating that they take 
information from the same EU budget.  
In 2005 and 2007 appropriations were first entered into ‘reserves’ and only later transferred to Chapter 19 
04, as at the time of preparation of the budget the existence of a basic act was insecure due to the expiry of the then 





The most notable increases in EIDHR expenditure include the increase from 350.000 ECUs in 
1985 to 2.35 million ECUs in 1986, which was due to the start of the EU’s first democracy 
assistance programme in Chile. The second remarkable increase occurred in 1990, when the 
budget of the then existing three democracy and human rights budget lines (for ‘NGOs in Chile’, 
‘Democracy in Chile and Central America’, and ‘NGOs in human rights promotion’) more than 
tripled compared to 1989. This increase was triggered by the democratization processes in Latin 
America and by the starting discussions about external human rights and democratization policies 
more generally, that was itself caused by the changing development paradigm and the arrival of 
the third wave of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Following the crucial November 
1991 resolution on the EU’s external human rights and democratization policy, the budget for 
related programmes increased from 17 ECUs to 32.2 ECUs in 1992. In particular, a programme 
for ACPs and the Phare Democracy Programme were started and allocated 5 million Euros each. 
The increases in 1995 (from 45.1 to 60 million ECUs) and in 1996 (from 60 to 84.8 ECUs) 
resulted from resulted from a 100% increase of the allocations for the former Communist states 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Phare and Tacis democracy), as well 
as from the start of the MEDA Democracy Programme. It demonstrated an increased 
engagement in the membership-applicant states as well as the geographically closer (western) NIS 
and ended the exceptional position of the MEDA states, that had until then been excluded from 
democratization policies. Finally, there was a remarkable increase of about 18% in 2004, when 
125 million Euros were committed, which reflected a more general commitment to a continuing 
and enhanced engagement in the field. All in all, there were no major increases after the 
publication of the EU’s main policy papers in the field, like of COM(1995) 567 and COM(2001) 
252 final, which were mainly of relevance for substantive or procedural aspects concerning the 
EIDHR, but not its growth.  
 In 1991, 1997, 2000, and 2005 the budgetary allocations for democracy and human rights 
programmes slightly decreased. While for 2000 and 2005 the reasons for the decrease are unclear, 
in 1997 the decrease resulted from the cancellation of the 1996 budget line ‘Enforcement of 
sanctions in former Yugoslavia’, which was used to cover expenditure on technical and 
administrative assistance to enforce sanctions and indeed constituted a very exceptional, 
abnormal use of the ‘positive’ EIDHR programme to enforce a negative tool.1120 The decrease in 
1991 resulted from the reduction of funds of the NGO programme in Chile, which was caused 
by the creation of a new specific democracy programme for Chile and Central America.1121 
                                                     
1120 Table A in the Appendix and budgetary remarks to line B7-7002 of the 1996 budget.  




Overall, the mentioned decreases were minor though and were usually corrected in the 
subsequent budget, which included an allocation that was higher than the preceding one.  
 When the budgetary commitments for the EIDHR are compared with the EU’s overall 
commitments for external assistance (without the EDF budget, that is separate from the EU 
budget), which include, among others, commitments for the various general socio-economic 
assistance programmes, EU enlargement-related assistance, humanitarian aid and food aid, it 
becomes evident that the EIDHR receives a very small share of the overall amount.1122 Between 
2002 and 2007 the commitments for the EIDHR on average only constituted 1.5 % of the overall 
commitments for external assistance programmes managed by the Commission. For example, in 
2006 the overall budget of the Commission for the various external assistance programmes 
amounted to 8 500 million Euros, while the allocation for the EIDHR was 127.7 million Euros. 
By comparison, in the same year ‘macroeconomic assistance and the EBRD’ was allocated 92 
million Euros, food aid 428.7 million Euros, and humanitarian aid 645.5 million Euros. The 
various general geographical programmes received a much higher allocation, like 1177.6 million 
Euros for MEDA, 1209.23 million Euros for ALA, and 527.58 million Euros for the Tacis 
programme. It has to be stressed though, that some, although a minor part, of this money has 
been spent for democracy assistance (see Chapter 7). 
 
b) Financial Envelopes in the EIDHR Regulations 
 
As indicated, the various EIDHR regulations include ‘financial envelopes’, ‘financial reference 
amounts’, or ‘financial frameworks’ that indicate the envisaged total amount of funding for the 
entire duration of the programme.1123 Regulated in inter-institutional agreements, they are not 
binding law, but still create some form of obligation, from which the institutions are only 
permitted to depart in cases of “new, objective, long-term circumstances”.1124 Table 11 provides 
an overview of the financial reference amounts in the five EIDHR regulations adopted so far. 
A comparison of the reference amounts and the commitment allocations included in the 
budgets shows that during the periods 1999 to 2004 and 2005 to 2006 the EU committed more 
money for the EIDHR than it had initially foreseen. During the first period commitments were 
                                                     
1122 For the overall annual budgets for Commission-managed external assistance see the various Annual Reports on 
development policy and external assistance.  
1123 For example, 2006 EIDHR regulation, Art. 19. Financial envelopes were first envisaged in a joint declaration by 
the three legislative institutions and later regulated in interinstitutional agreements. See the Declaration by the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the incorporation of financial provisions into legislative 
acts; 1999 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline; 2006 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary 
discipline.  
1124 1999 Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline, at point 33; 2006 Interinstitutional Agreement on 




even 50% higher than envisaged, while during 2005 to 2006 they were still 16% higher. While 
such divergence is against the original intention of reference amounts, it is proof of a growing 
interest in the tool of democracy and human rights assistance in the period 1999 to 2006. 
 
Table 11: Financial Reference Amounts in the EIDHR Regulations (in million Euros)1125 
 
 
The following period 2007 to 2013 shows a different picture. The total financial envelope of 1104 
million Euros for the 2007-2013 period would have required an allocation of 158 million Euros 
in each annual budget. Table 10 shows that in 2011 this amount was (nearly) reached, however, 
that all annual allocations in the previous years were lower. It therefore strongly appears that 
during the 2007-2013 period the sum of annual allocations will not meet the total intended 
envelope. It does not mean thought that the EU’s interest in the instrument decreased, but rather 
the concern that the Commission did not have the administrative capacities to implement an 
every growing number of projects. As mentioned above, the failure to meet financial envelopes 
does not, however lead to legal consequences.  
 
c) EU Expenditure under the EIDHR 
 
i. Total EU Expenditure under the EIDHR 
 
Table 12 provides data on EU expenditure under the EIDHR and its forerunner programmes 
between 1992 and 2006. The compilation of the Table has been very difficult and, unfortunately, 
the product is not complete and has to be consulted with considerable caution. The reason is that 
the Commission, despite the publication of numerous documents, has largely failed to provide 
regular and comprehensive information on the exact amounts disbursed under the EIDHR 
during certain periods, together with an identification of the exact budgetary source from which 
the funds were taken, that is, the budget year. The smaller time frame of Table 12 than of Table 
                                                     
1125 Source: Articles 10, 11, or 19 of the relevant regulations. 
Regulations on the EIDHR  Financial envelopes 
 
Reg. 975/1999 (on developing countries, 1999-2004)) 260  
Reg. 976/1999 (non-developing countries, 1999-2004) 150 
Total EIDHR 1999-2004 410 
Reg. 975/1999 extended/amended by Reg. 2240/2004 (2005-2006) 134 
Reg. 976/1999 extended/amended by Reg. 2242/2004 (2005-2006) 78 
Total EIDHR 2005-2006 212 
Reg. 1889/2006 (2007-2013) 1104 




10 is due to lack of reports for the pre-1992 period and of insufficient reporting for the post-
2006 period. For the period 2007 to April 2009 the Commission has only published a total 
amount, which is not reproduced in Table 12, but just provided in the text. According to the 
Commission, about 1 % of all EIDHR projects are not being reported on in order to protect the 
recipients of funds.1126 
 After analysing numerous EU publications containing data on the EIDHR, the following 
documents have proven to be, for individual periods, either the only or the most complete 
sources and have been used to compile Table 12. For the period 1992 to 2000, data has been 
taken from four specific EIDHR implementation reports, published in November 1993 (covering 
1992 and 1993)1127, in July 2005 (covering 1994)1128, in November 2000 (covering 1996-1999)1129, 
and in May 2001 (covering 2000)1130, all of which provide data on overall EIDHR expenditure as 
well as breakdowns for different geographical regions and/or thematic areas. A similar report for 
the year 1995, published in January 19971131, only gives a descriptive account of EIDHR activities 
and lacks to provide complete financial data. As also no other reports, compendia, or lists of 
projects exist for that year, Table 12 cannot provide information for that particular period of 
time.1132 Data for the years 20011133 and 20021134 is taken from the Commission’s annual reports 
on the EC’s development policy and implementation of external assistance, which, although not 
specifically focusing on the EIDHR, devotes a small section to the EIDHR. Data for the period 
2003-2006 is taken from a Commission table of EIDHR contracts signed between 2003 and 
2006.1135  
                                                     
1126 Information from Commission official (October 2008). 
1127 Commission des Communautes Europèenne, Rapport sur l’utilisation des resources financière pour la defense 
des droits de l’homme et la promotion de la democratisation (pour les annèes 1992-1993), Bruxelles, le 26/11/1993. 
1128 COM(95) 191 final. 
1129 COM(2000) 726 final. 
1130 SEC(2001) 801. 
1131 COM(96) 672 final. 
1132 An alternative source for data could have been the Court of Auditor’s Special Report No 12/2000. Annex 2 of 
that report contains an overview of projects 1994-1998. Problematically, the data diverges for each year (!) from data 
provided in Commission reports, which renders their joint use impossible.  
1133 European Commission, Annual Report 2001 on the European Community’s development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance, Brussels, 2002, at 38-9. It should be mentioned that the Council’s European 
Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2002 lists projects implemented in 2001 amounting to 99 million, which 
inexplicably diverges from the Commission’s Annul Report 2001.  
1134 European Commission, Annual Report 2003 on the European Community’s development policy and the 
implementation of external assistance in 2002, Brussels, 2003, Financial Tables at 183f. This reports states that data is 
for ‘commitments’, however, the mentioned commitments are for individual, chosen projects rather than 
commitment appropriations in the budget. This justifies their use as data on expenditure.  
1135 European Commission, Excel-Eidhr-contracts-signed-2003-2006. A Commission official confirmed the tables 
contained a complete list of all contacts signed in a particular year. For simplification, the date of signature of the 




Data for the 2007-April 2009 period has been published in the EIDHR Compendium 
January 2007-April 2009.1136 
 




For the post-2006 period the Commission has not published data for individual years, but only 
for the longer period of January 2007 to April 2009. The respective Commission report, that is, 
the EIDHR Compendium 2007-April 2009, mentions the implementation of 502 projects for a 
total amount for funding of 194.2 million Euros. Problematically, the main part of the 
Compendium, which claims to report on these 502 projects, only describes 400-odd projects that 
amount to a total funding of about 121.7 million Euros. It is therefore slightly unclear how much 
the EU has (annually) spent for the EIDHR since 2006. 
Table 12 shows that, just as budgetary commitments grew from the early 1990s on, 
(obviously) also expenditure increased during the 1992-2006 period. While 26.7 million ECUs 
were spent in 1992, 146.8 million Euros were spent in 2006. In total, the EU spent about 1.1 
billion Euros during the period 1993 and 2006, excluding 1995.  
Overall, the annual expenditures developed much less gradually than the commitments. 
As mentioned, the main underlying reason for the fluctuating pattern of increases and decreases 
of EIDHR expenditure lies in implementation cycles, which are not always following annual 
                                                     
1136 The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) Compendium January 2007-April 2009: 
Promoting Democracy & Human Rights Worldwide (from now referred to as EIDHR Compendium January 2007-
April 2009). 
1137 Data source are the various reports just mentioned in the main text.  
Year Budget Chapter or Title Expenditure 
1992 A-3030; B7-5073; B7-5076; B7-5078; B7-6000 26.7 
1993 A-3030; B7-5073; B7-5076; B7-5078; B7-5079; B7-6000 29.8 
1994 Chapter B7-52 54.4 
1995 Chapter B7-52 - 
1996 Title B7-7 75.5 
1997 Title B7-7 76 
1998 Title B7-7 63.7 
1999 Title B7-7 93.7  
2000 Title B7-7 97.3  
2001 Title B7-7 107 
2002 Title B7-7 73.9 
2003 Title B7-7 135.3 
2004 Chapter 19 04 64.4 
2005 Chapter 19 04 147.7 








patterns. In some years there were fewer or more calls for proposals and, depending on the date 
of the call and the deadline for submission, fewer or more decisions on projects than in other 
years. Consequently, even if commitment appropriations are similar in certain years, the 
expenditure can be entirely different. For example, in 2002, 2003 and 2004, the budgetary 
allocations were, with 104, 106 and 125 million Euros respectively, relatively constant. At the 
same time, the expenditures in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 were with 73.9, 135.3, 64.4 and 147.7 
million Euros respectively, very diverse. The reason is that major EIDHR calls were only 
published in 2002, using parts of the 2002 and 2003 budgets, and in 2004, with contacts to be 
signed/grants disbursed in 2003 and 2005 respectively. Consequently the expenditures were 
higher in 2003 and 2005 and lower in 2004. The expenditure in 2004 consisted of expenditure for 
smaller EIDHR calls, which concerned specific topics, and micro and targeted projects.  
 
ii. EU Democracy Assistance under the EIDHR 
 
Unlike data on commitment appropriations, it is possible to provide data on EU expenditure for 
democracy assistance as different from all EIDHR assistance, at least from 1996 on. However, it 
is not possible to provide a single table tracing the annual evolution of expenditure for EU 
democracy assistance since then, as the Commission has not reported on each individual year. 
For the periods 2000 to 2006 and, 2007 to April 2009, data is only available for the entire 
periods.1138  
In the choice of which EIDHR funds constitute democracy assistance rather than other 
EIDHR assistance, this section overall follows the Commission’s own categorization, except 
where Commission reporting has been unclear or imprecise. In these cases, assistance in the 
following fields has been included: activities that relate to elections, free media and freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, civil society (in particular NGO) development, civic and 
political participation and pluralism, public institutions like local councils, parliaments, political 
society, the rule of law, in particular, the judicial sector, and public administration reform. The 
data also includes, where available, expenditure for election observation, which is not democracy 
assistance per se, but financed from the EIDHR and usually included in reports on the EIDHR.  
Reference should at this point be made to the conceptual overlap of democracy and 
human rights and the fact that, as will be seen further below, some (but by way not all!) projects 
in the sector human rights have also had a direct impact on democratization. Due to their 
                                                     
1138 The author is aware that the year 2000 is covered in both Tables. The reason is that the Statistics of activities 
2000-2006 are only available for the entire period, while a specific, quite comprehensive separate report is available 
for the year 2000. The author did not want to neglect this report, in particular also because the statistics 2000-2006 




primary objective or focus they were (and had to be) classified as human rights projects, just as 
many democracy assistance projects also had a direct impact on human rights but were (and had 
to be) classified as democracy assistance projects. On the whole, when consulting the following 
Table and information in the text, the reader needs to keep in mind that the overall amount of 
EIDHR projects that directly facilitated democratization was slightly bigger than represented.  
 
Table 13: EU Expenditure for Democracy Assistance under the EIDHR  
and its Forerunner Programmes 1996-2000 (in million Euros)1139 
 
Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Expenditure 29.2 29.6 25.1 34.6 48.1 166.6 
 
Although the time period covered in Table 13 is relatively short, it shows a constant growth of 
expenditure for EU democracy assistance under the EIDHR programme from 29.2 million 
Euros in 1996 to 48.1 million Euros in 2000. Only in 1995 did EU expenditure decrease slightly. 
In total, about 166.6 million Euros were spent during the entire period. The evolution 
corresponded largely to the overall evolution of EIDHR expenditure between 1996 and 2000. In 
other words, the share of EIDHR democracy assistance with respect to all EIDHR assistance 
remained, with about 45%, relatively constant in all years.  
 During the period 2000-2006 about 286 million Euros were spent for democracy 
assistance (including election observation). This constituted a share of about 39% of all EIDHR 
assistance spent during that time.1140 This shows that, while average annual expenditure for 
democracy assistance increased in relation to the previous period, its share of all EIDHR 
expenditure was overall slightly smaller than during 1996-2000.  
 Data for the subsequent period from January 2007 to April 2009 is problematic. As 
indicated, the Commission only reports in more detail on about 121.7 million Euros of funding, 
while mentioning that in total 194.2 million were spent. Of the 121.7 million Euros, about 23.3 
million Euros were spent for democracy assistance, which constitutes only 19% of the total 
EIDHR expenditure. These numbers do not include funding of election monitoring though, 
which has definitely retained a major share in EIDHR expenditure (– according to EIDHR 
programming documents up to 24% of all planned expenditure). All in all, data for the period 
January 2007 to April 2009 is therefore to be consulted with care.  
 
On the whole, the general quantitative account of the EIDHR has shown that the EU’s 
budgetary allocations to its democracy and human rights programmes strongly increased since the 
                                                     
1139 Source: COM(2000) 726 final and SEC(2001) 801. 




start of activities in the late 1970s. It rose steadily from 200.000 ECUs in 1978 to 157.7 million 
Euros in 2011, a level at which it can be expected to remain at least till 2013. At the same time, 
the EIDHR’s share of the EU’s budget for external assistance, including money for general 
socio-economic programmes and other specific lines, was, with about 1.5%, rather small.  
 Reflecting increased allocations in the EU budget, EU expenditure for democracy and 
human rights projects also increased between 1992 and 2006. While they amounted to only 26.7 
million in 1992, they had increased to 146.6 million in 2006. However, the lack of a regular 
pattern in the implementation of the EIDHR has led to considerable fluctuations in the annual 
expenditure under the EIDHR. EIDHR expenditure for democracy assistance developed in a 
similar way during the period 1996 to 2000 and overall increased from 29.2 million Euros in 1996 
to 48.1 million Euros in 2000. During the subsequent period, about 286 million Euros (including 
election observation) were spent for democracy assistance. Data for the post 2006 period is 
problematic and requires more detailed reporting by the Commission. All in all, between 1996 
and 2006, the share of EIDHR democracy assistance of the entire EIDHR ranged between 39% 
and 45%. According to an approximate calculation, the total amount of democracy assistance 
(including election observation) provided under the EIDHR constituted only about 0.7% of all 
external assistance.1141 
 
2. The Thematic Distribution of EIDHR Funds 
 
This section focuses on the thematic or sectoral distribution of EIDHR funds and aims to reveal 
how the available EIDHR funds were distributed among the numerous thematic issues covered 
by the programme and how funds spent for EIDHR democracy assistance were distributed 
among its various sub-themes. This substantive dimension is definitely one of the core elements 
of the question on the EU’s strategy, exposing its primary approach to democracy assistance as 
well as giving insights into the underlying conception of democracy. Analysis of the human rights 
section of the EIDHR is carried out in order to determine which parts of that element of the 
EIDHR were also of relevance for democracy assistance, for example, because they focused on 
democracy-related human rights. Lack of data has limited the analysis to the period 1996 to 2006 
and, with caution, to the period 2007 to April 2009.  
 The section first analyses the EIDHR regulations, the EU budget, as well as the various 
EIDHR programming documents that have been adopted since 2001 in order to see at which 
stage in the policy-making and implementation process which crucial decisions are taken that 
determine or at least influence the final distribution of EIDHR funds.  
                                                     




a) The Determination of the Thematic Distribution of the EIDHR  
 
i. The EIDHR Regulations 
 
The EIDHR regulations 1999 and 2006 give considerable attention to the topic of the thematic 
dimension of EIDHR assistance. Of particular relevance are Articles 1 and 2 of the EIDHR 
regulations, which define the outer limits of possible assistance, provide a quite comprehensive, 
but non-exhaustive list of possible fields of engagement, and, in particular since 2006, identify 
several primary, albeit partly broad, aims of EIDHR support. However, beyond this, the 
regulations do not in detail determine which specific fields should receive more or less attention 
at particular points of time or levels of democratization nor suggest any sequencing of aid.  
 Article 2 of the EIDHR regulations provide quite comprehensive lists of themes that are 
envisaged as areas of support for the EIDHR, which are presented in Tables 14 and 15 (see 
further below). As is visible in the Tables, the 1999 and 2006 regulations list three to four broader 
thematic sectors of EIDHR assistance and between three and ten specific sub-fields in each of 
these sectors. The three/four main themes of the EIDHR regulations are exhaustively 
enumerated and therefore determine the outer limits or circumscribe the borders of possible 
EIDHR assistance. The 1999 EIDHR regulations mention human rights, democratization, and 
conflict prevention as three main sectors of assistance. Slightly differently, the 2006 EIDHR 
regulation stipulates that EIDHR assistance shall focus on democratization, human rights, the 
international framework for their protection, and elections. The field of conflict has since 2007 
on been covered by the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Any assistance provided under the EIDHR 
has to fall within one of the three or four main sectors. For example, programmes or projects 
relating to general socio-economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, or food aid can therefore 
not be provided under the EIDHR. Importantly, the EIDHR regulations exclude the indirect 
approach to facilitating democratization through socio-economic assistance.  
Further, Tables 14 and 15 list a whole range of possible (sub-)fields of assistance under 
the EIDHR. They are not exhaustively enumerated, which implies that the Commission can 
therefore also finance activities that are not expressly mentioned. For example, the EU already 
before 2007 engaged in support for human rights defenders, even if this topic was not expressly 
mentioned in the 1999 regulations. Further, it is suggested here that support to political parties 
can also in principle be provided under the EIDHR, even if this is not expressly mentioned. 
Importantly, any non-expressly mentioned topic financed under the EIDHR has to remain within 
the scope of the broader sectors suggested by the expressly mentioned themes. For example, the 




that any new topic would also have to constitute assistance focused on the political system, 
including political actors, institutions, or processes. For example, socio-economic assistance 
would fall outside the possible scope, while aid to political parties would be included.  
 
Table 14: Summary of Provisions defining the Thematic Scope of EIDHR Assistance in the 1999 EIDHR 
Regulations (Article 2 of Regulations 975 and 976/1999, as amended by Regulations 2240 and 
2242/2004)1142 
 
1999 EIDHR Regulations (Article 2) 
Promoting and defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, proclaimed in the UDHR and other int. 
instruments, in particular 
- Promotion & protection of civil and political rights; 
- Promotion & protection of economic, social, and cultural rights; 
- Promotion & protection of rights of discriminated, poor, or disadvantaged; 
- minorities, ethnic groups, indigenous people; 
- support to bodies and institutions involved in human rights protection; 
- organizations providing help to torture victims; 
- education, training, consciousness-raising in area of human rights; 
- human rights monitoring; 
- equal opportunity and non-discrimination, incl. racism and xenophobia; 
- freedom of opinion, expression, conscience, language. 
Supporting democratization, in particular 
- rule of law, incl. independence of judiciary, human prison system, constitutional and legislative support, 
abolishment of death penalty; 
- separation of powers, support to institutional reform; 
- promotion of pluralism at political and civil society level, support to NGOs, independent media, free 
press, freedom of association and assembly; 
- good governance, administrative accountability and anti-corruption. 
- participation of people in decision-making at national, regional, and local level; equal participation of men 
and women in society; 
- election support, incl. election commissions, assist preparation of elections, measure to promote 
participation of specific groups in elections, training observers; 
- separate civilian and military functions, training civilian and military personnel in human rights; 




Conflict prevention and consequences of conflict, in particular 
- capacity building, incl. local early warning systems; 
- balancing opportunities and bridging dividing lines among different ethnic groups; 
- facilitating the peaceful conciliation of interests, incl. support for confidence building, to prevent conflicts 
and restore civil peace; 
- support to int., regional, and local organizations involved in conflict prevention or dealing with 
consequences of conflict, incl. support for int. criminal tribunals and ICI. 
 
  
                                                     
1142 Reg. 2240/2004 and Reg. 2242/2004 inserted Art. 2(2)(h) into the 1999 EIDHR regulations. The move was 
related to efforts supporting the establishment of democratic groupings in UN bodies, special agencies and regional 
organizations.  




Table 15: Summary of Provisions defining the Thematic Scope of EIDHR Assistance in the 2006 EIDHR 
Regulation (Article 2 of Regulation 1889/2006) 
 
2006 EIDHR Regulation (Article 2) 
Promoting participatory and representative, including parliamentary democracy, and the processes of 
democratization, mainly through civil society organizations, inter alia: 
- freedom of association, assembly, movement, opinion and expression, incl. artistic and cultural expression, 
independent media, access to information, fight censorship; 
- rule of law, incl. independence of judiciary, legal and institutional reform, access to justice; 
- support ICI, ad hoc int. criminal tribunals and processes of transitional justice and truth and reconciliation 
commissions, 
- effective and transparent democratic accountability and oversight, incl. that of security and justice sectors 
and against corruption, 
- political pluralism and democratic political representation, encouraging political participation by citizens, in 
particular marginalized groups, in democratic reform processes at local, regional and national level; 
- equal participation of men and women in social, economic, and political life, equality of opportunity and 
participation and political representation of women; 
- supporting measures to facilitate the peaceful conciliation of group interests, including support for 
confidence building measures relating to human rights and democratization. 
Promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, as proclaimed in the UDHR and other 
instruments, mainly through civil society organizations, inter alia: 
- abolition of the death penalty, prevention of torture, ill-treatment and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment, rehabilitation of torture victims; 
- human rights defenders (in terms of Art. 1 of the UN Declaration on human rights defenders); 
- fight against racism, xenophobia, discrimination based on sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation; 
- rights of indigenous people and rights of persons belonging to minorities and ethnic groups, 
- rights of women as proclaimed in CEDAW and its Optional Protocols, including measures to combat 
female genital mutilation, forced marriages, crimes of honour, trafficking, any other form of violence 
against women; 
- rights of the child, as proclaimed in the CRC and its Optional Protocol, including fight against child 
labour, child trafficking, child prostitution, and the recruitment and use of child soldiers; 
- rights of persons with disabilities, 
- promotion of core labour standards and corporate social responsibility, 
- education, training and monitoring in the area of human rights and democracy in area of peaceful 
conciliation of group interests, including support for confidence building measures relating to human 
rights and democratization; 
- support for local, regional, national or international civil society organizations involved in protection, 
promotion or defense of human rights and field of peaceful conciliation of group interests, including 
support for confidence building measures relating to human rights and democratization. 
Strengthening of the int. framework for the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law and promotion of 
democracy, in particular 
- support for int. and regional instruments concerning human rights, justice, the rule of law and democracy, 
- fostering cooperation of civil society with int. and regional intergovernmental organizations, support civil 
society activities aimed at promoting and monitoring the implementation of int. and regional instruments 
concerning human rights, justice, the rule of law and democracy; 
- promoting observance of int. humanitarian law. 
Building confidence in an enhancing the reliability and transparency of democratic electoral processes, in particular  
- European Election Observation Missions, 
- other measures of monitoring electoral processes, 
- developing electoral observation capacity of civil society organizations at regional and local level, 
supporting their initiatives to enhance participation in, and the follow-up to the electoral process, 
- supporting measures implementing European Union Election Observation Missions, in particular through 
civil society organizations.  
Mainstreaming clause 
- gender equality, right of the child, rights of indigenous people, rights the disabled, principles such as 
empowerment, participation, non-discrimination of vulnerable groups and accountability shall be taken 





Both the 1999 and 2006 regulations envisage a broad thematic scope. As regards human rights, 
the EIDHR regulations refer to the promotion and protection of civil, political, social, economic, 
and cultural rights, and therefore embrace a comprehensive conception that has been the EU’s 
preferred approach in external relations since the early 1990s and expressed, for example, in the 
28 November 1991 resolution of the Council and the Member States. As regards 
democratization, they envisage support as regards all core political and civil rights or essential 
elements of a democracy, that is, election-related rights, the freedom of association, assembly, 
and expression. In relation to the latter, they expressly mention the support to independent 
media. Further, they refer to the development of the rule of law, including the independence of 
the judiciary, legal and institutional reform, and access to justice. Several references relate to 
citizen participation in social and political life at local, regional and national level, either as 
individuals, especially of particularly discriminated groups, or in the framework of civil society. 
One of the two major (and complementary) innovations as regards democracy assistance in the 
2006 regulations is the more explicit reference to civil society as a key area of development and as 
agent of reforms in a broad range of sectors. Further, while the 1999 regulations also envisaged 
assistance in the sector of institutional reform and issues of good governance, these are no longer 
fields of engagement under the 2006 regulation, except for the justice sector and issues of 
transparency and democratic accountability and oversight. Parliaments can benefit, if support 
cannot be provided under other programmes. The EIDHR was therefore increasingly rendered a 
civil society-focused instrument, while institutional reform was shifted to the mainstream 
development programmes. Finally, both regulations envisage action as regards civilian control of 
the security sector, in particular the military, and as regards the equality of men and women in 
social, economic, and political life. 
The 1999 regulations only stipulated the outer scope of assistance and provided a list of 
possible fields of engagement, but did not further identify specific focus areas of reform. 
Differently, the 2006 regulation also identifies several more specific aims of the EIDHR that 
should receive primary attention. Article 1 of the 2006 regulation mentions support for civil 
society organizations as promoters of reform, support to human rights defenders and victims of 
repression and abuse, support to the international and regional framework of protection and the 
role of civil society therein, and election support, in particular election observation and local civil 
society involved in the process. Some of these more specific aims are of course considerably 
broadly defined (civil society development), while others are more specific (human rights 
defenders). In any case, they constitute a more precise guideline for the Commission on where 




the 2006 regulation, which, although in a non-binding way, limits expenditure for EU Election 
Observation missions: It should “not take up a disproportionate amount” of the available funds. 
 As regards the approach to democracy assistance, the EIDHR regulation does not 
express a clear preference for either the political or the developmental approach. There are clear 
features of both, that is, the focus on elections and on core civil rights and freedoms, which is 
characteristic of the first, as well as the focus on civil society organizations as agents of change, 
the promotion of citizen participation at local level, and on legal and institutional reform in the 
justice sector, which is characteristic of the second. Also the shift expressed in the text of the 
2006 EIDHR regulation does not indicate a clear move towards the first or the second approach. 
The removal of governance and institutional reform from the scope of the EIDHR indicates a 
preference for the political approach, while the increasing relevance attributed to civil society 
organizations and their role in local development and governance means a strengthening of the 
developmental approach. All in all, the EIDHR regulations therefore suggest pursuing a mixed 
approach.   
 On the whole, the EIDHR regulations shape the thematic distribution of EIDHR funds 
by defining the outer scope, providing possible fields, and since 2006 identifying primary fields of 
engagement. In substance, the regulation does not express a clear preference for the political or 
developmental approach to democracy assistance. However, they do not predetermine the exact 
distribution and also do not further foresee any hierarchy among the various enumerated themes 
and sub-sectors, any sequence in the concentration of assistance, or any preference for a focus at 
certain levels of democratic development.  
 
ii. The EU Budget 
 
The EU budget does not only provide the overall commitment appropriations for the entire 
EIDHR in a particular financial year but also to some, albeit usually limited extent determines the 
thematic and the geographical distribution of funds. The extent to which this has been done and 
how much the budget has allocated to which field has differed from year to year. Overall, before 
2001 geographic determinations were widespread, mainly due to allocations to geographically-
focused programmes, like Tacis Democracy.1144 Since 2002 the budget rather includes one broad 
thematic allocation for democracy and human rights, as well as, at times, specific smaller 
allocation for particular topics.  
                                                     
1144 The 2001 budget constituted the transition from mainly geographically-determined allocations to thematically-




 Since 2001, the major thematic allocations in the budget were the following: the 2001 
budget allocated the sectors human rights and democracy 35 million Euros each; the ICC was 
given individual allocations of 3-7 million Euros between 1997 and 2006; human rights defenders 
were allocated 7 million Euros in each budget between 2004 and 2006; the European Inter-
University Centre in Venice was allocated 1.7 million Euros in 2005 and 2006; and election 
monitoring was allocated 31 million Euros in 2008.  
Overall, while the budget contains some thematic allocations, as regards democracy 
assistance the budget’s role in the predetermination of sectors of support has been limited.  
 
iii. The Programming Stage 
 
Based on the EIDHR and the budget, the Commission addresses the question of the thematic 
distribution of EIDHR funds in the (globally-focused) EIDHR programming documents. As 
mentioned, since 2001 five of such documents have been developed and adopted by the 
Commission in a special procedure involving the various Commission units, the Delegations, 
European civil society, as well as the relevant Member States’ Committee (Human Rights and 
Democracy Committee/Democracy and Human Rights Committee). Most of the documents 
have also been updated and concretized in Updates or Annual Work Programmes. 
All documents are quite complex, have chosen different structures and terminologies in 
the presentation of thematic priority areas, and have differed on whether and to which extent 
they allocate financial amounts to these areas or not. Table 16 presents the main parts of the 
various programming documents as regards the selection of priority areas and financial 
allocations.  
 The selection of thematic priority areas has been one of the central elements of each of 
the five programming documents. As is visible from the extracts provided in Table 16, the 
Commission has over the last decade experimented with various structures and terminologies in 
presenting these priority areas and has changed the model of presentation with each new 
programming document except for the most recent one. The various changes were amongst 
others the result of critique by NGOs involved in the implementation of the EIDHR of lack of 
‘clarity and coherence’ in the thematic areas. In any case, due to the similarity of the EIDHR 
Strategy Paper 2011-2013 with its predecessor, the Commission now seems to be satisfied with 





Table 16: Thematic Priority Areas as Defined in the four EIDHR Programming Documents adopted 
since 2001 (in particular for democracy assistance) 
 
Programming Human Rights and Democracy – Exercise 2001 
12 ‘thematic priorities’ 
(A) The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (35 million Euros): 
(1) Education, training and awareness-raising in the area of human rights;  
(2) Racism, xenophobia, minorities, indigenous people;  
(3) Freedom of opinion, expression and conscience; 
(4) Rights of the child; 
(5) Death penalty. 
(B) Democracy and Governance (35 million Euros): 
(6) Rule of law, independence of the judiciary and humane prison system; 
(7) Political and civil society pluralism, strengthening institutions and NGOs, free media; 
(8) Good governance, supporting administrative accountability and anti-corruption; 
(9) Participation of people, in particular equal participation of men and women. 
(C) Conflict-related Issues (19 million Euros): 
(10) Preventing, resolving and dealing with the consequences of conflict. 
 
 (11) Election observation and assistance (5 million Euros); 
 (12) ICC and Int. Criminal Tribunals (3 million Euros).1145 
2002-2004 EIDHR Programming Document and Updates for 2003 and 2004 
4 ‘principal thematic areas of action’ and various sub-fields (mentioned amounts relate to the year 2002) 
(1) ‘support to strengthen democratization, good governance, and the rule of law’ (60 million Euros):  
 strengthening the capacity of civil society (12 million Euros), 
 human rights education and training (5 million Euros), 
 freedom of expression and independence of the media (5 million Euros), 
 actions concerning elections (15 million Euros), 
 the legal system and strengthening (judicial) institutions (11 million Euros), 
 governance (8 million Euros),  
 conflict prevention and resolution (4 million Euros); 
(2) ‘activities in support of the abolition of the death penalty’ (4 million Euros);  
(3) ‘support for the fight against torture and impunity and for international tribunals and the ICC’ (13 million Euros); 
and 
(4) ‘combating racism and xenophobia and discrimination against minorities and indigenous people’ (17 million 
Euros).  
 
EIDHR Programming for 2005 and 2006 and Annual Work Programmes  
4 ‘campaigns’ (mentioned amounts relate to the year 2005) 
Campaign 1: Promoting justice and the rule of law (11 million Euros); 
Campaign 2: Fostering a culture of human rights (38.5 million Euros); 
Campaign 3: Promoting the democratic process (44,63 million Euros of which 13 million Euros  
are for election observation); and 
Campaign 4: Advancing equality, tolerance, and peace (17.5 million Euros). 
 
Campaign 3 on democracy consisted of the following lots and priorities. 
Lot 1: Underpinning and developing the democratic electoral processes: 
Priority 1: Civic & voter education/voter information programmes; 
Priority 2: Capacity building and specific technical assistance for local observers’ organisations and regional 
organizations; 
Priority 3: Capacity building and technical assistance for media and media monitoring programmes; 
Priority 4: Promoting political pluralism; 
Priority 5: Training of legal/judicial professionals and parliamentarians; 
Lot 2:  Strengthening the basis for civil society dialogue and democratic discourse: freedom of association: 
Priority 1: Alignment of national legal regimes and practices with internationally recognised standards and 
principles in the area of freedom of association; 
Priority 2: Promote awareness raising regarding the contribution of freedom of association to the 
democratic process; 
                                                     




Priority 3: Capacity building and technical assistance for media and media monitoring programmes; 
Lot 3: Strengthening the basis for civil society dialogue and democratic discourse: freedom of expression: 
Priority 1: Promotion of adequate media legislation 
Priority 2: Foster legitimate unimpeded access to internet.  
‘Strategy Paper’ for 2007-2010 and Annual Action Programmes 
5 principal objectives (mentioned amounts relate to the year 2007) 
Objective 1:Enhancing respect for human rights/fundamental freedoms in countries/regions where they are most at 
risk (14 million Euros); 
Objective 2: Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in peaceful 
conciliation, and in political participation and representation (45 million Euros); 
Objective 3: Supporting actions concerning EU Human Rights Guidelines (19 million Euros); 
Objective 4: Supporting the international and regional framework for human rights/justice/rule of law/democracy 
(16.3 million Euros); 
Objective 5: Election observation and assistance (35.1 million Euros). 
Objective 2 envisaged action in four areas of activity:  
(1) the pursuit of common agendas for human rights/democratic reform by civil society; 
(2) building of consensus on disputed or controversial areas of policy by civil society;  
(3) enhancing political representation and participation; and  
(4) enhancing the inclusiveness and pluralism of civil society. 
‘Strategy Paper’ for 2011-2013 and Annual Action Programmes 
5 principal objectives (mentioned amounts relate to the year 2011) 
Objective 1:Enhancing respect for human rights/fundamental freedoms in countries/regions where they are most at 
risk (15.7 million Euros); 
Objective 2: Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, in peaceful 
conciliation, and in political participation and representation (55.1 million Euros); 
Objective 3: Supporting actions concerning EU Human Rights Guidelines (approx. 29.3 million Euros); 
Objective 4: Supporting the international and regional framework for human rights/justice/rule of law/democracy 
(15.8 million Euros); 
Objective 5: Election observation and assistance (36.4 million Euros). 
Objective 2 envisaged action in four areas of activity:  
(1) the pursuit of common agendas for human rights/democratic reform by civil society; 
(2) building of consensus on disputed or controversial areas of policy by civil society;  
(3) enhancing political representation and participation;  
(4) enhancing the inclusiveness and pluralism of civil society; 
(5) promoting issues covered by human rights dialogues at local level.  
 
Each of the programming documents has identified several broader EIDHR priority areas or 
objectives, of which one or two usually related to democratization rather than one of the other 
fields covered by the EIDHR (human rights, etc.). The various broader priority areas did in part 
represent the broader thematic sectors of the EIDHR regulation, but in part also considerably 
departed from the structure and text of the EIDHR regulation. Importantly as regards the 
predetermination of the distribution of EIDHR funds, the programming documents allocated 
specific amounts of money to each of the several broader priority areas or objectives. For 
example, in 2005 Campaign 1 on ‘Promoting Justice and the Rule of Law’ was allocated 11 
million Euros and Campaign 3 on ‘Promoting the democratic process’ was allocated 44,63 
million Euros of which 13 million Euros was reserved for election observation. 
In addition to the selection of broader priority areas, the programming documents have 
identified several more specific sub-fields for each broader priority area or objective. Until 2006, 
these sub-fields were usually specific thematic fields, like civic and voter education or adequate 




like the building of consensus on disputed areas of policy or the pursuit of common agendas for 
democratic reform, which can itself concern a whole range of themes. In any case, this selection 
of sub-fields constitutes a form of prioritization, that is, of the EIDHR programming documents 
limiting the scope of EIDHR activities during a certain period of time. For example, from 2002 
on election observation and election assistance received increasing attention, while judicial reform 
and institutional reform were no longer identified as priority. However, besides the identification 
of specific sub-themes, the programming documents did overall hardly allocate specific sums to 
these more specific priority areas and therefore not entirely predetermine the distribution of 
funds. The major exception in this respect was in 2002, when, driven by the desire to be strategic 
and to strongly predetermine EU actions, the Commission attempted to allocate specific amounts 
also to individual sub-areas. The exercise failed in the implementation stage, when calls for 
proposals did not produce enough projects to spend all envisaged funds in particular sub-fields. 
Already in 2003 the exercise was not repeated.1146 
On the whole, the programming documents play a role as regards the final distribution of 
EIDHR funds, however, only as regards the determination of how much the sector 
democratization receives in total as well as regards the selection of priority areas. They do not, 
however, specify how much each sub-sector receives. Beyond these determinations and 
prioritizations, the final distribution of EIDHR funds among the various sub-fields is only 
decided when the financing decision is taken. Obviously, the EU can further influence the final 
distribution when taken this decision. However, its decisions are conditioned by the pool of 
available applications for projects and the demand of recipients therefore plays a considerable 
role in the final sectoral distribution of EIDHR funds.  
 
b) The Thematic Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure 
 
The focus now shifts to the actual thematic distribution of EIDHR expenditure. It presents how, 
based on the EIDHR regulations, the budget, the programming exercises, the submission of 
project proposals, and the financing decisions, EIDHR funds were distributed among the various 
sub-sectors covered by the programme. While the presented data expresses preferences and a 
hierarchy among the various fields, it cannot provide insights into any sequencing of different 
types of assistance.  
Due to limitations of data, the two sections focus on the period 1996 to 2006 or, albeit 
with awareness of the limitation of data for that period, on 2007 to April 2009. Separate tables 
are provided for different periods in order to allow comparisons between them and to trace 
                                                     




evolutions.1147 The section first looks at the entire EIDHR and then at EIDHR democracy 
assistance alone.  
The problems and difficulties in the selection of sub-categories have been pointed out in 
Chapter 1. The following Tables largely follow Commission reports. However, as the 
Commission has continuously changed its categorizations or used the same denominator for a 
different scope of projects, some changes were made and, in particular, some sub-categories were 
introduced in some of the Tables in order to render them more comparable. For example, while 
the Commission Statistics of activities 2000-2006 only refer to the category of (democratic) 
governance, Tables 17 and 18 mention individual sub-categories thereof, which have been 
extracted from a separate project compendium for the same period, that is, the EIDHR Project 
compendium 2000-2006 by theme.1148 Unfortunately, as different Commission reports on the 
same time-spans do often not report same expenditures, there are at times some divergences in 
the presented data.1149 
 
i. The Thematic Distribution of the Entire EIDHR Expenditure 
 
Tables 17 and 18 present the thematic distribution of EIDHR expenditure for the periods 1996 
to 2000 and 2000 to 2006 in million Euros and in % of total expenditure.  
 Although it is difficult to clearly differentiate between human rights and democracy as 
there are conceptual overlaps and as projects can and do fall into both categories, the relative 
shares of each of the main fields of the EIDHR have nevertheless been pointed out in the 
Tables. These show that human rights assistance (as classified by the Commission) has always 
received a slightly larger share than democratization-related assistance (including election 
observation, which is actually a different form of democracy promotion than assistance, but has 
increasingly been financed through the EIDHR). While the field of human rights received 47% 
of all EIDHR funds in the 1996-2000 period, its share increased to 53% in the subsequent 
period. As indicated, no reliable comprehensive data is available for the post-2006 period, which  
makes it difficult to see whether this trend has continued. An analysis of the 400-odd projects 
 
 
                                                     
1147 The author is aware that the year 2000 is covered in both Tables. See explanation above, footnote no. 1098. 
1148 European Commission, EuropeAid: EIDHR European Initiative for Democracy & Human Rights 2000-2006, 
Ambitious in scope... ...Global in reach: More than € 731 Million in EIDHR Funding Supporting more than 2400 
Projects in more than 140 Countries (from now on referred to as EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by 
theme).  
1149 Statistics on activities 2000-2006; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme; Compendium by location 




Table 17: EIDHR Thematic Distribution of Expenditure 1996 to 2000 (in million Euros and %)1150 
 
Sector/sub-sector Expenditure in million 
Euros 
% of total expenditure 
Human Rights   
Human rights education and public awareness 59.7 16% 
Victims of Torture 33.6 9% 
Children 16.9 5% 
Equal opportunities and non-discrimination 13.3 4% 
Women 13 4% 
Human rights monitoring 12.4 3% 
Public bodies and the defence of human rights 8.9 2% 
Indigenous people 5.9 2% 
National minorities 5.2 1% 
Refugees and Displaced Persons 4.9 1% 
Sub-total 173.8 47% 
Democratization   
Civil society and civic participation 54.4 15% 
Rule of Law 45.7 12% 
Media/freedom of expression/journalists 30.4 8% 
Election Support 20.6 6% 
Parliaments 6.7 2% 
Transparency/anti-corruption 6.6 2% 
Civil-military relations 2.2 <1% 
Sub-total 166.6 45% 
Conflict resolution 16.3 4% 
International Justice 14.6 4% 
Total 371.3 100% 
 
Table 18: EIDHR Thematic Distribution of Expenditure 2000 to 2006 (in million Euros and %)1151  
 
Sector/sub-sector Expenditure in million 
Euros 
% of total expenditure 
Human Rights   
Promoting human rights 143.8 20% 
Torture 75.5 10% 
Women 42.3 6% 
Racism, xenophobia, discrimination 28.6 4% 
Children 28.4 4% 
Rights of indigenous peoples 24.2 3% 
Abolition of death penalty 11.9 2% 
Minorities and ethnic groups 8.7 1% 
Human rights dialogues 5.8 <1% 
Trafficking of human beings 4.9 <1% 
Persons with disabilities 4.4 <1% 
Human rights protection mechanisms 3.4 <1% 
Human rights defenders 2.1 <1% 
Total 384 54% 
Democratization   
Election observation 101.2 14% 
Civil society/civic participation 85.7 10% 
Rule of law, justice, penal system 46.3 6% 
Media/freedom of expression 27 4% 
Election assistance 14 2% 
Public institutions 12.5 2% 
Anti-corruption 8.2 1% 
Total 294.9 39% 
Conflict Resolution/Peaceful conciliation 21.5 3% 
International criminal justice 31.8 4% 
Total 732.2 100% 
 
                                                     
1150 Data extracted from COM (2000)726 final and SEC (2001)801. 




described in the 2007-April 2009 EIDHR Compendium suggests that it does.1152 
 The various sub-categories of the sector human rights should briefly be looked at, in 
particular, to see whether and to what extent they also benefit democratization. The major sub-
category of human rights to be supported during both periods was the field of ‘human rights 
education and awareness raising’ and ‘promoting human rights’.1153 This preference was to some 
extent the result of UN calls for a strong engagement in the field.1154 Projects implemented 
overall aimed at increasing the general and specialized knowledge about human rights among 
NGOs, specific target groups (teachers, minority groups, etc.), state bodies (police, military, etc.), 
and largely consisted of training activities and the production and distribution of information on 
human rights.1155 The Commission did not report on the relative focus among the various kinds 
of human rights covered by the programme, but reports show that the focus was either a very 
general one, focusing on international human rights instruments, or on specific civil, political, or 
social rights, or on specific target groups.1156 To some extent the projects were therefore 
facilitating democratization, just as projects in the democracy assistance sector did. There is 
evidence that social rights were hardly promoted.1157  
 A considerably high share of 9-10% of the expenditure was used during both periods for 
the very specific focus group of ‘torture victims’, in the form of such things as rehabilitation 
centres. This has a long tradition in the EU.1158 Most of the remaining funds were spent for 
specific focus groups, most notably women and children, which in both periods received between 
4% and 6% of the funding. Projects benefiting women either concerned gender-based violence 
issues or the role of women in public, in particular, political life, which, again, has relevance for 
democratization.1159 Other specific groups benefiting, usually with slightly smaller shares (between 
1% and 4%), were indigenous people, ethnic and other minorities, refugees and internally 
displaced persons, the disabled, and from the early 2000s on, also human rights defenders.1160 
This latter category also overlaps with democracy assistance, as human rights defenders are 
frequently important figures in local pro-democracy movements. Most of these groups benefited 
                                                     
1152 Of 400-odd projects about 85% pertained to the human rights sector, while only about 19% were used for 
democracy assistance projects. As these numbers to not take election observation into account, the real share of the 
democratization sector was therefore surely larger.  
1153 The category ‘promoting human rights’ was, next to several others, included the field ‘human rights education 
and awareness raising’. 
1154 COM(2000) 726 final, at 22, referring to the U.N. General Assembly’s establishment of the ‘Decade for Human 
Rights Education’ in 1994.  
1155 COM(2000) 726 final, at 22-5; SEC(2001) 801, at 24-7, EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 
189-316. 
1156 Ibid. 
1157 EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 286-7.  
1158 COM(2000) 726 final, at 53; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 431-64. 
1159 EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 470-535.  




also from projects in the overlapping categories ‘equal opportunities and non-discrimination’ 
(1996-2000) and ‘racism, xenophobia, discrimination’ (2000-2006).1161 Other projects foresaw 
public awareness raising campaigns of the various groups’ rights, targeted information and 
education for the concerned groups, the establishment and capacity development of relevant 
NGOs, and training programmes for experts in the field, like lawyers.1162 One specific right, the 
right to life, was addressed in projects against the death penalty (2% of all funds during 2000 and 
2006).  
 Next to the target group- and rights-focused, attention was also given to different kinds 
of human rights (protection) instruments, in particular monitoring and human rights dialogues 
(each between less than 1% and 3%). It assisted international NGOs and UN agencies carrying 
out monitoring, which the EU would use as a basis for policy decisions.1163 Projects in the sector 
‘human rights dialogues’, foreseen in the EIDHR Programming document for 2005-2006, mainly 
supported the EU-China dialogue via academic seminars and a special network on the topic.1164 
Finally, the EIDHR supported specific institutions active in the promotion and protection of 
human rights (‘public bodies and the defence of human rights’, ‘human rights protection 
mechanisms’, less than 1% to 2% of the shares). Projects mainly focused on national or regional 
ombudsman offices, national commissions for human rights, human rights ministries, and human 
rights documentation centres and foresaw training, institutional and logistical support, and the 
organization of conferences.1165 
 Next to the broad sector human rights, the sector ‘conflict resolution/peaceful 
reconciliation’ received 4% and 3% of EIDHR funds during the respective periods, with projects 
financing campaigns, discussions and public opinion polls on peace and conflict resolution, 
dialogues and mediation efforts, but also the social and economic reintegration of refugees, 
displaced persons, and returnees.1166 It had featured as an important future theme in COM(95) 
567 on the EU’s external human rights policy, and became a core topic in the 1999 EIDHR 
regulations.1167 The 2006 regulation attributes it minor importance, as the Instrument for Stability 
(IfS) now mainly covers the topic. 
 Finally, the sector ‘international criminal justice’ received about 4% of all EIDHR funds 
between 1996 and 2006 with the funds mainly being used for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and the various ad hoc tribunals (ICTY, ICTR).  
                                                     
1161 COM(2000) 726 final, at 25; SEC(2001) 801, at 27. 
1162 COM(2000) 726 final, at 44 and 48; SEC(2001) 801, at 44f and 49; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by 
theme, at 30-53.  
1163 COM(2000) 726 final, at 36; SEC(2001) 801, at 37.  
1164 EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 144-8.  
1165 COM(2000) 726 final, at 17-8; SEC(2001) 801, at 18. 
1166 COM(2000) 726 final, at 30; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 164-86. 




 All in all, the most important insight of the overview of EIDHR projects in other fields 
than democratization was that democratization has also directly (not just indirectly) benefited 
from various human rights projects, which were, due to their primary focus, classified as the 
latter. Although a distinction can (and should) be made for analysis, the overlap has to be born in 
mind.  
 
ii. The Thematic Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure for Democracy Assistance1168 
 
Tables 19, 20, and 21 present the thematic distribution of EIDHR expenditure in the sector 
‘democratization’ for the periods 1996 to 2000, 2000 to 2006, and 2007 to April 2009 in million 
Euros and in % of all democracy assistance provided during the respective period. While some of 
the data has already been provided in Tables 17 and 18, Tables 19, 20, and 21 are more detailed 
and, in particular, include more sub-categories of democratization-focused aid. Importantly, 
Table 21 does not include data for election observation and can therefore not easily be compared 
to Tables 19 and 20, in particular, as regards the shares of the individual sub-fields.  
 Tables 19 and 20 show that election observation – as indicated, a different form of 
democracy promotion than assistance but (since the early 2000s exclusively) financed through the 
EIDHR – received an increasingly large share of the available EIDHR funds. While during 1996-
2000 only about 3% of all EIDHR funds were used for election monitoring as many missions 
were then also financed under the CFSP budget, during 2000-2006 its share increased to 
approximately 14%. Its share of all democratization-related assistance increased from about 6% 
to 39%. Most funds were spent for EU EOMs proper, some amounts for the training of EU 
observers, and some for the production of the ‘Handbook for European Union Election 
Observation Missions’ by SIDA, which provides a basic source of information for participants in 
the EU EOMs.1169 Although no expenditure data on election observation is available for the post-
2006 period, it appears that the share of election observation has further increased since 2007. 
The EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010 foresaw an indicative amount of 131.1 million Euros for 
election observation during 2007-2010, which is about 23.7% of all envisaged funds for that 
period. The Commission also mentioned in the same document that it would ensure that 
expenditure for EU EOMs would normally not exceed 25% of all expenditure, or, in duly 
justified cases, not more than 30%, recalling recital 22 of the 2006 EIDHR regulations.1170 The  
 
                                                     
1168 Similar Tables as those provided in this section and the analysis, devised and carried out by the author, have been 
published in OPPD, Getting Acquainted: Setting the Stage for Democracy Assistance, at 48f.  
1169 COM(2000) 726 final, at 8f; SEC(2001) 801, at 9f.  




Table 19: Thematic Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure for Democracy Assistance 1996-2000, including 
Election Observation (in million Euros and in % of total democracy assistance)1171 
 









% of total 
democracy 
assistance 
Civil society and civic participation (in particular NGOs)1172  54.4 33% 
Rule of law  45.7 28% 
 Legal reform, independent judiciary 30.6  18% 
 Access to justice (legal assistance) 6.3  4% 
 Magistrates, lawyers, court, prison staff 3.2  2% 
 Humane prison system 2.9  2% 
 Military, police, security forces 2.7  2% 
Media/freedom of expression/journalists  30.4 18% 
Election support  20.6 12% 
 Election assistance 10.31173  6% 
 Election observation 10.31174  6% 
Parliaments  6.7 4% 
Transparency/anti-corruption  6.6 4% 
Civil-military relations (subordination of armed forces to civil 
authorities)  
2.2 1% 
Total  166.6 100% 
 
Table 20: Thematic Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure for Democracy Assistance 2000-2006 including 
Election Observation (in million Euros and % of total democracy assistance)1175 
 









% of total 
democracy 
assistance 
Election Support  115.2 39% 
 Election observation 101.2  34% 
 Election assistance 14  5% 
Civil society and civic participation (in particular NGOs)  85.7 29% 
 Strengthening civil society (in particular NGOs) 56  19% 
 Civic participation/political participation 23.2  8% 
 Equal participation in civil and political life 6.4  2% 
Rule of Law  46.3 16% 
 Access to justice 20.3  7% 
 Constitutional and legislative reform 8.5  3% 
 Humane prison system 4.5  2% 
 Independence of the judiciary 0.6  0.2% 
 Not specified 12.4  4% 
Media/Freedom of Expression  27 9% 
 Media 14  5% 
 Freedom of Expression 13  4% 
Public institutions other than parliaments (local councils, trade 
unions, etc.)  11.8 
4% 
Transparency/Anti-corruption  8.2 3% 
Parliaments  0.7 0.2% 
Total  294.9 100% 
                                                     
1171 Source: COM(2000) 726 final and SEC(2001) 801. 
1172 No sub-categories are provided in Commission reports.  
1173 Due to lack of data, this is an approximation suggested by COM(2000) 726 final and the EU budget.  
1174 Ibid. 




Table 21: Thematic Distribution of 105-odd EIDHR Democracy Assistance Projects 2007-April 2009, 
excluding Election Observation(!) (in million Euros and % of total Democracy Assistance)1176 
 







% of total 
democracy 
assistance 
Civil society and civic participation (in particular NGOs)  11.1 48% 
 Strengthening civil society (in particular NGOs) 7.2  31% 
 Civic participation/political participation 2.4  10% 
 Equal participation in civil and political life 1.5  7% 
Media/Freedom of Expression  4.7 20% 
 Media 1.1  5% 
 Freedom of Expression 3.6  15% 
Rule of Law  4.5 19% 
 Access to justice 3.3  14% 
 Constitutional and legislative reform 0.7  3% 
 Humane prison system 0.3  1% 
 Independence of the judiciary 0.2  1% 
Election assistance  1.6 7% 
Transparency/Anti-corruption  0.9 4% 
Parliaments  0.3 1% 
Public institutions other than parliaments (local councils, trade 
unions, etc.)  0.2 
1% 
 
EIDHR Strategy Paper 2011-2013 foresees about 22.4% of the funds for election monitoring and 
therefore remains more or less around the same level as during the previous programming 
period.1177 
A share of about 23% for election monitoring also means though – considering that 
during 1996-2006 about 43% of EIDHR funds are used for democracy assistance including 
election observation – only about 20% of all EIDHR funds remained for democracy assistance. 
Tables 17 and 18 showed that the growing share of election observation of EIDHR funds during 
1996 and 2006 (or even 2009) happened at the expense of democracy assistance. While the shares 
of human rights projects, international justice, and conflict resolution remained equal or even 
increased during that period, the share of democratization became smaller. At the same time, the 
share of election observation increased, while the individual shares of different forms of 
democracy assistance decreased.  
The second type of election support, election assistance, only received about 2-3% of all 
EIDHR funds during 1996-2006 and also rather little funding (1.6 million Euros) in the most 
recent period, January 2007-April 2009. Its share of all EIDHR democracy support was about 5-
7%. Projects focused mainly on public awareness-raising campaigns about elections and electoral 
participation, on targeted civic and voter education for groups like women and young people, on 
                                                     
1176 Source: EIDHR Compendium January 2007-April 2009. Of approximately 400 EIDHR projects mentioned in 
the compendium, about 105 were primarily focusing on democracy assistance.  




the strengthening of local monitoring capacities, on the development of research methods to 
measure the role of media during elections, on media training on election reporting, and support 
to electoral commissions and the provision of equipment (in particular in Iraq).1178 The 
Commission’s indication to invest more in election assistance from 2000 on in order to 
complement election observation therefore mainly led to an increase in election-focused activities 
under general cooperation programmes rather than under the EIDHR.1179 It should also be noted 
though, that also some projects from other categories, like on women, have election assistance 
elements.1180 
 A major share of EIDHR funds was always provided to the sector civil society and civic 
and political participation. It received about 15% of all EIDHR funds during 1996-2000 and 
(albeit with increased actual funding) 12% during 2000-2006. Of the 105-odd EIDHR democracy 
assistance projects mentioned in the 2007-April 2009 report, nearly half belonged to the sector. 
Its share of all EIDHR democracy support was 33% and 29% during the two periods 1996-2000 
and 2000 to 2006. As indicated, its reduction in share was mostly due to the growing share of 
election observation. However, given the even stronger focus on civil society in the 2006 EIDHR 
regulation, the field can be expected to remain a major field of engagement. Most projects – 
approximately 70% – were used for strengthening civil society organizations through capacity 
development, like increasing their professionalism in advocacy and in the management of 
projects. The focus was in particular on NGOs, frequently on human rights- and political rights-
focused NGOs, but also on community-based voluntary organizations engaged in service delivery 
and community development. A second group of projects concentrated on the promotion of 
civic and political participation, in particular at the local level. It comprised projects that increased 
the awareness of the concept of civic and political participation among specific groups, like 
women and young people, increased the participation of NGOs in local governance, and trained 
community leaders, including such in public functions, on the possibilities of involving civil 
society and citizens in local governance. Finally, there were numerous specific projects promoting 
the equal participation of men and women in civil and political life, a category that overlapped 
with at least two others of the human rights dimension (women, non-discrimination).1181 
 Rule of law received 12% of all EIDHR assistance between 1996 and 2000. Its share 
dropped considerably in the subsequent period (to 6%), as did its expenditures in absolute 
amounts. Its share of all democracy support decreased from 28% to 16%. This development was 
                                                     
1178 COM(2000) 726 final, at 8f; SEC(2001) 801, at 9f; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 86-95. 
1179 COM(2000) 191 final. 
1180 Additionally to the reported amounts, about 1 million Euros were spent for election-related assistance through 
projects reported on in other categories.  




part of a shift of institutionally-focused assistance to the general assistance programmes for 
individual regions, that began in the early 2000s. Rule of law projects focused mainly on access to 
justice issues, which included the training of judges and lawyers, support to providers of legal 
assistance and to advocacy groups, capacity development of NGOs, information and education 
campaigns for citizens and disadvantaged groups, like rural populations and the poor.1182 A 
second major rule of law sector was support for constitutional and legislative reform, frequently 
in the penal law area, but also on other issues. For example, the EIDHR supported, channeled 
through UNDP, the Constitutional Committee of Iraq in its elaboration of a new constitution 
(with 5 million Euros). Other projects supported NGOs advocating for reforms or lawyers who 
were drafting new laws, funded training programmes and campaigns for the ratification and 
implementation of international human rights conventions, or supported institution building of 
courts, penitentiary institutions, ministries of justice, and general prosecutors, as well as trained 
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors.1183 Other projects aimed at establishing a humane prison system 
through support for prison staff, monitoring activities, and capacity development for NGOs. 
Tables 20 and 21, which provide more detailed data on the independence of the judiciary than 
Table 19, show that few projects directly concerned with the independence of the judiciary, 
which was, for example, promoted through the development of judicial transparency.1184 This 
indicates that the EU overall rather adopted a more developmental, bottom-up approach to rule 
of law development via access to justice projects rather than a more direct focus on the 
independence of the judiciary.  
 The sector media/freedom of expression received about 8% of all available EIDHR 
funds during 1996-2000. Its share and also average annual expenditure in total amounts decreased 
quite considerably in the subsequent period, 2000-2006, when it only received about 4% of all 
funds. Its share of EIDHR democracy support decreased from 18% to 9% between the first and 
the second period in question. The strong decrease is surprising, also given that the media 
featured in all programming documents from 2001-2006. In more recent years, the share appears 
to have increased again though. Projects mainly focused on the development of an independent 
press and broadcasting media, the professionalization of the media, the improvement of media 
relations with state and regional authorities, and support for and the capacity development of 
NGOs working in the sector of freedom of expression. Projects included training programmes 
for journalists on general professional topics and specific issues, like reporting on elections and 
conflicts, the establishment of journalists’ institutes and networks, and media monitoring.1185  
                                                     
1182 EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 362-74, 397 and 383.  
1183 Ibid, at 350-3, 381.  
1184 COM(2000) 726 final, at 14; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme, at 361. 




The Commission reports on several other smaller categories of support. The so-called 
sector on ‘public institutions’, which relates mainly to local councils, local administrations, offices 
for the administration of justice, but also included projects on NGOs, trade unions, and citizens 
more generally, in order to increase their capacity for participation in (local) governance. The 
sector received about 2% of EIDHR funds and 4% of EIDHR democracy funds during 2000-
2006.1186  
Until 2000, the Commission expressly targeted civil-military relations, which received a 
minor share of less than 1% of all EIDHR expenditure. It mainly consisted of projects 
subordinating armed forces to civilian control, promoting good civil-military relations, and 
projects promoting human rights within the military.1187 While it was neglected during the 2000-
2006 period, the 2007-2010 EIDHR Strategy Paper again mentioned the topic expressly, 
although as topic for NGO engagement.  
Projects on transparency and anti-corruption also received about 1-2% of all EIDHR 
funding or 3-4% of all EIDHR democracy assistance during the period 1996-2006. They mainly 
targeted the local level and concentrated on reforming communal self-administration through the 
training of local officials, the introduction of more transparent procedures, and greater openness 
towards civil society organizations and citizens. Fewer projects targeted national institutions.1188 
 Finally, from 1996 to 2000 the EIDHR funded several projects concerning parliaments, 
which in total amounted to 6.7 million Euros or 2% of all funds (4% of all EIDHR democracy 
assistance). Such projects decreased strongly in the subsequent period, when only about 0,7 
million Euros or 0.2% of all EIDHR funds were used for projects on parliaments. Also the 2007-
2009 EIDHR report mentions only two projects in the field. Overall, projects in the sector 
provided training to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff on basic issues of parliamentary 
democracy, law-making procedures, the role of international human rights law in national law, 
forms of cooperation with civil society, and the management of information with the help of IT.  
 All in all, applying Thomas Carother’s division between the political and developmental 
approach to democracy assistance, EIDHR implementation has in the period between 1996 and 
2006 (or even 2009) shown features of both, as is suggested by the text of the EIDHR 
regulations. Its primary focus has, in particular since 2000, been on election support, which 
constitutes a key feature of the political approach. Of course, the EIDHR has rather spent funds 
for election observation – which is not democracy assistance per se – and only to a much more 
limited extent invested in election assistance (34% and 5%, respectively, of all EIDHR 
                                                     
1186 Ibid, at 130-4.  
1187 Ibid, at 34.  




democratization-related assistance during 2000-2006). The focus, however, still constitutes a form 
of politically-focused engagement. Secondly, many EIDHR projects in the sector civil society and 
civic participation, which was during all analyzed periods a major sector of engagement (around 
31% of all EIDHR democratization-related assistance during 1996-2006), supported NGOs 
working on political rights and pursuing advocacy functions. Thirdly, the sector media and 
freedom of expression constituted a further main focus area, albeit with decreasing shares during 
2000-2006. Finally, some projects in the sector rule of law explicitly focused on developing the 
independence of the judiciary. The shift of institutional assistance and rule of law development to 
the mainstream assistance programmes in the early-mid 2000s, further supported the EIDHR’s 
political approach. All in all, while a concentration on the mentioned topics is characteristic of 
the political approach, the case of the EIDHR nevertheless constitutes a rather moderate form 
thereof. The main reason for this is that it neglects work with political parties and engagement 
with political leaders more generally, in particular with the political opposition, and only to a 
limited extent focused on parliaments and civil military relations.  
At the same time, the thematic distribution of EIDHR assistance has also shown clear 
features of the developmental approach. The main indication of this approach is the strong focus 
on civil society, which is, even more since the 2006 EIDHR regulation, considered as a major 
agent in democratic reforms. The underlying idea is to support a broad range of civil society 
organizations in various fields, which should gradually move on the democratization process 
from below. Obviously, this focus also involves engagement with a broader range of NGOs than 
political rights groups, in particular also to NGOs and community-based organizations engaged 
in community development and service delivery rather than advocacy. Further, numerous 
EIDHR projects have focused on local governance issues rather than at the national level, trying 
to facilitate the strengthening of democratic procedures at the level of local government through 
the encouragement of citizen participation, the development of local civil society organizations, 
as well as the form of local public bodies. Finally, the majority of rule of law projects did not 
focus on judicial independence, but on broader developmental issues in the justice sector, like 
access to justice programmes focusing on the underprivileged, and reforms in the penal law 
sector. All in all, the EIDHR cannot, therefore, easily be allocated to the political or 
developmental approach to democracy assistance, but contains elements of both approaches.  
 
3) The Geographical Distribution of EIDHR Funds 
 
This section analyses how EIDHR funds were distributed among the major world regions and 




on the period 1996 to 2006, the discussion of the distribution among different countries of one 
region is, due to lack of data, limited to the period 2000 to 2006 and, moreover, due to lack of 
space, only looks at countries of four selected world-regions. The analysis first shows to what 
extent and how the EU planned the geographical distribution of funds, and to what extent it gave 
room to the demand-led approach and let recipients influence the final distribution. In the choice 
of world regions, the section in general follows the Commission’s own categorisation, which in 
most documents, albeit not always, differentiates between seven major world-regions.  
 
a) The Determination of the Geographical Distribution of EIDHR Funds 
 
i. The EIDHR Regulations 
 
Neither the 1999 EIDHR regulations nor the currently applicable 2006 regulation address the 
geographical distribution of funds, but have left this decision to the budget and/or programming 
stage.  
 
ii. The EU Budget 
 
As indicated, until 2001 the annual EU budget was highly relevant in the regional distribution of 
funds. It allocated specific amounts to individual regions, mainly via allocations to geographically-
focused forerunner programmes of the EIDHR. For example, the annual budget 1999 stipulated 
that Tacis states would receive 10 million Euros and ACP states would get 17 million Euros.1189 
The only exception concerned those very few budget lines that were not geographically but 
thematically focussed, like the programme for ‘NGOs pursuing human rights activities’, for 
which the budget did not identify a geographical focus with specific allocations. Since 2002 the 
budget only mentions a broad and several smaller thematically-focused appropriations. The 
reorganization was part of the process of strengthening the EIDHR programming phase, during 
which all crucial decisions should be taken.  
 Different from the regional allocation of funds, the budget very seldom included country-
specific allocations or explicitly mentioned that certain sums of a regional allocation should be 
used in a particular country. The separate lines for Nigeria (B7-7022 in 1998 and 1999) and 
Turkey (B7-5241 in 1994) during some years, or occasional budgetary remarks that a particular 
amount should be spent for a particular activity in a particular state, usually inserted by the 
Parliament, were highly exceptional.  
                                                     




iii. The Programming Stage 
 
It has already been stipulated that since 2002, the pre-determination of regional and country-
specific allocations happens during the programming phase. Over the last decade, the 
Commission has experimented with several different models of predetermination.  
 The 2002-2004 EIDHR Programming document and its annual updates allocated specific 
sums to individual regions, just as the budget had done, and retained some allocations for global 
projects, for which no detailed regional allocations were made. At the same time, as part of the 
overall effort of rendering the EIDHR more ‘strategic’ and ‘prioritised’, the Commission also 
tried to exercise strong control over the distribution of funds among states.1190 It concentrated 
about 60-70% of the EIDHR budget in about 32 pre-selected ‘focus’ countries, that were 
allocated specific amounts for targeted, micro, and macro projects.1191 The approach proved to be 
unfeasible when in almost half of the countries the allocated funds could not be spent due to a 
lack of project proposals that met quality and administrative standards.1192 Comprehensive 
predetermination was incompatible with the project selection mode of global calls for proposals.  
 During 2005 and 2006 the EIDHR Programming exercise only stipulated which regions 
and countries (so-called ‘designated countries’) were eligible to benefit under the various 
individual thematic campaigns of the EIDHR and foresaw minimum numbers of regions and 
countries that should benefit under each campaign.1193 While the EU ensured a certain spread of 
funds among different regions, no specific allocations were made and the level of financial 
predetermination was small. An exception applied to the micro-project scheme, for which 
individual countries were of course identified a priori. While the approach with eligible countries 
had been the result of negative experiences with a too specific predetermination practised in the 
previous period, it was abandoned because of its complexity.  
 A further implication of the approaches pursued during the period 2002-2004 and 2005-
2006 was the strong limitation as regards the number of countries that could at all or to a more 
than minor degree benefit from the EIDHR. Both, the selection of focus states and of designated 
countries considerably reduced the scope of potential beneficiary states. For example, during 
2005-2006 only 31 states could benefit from macro projects under the democracy campaign 
(Campaign 3). Given the character and specificity of the EIDHR, such limitation was 
inacceptable.  
                                                     
1190 The idea of focus states was first outlined in COM(2001) 252 final, at 15. The concurrently drafted 2001 
Programming Exercise used the term ‘focus countries’, but did neither suggest such, nor restrict funds to them. 
SEC(2001) 891. 
1191 See EIDHR Programming Document 2002-2004, at 17.  
1192 EIDHR Programming document for 2005 and 2006, at 12. 




 The approach pursued since 2007 resembles the simpler pre-2002 approach, while also 
containing elements of the others. The EIDHR Strategy Papers allocate specific amounts to 
individual regions for specific EIDHR ‘objectives’, that is, thematic priorities identified in the 
programming document. Further, specific countries are allocated exact amounts of money for the 
CBSS. At the same time, there are numerous global calls for proposals, for which no specific 
regional or country-focused allocation is foreseen and which are open to all states. However, as 
regards these global calls, the programming documents foresee that a regional balance should be 
ensured in the allocation of funds. 
 All in all, due to different models used during the last decade it is difficult to make general 
arguments on the extent to which the regional and country-specific allocation of EIDHR funds 
was predetermined during the programming phase. It seems though, taking into account the 
various project types and systems, that overall this predetermination was made for about half of 
the available EIDHR funds. For the remaining part, the final distribution of funds among 
countries was determined with the decision on which projects would be financed, which 
dependent strongly on the submitted proposals, that is, the demand of applicants. 
 In those cases where the EU chose regions and countries, the decisive criteria for the 
selection were, according to the Commission, the political importance of countries, to be derived 
from EU policies and documents, in particular CFSP documents, and the extent to which 
substantive work in the field of democratization and human rights promotion was already carried 
out through other EU programmes or by other donors, which would be complemented by the 
EIDHR. The Commission mentioned also the aim to ensure some ‘geographical balance’, 
without, however, clarifying what exactly this implied.1194 Further, the Commission declared a 
preference for states with a ‘favourable situation’ with regards to democracy and human rights 
assistance, that is, some governmental commitment to reform and/or enough freedom for 
NGOs to carry out projects. This criteria excluded EIDHR assistance in highly authoritarian 
states, but otherwise does not does not indicate any preferences for concentrating assistance at 
different stages of the democratization process. The situation changed with the programming 
document for 2007-2010, where about 10% of all EIDHR funds were reserved for projects in 
countries where human rights and freedoms were ‘most at risk’. Planned projects in those 
countries rather pertained, however, to the human rights sector than to democratization.1195 
 
 
                                                     
1194 EIDHR Programming Document 2002-2004, at 16 and 23.  




b) The Regional Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure 1996-2006 
 
Tables 22 to 25 present the regional distribution of all EIDHR expenditure over three periods, 
1996-1999, 2000, 2000-2006, which allows the evolutions to be traces, as well as during the entire 
period 1996-2006.1196 Table 26 presents the average share of each state in each region during 
1996-2006. Due to lack of (aggregate) data, no Table can be provided on how EIDHR 
democracy assistance was spent in the various world regions. 
 





ACP LA MEDA Global Asia 
% of total 
EIDHR 
35% 21% 17% 14% 12% 1% 
 
Table 23: Regional Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure in 2000 (in %)1198 
 
Region ACP CEEC, 
SEE, 
NIS 
LA Global MEDA Asia 
% of total 
EIDHR 
24% 24% 19% 12% 11% 10% 
 





LA MEDA Asia Global NIS 
% of total 
EIDHR 














7% 6% 4% 1% <1% 
 
Table 25: Regional Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure between 1996-2006 (in %)1200 
 
Region ACP LA MEDA Global NIS CEE Asia SEE Others 
% of total 
EIDHR 
24% 18% 12% 12% 10% 9% 8% 6% 1% 
 
  
                                                     
1196 The regional distribution of budgetary allocations (until 2001) is visible in Table A, included in the Appendix to 
this thesis.  
1197 COM(2000) 726 final. 
1198 SEC(2001) 801. 
1199 Statistics of activities 2000-2006. 




Table 26: Average Share of all EIDHR Funds of Each State in the main Regions  
between 1996-2006 (in %)1201 
 
Region MEDA SEE LA CEEC NIS Asia ACP 
Average 
share in%  1.36% 1.12% 1% 0.93% 0.80% 0.40% 0.30% 
 
Overall, the ACP region was the region that during the entire period 1996-2006 received most 
and also an increasing share of all EIDHR funds (24%). However, despite the high share as 
region, each individual ACP state on average received the smallest share of all states, which 
considerably changes the picture. 
 Latin America was the area in which EU democracy assistance began in the mid 
1980s/early 1990s and which remained the major recipient of funds until 1996. During 1996-
2006 it received a quite remarkable and stable share of 18% of the available EIDHR funds, 
indicating a continuing interest in the region. At the same time, the average share of each state in 
Latin America was also considerably high.  
 The Mediterranean states received about 12% of all EIDHR funds during the 1996-2006 
period.1202 The share in the early years of this period was with 14% remarkably high, considering 
that the specific democracy programme for the region, MEDA Democracy, was only established 
in 1996.1203 Further, the MEDA region is the region with the highest average share of EIDHR 
funds per country, which is also about 20% higher than the region with the second largest share 
(the SEE states) and more than four times higher than an ACP state received on average. Overall, 
the MEDA states are therefore major EIDHR recipients. 
 Although the Commission did not publish separate data on EIDHR expenditure for the 
former Communist states during 1996 and 2000, based on budgetary allocations it appears that 
during 1996-2006 the NIS region was the fourth largest recipient of EIDHR funds (10%). 
Overall, however, its annual shares decreased considerably between 1996 and 2006.1204  Average 
shares of individual countries of the region were smaller than in most other regions, except for 
Asian states and the ACP countries. Data on the NIS also point to the unbalanced distribution of 
funds among countries of a single region, as the Central Asian region only received 1% of 
                                                     
1201 The Table shows the average share of EIDHR funds received by each state in each region. For example, one 
ACP state on average received 0.3% of all EIDHR funds, while one MEDA state on average receive 1.36% of all 
EIDHR funds disbursed during 1996 and 2006. Importantly, average shares are in most cases of course not identical 
and most likely not even approximately close to actual shares of individual states, however, they allow determining 
the extent to which the EU took the number of countries covered by one region into account when distributing 
funds among regions.  
1202 For an overview of democracy assistance to the Mediterranean, in particular through the EIDHR, see D. Huber, 
‘Democracy Assistance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparison of US and EU Policies’, 13 Mediterranean 
Politics 1 (2008), at 43. 
1203 See the allocation of 9 million in the EU budget 1996, compared to 0 in 1995. See Table A in the Appendix for 
comparisons with evolutions of other lines.  




EIDHR funds between 2000 and 2006, while the western NIS and the Caucasian states received 
7% (a topic addressed in more detail in the next section).  
 The group of CEECs received about 9 % of the EIDHR expenditure disbursed between 
1996 and 2006.1205 Its share as a group considerably decreased during the entire period (from 
about 14% in 1996-1999 to 4% in 2000-2006),1206 not least because of the EU membership of 
most CEECs in 2004. This reduction also has to be kept in mind when considering that each 
CEEC on average only received 0.93% of all EIDHR funds. The share of each CEE was higher 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s than later.  
 SEE countries only accounted for about 6 % of all EIDHR fund disbursed during 1996 
and 2006; however, due to limited number of countries in that region, each state received about 
1.12 % of all EIDHR funds and therefore a considerably large share of EIDHR funds (only 
superseded by the MEDA states). 
 Asia was the last region to benefit from a specific democracy programme in 1998. Unlike 
the case of MEDA, the EU started the Asian programme with lower annual budgetary allocations 
that were only gradually increased in the following years. Therefore, as shown in Table 22, 
between 1996 and 1999 only about 1% of the funds were spent in Asia, while its share in 2000 
and 2000-2006 was already 10% and 12% respectively. The increase was made possible by the 
reduction of the shares of the MEDA states, the NIS and CEECs. Overall, between 1996 and 
2006 Asia received about 7.6% of all EIDHR funds and a very minor share if one takes the 
number of countries in the region into account. 
 About 1% of the funds was spent in other countries, including the EU and the US. 
Projects in the EU did not aim at improving the human rights and democratic situation in 
European states1207 but were only carried out in European states while benefiting people from 
third states, mostly torture victims.1208 Projects in North America concerned the campaign against 
the death penalty in the US.1209 Finally, between 1996 and 2006 a relatively stable percentage of 
12% of the EIDHR funds were spent for global projects, which were implemented in more than 
one region.  
 The distribution of EIDHR funds during 1996 and 2006 shows that the EU intended to 
devote a non-negligible portion of the EIDHR funds to each geographical area and therefore to 
ensure a visible presence worldwide. However, the distribution is far from providing equal shares 
                                                     
1205 The numbers were calculated on the basis of an approximate percentage of 4% for the CEEC in the 2000-2006 
period.  
1206 Data based on budgetary allocations and project compendia.  
1207 An exception was a grant to the Council of Europe for the European Social Charter. EIDHR Project 
compendium 2000-2006 by location. 





to regions, neither in terms of overall funds, nor if the number of states in the regions is taken 
into account, nor in terms of a combination of both.  
 The most salient feature of the pattern of distribution is that the EU – if taking the 
number of countries per region into account – favoured countries that were geographically closer 
to the EU and (therefore) politically more relevant, in particular the MEDA states, the SEE 
countries, and the CEECs. In other words, the EU invested more efforts into establishing 
democracies and increasing human rights protection in states at its land and sea borders and, 
obviously, in future member states than in countries farther away and/or having no prospect of 
EU membership. This pattern is also visible in the post-2006 period, with the EIDHR 
programming documents foreseeing more aid in the ENP and Western Balkans than other 
regions.1210 The only exception in this pattern during 1996-2006 was Latin America, whose 
exceptionally high shares of EIDHR funds can be traced to the origins of EU democracy 
assistance in that region and a lack of willingness to break the pattern of regular attributions.  
 Finally, it is not possible to discern a clear pattern as regards any EU preference for 
regions that are on average more advanced in their democratization processes and/or have higher 
standards of human rights protection or a preference for regions that do not show such positive 
signs. While most of the major recipient regions fared better in both fields, like the CEECs and 
Latin America, the largely non-democratic MEDA region also received a considerable high share 
of EIDHR funds, in particular when taking average shares per country into account.1211 
 
c) The Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure among Countries 2000-2006 
 
This section provides data on the distribution of EIDHR funds among target countries. It first 
focuses on the entire EIDHR and subsequently on EIDHR democracy assistance only (without 
data for election observation, which is not available). For reasons of lack of time and space it 
concentrates on four main regions, the former Soviet States, Asia, the Mediterranean and Middle 
East, and Latin America, and for lack of data on the period 2000 to 2006. Before presenting the 
detailed data, several preliminary comments need to be made. 
 First, Tables 27 to 30 only provide data on EIDHR funds spent for targeted, macro, and 
micro projects, leaving aside expenditure for election observation and for funds spent in 
individual countries through regional and global projects. Data for the latter is not available or it 
cannot be determined how much of it benefited individual countries.  
                                                     
1210 EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010, at 14 and 16.  
1211 For levels of the protection of human rights and levels of democracy see the ratings for civil and political rights 




 Secondly, the primary data source for the Tables is the Commission’s EIDHR Project 
Compendium by location 2000-2006 and the sister compendium to this report, which is 
structured by theme of EIDHR projects.1212 The source has one major weakness, that is, it 
reports on fewer country-specific and regional projects than are mentioned in the Commission’s 
2000-2006 Statistics on EIDHR expenditure in the various regions.1213 However, as it constitutes 
the only available source for the distribution of EIDHR funds among countries, it has to be 
relied on.  
 Thirdly, the Tables provide information on the recipient states’ level of democratic 
development in order to establish the relevance of these factors for the EU’s level of 
engagement. For the level of democratic development, the Tables use Freedom House’s average 
score for political rights (PL) and civil liberties (CL) for the period 2000-2006, published in its 
annual reports on ‘Freedom in the World’.1214 The PL and CL scores range from 1 to 7, with 1 
representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom.1215 Therefore, the lower the respective 
scores, the closer a country is to be an electoral or even a liberal democracy. The arrow ‘’ 
following a score indicates that there was a tendency for the score to become lower during the 
period in question, indicating that the situation as regards civil and political rights improved. The 
arrow ‘↑’ indicates that the score became higher during the period in question, which means that 
the actual situation worsened. 
 Fourthly, ‘Rank per capita’ in Tables 27 to 30 indicates which country of a region received 
most EIDHR funds on the basis of the per capita allocation.1216 
 Finally, reference should be made to Tables C and D, included in the Appendix, which 
provide a single list of the major recipients of EIDHR assistance and EIDHR democracy 
assistance of all four analysed regions in absolute terms and per capita, which allows quick 
comparisons among the countries of all regions.  
  
                                                     
1212 EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by location. 
1213 Statistics of activities 2000-2006, at 3.  
1214 Freedom House allocates the scores on the basis of answers to a standard set of ‘checklist questions’ on political 
rights and civil liberties. Political rights questions concern the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
and the functioning of government, while and civil liberties questions relate to the freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, personal autonomy and individual rights. See: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010 (last accessed on 25.5.2011). 
1215 While Freedom House only provides scores from 1 to 7, Table 10(a)-(d) in part also gives scores with decimal 
places, like 3.5 or 4.5. The reason is that the Table provides the average score for the period 2000 to 2006. 
1216 Population Reference Bureau: 2003 World Population Data Sheet, at 





i. The Distribution of all EIDHR Funds among Countries 2000-2006 
 
The exact allocation of EIDHR funds for country-specific macro, micro, and targeted projects to 
individual countries and their comparative share can directly be consulted in Tables 27 to 30 and 
should not be repeated here. Reference should only be made to some striking data, like the 
extremely high amounts of funding provided to Colombia, which during the period 2000-2006 
received nearly 40% of all EIDHR funds spent in Latin America as well as a considerable share 
per capita. At the same time, Colombia is also the major recipient of all countries of all four 
analysed regions and receives double as much as the second-ranked Russia and the third-ranked 
Georgia. For this and all following aggregate data of all regions, see Table C in the Appendix.  
 Among the NIS, Russia and Georgia received high amounts of funding and very high 
shares of all regional EIDHR assistance compared to other countries in the region (each around 
30%). At the same time, Georgia was also the main recipient per capita (with 2.81 Euros) and, 
indeed, was also one of the main recipients per capita of all four regions (in particular, if allocations 
to Israel and Gaza/West Bank are considered separately), and a major recipient in absolute terms 
of all analyzed regions (rank 3 of all states of all four analyzed regions). 
In the MEDA and Middle East, attention was mainly given to the Palestinians, who 
benefited from allocations for Gaza and the West Bank as well as those given to Israel and 
therefore in total received about 30% of all funds. They also appear as a major recipient per capita 
of all four analysed regions (especially when uniting expenditure for Israel and Gaza and the West 
Bank). Next to the Palestinians was also Iraq was, with 18% of all regional EIDHR expenditure, a 
major recipient.  
 Finally, in Asia, Cambodia was a major recipient of EIDHR assistance between 2000-
2006, as it was the major recipient per capita and received a major part of the EIDHR funds in 
absolute terms (17.6%). Nepal too was a major recipient in absolute terms and per capita, as it 
received about 12.8% of EIDHR funds and had the second-largest per capita allocation. Although 
China was the major recipient in absolute terms, its share appears much smaller if the population 





Table 27: EIDHR Expenditure for Country-specific Macro, Micro, and  






% of regional 
expenditure 
Expenditure per 






1 Russia 13.38 30.5% 0.092 8 5/5 
2 Georgia 13.227 30.0% 2.81 1 3.5/4 
3 Ukraine 7.007 16.0% 0.15 7 4/3.5 
4 Kazakhstan 4.125 9.4% 0.28 4 6/5 
5 Armenia 1.987 4.5% 0.62 2 4.5/4 
6 Kyrgyzstan 1.515 3.4% 0.303 3 6/5 
7 Tajikistan 1.083 2.5% 0.16 6 6/5.5 
8 Moldova 0.845 1.9% 0.2 5 2.5/4 
9 Azerbaijan 0.66 1.5% 0.08 9 6/5 
10 Uzbekistan 0 0.0% 0 10 7/6 
11 Turkmenistan 0 0.0% 0 10 7/7 
12 Belarus 0 0.0% 0 10 6.5/6 
 Total 43.829     
 
Table 28: EIDHR Expenditure for Country-specific Macro, Micro, and  






% of regional 
expenditure 
Expenditure per 






1 China 8.105 17.8% 0.0063 13 7/6 
2 Cambodia 8.035 17.6% 0.64 1 6/5 
3 Indonesia 5.841 12.8% 0.026 7 3/4 
4 Nepal 5.828 12.8% 0.23 2 4/4 
5 Pakistan 5.148 11.3% 0.034 5 6/5 
6 India 3.883 8.5% 0.00236 14 2/3 
7 Bangladesh 2.497 5.5% 0.017 10 3.5/4 
8 Philippines 1.679 3.7% 0.02 9 2/3 
9 Burma 1.441 3.2% 0.029 6 7/7 
10 Vietnam 0.984 2.2% 0.012 11 7/6 
11 Malaysia 0.931 2.0% 0.037 4 5/4.5 
12 Sri Lanka 0.455 1.0% 0.024 8 3/3.5 
13 Laos 0.394 0.9% 0.07 3 7/6 
14 Afghanistan 0.295 0.6% 0.01 12 6/6 
15 Maldives 0 0.0% 0 14 6/5 
16 North Korea 0 0.0% 0 14 7/7 
17 Mongolia 0 0.0% 0 14 2/2 
18 Bhutan 0 0.0% 0 14 6/5 
19 Singapore 0 0.0% 0 14 5/4 
20 Brunei 0 0.0% 0 14 6/5 
21 Thailand 0 0.0% 0 14 2/3 
 Total 45.516     
 
                                                     
1217 Source: EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by location. Additionally about 6 million Euros were spent for 
regional projects. 




Table 29: EIDHR Expenditure for Country-specific Macro, Micro, and Targeted  






% of regional 
expenditure 
Expenditure per 






1 Iraq 11.006 18.3% 0.45 4 7/6 
2 Israel 9.096 15.2% 1.36 2 - 
3 
Gaza/West 
Bank 8.655 14.4% 2.4 1 6/6 
4 Egypt 7.144 11.9% 0.099 9 6/5 
5 Algeria 5.538 9.2% 0.17 7 6/5 
6 Iran 4.265 7.1% 0.064 10 6/6 
7 Tunisia 3.766 6.3% 0.38 6 6/5 
8 Morocco 3.559 6.0% 0.12 8 5/4.5 
9 Lebanon 3.399 5.7% 0.81 3 6/5 
10 Jordan 2.245 3.7% 0.4 5 5/5 
11 Syria 0.956 1.6% 0.055 11 7/7 
12 Yemen 0.396 0.7% 0.02 12 5.5/5 
13 Oman 0 0.0% 0 13 6/5 
14 Saudi Arabia 0 0.0% 0 13 7/7 
 Total 60.025     
 
Table 30: EIDHR Expenditure for Country-specific Macro, Micro, and  






% of regional 
expenditure 
Expenditure per 






1 Colombia 26.901 39.6% 0.61 4 4/4 
2 Guatemala 10.612 15.6% 0.86 1 4/4 
3 Mexico 5.662 8.3% 0.054 11 2/2 
4 Peru 4.964 7.3% 0.18 8 2/3 
5 Ecuador 4.469 6.6% 0.68 2 3/3 
6 Brazil 3.908 5.7% 0.022 14 2/3 
7 Bolivia 2.96 4.4% 0.34 6 2/3 
8 El Salvador 2.29 3.5% 0.35 5 2/3 
9 Chile 1.63 2.4% 0.68 3 1.5/1 
10 Venezuela 1.549 2.3% 0.06 10 3/4 
11 Nicaragua 1.246 1.8% 0.23 7 3/3 
12 Argentina 0.989 1.5% 0.027 13 2/3 
13 Honduras 0.7 1.0% 0.1 9 3/3 
14 Costa Rica 0.15 0.2% 0.036 12 1/2 
15 Panama 0 0.0% 0 15 1/2 
16 Paraguay 0 0.0% 0 15 3.5/3 
17 Uruguay 0 0.0% 0 15 1/1 
19 Cuba 0 0.0% 0 15 7/7 
 Total 68.03     
 
                                                     
1219 Ibid. Additionally, about 14 million Euros were spent for regional projects. 





Overall, the distribution of EIDHR funds among countries between 2000 and 2006 was highly 
unbalanced. In three of the four regions – the NIS, Asia, and Latin America – one fourth of the 
states received between 72% and 75% of the EIDHR funds, while one fourth received no 
EIDHR funds at all. About half of the states in each region received very minor shares. One 
reason for this imbalanced distribution was the EU’s ‘prioritised’ approach from 2002 to 2004, 
whose impact is strongly visible in the Tables, as all 32 focus countries received the largest shares 
in their respective regions. However, even beyond the 2005-2006 period the distribution was 
imbalanced.  
The imbalances in the allocations are also strongly visible in the per capita allocations. 
Overall, the per capita allocations range from 3.76 Euro in Palestine (if Israel and Gaza/West Bank 
are considered together) or 2.81 Euro in Georgia, to 0.00236 Euro in India, with individual 
countries receiving various amounts between these maximum and minimum amounts. The EU 
did therefore not take the population size into account when allocating funds to individual 
countries. 
The only exception to this imbalanced picture is the Mediterranean region, where the EU 
not only attempted to engage in all states but also more or less ensure a relatively equal allocation 
of funds (in absolute terms), except for a stronger focus on assistance for the Palestinians. Within 
its closer neighbourhood, the EU was therefore putting more efforts into facilitating 
democratization processes and improving human rights protection in all countries of the region. 
In areas farther away it is more willing to accept imbalances and that many countries are left 
without EIDHR support.  
 It should be added that the increasing use of CBSS, in the case of which individual 
countries are usually allocated between 300,000 Euros and 3 million Euros, has already started to 
correct the imbalances. On the one hand, the scheme has also become operative in countries that 
did not receive funds in the 2000-2006 period (like Mongolia, Panama, Paraguay) and it has 
increased shares of countries that during the 2000-2006 period received smaller shares (like 
Kyrgyzstan, Yemen, Jordan, Morocco).  
 As regards the preference for some and negligence of other countries of particular regions 
it is difficult to discern a really clear pattern. At most, the distribution confirms the EU’s 
preference for ‘politically important’ states. Relevance of a particular state can result from various 
factors, like the geopolitical importance of states, as in the case of Russia and China, which were 
major recipients in terms of total amounts, albeit not per capita. Importance can be a function of 
particular problems with effects for the EU, like narcotics production and trade in Colombia, the 
presence of long-lasting conflicts of particular international interest, as in the case of Palestine, 




overall amount in their respective regions, albeit not always major recipients per capita. In these 
cases, the level of protection of civil and political rights and freedoms did not play a major role in 
the choice, as the group includes countries with higher and lower Freedom House rates.  
 Among the states that received no or hardly any EIDHR funds is a considerably high 
number of countries with very bad Freedom House ratings of 6 or even 7, like Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, indicating, on the one hand, the difficulties of implementing democracy and human 
rights programmes in such countries, but also, on the other hand, a lack of real effort by the EU 
to engage in such difficult environments. As stipulated above, only from 2007 on were 10% of all 
EIDHR funds reserved for countries in which human rights were most at risk. At the same time, 
among the group of states that hardly benefited from the EIDHR are also states with high levels 
of freedom, in which the EU considered engagement less necessary, like in Thailand and 
Mongolia and many states in Latin America. At the same time, many non-recipient states were 
also high income countries, like Singapore, Brunei, Saudi Arabia, indicating hesitation to run 
democratization and human rights programmes by the EU (in addition to these states being 
authoritarian and therefore critical of such programmes).1221 
 All in all, the final distribution of funds was therefore the result of a complex mix of 
numerous factors.  
 
ii. The Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure for Democracy Assistance  
among Countries 2000-2006 
 
 
As regards detailed data on EIDHR expenditure for democracy assistance in each country of the 
four selected regions during 2000-2006, reference should be made to Tables 31 to 34, while only 
some remarkable features should be pointed out here. Among the NIS, Georgia appears as a 
major democracy assistance recipient. About 40% of all democracy assistance provided to the 
NIS was spent in that country, it is the major recipient per capita, and also received a considerably 
higher per capita share (1.65 Euros) than the second-ranked Armenia (0.34 Euro per capita). Indeed, 
Georgia is also the major recipient per capita of all four analysed regions and the second-largest 
recipient of EIDHR democracy assistance funds in absolute terms (after Iraq). A considerable 
amount of democracy assistance was also spent in Russia (about 20%). It is the fourth largest 
recipient of all four analyzed regions, however, it is a much less remarkable recipient in per capita 
terms.  
  
                                                     




Table 31: Expenditure for EIDHR Democracy Assistance for Macro, Micro, and Targeted  
Projects per Country in the NIS 2000-20061222 
 
No. Country 
DA in million 
Euros % of regional DA 







1 Georgia 7.762 40.0% 1.65 1 3.5/4 
2 Russia 3.912 20.0% 0.027 9 5/5 
3 Kazakhstan 2.703 14.0% 0.18 3 6/5 
4 Ukraine 2.003 10.0% 0.042 7 4/3.5 
5 Armenia 1.08 6.0% 0.34 2 4.5/4 
6 Kyrgyzstan 0.913 5.0% 0.18 4 6/5 
7 Azerbaijan 0.36 2.0% 0.04 8 6/5 
8 Tajikistan 0.428 2.0% 0.06 5 5/5.5 
9 Moldova 0.261 1.0% 0.06 6 2.5/4 
10 Belarus 0 0.0% 0 0 6.5/6 
11 Uzbekistan 0 0.0% 0 0 7/6 
12 Turkmenistan 0 0.0% 0 0 7/7 
 Total 19.422     
 
Table 32: Expenditure for EIDHR Democracy Assistance for Macro, Micro,  





Euros % of regional DA 







1 Indonesia 1.861 26.0% 0.008 5 3/4 
2 Pakistan 1.338 19.0% 0.009 4 6/5 
3 Cambodia 0.979 14.0% 0.078 1 6/5 
4 Burma 0.92 13.0% 0.019 3 7/7 
5 Nepal 0.854 12.0% 0.034 2 4/4 
6 China 0.515 7.0% 0.0004 11 7/6 
7 Vietnam 0.233 3.0% 0.0029 9 7/6 
8 Bangladesh 0.176 2.0% 0.0012 10 3.5/4 
9 Afghanistan 0.099 1.0% 0.0034 8 6/6 
10 Sri Lanka 0.071 1.0% 0.0037 7 3/3.5 
11 Laos 0.04 1.0% 0.0072 6 7/6 
12 Bhutan 0 0.0% 0 12 6/5 
13 Maldives 0 0.0% 0 12 6/50 
14 North Korea 0 0.0% 0 12 7/7 
15 Singapore 0 0.0% 0 12 5/4 
16 Brunei 0 0.0% 0 12 6/5 
17 Malaysia 0 0.0% 0 12 5/4.5 
18 India 0 0.0% 0 12 2/3 
19 Mongolia 0 0.0% 0 12 2/2 
20 Philippines 0 0.0% 0 12 2/3 
21 Thailand 0 0.0% 0 12 2/3 
 Total 7.086     
 
  
                                                     





Table 33: Expenditure for EIDHR Democracy Assistance for Macro, Micro, and  
Targeted Projects per Country in the Mediterranean and Middle East 2000-20061224 
 
No. Country 
DA in million 
Euros % of regional DA 







1 Iraq 9 36.0% 0.37 2 7/6 
2 Egypt 7.144 29.0% 0.099 5 6/5 
3 
Gaza/West 
Bank 2.464 10.0% 0.68 1 6/6 
4 Algeria 2.325 10.0% 0.073 6 6/5 
5 Morocco 1.149 5.0% 0.038 7 5/4.5 
6 Tunisia 1.049 4.0% 0.106 4 6/5 
7 Jordan 0.632 3.0% 0.115 3 5/5 
8 Syria 0.621 3.0% 0.035 8 7/7 
9 Lebanon 0.051 0.2% 0.012 9 6/5 
10 Iran 0 0.0% 0 0 6/6 
11 Oman 0 0.0% 0 0 6/5 
12 Saudi Arabia 0 0.0% 0 0 7/7 
13 Yemen 0 0.0% 0 0 5.5/6 
14 Israel 0 0.0% 0 0  
 Total 24.435     
 
Table 34: Expenditure for EIDHR Democracy Assistance for Macro, Micro, and Targeted  
Projects per Country in Latin America 2000-20061225 
 
No. Country 
DA in million 
Euros % of regional DA 







1 Peru 3.15 18.0% 0.12 4 2/3 
2 Colombia 3.034 18.0% 0.069 7 4/4 
3 Guatemala 2.992 18.0% 0.24 2 4/4 
4 El Salvador 2.29 13.0% 0.35 1 2/3 
5 Ecuador 1.726 10.0% 0.14 3 3/3 
6 Bolivia 1 6.0% 0.12 5 2/3 
7 Mexico 0.72 4.0% 0.007 12 2/2 
8 Honduras 0.7 4.0% 0.1 6 3/3 
9 Venezuela 0.6 4.0% 0.02 9 3/4 
10 Argentina 0.38 2.0% 0.01 11 2/3 
11 Chile 0.296 2.0% 0.02 10 1.5/1 
12 Costa Rica 0.15 1.0% 0.036 8 1/2 
13 Cuba 0 0.0% 0 0 7/7 
14 Nicaragua 0 0.0% 0 0 3/3 
15 Paraguay 0 0.0% 0 0 3.5/3 
16 Brazil 0 0.0% 0 0 2/3 
17 Uruguay 0 0.0% 0 0 1/1 
18 Panama 0 0.0% 0 0 1/2 
 Total 17.038     
 






In Asia, 45% of all money spent for democracy assistance was spent in Indonesia and Pakistan. 
However, if looking at the expenditure per capita, Cambodia and Nepal emerge as main recipients. 
Comparing countries of all regions, Asian countries received considerably little democracy 
assistance in absolute numbers as well as in per capita terms.  
In the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region, Iraq appears a major democracy 
assistance recipient (36% of all regional democracy assistance). It received most money (9 million 
Euros) as well as a considerable amount per capita (0.37 Euros). Iraq is also the major recipient of 
all four regions, and is the third largest recipient per capita of all regions (Table C in the 
Appendix). Further, Egypt too was a major recipient of EIDHR democracy assistance in the 
MEDA & Middle East (7.144 million Euros), and in comparison with countries of all regions 
(rank three of all major recipients). Its per capita share is smaller though, within the region as well 
as when looking at all four regions. Finally, Gaza and the West Bank were the major recipients per 
capita; however, were only the third-largest recipients in absolute terms within the region (and 
received only about one fourth of the funds spent in Iraq). 
Finally, in Latin America considerable attention was given to Guatemala, which received 
about 18% of all regional EIDHR democracy assistance and had the major per capita allocation. 
Further, also Peru and Colombia received equally high shares of all regional assistance, but lower 
per capita allocations.  
The following two general observations can be made on the overall distribution of 
democracy assistance among countries. First, the distribution of democracy assistance among 
countries was slightly different from the distribution of all EIDHR funds among countries. 
Nevertheless, in most regions the major recipients of EIDHR funds were also the major 
recipients of democracy assistance. There were therefore hardly states with much activity in the 
human rights sector and little in democratization or vice versa, but the majority of recipient states 
had projects in both. The major exception to this pattern was China, which was the major 
recipient of EIDHR assistance in Asia, but where considerably little was done in the sector of 
democratization. Secondly, the distribution of democracy assistance among the various countries 
of one region was highly imbalanced. Indeed, the imbalance is even higher as regards democracy 
assistance than as regards all EIDHR assistance. In all four regions, about one fourth of the states 
received between 74% and 85% of all democracy assistance, one fourth to half of the countries 
received about 15% to 26% of democracy assistance, while the remaining one fourth to half of 
the states received nothing. The imbalance is particularly strong in Asia, where five of 21 states 
received 84% of the provided democracy assistance, and ten states did not receive any democracy 




 Just like with the overall distribution of EIDHR funds, it is difficult to identify clear, 
underlying patterns in the distribution of EIDHR democracy assistance. Political relevance seems 
to play a role in some cases, like Iraq and Russia, but is less decisive than in the overall 
distribution of EIDHR funds. As regards democratization, the major recipients of EIDHR 
democracy assistance in all four analyzed regions include regionally better performing states, like 
Georgia, Indonesia, and Peru, as well as regionally worse performers, like Kazakhstan, Pakistan, 
and Colombia. There is also no clear indication that the EU is mainly engaging in states, which 
show positive trends in democratization. While several of the major recipients had slightly 
improving political and civil rights and liberties ratings during 2000-2006, like Georgia, Indonesia, 
Colombia, the EU also strongly engaged in countries with declining rates, in particular in Russia. 
Moreover, numerous countries with improving situations received minor EIDHR shares or no 
assistance, for example Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, and many states in Asia. Similarly, despite Georgia, 
the other countries that had undergone colour revolutions, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, did not 
receive considerably high shares. All in all, there is therefore no clear link between level of 
democratization and trends in democratization and EU democracy assistance.  
 
4. Core Features of the Stage of Implementation 
 
This last section of Chapter 6 sheds more detailed light on three issues of the stage of the 
technical implementation of EIDHR: project types, project sizes, and partners in implementation. 
Reference should at this point be made to the more general discussion of the stages and 
procedures in EIDHR implementation and, especially, the project cycle in Chapter 5. That 
Chapter, amongst others, introduced the primary modes of project identification, that is, calls for 
proposals and formulation by the Commission or by a selected partner, which, as will be seen 
shortly below, directly related to project types and other project features discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
a) (Technical) Project Implementation 
 
i. Project Types 
 
The two types of project identification discussed in Chapter 5 – calls for proposals and 
formulation by the Commission or a selected partner – are closely linked to the different types of 
projects, in Commission jargon also called EIDHR instruments, through which the EIDHR is 




referred to as ‘calls for proposals’,1226 which were larger projects selected by the Commission 
headquarters, implemented by Western and/or local actors, and administered by the Commission 
headquarters and/or the EU Delegations, (2) micro projects, which were smaller projects 
identified through local calls for proposals, implemented by local actors only, and administered 
by the Delegations,1227 and (3) targeted or ‘ad hoc’ projects, devised by the Commission, 
implemented by Western or local actors, and administered from Brussels. From 2000 on the EU 
often mentioned election-related projects, including electoral observation and some types of 
observation mission-related electoral assistance, and urgent projects as separate categories rather 
than as targeted projects. Unlike from other targeted projects, urgent or emergency measures do 
not need to be envisaged in programming documents and are adopted according to speedier 
procedures.1228 
 Since 2007 the Commission has partly changed these categories and used a different 
terminology. It now distinguishes between projects selected through (1) ‘centralized calls for 
proposals’, which largely correspond to macro projects, (2) ‘country based support schemes’ 
(CBSS), which are similar to the micro-project scheme but foresee larger grants, (3) targeted 
projects and cooperation with international organizations, (4) election observation, and (4) other 
support measures, which include urgent projects.1229  
 Table 35 provides an overview of the use of the major project types during 2000-2006 in 
number of projects, EIDHR funds disbursed through various project types, and the percentage 
of overall funds disbursed through project type, as published by the Commission in the 
document ‘Statistics of activities 2000-2006’.1230 It shows the dominance of macro projects (55%), 
followed by micro projects (25%), election observation (14%), and targeted projects (6%). 
Analysis of various other documents suggests a slightly different distribution (about 45% for 
macro projects, 20% for micro projects, 15% for election observation, 15% for targeted projects, 
and 5% for administrative expenditure and contingencies).1231  
  
                                                     
1226 Calls for proposals is therefore a type of project selection as well as a term used to denominate macro projects. It 
has to be recalled that also micro projects are identified through calls for proposals.  
1227 For a study on the implementation of the micro-project scheme in the Mediterranean see the article by Bicchi, 
‘Democracy Assistance in the Mediterranean’.  
1228 Art. 14 of the 1999 EIDHR regulation (for developing countries); Art. 7 of the 2006 EIDHR regulation.  
1229 EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010. 
1230 Statistics of activities 2000-2006. 
1231 SEC(2001) 801, at 72, which reports on a higher amount provided to targeted projects in 2000 than during the 
entire 2000-2006 period; EIDHR Programming Document 2002-2004; 2003 EIDHR Programming Update; 2004 




Table 35: Distribution of EIDHR Expenditure through EIDHR Instruments 2000-2006  
(in numbers of projects, million Euros, and % of all EIDHR expenditure)1232 
 








No. of projects 635 1348 388 39 
Expenditure/project type 
(million Euros) 
399.8 183.7 101.2 46.6 
% of all EIDHR expenditure 55% 25% 14% 6% 
 
Before 2000 the distribution was different. In the early 1990s, when the three project types 
macro, micro, and targeted projects were only used under the Phare and Tacis Democracy 
Programme, the largest part (70%) was used for macro projects, while micro projects only slowly 
started to be developed (11%).1233 By the late 1990s, the share of targeted projects had risen to 
35% and, in 2000, even to 65%(!).1234 Due to criticisms and mentioned legal changes, their share 
considerably reduced again from then on.  
At the same time, the micro-project facility was increasingly used, reflecting an interest in 
small and, even more, local NGOs as promoters of democracy and human rights. In 2001 it was 
first used beyond the Phare and Tacis countries and introduced in China, and from then on 
extended to an increasing number of states. While only 20 states were allocated funds for micro 
projects in 1999, the number had risen to 52 in 2006.1235 Table B, provided in the Appendix to 
this thesis, provides more details on the evolution of the micro-project scheme. The CBSS, the 
successor of the micro-project scheme, which, however, uses larger grants, was launched in 48 
states in 20071236 and currently already operates in about 82 countries and receives about 40% of 
all EIDHR funds (for 2011).1237 
 
ii. Project Sizes 
 
As indicated, a major differentiating factor of most projects types is their grant size. Minimum 
and maximum grants are influenced by administrative capacities in the Commission (headquarters 
and Delegations) and have a strong impact on the scope of eligible partners, that is, smaller or 
larger NGOs, local or Western partners. Overall, the EU has experimented with various 
minimum and maximum grant sizes over the last decade in order to adjust to its own capacities 
and (expected) capacities of recipients. Co-funding by applicants was necessary to 20% (until 
                                                     
1232 Statistics of activities 2000-2006. 
1233 PTDP Evaluation Report, at 33; COM(95) 191 final, at 7.  
1234 SEC(2001) 801, at 72.  
1235 SEC(2001) 891, Section 4; Micro-project Facility; EIDHR Programming document 2005-2006, Annex 1, at 34-5; 
EIDHR Annual Work Programme 2005, Annex 2; EIDHR Annual Work Programme 2006, Annex 2.  
1236 EIDHR Strategy Paper 2007-2010, Annex II.  




2001 for 10%), except if a higher contribution by the EU was necessary for the realization of the 
project.1238 
 For most of the period since 2001, the minimum grant for macro projects was 300.000 
Euros, while the maximum grant was 1.5 million Euros. Between 2004 and 2006, the threshold 
was lowered for local applicants (to 150.000 Euros, but only for up to 20% of all EIDHR funds) 
in order to increase their chances and following a debacle in 2002, when there were not enough 
applications to disburse all funds. Since 2007, the Commission has adopted a more flexible 
approach, adjusting minimum and maximum grants to the themes of the call, without, however, 
treating local applicants more favourably. Minimum grants range between 150.000 and 500.000 
Euros, while maximum grants range between 1.2 and 1.5 million Euros.1239 
An analysis of the 175-odd macro projects in the NIS and MEDA region and the 
thematic sector democratization during 2000 and 2006 reveals that overall there was a broad 
range of project sizes and that the average macro project grant was around 610.000 Euros, with 
very minor differences between local and EU-based applicants.1240 The threshold was therefore 
not discriminating local applicants to the extent that they could not apply. 
 Macro project took on average three years to be implemented, which corresponds to the 
envisaged time frame.  
 The minimum and maximum grants for micro projects rose from 3.000 Euros 
and 50.000 Euros in 1999 to 10.000 Euros and 100.000 Euros in 2006. Delegations had the 
possibility to make small adjustments though, which they used according to administrative needs 
and policy-considerations. There was therefore always a gap between macro and micro projects, 
which precluded projects of a middle size.1241  
An analysis of 640-odd micro projects implemented in the NIS, MEDA states and the 
category of democracy assistance between 2000 and 2006 shows that in all three categories there 
was considerable variation in grant sizes. On average, grants in the NIS amounted to 54.000 
Euros, those in the MEDA states to about 78.000 Euros, and democracy assistance projects to 
                                                     
1238 Financial Regulation, Art. 169.  
1239 Call for Proposals, SCRE/111700/C/G, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights issued by the 
European Commission (2001), at 1; European Commission, The European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights, Support for Democratization, Good Governance and the Rule of Law, Guidelines for Applicants to Call for 
Proposal 2002, Budget Line B7-701, at 5 and 8; European Commission, The European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights, Support for Democratization, Good Governance and the Rule of Law, Guidelines for Grant 
Applicants responding to the restricted Call for Proposal for 2004, Budget line 19.04.03, at 3; For more recent calls 
see the link ‘Funding’ at the EuropeAid website, at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm (last accessed on 
30.5.2011).  
1240 Data source for the analysis: EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by theme and the sister report to this 
compendium, that is, the EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by location.  
1241 COM(95) 191 final, at 7; Guidelines for Applicants 1999, at 6; Commission Staff Working Document EIDHR 




about 63.000 Euros. An evaluation carried out for the EU considered the sizes adequate for the 
absorption capacity of targeted NGOs.1242 
Micro projects took on average 15 (in MEDA states) 20 (in NIS) months to be 
implemented, which was more than the envisaged 12 months.  
Since the launch of the CBSS, the Delegations can determine minimum and maximum 
grant sizes. These vary considerably, with minimum grants, for example in the NIS, ranging 
between 30.000 Euros and 100.000 Euros, and maximum grants ranging between 100.000 Euros 
and 300.000 Euros. Overall, CBSS projects can therefore be expected to be larger than micro 
projects.1243 
Targeted projects, which are since 2002 mainly contributions to projects of international 
organizations, like UN agencies, and urgent projects, by definition do not have minimum or 
maximum sizes. In the MEDA states, the average grant for a targeted project was between 2000 
and 2006 about 1.3 million Euros. In the NIS, EU contributions to targeted projects were on 
average smaller (600.000 Euros), as most were co-financed to 50% by the Council of Europe.1244 
 
iii. Partners in Implementation 
 
A further important question on the implementation of EIDHR projects concerns the eligibility 
of grant recipients. Both EIDHR regulations have regulated this personal scope.  
 Articles 4 and 5 of the 1999 EIDHR regulation, which basically wrote into law what had 
by the mid-late 1990s been practiced and mentioned in various COMs,1245 enumerated the 
following eligible applicants in an exclusive way: “regional and international organisations, 
nongovernmental organisations, national, regional and local authorities and official agencies, 
community-based organisations and public or private-sector institutes and operators”. The 2004 
amendment to the EIDHR regulations added, for the case of election observation missions, 
natural persons as eligible partners.1246 They had to based in the EU or one of the targeted states. 
Overall, the scope of eligible actors envisaged in the 1999 regulation was very broad and 
hardly excluded any entity from the public and private sector.1247 The vague terminology was used 
to extend the scope even further: for example, to ‘public and private sector institutes and 
operators’, mainly applying to universities and other educational or research institutes, which was 
                                                     
1242 Evaluation of the micro-projects facility, at viii.  
1243 See the various calls under the link ‘Funding’ at the EuropeAid website. 
1244 Statistics of activities 2000-2006, at 1; EIDHR Project compendium 2000-2006 by location. 
1245 COM(96) 672 final, at 37 and COM(95) 191 final, at 15.  
1246 Art.1 (2) and (3), 2004 amendment to the 1999 EIDHR regulation (for developing countries).  
1247 See also the Vade-mecum for grant management, which does not rule out grants to private applicants, but limits 




also interpreted to include profit-making businesses, like media institutions, as long as the grant 
was for non-commercial purposes.1248 In principle, political parties could also be seen as ‘public 
sector’ operators; however, the prevailing view was that they were excluded as potential 
applicants (but not necessarily as beneficiaries of a project). The term ‘nongovernmental 
organization’ was understood as a more general category of non-profit-making organizations and 
included foundations, political foundations, charities, and trade unions.1249 
While the regulations provided the scope of eligible partners, they did not further regulate 
any preference for or balance among the various actors. The Commission could restrict the scope 
in individual calls for proposals and did so, for example in micro projects, for which only local 
civil society organizations could apply. From 2002 on, it excluded public institutions as eligible 
applicants, which formed part of efforts to render the EIDHR increasingly a civil society tool 
(not only as target, but also as key partners).  
The 2006 EIDHR regulation provides a non-exhaustive list of the following eligible 
beneficiaries in Article 10: civil society organizations, as part of which it amongst others expressly 
refers to NGO, independent political foundations, and community based organizations. Further, 
it mentions public sector non-profit agencies, institutions and organizations and international and 
regional organizations. Private persons are deemed eligible if this is necessary for the objectives 
of the regulation,1250 as in the case of election observation missions or in the case of urgent 
requests by human rights defenders.1251 Parliamentary bodies are eligible if their support is 
necessary for the objectives of the EIDHR and when the measure cannot be financed under a 
different EU programme, for example a geographical programme. Finally, other non-enumerated 
bodies can exceptionally receive funding, if that is necessary for achieving the objectives of the 
EIDHR. As regards location, applicants can now also be from the EEA or from candidate 
countries.1252  
The major novelty of the 2006 regulation is the exclusion of public authorities as potential 
applicants and the limitations concerning parliaments, which confirms the mentioned policy shift 
to strengthen the EIDHR’s character as civil-society focused programme. It expressly refers to 
political foundations, which have increasingly important become actors in democracy assistance 
and to human rights defenders, which occupy a special role as recipients. Finally, the regulation 
                                                     
1248 Art. 109(2) of the Financial Regulation of 2002. See also the earlier inclusion of the principle in the Vade-mecum 
on Grant management (2000), at 23.  
1249 See, for example, the EIDHR calls which refer to ‘non-profit-making legal persons, in particular NGOs’ rather 
than NGOs alone. EIDHR call 2002 and 2004, at 5.  
1250 See in this respect also Article 114 of the Financial Regulation of 2002, which stipulates that in principle legal 
persons should receive grants, but that exceptionally also private persons may do so.  
1251 Art. 14 of the 2006 EIDHR regulation. 




gives the Commission the possibility to extend the scope of potential applicants, if it is 
considered necessary.  
Two more factors, not expressly mentioned in the regulation, should be addressed. While 
the EU has for a long time required applicants, except where they are private persons, to be 
‘legally constituted and registered’ under national law,1253 since late 2006 non-registered NGOs 
can also receive grants.1254 Further, while the Phare/Tacis Democracy Programme, required the 
partnership of a Western and a local partner for the implementation of a macro project,1255 it was 
no longer foreseen as a requirement but just as a possibility under the EIDHR after 1999, which 
would, however, be positively valued.1256 
An analysis of all macro projects implemented in the NIS and MEDA region, as well as 
of all democracy assistance projects worldwide between 2000 and 2006 shows that about 80% of 
the projects were implemented by civil society organizations, in particular by (European and 
local) NGOs and foundations. Western NGOs included a broad range of NGOs that differed in 
size and focus. Local recipients were usually NGOs with a specific human rights and democracy 
agenda or with a specific focus on particular topics, like women’s rights. About 14% of projects 
were implemented by universities, in particular local universities, and about 6% of the projects 
were implemented by Western political foundations, in particular the major German Politischen 
Stiftungen. Of all 175-odd projects analysed, only one was implemented by a local public 
authority, and none by a trade union.  
Micro projects, which can by definition only be implemented by local NGOs, show a 
similar pattern. More than 90% of all micro projects were implemented by NGOs, some by 
research institutes and media organizations, and very few by trade unions. No project was carried 
out by an Islamic civil society organization (which does not show whether some applied or not 
though). In the NIS, many NGOs had a specific human rights and democratization focus, a 
focus on groups like women, minorities, and the disabled, or on social topics. In the MEDA 
region, NGOs that focused on groups and social topics dominated. There was considerable 
variation among states on whether NGOs were rather based in the capital or in the regions.  
Main partners in the implementation of targeted projects were UN agencies, especially 
UNDP and UNICEF, and in the NIS, the Council of Europe and the OSCE (especially the 
ODIHR). 
Finally, as regards the share of Western and local involvement in project implementation, 
the analysis shows that about 37% of all macro funds were given to local partners, while 63% 
                                                     
1253 Vade-mecum on Grant management (2000). 
1254 Council Regulation No 1995/2006, Art. 114(2)(a). 
1255 EIDHR Guidelines for Applicants 1999, at 12; PTDP Evaluation, at 6. 




were channelled through western partners. Western partners also implemented slightly more 
macro projects than local partners. Overall, western NGOs, universities, and foundations were 
therefore more strongly involved in the implementation of macro projects. However, given that 
micro projects were exclusively implemented by local NGOs and constituted about 25% of all 
funds, in total more funds were implemented through local organizations: about 43.5% of all 
EIDHR funds were provided to local organizations, and 31.5% were channelled through local 
NGOs.1257 
On the whole, in the technical implementation of the projects, the EU has mainly used 
calls for proposals and only secondarily targeted projects, formulated by itself or a selected 
partner. The EU has mainly worked with three types of projects, macro, micro, and targeted 
projects, which differ as regards project identification, size, recipients, and location of selection 
and administration. While macro projects (with average grants of about 610.000 Euros) have 
overall been the major types of instruments since 2000, the micro project facility (with average 
grants of about 65.000 Euros) has increasingly been developed, reflecting the EIDHR’s 
increasing focus on local civil society. In 2007 the CBSS replaced the micro project facility, which 
however works with larger projects. As regards implementing partners, macro and micro projects 
have overwhelmingly been implemented by NGOs (over 90%) and only to a very limited extent 
by other eligible bodies, like universities, trade unions, and parliaments. While more western 
NGOs have implemented macro projects, overall, most EIDHR funds have been paid to local 




Chapter 6 has analyzed the EU’s specific programme on promoting democratization and the 
respect for human rights, the EIDHR, and has provided a detailed insight into four major issues: 
the quantitative scope of the EIDHR, the thematic distribution of funds, the geographical 
dimension of the EIDHR, as well as, on several topics relating to the stage of EIDHR 
implementation (project identification, project types, and implementing partners). Although the 
major aim of Chapter 6 has been the analysis of EIDHR democracy assistance, the inclusion of 
human rights and democracy-issues in a single regulation, necessitated a broader view, which also 
allowed comparing EU engagement on democratization with human rights assistance. The 
analysis intended to be as comprehensive as possible and to cover the period since the start of 
EU democracy through EIDHR forerunner programmes and 2011. However, lack of available 
data has in many sections restricted the focus to a shorter period of time, in particular to the 
                                                     




period 2000 to 2006, for which the Commission has published detailed and comprehensive 
compendia on EIDHR projects. 
 Chapter 6 has, first, provided data on EU commitments and expenditure under the 
EIDHR. Commitments relate to annual allocations in the EU budget, drafted by the Commission 
and jointly agreed by the Parliament and the Council. The presented data has demonstrated the 
strong surge in commitments for democracy and human rights assistance under the EIDHR and 
its forerunner programmes between 1978, when the EU first provided human rights assistance, 
and 2011. The annual allocations grew from 200.000 Euros in 1978 to 157.7 million Euros in 
2011, at which level they can, on the basis of the financial envelopes of the EIDHR regulations, 
expected to remain at least until 2013. The increase was overall, if considering individual budget 
lines implemented under the EIDHR umbrella as well as the overall amounts, a rather steady one, 
with budget lines, once inserted, remaining steady or increasing but hardly being reduced or 
abolished. Particularly strong increases occurred in 1990 and 1992, when events in Latin America, 
the CEECs, and other part of the world brought democracy promotion on the agenda of 
basically all western donors and the EU, in November 1991, publicly proclaimed its policy shift. 
Other major increases, like in 1995 and 2009, where either caused by the start of a new regional 
programme or simply the result of increasing interest in the policy instrument. Importantly, 
compared to EU commitments for democracy assistance under the EU’s mainstream 
development programmes, discussed in Chapter 7, which only started to increase several years 
after the November 1991 policy declaration, the EU much more quickly, and indeed even before 
1991, provided democracy assistance under the EIDHR’s forerunner programme. Until 1999, the 
EIDHR was the main budget line for assistance in the sector of democratization. Nevertheless, 
compared to the overall EU budget for external assistance, allocations for democracy assistance 
appear small. Between 2002 and 2007 only about 1.5% of all external assistance was committed 
for democracy and human rights assistance under the EIDHR. In total, the EU committed about 
2.1 billion Euros under the EIDHR for democracy and human rights assistance between 1978 
and 2011. 
 Chapter 6 has also looked at expenditure data on the EIDHR. Data on expenditure has 
been much more volatile, due to a lack of regular, in particular, annual patterns of aid 
implementation. In total, during the period from 1992 to 2006, for which data is available, about 
1.2 billion Euros have been paid for democracy and human rights projects under the EIDHR 
(excluding 1995, for which no data is available). While data on commitments and payment are 
difficult to relate to each other and compare, it seems that, overall and considering an average 




 Chapter 6 has not only provided expenditure data on the entire EIDHR, but also on 
democracy assistance alone (including on election observation missions, i.e. EUEOMs). During 
the period 1996 and 2000, in total about 166.6 million Euros were spent for EIDHR democracy 
assistance, which constituted about 45% of all EIDHR assistance. In the subsequent period from 
2000 to 2006, about 286 million Euros were spent for democracy assistance, which was about 
39% of the entire EIDHR. While expenditure for democracy assistance therefore increased after 
2000, it decreased in terms of the share of all EIDHR assistance. A comparison with democracy 
assistance under the mainstream programmes, discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, shows that only 
from about 2004 on, did expenditure under the mainstream programmes begin to outweigh 
expenditure under the EIDHR.  
 The second set of questions of Chapter 6 has related to the thematic distribution of 
EIDHR funds among its numerous sub-headings. It has first demonstrated that in the case of the 
EIDHR the final distribution among funds is the result of the interplay of different institutions 
and bodies and different stages. Importantly, and different from democracy assistance under the 
EU’s mainstream development programmes, the recipients of EIDHR assistance, in particular 
NGOs applying for grants, play a major role in final distribution of funds among sub-sectors. 
EIDHR programming documents determine how much of the entire EIDHR will be used for 
democratization and predetermine priority areas, however, the final decision on how much 
money will be used for the sub-sectors depends on the proposals of (potential) aid recipients.  
 As regards the relative shares of democracy and human rights assistance, which constitute 
the two major thematic fields covered by the EIDHR, Chapter 6 has shown that the share of 
EIDHR funds used for democratization has become smaller during the period 2000-2006 (39% 
of all funds) than during the previous period of analysis, 1996-2000 (45% of all funds). At the 
same time, the relative share for human rights projects increased from 47% to 54%. A further 
important insight has been that the share of election observation considerably increased during 
both periods (from 3% to 14%), which implies that the share of democracy assistance (without 
election observation) decreased considerably. The more detailed presentation of human rights 
assistance has shown that much of the provided assistance focused on individual rights that did 
not necessarily have an (immediate) impact on democratization. However, the major category of 
human rights assistance, which focused on human rights education and awareness raising, also 
covered political and core civil rights and therefore to some extent overlapped with democracy 
assistance. 
 Further, the analysis of the thematic distribution of EIDHR funds used in the sector of 
democratization has exposed the relative shares of the major sub-fields as identified by the 




to 2006 or even 2009 were, first, the growth of the share of election observation, and secondly, 
the reduction of assistance for institutional reform and rule of law, which was shifted, as 
governance issues, to the mainstream programmes. During the more recent period of 
investigation, 2000-2006, election observation received the largest share of democratization-
related assistance (34%), civil society development and civil participation received about 29 %, 
rule of law development about 16%, media/freedom of expression received about 9%, election 
assistance about 5%, public institutions (local councils, trade unions, etc.) about 4% of all funds, 
transparency/anti-corruption about 3%, and parliaments about 0.2% of all EIDHR 
democratization-related funds.  
 The picture of the thematic distribution has revealed that the EIDHR was pursuing both, 
a moderate political, as well as developmental approach to democracy assistance. On the one 
hand, it strongly focused on election support (although mainly at election observation), provided 
assistance to political rights-focused NGOs, developed advocacy functions of (nationally acting) 
civil society organizations, and financed projects on the independence of the judiciary. It 
therefore addressed core institutions and procedures of a democracy or of democratization 
processes. However, as it lacked to work with political parties and, in particular the political 
opposition, the approach was only a moderate form of the political approach. At the same time, 
the EIDHR had clear features of the developmental approach. It strongly focused on the 
development of civil society as agent of reform, it supported NGOs engaged in community 
development and service delivery, it promoted local level developments rather than such at the 
national level only, and its rule of law engagement had a strong developmental features. All in all, 
the EU’s approach to democracy assistance through the EIDHR therefore constituted a mix of 
both ideal-typical approaches.  
 EIDHR assistance addresses all features of Dahl’s list of minimum procedural conditions 
of democracy: elections, freedom of information and expression (the media), and associational 
autonomy (civil society). Additionally, the rule of law is, even with decreasing attention, being 
addressed. EIDHR assistance therefore neatly fits into a very basic model of liberal democracy. 
When looking at the various more specific conceptions of democracy that have been introduced 
in Chapter 2, the argument could be made that the EIDHR, though its strong and growing focus 
on elections, is promoting a form of elitist democracy. However, given that has always also been 
a very strong emphasis on supporting the establishment and capacity development of civil society 
organizations and on increasing their participation in local policy-making and implementation, 
this argument does not hold. There is also no real proof of the EU building pluralist, 




 Thirdly, Chapter 6 has analyzed the geographical distribution of EIDHR funds among 
regions and countries. As regards the regional distribution of all EIDHR funds it has shown that 
the EU overall invested more funds into democracy and human rights promotion in regions that 
were geographically closer to the EU and therefore politically, geopolitically, and economically 
more important. At the same time, it attempted to achieve some geographical balance among the 
major world regions. Levels of democratic development or human rights protection did 
apparently not influence its choice. During 1996 and 2006, the major recipients of EIDHR funds 
were, taking the number of countries per regions into account, the MEDA states, followed by 
states in South-Eastern Europe, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and the NIS. The 
average amount of EIDHR funds spent in individual Asian and ACP states was very low. 
Aggregate data on entire regions show a different picture, with the ACPs receiving the largest 
share, followed by Latin America, the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, the NIS, global 
projects, the CEEC, Asia and SEE countries.  
 The analysis of the distribution of EIDHR funds among countries showed that the 
distribution was highly unbalanced. Some states received remarkable shares in absolute amounts 
and per capita, like Colombia, Guatemala, Russia, Georgia, West/Bank Gaza (in particular 
including expenditure in Israel), and Iraq, while some states received nothing. In all regions 
except the MEDA region, about three fourth of the funds were given to one fourth of the states, 
while one fourth received nothing, and about half of the states received very minor shares. The 
MEDA exception suggests that the EU put more efforts into ensuring engagement in all 
countries geographically closer to the EU. The conscious choice to focus on a limited number of 
target countries from 2002-2004 accounts for some these imbalances, but not for all. The 
introduction of CBSS and its use in an increasing number of countries will correct some of the 
imbalances.  
 It is difficult to discern a clear underlying pattern for the (unbalanced) distribution. At 
most, the distribution confirms the preference for politically more important states, in particular 
if overall aid flows rather than per capita flows are considered. Importance can flow form the 
geopolitical role of a state, specific problems like narcotics production, or on-going conflicts. 
Levels of human rights protection and of political freedoms did not play a role in the distribution 
of funds in these states. It also appears thought that countries with very negative Freedom House 
ratings hardly received funds, suggesting difficulties to run programmes in these countries, but 
also lack of efforts by the EU.  
 Further, data on the distribution of democracy assistance among countries also does not 




little decisive. Levels of democracy and (negative or positive) trends in democratization have not 
decisively affected the distribution.  
 Finally, as regards the technical implementation of the EIDHR, Chapter 6 has shown that 
(according to the Commission) most EIDHR projects during 2000 and 2006 were macro projects 
(55%; with average grants of about 610,000 Euros), followed by micro projects (25%; with 
65,000 Euros), election observation (14%), and targeted projects (6%).1258 A major trend that has 
started in the early 2000s and has continued until today is the increasing use of the micro project 
facility, or, since 2007, the CBSS, which indicates a stronger belief that democracy promotion 
(and human rights promotion) should to a large degree happen through the involvement of local 
organizations and other bodies.  
 As regards implementing partners, macro and micro projects have overwhelmingly been 
implemented by NGOs (over 90%) and only to a very limited extent by other eligible bodies, like 
universities, trade unions, and parliaments. While more western NGOs have implemented macro 
projects, overall most of EIDHR funds have been paid to local civil society organizations (about 
43.5% of all funds, as compared to 31.5% of all funds).  
 
  
                                                     
1258 The average sizes of projects relate to projects implemented in the NIS, the MEDA region and for democracy 




Chapter 7: Democracy Assistance as Part of the EU’s Mainstream and Special 








The evolutionary account of EU democracy assistance provided in Chapter 3 has shown that 
next to the EIDHR the EU also provides democracy assistance in the framework of its 
mainstream development programmes. Indeed, in its crucial 28 November 1991 resolution on 
‘human rights, democracy, and development’, the Council did not mention the various 
programmes founded by the Parliament, which should eventually be assembled under the 
umbrella of the EIDHR and later become the EIDHR programme, but only foresaw EU 
democracy assistance as part of existing development activities. Throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s this parallel system of providing democracy assistance under the mainstream development 
programmes and the specific EIDHR consolidated. Further, democracy assistance within 
development cooperation became increasingly important, not at last because of the limited funds 
available under the EIDHR programme and therefore the need to also use mainstream 
development funds.  
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 concentrate on democracy assistance under the EU’s general 
and specific development programmes and should be read together. Chapter 7 introduces the 
numerous programmes and Chapter 8 concentrates on their implementation. Both aim at 
determining elements of the EU’s overall strategy of democracy assistance that derive from these 
mainstream and special development programmes, especially the financial scope of democracy 
assistance, the the geographical focus of assistance, and the thematic focus of assistance that 
allows drawing conclusions on an underlying model of democracy and strategy of 
democratization. 
As just mentioned, Chapter 7 introduces the various programmes that – beyond the 
EIDHR – finance democracy assistance. It provides a comprehensive overview of the numerous 
general and special EU development assistance programmes that have been adopted and 
implemented during the last two decades. It presents each programme, the underlying assistance 
regulation(s), and the general thematic focus and financial scope of a programme. The core focus 




order to see to which extent such policy and activity are foreseen and regulated in secondary law. 
The discussion also briefly addresses the context in which the assistance regulations are being 
implemented, that is, other relevant policy tools that affect or determine democracy assistance in 
a certain region, for example, by adding possible fields of engagement.  
Chapter 7 does not address programmes adopted in the framework of the enlargement 
dimension, which are excluded from this study, some very small programmes of minor relevance 
to democracy assistance, the very limited activities carried out by EU institutions and bodies, like 
by the European Parliament’s Office for the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD), 
and the few rule of law missions adopted and implemented in the framework of CFSP that have 
been briefly addressed in Chapter 4. 
 
II. Overview of the EU’s General and Specific Development Assistance Programmes 
 
The following presentation of the major EU programmes that had/have a democracy-related 
component is structured along two dividing lines: it first looks at the general development 
programmes before and after 1 January 2007 and then at the theme- and actor-specific 
programmes before and after this date, when as part of the major EU reform of external 
assistance discussed in Chapter 3, a whole range of new assistance regulations entered into force.  
As indicated, assistance to the CEECs and the Balkan states is excluded from the study 
and the Phare, OBNOVA and CARDS programmes, as well as the Instrument for Preaccession 
(IPA) are therefore left aside.1259 Moreover, several smaller thematic programmes are not 
discussed in more detail, like ‘Aid to up-rooted people in Asia and Latin America’, ‘Gender 
equality in development cooperation’, ‘Conservation and sustainable management of tropical 
forests’, ‘Assistance in the areas of migration and asylum’, ‘Rehabilitation and reconstruction in 
developing countries’, and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC).1260 Although 
                                                     
1259 Council Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 of 25 July 1996 relating to aid for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 1996 L204/1 (OBNOVA 
programme); Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 of 5 December 2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89 and (EEC) No 1360/90 and 
Decisions 97/256/EC and 1999/311/EC, OJ 2000 L306/1 (CARDS programme); Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3906/89 of 18 December 1989 on economic aid to the Republic of Hungary and the Polish People's Republic, OJ 
1989 L375/11 (Phare programme); IPA regulation. For an analysis see, for example, C. Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to 
Europe: The EU’s Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of 
Conditionality’, 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 2 (Summer 2004), at 219f.  
1260 Regulation (EC) No 2130/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 October 2001 on 
operations to aid uprooted peopled in Asian and Latin American developing countries, OJ 2001 L237/3; Regulation 
(EC) No 806/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on promoting gender equality in 
development cooperation, OJ 2004 L143/40; Regulation (EC) No 2494/2000 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 November 2000 on measures to promote the conservation and sustainable management of tropical 




most of the regulations establishing these programmes envisage the provision of some 
democracy assistance within their thematic framework, they are financially of minor importance 
and have not or only to a very limited extent given rise to democracy assistance projects in 
practice.1261 
Table 36 summarizes all programmes discussed in the following pages and also shows the 
relation of the old and new programmes to each other, that is, which programme succeeded 
which in the reform of 2007.1262 
 
Table 36: Overview of Major EU Development Programmes before and since 1.1.2007 (except for 
CEECs and Western Balkans)1263 
 







ALA  DCI 
Special Programmes for South Africa 
Tacis ENPI 
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Special Programmes for Palestine 
Lomé I-IV Conventions, Cotonou Agreement (since 
2000) 
Cotonou Agreement (since 2000) 








Co-financing with European NGOs (B7-6000) Non-State Actors and Local 
Authorities in Development 
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1. Overview of the General Development Assistance Programmes 
 
Before 1 January 2007 
 
a) Asia and Latin America: The ALA Regulation 
 
The ALA regulation1264 was between 1992 and 2006 the legal basis for the EU’s socio-economic 
assistance programme(s) for about 17 developing states in Asia, 18 developing countries in Latin 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to 
third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ 2004 L80/1; Council Regulation (EC) No 
2258/96 on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries, OJ 1996 L306/1; Council 
Regulation (Euratom) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, 
OJ 2007 L81/1.  
1261 Description of implemented acts by the Commission on its website.  
1262 It is not visible in this Table that the Central Asian states, which until 1.1.2007 received support under Tacis, and 
are now covered by the DCI.  





America, and some states in the Middle East that were not covered by the Mediterranean policy, 
in particular Yemen. It succeeded a smaller programme for the same group of countries that had 
mainly foreseen aid for the very poor populations of a state and was implemented between 1976 
and 1992.1265 The reason for including countries of such diverse continents under a single 
regulation lies in the evolution of EEC development cooperation and can mainly be traced back 
to the differentiation between the two large groups in the early 1970s, that is, ‘associated’ 
developing countries comprising the ACP countries and ‘non-associated developing countries’ 
comprising all others.1266 However, despite the existence of a single ALA regulation, the EU 
institutions always clearly distinguished between the various regions covered and even between 
sub-regions and rather spoke of ‘assistance for Asia’ and ‘assistance for Latin America under the 
ALA regulation’ rather than of the ALA programme.  
 The general focus of the ALA regulation was on the poor, the rural and the food sector, 
the environment and national resources, the fight against drugs, culture, demographic questions, 
national institutions, support for specific groups like women, children, and ethnic minorities1267 as 
well as on economic cooperation.1268 Rather unique for EU assistance regulations, the ALA 
regulation was adopted for an unlimited period of time and remained unchanged until its repeal 
by the DCI in 2007. The ALA’s annual budget for Asia rose from about 140 million Euros in 
1986 to about 696 million Euros in 1996 and 834 million Euros in 2005. The budget for Latin 
America increased from about 160 million Euros in 1986 to about 486 million Euros in 1995. 
During 2002 and 2005, Latin American states were allocated about 300-350 million Euros each 
year.1269  
 For the time of adoption, the ALA regulation was remarkably outspoken as regards 
democracy promotion and assistance. This was the consequence of, on the one hand, the new 
and strong interest in the policy in 1991/92, and, on the other hand, the explicit call for 
democracy promotion by Latin American states, most of which had undergone transitions to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1264 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 443/92 of 25 February 1992 on financial and technical assistance to, and 
economic cooperation with, the developing countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ 1992 L52/1 (or, short, ALA 
regulation). 
1265 The relevant legal basis for this ALA-predecessor was only provided with Council Regulation No. 442/81 on 
financial and technical aid to non-associated developing countries, OJ 1981 L48/8.  
1266 See, for example, Pippan, at 29-31; Arts, at 100-2. Suggestions by the European Parliament to split the regulation 
were made redundant by the entire overhaul of the external assistance programmes in 2007European Parliament, 
Committee on Development and Cooperation, Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
regulation concerning Community cooperation with Asian and Latin American countries and amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2258/96 (COM(2002) 340 – C5-0368/2002 – 2002/0139(COD)) of 8 October 2003.  
1267 Arts. 4-5 of the ALA regulation.  
1268 Arts. 7-8 of the ALA regulation. See the Communication from the Commission, Guidelines for Cooperation 
with Developing Countries in Latin America and Asia, COM(90) 176 final, 11.6.1990; Court of Auditors, Special 
Report No 4/2005 concerning the Commission’s management of economic cooperation in Asia, together with the 
Commission’s replies.  
1269 Evaluation of E.U. Development Aid to ALA States, Phase III-Synthesis Report (15 March 1999), at 5; EU 




democracy in the 1980s.1270 Recall in this respect, that also assistance under the EIDHR 
forerunner programmes had started in Latin America in the mid-late 1980s. The absence of 
democratization processes in Asia and more hesitant approach of the EU in that region did not 
harm in drafting of the ALA regulation.  
Article 1 of the ALA regulation stipulated the general objective of democracy promotion: 
“in…connection” with financial, technical and economic cooperation, “the Community shall 
attach the utmost importance to the promotion and protection of human rights, support for the 
process of democratization, good governance,…”. This should be done with three instruments. 
First, Articles 5 and 6, pertaining to the section on ‘financial and technical assistance’, referred to 
democracy assistance. They mentioned that “(A)id should…be allocated, inter alia, to specific 
projects for the spread of democracy, good governance and human rights” and that assistance in 
the more advanced ALA countries should, amongst others, in particular be provided for the 
“spread of democracy and human rights”. The provisions did not enumerate specific themes of 
democracy support though and remained therefore rather general. The regulation also did not 
reserve funds for democracy assistance projects. Secondly, according to Article 2 of the ALA 
regulation, those countries most committed to upholding democratic principles should receive 
“increased support”, “particularly for positive incentives to put them in practice”. This 
constituted a very early example of ‘incentive conditionality’ that should only much later, in the 
early-mid 2000s, become a more popular EU tool. There is no evidence that the EU ever used 
the tool in the ALA context, in particular, it did not operationalize it in a way similar to current 
incentive instruments, like the Governance Initiative in Africa, that is, with governance reports 
that allow assessments of reforms.1271 Different from current instruments of this type, the ALA 
regulation foresaw the use of extra funding for democracy-related measures themselves rather 
than projects in other sectors.  
The third instrument of democracy promotion envisaged in the ALA regulation was a 
political conditionality clause that allowed the EC to amend or even suspend the implementation 
of cooperation in case of “fundamental and persistent violations of human rights and democratic 
principles” (Article 2 of the ALA regulation). It was the first unilateral assistance regulation to 
include a conditionality clause and preceded the use of the standard, essential element clause that 
was only to become practice in the mid-1990s.1272 Rather exceptionally among regulations, ALA 
also explicitly explained the motivation for democracy promotion, by stressing that 
                                                     
1270 See, for example, the Declaration of the EC and the Rio Group of Countries of 20 December 1990 which 
affirmed the countries’ attachment to human rights and democracy as well as the support to their promotion. See 
Fierro, at 215.  
1271 See the discussion further below, in section II. a) ix..  
1272 See in this respect recital seven of the ALA regulation, which refers to the June 1991 Luxembourg European 




democratization was a precondition for real and lasting economic and social development (Article 
2 of the ALA regulation).  
 The ALA regulation did of course not operate in a vacuum, but in its programming 
process and implementation other policy documents, in particular COMs and, in particular, also 
cooperation agreements concluded by the EC/EU and the numerous countries also played a role, 
even if this was not explicitly stipulated in the regulation.1273 For example, if the parties of a 
cooperation agreement identified one field as particularly important, it would be supported 
through ALA, as long as it was in principle covered by the regulation.1274 Detailed provision on 
democracy assistance in an agreement could therefore further define the thematic scope of ALA 
democracy assistance.  
An analysis of the numerous policy documents exposes considerable differences between 
Latin America and Asia. As regards Latin America, basically all COMs adopted in the last two 
decades stressed the centrality of democratic principles in EU-Latin American relations and called 
for more action in the sector.1275 Further, the cooperation agreements with Latin American states 
were among the first to include political conditionality clauses, in particular also upon insistence 
of these states. The clauses express both parties’ commitment to upholding democratic principles 
and allow for suspension of the agreements in case of their violation.1276 However, only very few 
(bilateral or regional) agreements of the EU and the Latin American states – five of 20-odd – also 
explicitly refer to democracy as a particular field of cooperation.1277 The partnership and 
cooperation agreement with Mexico, signed in 1997, includes one of the most detailed provisions 
in this respect, that is definitely also much more specific than the ALA regulation.1278 It foresees 
that “cooperation on human rights and democracy” should mainly be carried out through 
support to the development of civil society by means of education, training and public awareness 
programmes, training and information measures designed to help institutions function more 
effectively and to strengthen the rule of law, election assistance and observation, and human 
                                                     
1273 As will be seen, many other assistance regulations establish a direct link between the regulation and cooperation 
agreements. In the case of ALA this was not done, especially also because ALA preceded most agreements and was 
not amended until its repeal in 2007.  
1274 Recall in this respect Case C-403/05 (Philippine Border Mission case). 
1275 For example, COM(2005) 636 final, at 13-4.  
1276 Fierro, at 215.  
1277 Next to the agreement with Mexico, these are the agreements with Paraguay of 1992, with the Central American 
states of 1993, and with the Andean Community and Central American countries of 2003. The latter two have been 
signed in 2003 but have, due to lack of ratification by all states, not entered into force yet. See the Council 
agreements database on the individual agreements, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=252&lang=EN (last accessed on 21.11.2011). 
1278 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community 




rights monitoring.1279 The 2003 agreements with the Andean Community and the Central 
American countries, both of which have not entered into force yet, mention a very similar focus 
on state institutions and civil society, as well as the rule of law.1280 It remains to be seen whether 
the inclusion of a title on democracy in the more recent agreements – 2003 – has been the 
beginning of a trend to do this in all future agreements.  
 Different from Latin America, EU policy documents towards Asia have always been 
more hesitant when addressing democratization.1281 The topic entered discussion belatedly and 
continues to be addressed more generally and cautiously than in other regions, even if the topic 
has definitely increasingly gained importance over the last decade.1282 Moreover, there was always 
a strong emphasis on little intrusive and positive tools, in particular on (political) dialogue.1283 It 
was, indeed, under the bilateral agreements with Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, concluded in the 
late 1990s, that sub-groups or sub-committees on human rights were first created in the 
framework of political dialogues established by the respective agreements in order to ensure a 
regular discussion on the topics.1284 This provided the blueprint for the widespread use of such 
sub-committees in EU external relations today. The increased provision of democracy assistance, 
especially through the EIDHR, was first called for in 2001 and 2003, without going into detail on 
the financial and thematic scope though.1285 EU external agreements with individual Asian states 
and regional organizations include political conditionality clauses, if concluded after the early 
1990s. However, with the partial exception of an agreement with Sri Lanka, that envisages human 
rights projects, the topic of democracy support is not addressed in any of the agreements.1286 
  
                                                     
1279 Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community 
and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican States, of the other part, OJ 2000 L276/45.  
1280 Political dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the 
one part, and the Andean Community and its Member Countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), 
of the other part; Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member 
States, of the one part, and the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, 
of the other part; both signed on 15.12.2003. 
1281 A communication of 1994 even stressed the relevance of the modernization approach in democratization in Asia, 
which was inconsistent with the EU’s approach of that time and indeed also not followed up in subsequent policy 
documents. European Commission, Towards a new Asia Strategy, COM(1994) 314 final, Section I, Overall 
Objectives. 
1282 Ibid. See also the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, adopted at the first EU-
ASEAN summit in 2007.  
1283 COM(1994) 314 final; European Commission, Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced 
partnerships COM(2001) 469 final; European Commission, A new partnership with South East Asia, COM(2003) 
399/4. The only exception was Burma, which has since 1990 been targeted with sanctions.  
1284 See, for example, the Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, OJ 1996 L136/29.  
1285 COM(2001) 469 final, at 15 and 22; COM(2003) 399/4, at 17.  
1286 Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 




b) The Newly Independent States (NIS): The Tacis Programme 
 
The Tacis Programme – based on three successive regulations – was between 1993 and 2006 the 
major EU assistance programme for twelve of the 15 successor states to the former Soviet Union 
as well as, until 2004, for Mongolia1287 – the acronym Tacis standing for ‘Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States’.  
The origins of the programme go back to the 1990 Dublin and Rome European Council 
meetings that first envisaged, next to food aid, an EEC assistance programme for the Soviet 
Union in order to respond to the growing socio-economic crisis in that state as well as to send a 
signal of support for Gorbachev’s economic and political reforms.1288 This was only shortly after 
first official relations between the EEC and the USSR had been established in mid-1988.1289 The 
first assistance regulation concerning ‘technical assistance’ for the Soviet Union, covering 1991 
and 1992, was adopted in July 1991 and mainly envisaged projects on public and private-sector 
management training, financial services, energy, transport and foodstuffs distribution.1290 Given 
the continuing bad socio-economic situation in the successor states of the – in the meantime 
dissolved – Soviet Union, it was in July 1993 followed by the first of three Tacis regulations. The 
first of these regulations covered the period 1993-19951291, the second the period 1996-19991292, 
and the last the period 2000-20061293. The envisaged thematic scope of assistance was extended 
by each regulation and by 1999 encompassed, next to the already enumerated areas, the fields of 
macroeconomics, privatization, the rural economy, nuclear safety, the management of natural 
resources, infrastructure and investment, legal reform, the social sector, and civic [!] society.1294 
Moreover, from 1999 on, the Tacis regulation should also be an instrument for the 
                                                     
1287 Mongolia requested its inclusion into Tacis because of its economic links with the (former) Soviet Union and 
similarities in socio-economic problems. Before 1993 and after 2004 it was covered by ALA. The three Baltic were 
from the beginning on treated as part of the group of CEECs and recipients under the Phare programme. 
1288 Bull. EC 6-1990, I.19 and Bull. EC 12-1990, I.30.  
1289 Joint Declaration on the Establishment of Official Relations between the EC and the Council of Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA), Bull. EC 6-1988, 2.2.42 and 1.5.1.-4. For more details on the relations see M. 
Niedobitek, ‘Die Europäische Union and Rußland: Zum Stand der Beziehungen’, 2 Europarecht (1997), at 107.  
1290 Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 2157/91 of 15 July 1991 concerning the provision of technical 
assistance to economic reform and recovery in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, OJ 1991 L201/2, in 
particular Art. 3. 
1291 Council Regulation (Euratom, EEC) No 2053/93 of 19 July 1993 concerning the provision of technical 
assistance to economic reform and recovery in the independent States of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia, OJ 
1993 L187/1. (From now on referred to as 1993 Tacis regulation). 
1292 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 1279/96 of 25 June 1996 concerning the provision of assistance to 
economic reform and recovery in the New Independent States and Mongolia, OJ 1996 L165/1 (1996 Tacis 
regulation). 
1293 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 99/2000 of 29 December 1999 concerning the provision of assistance to 
the partner states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, OJ 2000 L12/1. (From now on referred to as 1999 Tacis 
regulation). 




implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs),1295 that is, the 
comprehensive trade and cooperation agreements that had entered into force with most NIS 
between December 1997 and July 1999.1296  
Between 1991 and 1999 the EC committed about 4 221 million Euros under the various 
Tacis programmes and its forerunner.1297 The third and last Tacis regulation mentioned a financial 
reference amount of 3 138 million Euros for the period 2000-2006. The annual EU budgets, 
however, foresaw smaller allocations of on average about 350 million Euros annually during the 
same period.1298 
The provisions on democracy promotion and democracy assistance were different in each 
of the three Tacis regulations and its forerunner-regulation. Overall, each of the subsequent 
regulations attributed an incrementally greater relevance to the topic. The 1991 regulation did, 
little surprising for its time of adoption, not address democratization at all. The 1993 Tacis 
regulation stressed the relevance of democratization for the success of socio-economic reform 
and assistance in its preamble,1299 but did not really follow up on this in the main body of the 
regulation. It mentioned ‘strengthening of the civic society’ and ‘legal reform’ as focus areas, 
however, not expressly as part of democratization.1300 Article 1 even suggested, in contradiction 
to the preamble and EU policy ideas of the early-mid 1990s, that democracy would follow 
economic development.1301 Unlike the slightly older ALA regulation, Tacis 1993 also did not 
include a political conditionality clause.  
The 1996 Tacis regulation abolished the allusion to the modernization approach in Article 
1 and apparently – while still using an ambiguous wording – made democracy promotion an 
objective of the regulation. Article 3(1) of the 1996 Tacis mentioned that “(T)he programme 
…shall mainly take the form of technical assistance in support of the economic reform in 
progress in the partner States for measures aimed at bringing about the transition to a market 
economy and reinforcing democracy.” It also included a rather special political conditionality 
clause, which only consisted of a suspension clause but lacked an essential elements clause.1302 
                                                     
1295 Article 2(1) of the 1999 Tacis regulation and European Commission, Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Commission , IV. The means to achieve the priority objectives, a) Dialogue-driven programming. 
1296 The PCAs with Belarus and Turkmenistan are not yet in force. For all other see the Council agreements database. 
1297 COM(2000) 835 final, at 60f.  
1298 See the various annual commitments in the budgets 2000 – 2006 and Figure 1 (‘Tacis Global Commitments’) in 
Evaluation of Council Regulation 99/2000 (Tacis) and its Implementation, Synthesis Report, Volume 1, (January 
2006), at 15. 
1299 See the third recital in the 1993 Tacis regulation.  
1300 See Annex II, which lists the mentioned areas under the heading of ‘human resource development’. 
1301 Art. 4(1) of the 1993 Tacis regulation stipulated that “(T)he programme referred to in Article 1 shall take the 
form of technical assitance for the economic reform under way in the beneficiary States for measures aimed at 
bringing about the transition to a market economy and thereby reinforcing democracy”. [emphasis added by the 
author.] 




However, except for the already mentioned fields of civic society and legal reform, no further 
democracy assistance was expressly envisaged. 
Finally, the 1999 Tacis regulation contained an entirely revised Article 1, which 
unequivocally stipulated that the Tacis programme was “(A) programme to promote the 
transition to a market economy and to reinforce democracy and the rule of law in the partner 
state”.1303 This statement was reinforced through linking the programme to the principles and 
objectives of the PCAs, which explicitly mentioned ‘respect for democratic principles’ in their 
political conditionality clauses and envisaged “support [to] efforts of democratization’.1304 Despite 
this clear objective, the 1999 Tacis regulation did not explicitly mention democracy assistance as 
one of the six ‘areas of cooperation’, but some themes under the heading ‘institutional, legal and 
administrative reform’ constituted democracy assistance: rule of law development, support for 
executive and legislative bodies (national, regional, local), and support for civil [!] society.1305 
Overall, the 1999 Tacis regulation remained therefore rather general on the possible area of 
democracy support. At the same time, Article 2(2) of the 1999 Tacis regulation, which required 
the Tacis programming documents (Indicative Programmes) to concentrate on at most three of 
the possible six areas of cooperation, also mentioned that the programme shall in particular take 
into account “the need to promote democracy and the rule of law” in the various countries 
covered. This constituted a quite special explicit call for attention to democracy assistance, 
without, however, reserving a certain share for the topic, that was later only repeated in the 
ENPI. Further, the 1999 Tacis regulation contained the same political conditionality clause as the 
1996 regulation.1306  
Next to regional and national Tacis programmes, the Commission also devised and 
implemented various so-called small project programmes (SPPs), which were not foreseen in the 
Tacis regulation. They usually foresaw smaller projects on specific topics and worked with 
simpler implementation procedures.1307 Three SPPs appear as particularly relevant for democracy 
assistance. First, the programme ‘Link inter-European NGOs’ or LIEN,1308 implemented 
between 1993 and 2001, aimed at stimulating citizens’ initiatives and strengthening the capacity of 
NGOs and other non-profit organisations working in the social sector. During 1993 and 1998 
about 14 million Euros were spent under the LIEN programme.1309 Secondly, the Tacis City 
                                                     
1303 Art. 1 of the 1999 Tacis regulation.  
1304 Recital 7 and Art. 2 of the 1999 Tacis regulation. For example, Articles 1 and 2 of the PCA with Ukraine.  
1305 Annex II to the 1999 Tacis regulation.  
1306 Art. 16 of the 1999 Tacis regulation.  
1307 European Commission External Relations Directorate General, Guide to Tacis small project programmes and 
other support structures: What they are, and how to benefit from them (2000), at 5-6.  
1308 For an evaluation of the LIEN programme, see the Mid Term Evaluation of Tacis LIEN Programme (2000).  




Twinning Programme (CTP)1310 operated between 1996 and 2001 and aimed at supporting local 
and regional authorities in the improvement of their administrative services and working 
practices, including through the involvement of civil society in local policy-making processes.1311 
Only incomplete financial data is available on the programme; for example, its 1998 budget was 
2.7 million Euros.1312 Both SPPs operated through linking Western and local partners. In 2001, 
LIEN and CTP were replaced by the ‘Institution Building and Partnership Programme 
(IBPP)/Support to Civil Society and Local Initiatives’.1313 This programme aimed at supporting 
NGOs, other not-for-profit professional organizations (like chambers of commerce, trade 
unions, associations of SMEs), and local and regional authorities in redefining and strengthening 
their role, so that they could contribute in the transition to democracy and to market economic 
systems.1314 As was the case under LIEN and CTP, this was mainly done through partnerships 
between EU and NIS-based actors. The overall budget of the new programme was with about 
66,4 million Euros considerably larger than those of its predecessors.1315 
Additionally, a very special democracy assistance programme under Tacis was the ‘Tacis 
Civil Society Development Programme for Belarus for 1997’.1316 Its roots lay in the suspension of 
most Tacis assistance to Belarus in 1996/19971317 and the wish to complement this punitive 
measure with a positive signal to Belarusian civil society. The programme was, like Tacis and 
unlike the EIDHR, agreed with the Belarusian government, which pursued a policy of delaying 
rather than outright rejection of the EU’s initiative.1318 Agreement on a democracy assistance 
programme could also be reached as the Commission, with a single exception, proposed rather 
                                                     
1310 For an evaluation, see City Twinning Programme in the New Independent States and Mongolia, Evaluation 
Report (July 1998).  
1311 City Twinning Evaluation Report, at 46.  
1312 City Twinning Evaluation Report, at 15. 
1313 A second line of the IBPP, entitled, ‘Key Institutions’ and focusing on twinning ministries, legislative bodies, 
courts, and central banks, has never become operational.  
1314 See, for example, European Commission, Delegation of the European Commission to Russia, TACIS Institution 
Building Partnership Programme (IBPP) Support to Civil Society and Local Initiatives, Guidelines for grant 
applicants responding to the restricted call for proposals for Russia, Funded from 2005 Action Programme, Budget 
line BGUE-B2006, 2006, at 7. 
1315 The amount is based on the various calls for proposals made between 2002 and 2007.  
1316 Council Decision of 18 December 1997 on a Tacis Civil Society Development Programme for Belarus for 1997, 
OJ 1998 L1/6; European Commission, Tacis 1997 Civil Society Development Programme Results from 
Implementation Belarus, November 2002.  
1317 There was apparently no formal decision on the basis of Art. 3(11) of the 1996 Tacis regulation to suspend the 
further provision of Tacis assistance, but the Council rather expressed it preference for a suspension as ‘position’ in 
various conclusions and declarations. See the fifth and sixth recital of Council Decision on a Tacis Civil Society 
Development Programme, which refers to a Council Conclusion of 24 February 1997, a Declaration of 29 April 
1997, and Conclusions of 15 September 1997. See also Fierro, at 368-9; E. Piontek, ‘Chapter 16 Belarus’, in S. 
Blockmans and A. Lazowski (eds), The European Union and Its Neighbours: A Legal Appraisal of the EU’s Policies of 
Stabilisation, Partnership and Integration (2006), at 545.  




soft measures or activities in less critical thematic areas.1319 Interesting from a legal point of view 
was the programmes’ adoption on the basis of the conditionality clause of the 1996 Tacis 
regulation, which was therefore used for a positive rather than negative measure.1320 In total, 5 
million Euros were spent for projects on the media, NGOs, and institutional twinning, especially 
in the field of higher education.  
The broader framework of EU-NIS relations, as part of which Tacis operated, was replete 
with references to democracy and democratization, despite the lack of democratic reform and 
even democratic regression in many of the states during the previous 15 years. A facilitating 
factor behind the numerous references to democracy was definitely the membership of basically 
all NIS in the OSCE, which includes the objective of democratization as part of its human 
dimension basket.1321 The central instrument in EU-NIS relations was – and partly still is – the 
PCAs, the comprehensive trade and cooperation agreements concluded with most NIS.1322 
Article 1 of the overall highly similar PCAs mentions as one of the objectives of the partnership, 
‘to support the third country’s efforts to consolidate its democracy’ and, uniquely, in the Russian 
PCA, the objective of ‘strengthening political freedoms’.1323 The envisaged tools of democracy 
promotion include a political dialogue that should, amongst others, ensure cooperation on ‘the 
observance of the principles of democracy’ and a political conditionality clause in the form of an 
essential elements clause. Further, about half of the PCAs – basically all adopted in and after 
1996 – include a separate Title on ‘cooperation on matters pertaining to democracy and human 
rights’, which envisages the provision on democracy assistance and enumerates, non-exclusively, 
specific fields of action.1324 The list includes technical assistance and/or training in the drafting of 
democracy- and human rights- related legislation and its implementation, the functioning of the 
judiciary, the operation of the electoral system, the facilitation of contacts and exchanges between 
administrative and judicial authorities, parliaments, and civil society organizations.1325 The list is 
largely overlapping with the assistance foreseen in the Tacis regulation, with the exception of the 
                                                     
1319 The major exception was an NGO-project on a ‘human rights network’, carried out by the Belarusian Helsinki 
Committee, which, among others, provided legal assistance in human rights cases. According to the Commission it 
was of all the most difficult to implement. European Commission, Tacis 1997 Civil Society Development 
Programme Results from Implementation Belarus, November 2002.  
1320 See the second recital of Council Decision on the Tacis Civil Society Programme. 
1321 Mongolia only asked to join the OSCE in 2011.  
1322 For an analysis see, for example, B. Berdiyev, ‘The EU and former Soviet Central Asia: A legal analysis of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements’, 22 Yearbook of European Law (2003), at 463.  
1323 Differences in the PCAs relate to the prospect of a free trade area, to rules of competition and to social security. 
Cremona speaks of more advanced and more limited PCAs.  M. Cremona, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: 
More than a Partnership?, in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law (2008), at 244f. , 
1324 These are basically all agreements with the Caucasian states and the Central Asian states. 
1325 See, for example, Art. 68 of the PCA with Armenia; Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, 




explicit reference to facilitating contacts and exchange, or, in EU jargon, ‘twinning’, as well as 
assistance concerning elections.  
A further type of EU document stressed the relevance of democratization for the EU-
NIS context: the EU Common Strategies to Russia and to Ukraine.1326 These politically highly 
relevant documents by the European Council, which between 1999 and 2003 defined the overall 
EU policy towards a country and/or region, repeatedly stressed the importance of 
democratization of the two target states as a condition for peace and prosperity and also mention 
that the EU should provide support for that process. The Common Strategy on Russia identified 
several fields of support, in particular, the rule of law, institutional reform, administrative reform, 
an independent judiciary, electoral support, support to NGOs and the freedom of the media, as 
well as, rather uniquely, the training of young politicians. The EU Common Strategy on Ukraine 
was less elaborate, but stressed efforts in the field of democratic local self-governance and the 
free media.1327 It needs to be stressed though that these fields could also be promoted through 
the EIDHR. 
 
c) The Mediterranean States: The MEDA Programme 
 
The MEDA programme – taking its name from parts of its French title ‘mesures 
d’accompagnement’ – was between 1995 and 2006 the EU’s main assistance programme for the 
Southern Mediterranean region.1328 It covered for the entire period Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and the West Bank. Turkey, Malta, and Cyprus 
benefited under MEDA until being covered by specific pre-accession instruments, Israel could as 
a high income state only participate in regional programmes, and Libya, until 2004 under various 
kinds of EU sanctions, remained excluded from the programme. It was granted observer status in 
2004.  
 EU assistance to the Mediterranean region started as part of the EEC’s ‘Global 
Mediterranean Policy’ in 1982.1329 Unlike the cases of Asia and Latin America and following the 
ACP model, assistance was then provided on the basis of bilateral protocols that accompanied 
the various cooperation agreements concluded with the respective states in the mid-late 1970s.1330 
                                                     
1326 Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 on Russia (1999/414/CFSP), OJ 1999 L157/1; 
European Council Common Strategy of 11 December 1999 on Ukraine, OJ 1999 L331/1.  
1327 Common Strategy on Russia, at Part II, (a) and (b); Common Strategy on Ukraine, at Part III, para. 50.  
1328 For a general overview, see Court of Auditors, Special Report No 5/2006 concerning the MEDA programme, 
together with the Commission’s replies, OJ 2006 C200/1.  
1329 K. Pieters, ‘The Mediterranean Countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon)’, 
in S. Blockmans and A. Łazowski (eds), The European Union and its Neighbours (2006), at 396. 
1330 See, for example, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2210/78 of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion of 




A regulation of 1986 provided more detailed and harmonized procedural rules for the 
implementation of these numerous protocols.1331 The thematic focus of assistance was similar in 
all protocols and mainly encompassed the agricultural sector, industry and services, science and 
technology, trade, and the social dimension.1332 In 1992, as part of the so-called New 
Mediterranean Policy, new assistance protocols, a new regulation on the application of the 
protocols, and a new regulation on regional Mediterranean projects were adopted.1333 The major 
thematic novelty was the additional focus on the environmental dimension, in particular in 
regional projects.1334 
The Barcelona Declaration of 27 and 28 November 1995 launched the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which brought considerable changes to the relationship of the 
parties.1335 First, the objectives of the new partnership went far beyond earlier commitments, as 
the EMP envisaged three comprehensive sectors of engagement: the political and security 
dimension, which aimed at establishing a common area of peace and stability and encompassed 
democratization; the economic and financial dimension, which aimed at creating an area of 
shared prosperity and envisaged the progressive establishment of a free trade area and an increase 
in development aid; the social, cultural, and human dimension, which aimed at increasing 
understanding and exchanges between the various cultures and its civil societies.1336  
Secondly, the system of financial protocols was replaced by the unilateral MEDA 
programme, which from then on was to be the EU’s principal instrument for the provision of aid 
to the countries of the region as well as for the realization of the three objectives of the EMP.1337 
Overall, however, the primary focus of the MEDA programme was the economic and trade 
dimension.1338 In 2000 a planned amendment adjusted the programme to new developments.1339 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Algeria, OJ 1978 L263/1; Council Regulation (EEC) No 3177/82 of 22 November 1982 on the conclusion of a 
Protocol of financial and technical cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria. In the same year, 1982, protocols were also concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.  
1331 Council Regulation no. 3973/86 ‘concerning the application of the Protocols on financial and technical 
cooperation concluded between the Community and Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, 
Malta and Cyprus’, OJ 1986 L370/5. 
1332 See, for example, Arts. 1 and 3 of the Protocol on financial and technical cooperation in Algeria. 
1333 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1762/92 of 29 June 1992 on the implementation of the Protocols on financial and 
technical cooperation concluded by the Community with Mediterranean non-member countries, OJ 1992 L181/1; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 1763/92 of 29 June 1992 concerning financial cooperation in respect of all 
Mediterranean non-member countries, OJ 1992 L181/5.  
1334 Ibid. 
1335 Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27th-28th November 1995.  
1336 Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference – 27-28/11/1995. 
1337 Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 of 23 July 1996 on financial and technical measures to accompany 
(MEDA) the reform of economic and social structure in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, OJ 
1996 L189/1. 
1338 Art. 2(2) and Annex II, sections I, II, and III of the MEDA regulation.  
1339 Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000 of 27 November 2000 amending Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on 
financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the 




The new MEDA regulation (often referred to as MEDA II), applicable from 2000 to 2006, 
introduced some changes concerning procedural issues, like on comitology and the introduction 
of CSPs and added a new focus area (‘underprivileged groups’). The 1996 MEDA regulation 
envisaged a financial reference amount of 3 424.5 million Euros, while the 2000 regulation 
mentioned that the EU planned to spend about 5 350 million Euros.1340According to the Court of 
Auditors, between 1995 and 2005 about 6 800 million Euros were committed under national 
programmes for the eight permanent Mediterranean aid recipients and for regional projects, 
which is about 626 million Euros annually for each covered country.1341  
The various bilateral financial protocols in force under the Global and the New 
Mediterranean Policy did not foresee any democracy promotion, in particular also not after the 
1991 November resolution by the Council and the Member States officially launched the EU’s 
policy of democracy promotion. On the one hand, it has already been seen that the EU hesitated 
with the immediate implementation of the new policy in difficult regional contexts, for example, 
in Asia. On the other hand, several authors have explained the EU’s cautious approach in the 
Mediterranean by more specific reasons, in particular, by fears of Islamist groups gaining power 
through democratic elections, as had happened in Algeria in 1991.1342  
Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s, with the launch of the EMP and the adoption of the 
MEDA programme, democracy and democratization finally also became a topic in EU-
Mediterranean relations. There were some references in the Barcelona Declaration and the 
preamble of the MEDA programme that indicated a continuation of the hesitant approach, like 
an allusion to the sovereignty principle and references to, despite the goal of democracy 
promotion, the need for “ respecting international law” and “the territorial integrity 
and…frontiers” of states, which was unseen in other regulations.1343 However, at the same time 
the MEDA regulation also included similar provisions on the topic of democracy promotion as 
basically all other assistance regulations in force, like Tacis. It mentioned the general objective of 
contributing to the “reinforcement of political stability and democracy” in Article 2(1) and 
included a political conditionality clause in the form of an essential elements clause in Article 
3.1344 It envisaged the provision of democracy assistance, but was, similar to the 1996 Tacis 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Community’s MEDA Aid Programme: A Strategic Instrument of Civilian Power?, 8 European Foreign Affairs Review 3 
(2003), at 347f.  
1340 Article 1(3) of the MEDA regulations.  
1341 Court of Auditors, Special Report No 5/2006, at 12. Importantly, the MEDA funds given to Turkey, Cyprus and 
Malta are not included here.  
1342 See, for example, R. Youngs, ‘The European Union and Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean: A New or 
Disingenuous Strategy?’, 9 Democratization 1 (2002), at 40. 
1343 Preamble of the 1996 MEDA regulation. 
1344 Article 3 of the MEDA regulation. Fierro, at 357. The procedure for the use of the clause, in particular, that the 
Council would decide by qualified majority or unanimously, was due to disagreements by the Member States, only 




regulation, general and unstructured as regards listing individual fields of support. Annex II to the 
MEDA regulation, which was devoted to more concrete measures of assistance, only mentioned 
democracy assistance very generally and, moreover, only as one of eleven sub-fields of the 
broader sector ‘socioeconomic balance’. Additionally, civil society and media support were 
enumerated as part of the sub-field of ‘good governance’, without, however, clarifying the exact 
link between these concepts. Specific Council ‘guidelines for the establishment of the NIPs’, 
which constituted very particular and unique documents through which the Council influenced 
the MEDA programming process, stressed that considerable efforts would be devoted to 
democracy promotion, and that the development of civil society should be one specific field of 
engagement in the entire region.1345 However, overall the particular fields of engagement 
remained weakly defined also in these documents. The amendment to the MEDA regulation in 
2000 introduced two important changes as regards democracy assistance that rendered the 
relevant provisions slightly more precise. First, it expressly mentioned that the strengthening of 
democracy should primarily happen through NGOs and, secondly, it included the field of rule of 
law as focus area. More concretely, it mentioned cooperation in judicial and criminal matters, the 
strengthening of institutions, which guarantee the independence and effectiveness of the judicial 
system, and the training of national security services and civil protection. Like ALA and Tacis, no 
specific amounts or percentages of the overall funding were reserved for democracy promotion.  
 In the early 2000s, as part of several efforts to increase the profile of human rights and 
democratization in the EU-Mediterranean relationship, the Commission suggested the 
introduction of an instrument of incentive conditionality, which was not explicitly foreseen in the 
MEDA regulation, but could be based on it: the - later – so-called Democracy Facility.1346 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, it promised extra funding for countries willing to draft and implement 
specific plans or strategies on human rights and democracy. In practice, only two countries – 
Morocco and Egypt – received additional funding under this facility, which was, form 2007 on, 
replaced by a different, ENPI tool.1347 
Other major policy tools of the EU-Mediterranean framework also referred to democracy 
promotion, mixing very explicit pro-democracy statements with hesitations to address the topic 
equally.1348 As part of the EMP the EU concluded so-called ‘Euro-Mediterranean association 
                                                                                                                                                                      
regards the procedure for adopting the appropriate measures where an essential element for the continuation of 
support measures for a Mediterranean Partner is lacking, OJ 1998 L113/3.  
1345 Council Decision 96/706/EC of 6 December 1996 concerning the adoption of the guidelines for the indicative 
programmes concerning financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of economic and social 
structures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (MEDA), , OJ 1996 L325/20. 
1346 COM(2003) 294 final, at 14; Principles for the Implementation of a Governance Facility under ENPI, at 2.  
1347 Principles for the Implementation of a Governance Facility under ENPI, at 2.  
1348 For a broader overview of EU-Mediterranean relations in the early 2000s see: M. Maresceau and E. Lannon 




agreements’ with most of the MEDA states, which entered into force between 1998 and 2006 
and are still valid.1349 All of these agreements included a political conditionality clause that 
stressed both parties’ adherence to democracy and human rights protection. Like the PCAs, the 
association agreements established a political dialogue, but unlike all PCAs, only the agreements 
with Jordan and Tunisia expressly foresaw that this dialogue should also discuss the topic of 
democratization.1350 Moreover, different from the PCAs and several agreements in Latin America, 
none of the Mediterranean agreements included a whole title on cooperation on democracy and 
human rights. The only partial exception was the interim association agreement with Palestine of 
February 1997, that explicitly envisaged some form of democracy assistance (dialogue on 
democracy, active citizenship, etc.).1351  
In 2000, the European Council adopted a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean 
Region – the third of in total three common strategies ever adopted by the European Council, 
which strongly stipulated that the promotion of democracy was one of the core objectives of the 
EU’s policy towards the Mediterranean.1352 It devoted considerable space to determining the 
principle tools to be used in pursuing this objective, amongst which it stressed political dialogue 
and democracy assistance. It mentioned various fields of support, including support for judicial 
reform, institution building, freedom of expression, the media, and NGO development, most of 
which had already been identified in the MEDA programme. The major novelty was the 
reference to the freedom of expression. As with the Common Strategies on Russia and Ukraine, 
the objectives of this type of document could also be achieved through the EIDHR and did 
therefore not necessarily define the scope of the MEDA programme.  
 Finally, as already mentioned in Chapter 3, in 2003 the Commission published a very 
detailed and specific communication on EU democracy and human rights promotion in the 
Mediterranean region, which stipulated ten recommendations, what where welcomed by the 
Council.1353 As regards the MEDA programme, it foresaw a stronger focus on good governance, 
democracy, and human rights in CSPs and NIPs, at national and regional level, as well as, the use 
of MEDA funds for the introduced Democracy Facility.1354 
  
                                                     
1349 See the collection of agreements in the Council’s agreement database.  
1350 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, OJ 2002 L129/3. 
1351 Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade and cooperation between the European 
Community, of the one part, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian 
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1352 Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean Region (2004/45/CFSP), OJ 
2000 L183/5. After having been extended once, it applied till 2006.  
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d) The ACP states: The Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement 
 
EU development assistance to the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states has 
always been provided in a different framework than assistance to all other geographical regions. 
Rather than by a unilateral regulation, assistance was foreseen in multilateral agreements 
concluded between the various ACP states, the EEC/EC, and the Member States, and funding 
originated from the European Development Fund (EDF), a fund that is separate from the EU 
budget. At the same time, the programmes have always been implemented by the Commission, 
just like other development programmes. ACP aid therefore constitutes a hybrid system, 
involving intergovernmental and supranational institutions and procedures.  
 The framework dates back to the 1950s and the foundation of the EEC. As indicated in 
Chapter 4, development policy was then not regulated in the EEC-Treaty, except for the relations 
with the overseas countries and territories (OCTs) that had a special, mainly colonial, relationship 
with individual Member States.1355 They should be targeted with preferential trade measures and 
receive assistance for their social and economic development, which was, in particular, regulated 
in a special Implementing Convention annexed to the EEC-Treaty.1356 Soon after the adoption of 
the Treaty of Rome a large number of the OCTs became independent – a situation that called for 
a redefinition of the relations with these states. In result, the EEC, its Member States, and 18 
African States and Madagascar concluded the so-called Yaoundé Agreements, which entered into 
force in 1964 and 1971. In 1971 the so-called Arusha Agreement with three former British 
African colonies also entered into force.1357 Not soon afterwards the EEC brought the – then 
already 48 – African, Caribbean and Pacific states into a single framework and concluded the first 
Lomé Convention (signed in 1975, in force in 1976). It was followed by Lomé II (signed in 1979, 
in force in 1981), Lomé III (signed in 1984, in force in 1985) and Lomé IV (signed in 1989, in 
force in 1990, with a revision in 1995).1358 In the late 1990s, a broader revision of EU-ACP 
relations led to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 that is valid until 2020 and is being 
revised in five-year intervals.1359 By 2000, the number of ACP countries signatories to the 
agreement had risen to 78 countries. With the accession of Timor Leste in 2003, the number 
increased to 79. At the same time, the specific Treaty provisions on OCT’s have always remained 
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1359 Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, OJ 




applicable for those countries and territories that did not gain independence, but retained special 
relationships with EU Member States.  
As indicated, each of these agreements was accompanied by a special fund, the EDF, 
which provided the means for achieving the objectives of the agreements as well as covering aid 
to the OCTs. The EDF is established by an Internal Agreement of the Member States meeting 
with in the Council, which lays down the overall amount, the contributions of each Member 
State, as well as how the funds should be distributed among national, regional and other 
programmes.1360 A specific Council Financial Regulation applicable to the EDF regulates the 
financial implementation of the funds and the presentation and auditing of the accounts.1361 
Frequent calls for the integration of the EDF into the EU budget, which is suggested to increase 
democratic legitimacy (due to the involvement of the European Parliament) as well as the 
efficiency and effectiveness of aid and its implementation, have yet been delayed at least until 
2013, when the current multiannual financial framework ends.1362 The 9th EDF, applicable for the 
period 2003-2007, had a budget of 15 200 million Euros and the 10th EDF, applicable for the 
period 2008-2013, is endowed with 22 700 million Euros, which is a high number, but is of 
course distributed among a very high figure of countries.  
The main objectives of the four, broadly similar, Lomé Conventions were the promotion 
the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states and the consolidation of EU-
ACP relations in an ever growing number of sectors.1363 A particular focus was always placed on 
trade, with the aim of integrating the ACPs into the world economy; however, preferential 
trading arrangements increasingly caused difficulties under WTO rules.1364 Other fields identified 
in the Convention were the environment, agriculture and fisheries, food security, commodities, 
services, culture, and the social sector, which should also be a particular focus of EC assistance. 
The Cotonou Agreement explicitly added a political dimension that expressed itself in the aims of 
the Agreement and in a separate title on the political dimension. In addition to promoting the 
economic, cultural and social development of ACP states, Article 1 of the Cotonou Agreement 
also stipulates that this should be done “with a view to contributing to peace and security and to 
promoting a stable and democratic political environment”. The political dimension provides for a 
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political dialogue, envisages peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution policies, 
addresses migration, and includes the political conditionality clause of the agreement.  
As regards democracy promotion and assistance, Lomé IV of 1989 was widely praised for 
having been the first EC external agreement to address the topic of human rights. It included 
something like a first kind of a human rights clause, albeit without using the essential elements 
terminology and without providing for a suspension mechanism. It only stressed the attachment 
of the parties to the agreement to all kinds of human rights and mentioned that development was 
centred on mankind and implied the respect for and promotion of human rights (Article 5(1) and 
(2) of Lomé IV). Further, upon request from ACP states, funds could be allocated to human 
rights projects (Article 5(3) of Lomé IV). Given that the signing of Lomé IV occurred before the 
EU’s policy shift, there was unsurprisingly no mentioning of democracy promotion or assistance 
in the Convention.  
The revision of Lomé IV in 1995 introduced important changes. It amended Article 5, 
which from then on also mentioned “democratic principles, the consolidation of the rule of law 
and good governance” as closely linked to development policy, without, however, explicitly 
identifying it as objective of the agreement. Several explicit references to the provision of 
democracy assistance strongly support that it had become an objective. First, just like in the 
sector of human rights, measures aimed at democratization, rule of law and good governance 
could be implemented upon request of an ACP state (Article 5(3) of revised Lomé IV). Secondly, 
“support for institutional and administrative reform measures, with a view to democratization 
and the rule law” was also foreseen as one of the regular fields of cooperation or assistance 
(Article 224(m) of revised Lomé IV). Thirdly, Article 5(3) of revised Lomé IV, together with 
Article 3 of the Second Financial Protocol, envisaged some kind of incentive conditionality. They 
reserved Euros for the period 1995-2000 for projects on ‘institutional and administrative reform’, 
with a view to democratization and the rule of law”, which countries willing to carry out such 
reforms would receive in addition to their national allocations.1365 Overall, though, no more 
specific forms of democracy support were mentioned though in the Convention. The formerly 
vague human rights clause was replaced by an essential elements clause that allowed for the 
suspension of the agreement (Article 366a of revised Lomé IV). A particular feature of the Lomé 
clause was that a suspension had in principle to be preceded by consultations among the 
parties.1366 All in all, while the revised Convention did not explicitly identify democracy 
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promotion as an aim of the agreement, it definitely envisaged the provision of democracy 
assistance. 
The Cotonou Agreement (2000) – revised in 2005 and 2010 –, which until 2020 regulates 
EU relations with the ACP states, refers to democracy promotion and assistance in a much larger 
number of provisions than its predecessors and also more than all unilateral assistance 
regulations. It refers to democracy promotion in Article 1, first paragraph, which broadly 
stipulates the goals of the Agreement. But rather than mentioning democratization clearly as an 
objective of the agreement, it uses a slightly vague formulation (…“with a view to…promoting a 
stable and democratic political environment”). Article 1, fourth paragraph, expressly declares that 
building the institutional framework necessary for the functioning of a democratic society is an 
integral part of EU-ACP relations. Article 9 of the Agreement, which is entitled ‘essential 
elements and fundamental element’, repeats the general objective of democracy promotion by 
mentioning that the “(P)artnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, 
processes of democratization, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance”. Quite 
uniquely, Article 9 also provides a definition of democracy, while at the same time stressing that 
each country develops its own form. The definition remains general and mixes purposes, results, 
and organizational features of democracy. It mentions that “(D)emocratic principles are 
universally recognized principles underpinning the organization of the State to ensure the 
legitimacy of its authority, the legality of its actions reflected in its constitutional, legislative and 
regulatory system, and the existence of participatory mechanisms.” Article 9 also provides 
definitions of the rule of law and of good governance. It mentions that the rule of law entails 
“effective and accessible means of legal redress, an independent legal system guaranteeing 
equality before the law and an executive that is fully subject to the law” (Article 9(2)). The 
definition of good governance is more elaborate and refers to “the transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable 
and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public 
authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and 
distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming 
in particular at preventing and combating corruption” (Article 9(3)). Compared to all other 
external agreements of the EC as well as unilateral assistance regulations, the Cotonou 
Agreement definitely goes much further in attempting to explain the content of concepts relevant 
for the partnership, even if it remains general and unspecific as regards some terms, like 
democracy.  
Democracy assistance is not identified as a separate area of support, like, amongst others, 




and gender issues (Title I, Chapter 2 ‘Areas of support’ in development). The sector ‘Institutional 
development and capacity building’ (Article 33), includes several forms of democracy assistance 
though. It mentions that “(C)ooperation shall pay systematic attention to institutional aspects and 
in this context, shall support the efforts of the ACP States to develop and strengthen structures, 
institutions and procedures that help to: (a) promote and sustain democracy, human dignity, 
social justice and pluralism, with full respect for diversity within and among societies; (b) 
promote and sustain universal and full respect for and observance and protection of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms; (c) develop and strengthen the rule of law; and improve access 
to justice, while guaranteeing the professionalism and independence of the judicial systems; and 
(d) ensure transparent and accountable governance and administration in all public institutions.  
The Cotonou Agreement contains a similar political conditionality clause as its 
predecessor, including the demand for consultations among the parties, except in urgent cases, 
before aid (or other parts of the agreement) can be suspended.1367 A more particular feature of 
the Agreement is the elevation of the principle of good governance as a ‘fundamental element’ – 
not essential element – of the agreement, which does not allow for suspension, but can give rise 
to a special consultation procedure.1368 
  
e) Palestine: Special Assistance Programmes 
 
Palestine was one of the few entities that due to its specific status and EU interest for a quite long 
period of time benefited from special country-specific assistance programmes, next to receiving 
assistance through regional programmes. EU assistance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip started 
in 1971 with the first EEC contribution to the budget of the UN Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA) that continues until today.1369 In the early 1980s, the EEC additionally started to 
provide direct assistance through an NGO support programme.1370 Finally, following its pledge of 
support at the Washington donor’s conference after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 
September 1993, the EU started a separate assistance programme that focused broadly on 
sustainable economic and social development (Regulation No 1794/94).1371 In parallel, Palestine 
benefited under regional MEDA Mediterranean programmes from 1994 on and received national 
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funds under the MEDA programme from 1995 on.1372 From 1994 to 1999, EC total 
commitments under the three main budget headings on Palestine amounted to 639 million 
Euros, of which 447 million Euros were paid out in the same period.1373  
 When Regulation No. 1794/94 was adopted in 1994, it did not mention democracy 
promotion as objective of the assistance programme and also lacked a political conditionality 
clause, apparently for fears of interrupting the peace process, but also in line with the general 
absence of democracy promotion in EU-Mediterranean relations. It did foresee the provision of 
democracy assistance though, as Article 2(1) of the regulation mentioned the “setting-up and 
improvement of institutions necessary for the proper working of the public administration and 
the advancement of democracy and human rights” as one priority area of support. The revision 
of Regulation No 1794/94 in 1998 brought important changes. Article 1 was revised to expressly 
refer to political development as objective of EU assistance and the development of civil society 
was added as field of support (Article 2 of Regulation No 1794/94).1374 
 
f) South Africa: Special Assistance Programmes 
 
South Africa was the second state, which due to its specific problems and EU interest, in this 
case due to the apartheid regime, was targeted by a series of special EU assistance programmes. 
First EU efforts go back to a September 1985 decision by the EC Member States’ Foreign 
Ministers, which decided to pursue a twin-track approach of imposing sanctions as well as 
assisting disadvantaged communities and victims of apartheid.1375 The resulting ‘Special 
Programme for the Victims of Apartheid’ was implemented between 1986 and 1990, with funds, 
due to the sensitivity of the issue, being channeled through European NGOs, rather than being 
directly administered by the EC.1376 In 1991, when apartheid started to be dismantled, the 
thematically broader ‘Special Programme for South Africa’, that also had a socio-economic focus, 
started to be implemented. In a more relaxed atmosphere, the EC switched to self-management; 
however, the South African government remained excluded in the choice of themes of support, 
which is usually not the case with general assistance programmes.1377 In 1994, after the first free 
elections in South Africa, the EU started to implement the ‘European Programme for 
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Reconstruction and Development’ (EPRD), which provided support to South Africa’s own 
national development plan.1378 It supported a much broader range of themes than before, 
including socio-economic topics, health, rural development, regional integration, and the 
environment. In 2000, the thematic scope was enlarged to also encompass trade and efforts for 
South Africa’s integration into the world economy,1379 which stood in direct connection with the 
signing of a comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement in 1999.1380 The allocations for the 
programmes for South Africa rose from about 20 million Euros in 1986 to about 72 million 
Euros in the mid-1990s. From the late 1990s to 2006, they were about 130 million Euros 
annually.1381 
 Democratization featured in all assistance programmes. The official aim of the first 
special programme on apartheid was to foster the “transition to a peaceful, stable, democratic and 
non-racial South Africa by assisting the victims of political repression”.1382 Similarly, the 1991 
Special Programme for South Africa, envisaged assistance in the transition to democracy, which, 
in practice was also used for the preparation of the first free elections in 1994.1383 The regulation 
underpinning the EPRD foresaw in Article 1 that the aim of EC cooperation was, next to 
promoting sustainable and social development, “to consolidate the foundations laid for a 
democratic society and a State governed by the rule of law in which human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are respected”. Article 2 of the same regulation mentioned as the first type 
of operation to be carried out “support for democratization and the protection of human rights”, 
without, however, going into more detail. After its revision in 2000, Article 2(c) added the 
“support to democratization, the protection of human rights, sound public management, the 
strengthening of local governments and the involvement of civil society in the development 
process” as one area of cooperation.  
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Since 1 January 20071384 
 
g) The European Neighbourhood States in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean:  
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, following a reform process in the field of external development and 
cooperation policy, several new assistance regulations entered into force on 1 January 2007. 
Definitely the most notable of the new programmes – in particular in terms of the political 
relevance of its target states – is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), which was established by Regulation No 1638/2006 of 24 October 2006 (or ENPI 
regulation).1385 It is, as the name indicates, the EU’s principal programme in support of achieving 
the objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and of the so-called Strategic 
Partnership with Russia, a state that preferred not to participate in the ENP.1386 Since 2009, it also 
finances projects within the frameworks of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Euromed) or 
Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, which supplement the ENP as regards 
Europe’s southern and eastern neighbours and envisage upgraded engagement with these 
states.1387 The ENPI therefore covers Russia and the countries that form part of the ENP: 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Russia (in the East), as well as 
Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Israel (in the South).1388 Given this geographical focus, the 
ENPI is basically the successor to the Tacis and the MEDA programmes, as well as to Regulation 
No 1734/94 on Palestine.1389 
 While the general aim of the ENPI is the promotion of prosperity and good 
neighbourliness (Article 1(1) of the ENPI regulation), Article 8 of the regulation mentions a long 
list of themes of support, including trade, legal and regulatory approximation, environmental 
protection, social development, poverty reduction, health education, SME development, energy, 
transport, food safety, justice and security, culture, and border management (Article 2(2)(a)-(cc) 
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of the ENPI regulation). The regulation foresees a financial reference amount of 11 181 million 
Euros for the 2007-2013 period. The 2009 EU budget stipulated a total commitment of 1 650 
million Euros, of which, next to some minor allocations, about 790 million were earmarked for 
the Mediterranean countries, about 410 million for Eastern Europe, and 300 million for 
Palestine.1390 The numbers have increased since then, especially as regards the Eastern states.1391 
Compared to the budgets of the Tacis and MEDA programmes, the ENPI is, in both covered 
regions, endowed with more funds than its predecessors.  
 The current thematic focus of the ENPI and, concurrently, the character of the ENPI as 
main development programme for the ENP countries and Russia, only emerged gradually during 
the reform process of EC external assistance policies. Its final thematic scope was strongly 
influenced by the wishes of the European Parliament and by the character of the other new 
assistance programmes, in particular the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), all of 
which were, of course, just pieces of a single jigsaw, which had to be adjusted to each other. 
Initially, the Commission envisaged a New Neighbourhood Instrument with a more limited 
thematic focus,1392 which should basically only support crossborder and regional cooperation 
activities, like projects concerning border management and the socio-economic development of 
external border regions of the EU.1393 Something similar was carried out by the so-called 
‘neighbourhood programmes’, that were – based on various existing regulations, like 
INTERREG, MEDA and Tacis – implemented from about 2004 on and constituted one of the 
first activities of the then young ENP.1394 As such, the Commission envisaged the New 
Neighbourhood Instrument as a complementary measure to the planned Economic Cooperation 
and Development Instrument, which had been devised as the main development programme for 
basically all third, developing states, including the ENP countries.1395 The Parliament objected to 
such a structure out of concern about its lack of influence due to the small number of assistance 
programmes and out of the fear of watering down the concept of development if all third stats 
were addressed in a single instrument.1396 Consequently, the New Neighbourhood Instrument 
was made a thematically more comprehensive assistance programme for the ENP region and 
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Russia,1397 while the – in the meantime renamed – Development Cooperation and Economic 
Cooperation Instrument should not be applicable to the ENP states.1398  
 The preamble of the ENPI regulation contains several references to democracy and 
democratization and, in particular, stresses that democracy and respect for human rights are 
‘shared values’ of the EU and the various ENPI partner states (recitals (3) and (4) of the ENPI 
regulation) and that EU assistance should support the partner countries’ commitment to these 
‘common values’ (recital (8)).1399 Democracy promotion is also mentioned in the main text of the 
regulation, however, not in Article 1(1), which stipulates the overall objectives of the ENPI, that 
is, prosperity and good neighbourliness, but in Article 1(3), which forms part of the essential 
elements clause of the regulation. It stipulates that “(T)he European Union is founded on the 
values of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law, and seeks to promote commitment to these values in partner countries through dialogue and 
cooperation”. Noticeable in this provision is the lack of a strong and direct language on the 
objective of democracy promotion (“seeks to promote commitment to…”), as has for example 
been used in the Tacis regulation and in the concurrently adopted DCI regulation. However, 
there is nevertheless no doubt about this objective. Article 1(3) of the ENPI also expressly 
mentions two instruments of democracy promotion, one of which is assistance (“cooperation”). 
Article 2(2), which contains a long but partly overlapping, 28-odd item list of possible themes of 
support under the ENPI, expressly mentions several more specific forms of democracy. The 
most relevant item is paragraph (l) of Article 2(2), which stipulates that assistance shall be 
provided for “supporting democratization, inter alia, by enhancing the role of civil society 
organizations and promoting media pluralism, as well as through electoral observation and 
assistance”. Paragraph (d) mentions “promoting the rule of law and good governance, including 
strengthening the effectiveness of public administration and the impartiality and effectiveness of 
the judiciary, and supporting the fight against corruption and fraud”. Paragraph (m) foresees 
measures “fostering the development of civil society and of non-governmental organizations”. 
Paragraph (k) envisages measures “promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”, and, finally, paragraph (i) envisages, among other actions in the social sphere, actions 
in “respect for trade union rights”. All in all, the enumeration of types of democracy assistance in 
the ENPI regulation is quite detailed if compared to earlier regulations. However, like all other 
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programmes, no funds or percentages of available funds are reserved for democracy assistance 
and/or specific themes thereof. 
 The ENPI contains a political conditionality clause of a new type that is important for 
democracy assistance. While not only authorizing the parties to “take appropriate steps” in case 
of violations of essential elements, Article 28(1) of the ENPI regulation envisages, that 
“assistance shall primarily be used to support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratization process in partner 
countries”. Rather than suspending or reducing aid, it should therefore be redirected to 
democracy and human rights assistance. The provision has its direct roots in the EU’s actions 
towards Belarus following the 1997 suspension of most Tacis assistance and represents a new 
focus on conditionality that stresses positive features of the tool.  
The ENPI uses conditionality, including political conditionality, in a further way, that is, 
as incentive conditionality. Article 7(2) of the ENPI regulation stipulates that, in allocating ENPI 
funds, account should be taken of, amongst others, the partner states’ “progress towards 
implementing agreed objectives, including on governance and on reform”. On the one hand, 
progress on governance reform is therefore one of the general criteria in deciding on country 
allocations. On the other hand, the Commission has developed the so-called ENPI ‘Governance 
Facility’, discussed in Chapter 3, which gives additional funds to those ENPI countries that show 
most progress in implementing governance aspects of the ENP Action Plans.1400 During the 
2007-2013 programming period, in total about 300 million Euros were reserved for the 
Governance Facility, which should each year only be given to at most two countries.1401 So far, 
Ukraine and Morocco, and later also Moldova, have benefited under the facility; however, it has 
overall kept a rather low profile and was criticized for lack of impact.1402 The additional funds do 
not necessarily have to be used for governance-related projects, even if this is encouraged.1403 It 
can therefore be expected that at least some of these funds were used for democracy assistance.  
 Democracy and human rights assistance is further privileged, as support to civil society 
and non-state actors aimed at promoting democracy and human rights are exempt from the usual 
requirement of co-financing through national, public funds (Article 4(4) of the ENPI regulation). 
Finally, threats to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights allow an ad hoc review of the 
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approved programme for a specific country (Article 7(6) of the ENPI regulation), which was, for 
example, done after the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011.1404  
 As mentioned, the ENP has not replaced the existing framework of relations between the 
EU and the ENP states, but has mainly added an additional layer of relations, with further 
objectives and tools. This means that the existing agreements with the ENP states, that is, the 
PCA and the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, have remained in force and continue to function 
as a major framework for the relations of the EU with the respective states. Indeed, the bodies 
established under these agreements participate in the implementation of the ENP, like the 
Cooperation Councils, which have to endorse the ENP Action Plans (APs). Nevertheless, the 
ENP in principal also envisages the conclusion of new ‘specific’ neighbourhood agreements, as 
explicitly stipulated in primary law (Article 8 TEU). So far, negations on a New Enhanced 
Agreement or Association Agreement, that will establish a free trade area, have only been 
launched (in March 2007) and are ongoing with Ukraine.1405  
 So far, the most important new type of document introduced by the ENP is the Action 
Plans (APs). These are documents that outline a jointly defined agenda of how relations between 
the EU and an ENP state would further be developed and which reforms a state would 
undertake during a time-frame of, usually, three to five years.1406 The APs matter as regards the 
ENPI, as both are instruments aiming to achieve the goals of the ENP: The APs define concrete 
steps to be undertaken in the short and medium term, while the ENPI is the principal instrument 
to assist in the implementation of the ENP. Nevertheless, the priority areas identified in the APs 
are not at the same time priority areas of intervention under the ENPI. The latter’s priority areas 
are identified in the country-specific and region-specific ENPI Strategy Papers (SPs) as well as 
Indicative Programmes (IPs). However, when adopting these ENPI SPs and IPs, the APs have to 
be/are taken into account. It has to be added – to render things even more complex – that in the 
case of Ukraine in 2010 the AP has been replaced by a so-called Association Agenda, that aims at 
preparing for and facilitating the entry into force of the new EU-Ukraine association agreement 
(which is still being negotiated). Based on the general Association Agenda, each year an Action 
Plan with specific priorities is agreed, which again factors into ENPI programming. 
 All APs (and the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda) follow a blueprint suggested by the 
Commission, according to which the topics of ‘democracy and the rule of law’ are addressed in 
the first thematic section of the AP, entitled ‘Political dialogue and reform’. Each AP therefore 
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addresses the topic, however, the various specific topics mentioned in the APs differ from 
country to country, reflecting specific weaknesses and upcoming events or ongoing processes. 
For example, the EU/Ukraine AP, now replaced by the Association Agenda, called for free and 
fair presidential and parliamentary elections, the strengthening of local self-governance in line 
with the European Charter on Local Self-Governance, increased participation in governance by 
civil society, and the improvement of media freedom in accordance with Council of Europe 
recommendations. The EU/Jordan AP envisaged the establishment of a political dialogue 
between the European and the Jordanian Parliament, the promotion of a national dialogue on 
democracy, the reform of political party laws, the strengthening of the administration of justice, 
and the promotion of the freedom of expression.1407 The broad and general nature of goals 
mentioned in the APs was criticized for not allowing monitoring and follow-up.1408 However, the 
fact that democracy and rule of law are addressed in all APs makes it highly likely that the ENPI 
SPs and IPs also envisage democracy support. Indeed, basically all national (not regional!) ENPI 
SPs 2007-2013 and IPs 2007-2010 envisaged support in the sector.1409 
 Some of the more recent policy initiatives in the field of democracy promotion in the 
Mediterranean have been discussed in Chapter 3, like the suggested ‘Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity for the Southern Mediterranean’ (COM(2011) 200 final).  
 
h) Developing Countries in Latin America and Asia (including former Soviet  
Central Asia): The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
 
The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), established by Regulation No 1905/2006 (or 
DCI regulation), is since 1 January 2007 the second major new assistance programme and the 
EU’s principal programme for financing development measures in developing countries not 
benefitting under the ENPI or under Lomé and the EDF.1410 The DCI has quite a 
comprehensive geographical scope and currently covers 47 states, of which 18 are in Latin 
America, 19 in Asia, five in Central Asia, 4 in the Middle East, and one in Africa.1411 These are 
largely the states previously covered by the ALA regulation, plus the former Soviet Central Asian 
states, which are not covered by the ENP and have therefore been shifted to the group of 
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developing countries, as well as South Africa, which has always been addressed in specific 
assistance programmes. As discussed in Chapter 4, the list of DCI beneficiary countries is linked 
to the OECD/DAC list of ODA recipients and changes with the regular review of this list. If a 
country graduates from the DAC list, it can also no longer benefit under the DCI, but will be 
added to the list of countries benefitting under the Instrument for Cooperation with 
Industrialized and Other High-Income Countries (ICI), as happened with Saudi Arabia in 
2008/2009. It needs to be mentioned, though, that next to this primary geographical coverage, 
the DCI also finances five so-called ‘thematic programmes’ on the following topics/with the 
following titles: (1) ‘investing in people’, (2) ‘environment’, (3) ‘non-state actors and local 
authorities’, (4) ‘food security’, (5) ‘migration and asylum’.1412 These programmes are not only 
implemented in the DCI states, but also in ENPI and ACP/EDF states. As regards these 
programmes, the geographical scope of the DCI is therefore much larger.  
 The primary objective of the DCI is the eradication of poverty in the context of 
sustainable development, the pursuit of (other) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, as 
discussed shortly below, promoting democracy, good governance, human rights, and the rule of 
law (Article 2(1) of the DCI regulation). More specific objectives include the promotion of 
gender equality, the integration of developing countries into the world economy, and 
environmental protection (Article 2(1) of the DCI regulation). The regulation, which is applicable 
from 1.1.2007 to 31.12.2013, foresees a financial reference amount of 16 897 million Euros for 
the entire period, of which 2 980 million Euros are earmarked for geographical programmes in 
Latin America, 5 187 million Euros for programmes in Asia, 719 million Euros for programmes 
in Central Asia, 481 million Euros for the Middle East, and 980 million Euros (!) for South 
Africa. Latin American and Asian states receive slightly less than they did under the predecessor 
programmes, while the allocations for South Africa have slightly increased. The amount of 5 587 
million Euros, or 33% of all DCI funds, are earmarked for the five thematic programmes.1413  
 The drafting of the DCI was marked by considerable disagreement between the Council, 
the Commission, the Parliament, and, at times, also between different parliamentary committees. 
Not only the text of the DCI was disputed, but, as already indicated, the overall structure of the 
new system of external assistance programmes and the position of the DCI therein.1414 While the 
eventually adopted text represents a compromise, the considerable influence of the Parliament 
(which could co-decide the measure) and, in particular, of the Parliament’s Committee on 
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Development, is strongly evident. At the same time, the process leading to the adoption of the 
DCI is also an excellent example of the intensive informal processes that accompany formal 
legislative procedures, in this case, the co-decision procedure. 
 The first issue of discussion on the DCI, already mentioned, concerned the relation 
between the planned, new development programme and the neighbourhood programme. As 
discussed, the Commission first envisaged a geographically very broad new development 
programme that would also apply to ENP states and Russia, while the ENP programme would 
focus on cross-border activities only. In July 2004 it was decided that the ENP states and Russia 
would be targeted by a separate, thematically broad ENP programme, which left these states 
outside the scope of the planned development programmes.1415 However, with the settlement of 
this question, the dispute on the development programme was not over. The publication of the 
first proposal for the new “financing instrument for development cooperation and economic 
cooperation” (DCECI) in September 2004,1416 which was supposed to apply to all developing 
countries – including ENP states as well as ACP states – and all industrialized countries, gave rise 
to strong critique by the Development Committee of the Parliament. The body pointed out, 
amongst other things, the small number of new assistance regulations with long validity that 
reduced the Parliament’s influence overall, the inclusion of developing and industrialized 
countries into one programme that undermined the specificity of the concept of development, 
the insufficient substantive focus on development issues, and the inclusion of the EIDHR and of 
other programmes as a thematic programme rather than giving them a separate legal basis in a 
specific regulation.1417 Intensive informal consultations among the institutions started and 
continued until late 2005/early 2006. One important decision that influenced the proposal was 
taken in December 2005, when the European Council agreed not to integrate the EDF into the 
EU budget. This brought the ACP states outside the scope of the DCECI, which was, however, 
against the intentions of the Commission and the European Parliament. In early 2006 the 
institutions eventually decided to split the proposal on the DCECI into three separate texts: a 
proposal for a regulation on cooperation with developing countries (the (future) DCI), a proposal 
for a regulation on cooperation with industrialized countries (the (future) ICI), and a proposal for 
the EIDHR. The Commission also agreed to elaborate in more detail on development issues in 
the DCI, in particular, to create a link with the OECD. This informal agreement on important 
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points led to the first formal reading in the European Parliament on 18 May 2006, which 
accepted the Commission’s first proposal but suggested the mentioned, major changes.1418 It was 
followed, only a few days later, by a modified proposal for the DCI by Commission, which took 
account of most of the mentioned issues.1419 The Commission insisted on keeping the five 
thematic programmes within the DCI, in order to reduce the number of regulations, which had 
indeed been one of the major objectives of the entire reform.1420 Discussions continued during 
the summer and autumn of 2006, when final breaking points were settled, in particular on the 
percentage of ODA of all DCI assistance, on details concerning the thematic programmes, and 
on the involvement of the Parliament in the elaboration of DCI Strategy Papers and Indicative 
Programmes. In October, the Council adopted its common position, which was approved by the 
Parliament in December 2006.1421 All in all, intensive informal discussions went on for about 26 
months, while the DCI regulation was adopted by the Parliament in the stage of the second 
reading, without recourse to the conciliation procedure.  
 Democracy promotion and assistance occupy important positions in the DCI regulation, 
indeed, more than in any other of the new general assistance regulations. Recital six of the 
preamble declares respect for democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law, as 
‘fundamental’ to long-term development. Article 2(1) of the DCI regulation mentions the 
promotion of democracy, good governance, human rights, and the rule of law, next to poverty 
eradication, as primary objective of the programme. Additionally, it stipulates that “cooperation 
with partner countries and regions shall: – consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, gender equality and related 
instrument of international law”. This expressivity and prominence is remarkable, in particular 
also in comparison to the concurrently adopted ENPI regulation.  
As regards democracy assistance, reference should first be made to Article 3(3) of the 
regulation, which mentions – as one of the general principles of the regulation – that the 
promotion of democracy, good governance, human rights, gender equality, the rights of the child 
and of indigenous people, environmental sustainability and combating HIV/AIDS should be 
mainstreamed into all programmes funded by the DCI. Additionally, strengthening the rule of 
law, access to justice, and supporting civil society, should be given particular attention (Article 
3(3) of the DCI regulation). Article 5 of the DCI regulation focuses on democracy assistance 
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proper and lists the various thematic fields that the different geographical programmes for the 
various regions covered by the DCI (Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and 
South Africa) shall focus on. Article 5(2)(f) – (j) is devoted to ‘governance, democracy, human 
rights and support for institutional reform’. It mentions in paragraph (f), again rather generally, 
“promoting and protecting fundamental freedoms and human rights, strengthening democracy, 
the rule of law, access to justice and good governance, including actions to combat corruption”. 
Paragraph (g) calls for support for an active civil society, promoting civic dialogue, participation, 
reconciliation, and institution-building. Paragraphs (h) to (j) refer to issues of governance, namely 
to policy reform in the fields of security and justice, including asylum, migration, trafficking of 
human beings and drugs, corruption and money laundering and to supporting effective 
multilateralism. Articles (6) to (10) of the DCI regulation identify areas of ‘additional attention’ 
for individual geographical areas. Several mention a particular focus on good governance, human 
rights, constitutional reform and civil society development, and in the case of South Africa there 
is an explicit call for special attention to be given to democracy promotion (Article 10). All in all, 
next to the strong commitment to democracy promotion, the enumeration of fields of democracy 
assistance remains more general than, for example, the ENPI regulation.  
 Article 37 of the DCI regulation contains a political conditionality clause. Different from 
the ENPI, the clause requires consultations of the partner countries, before ‘appropriate 
measures’ can be taken, except in cases of urgency or if such consultations are refused. The 
clause is in this respect similar to the Cotonou Agreement. Also different from the ENPI 
agreement, it is not foreseen that assistance should be reallocated or limited to democracy and 
human rights promotion.  
 As regards the framework in which the DCI operates, that is, other crucial policy 
instruments of the EU towards the covered regions and/or countries of the region, there have 
not been major changes since 2006. Overall, the same agreements are in force and many of the 
above mentioned communications are still defining EU policy towards the region. Overall, the 
objective of democratization therefore continues to be a key objective in the EU’s relations with 
the particular countries concerned, even if some newer documents, like COM(2009) 495/3 on 
EU-Latin America relations, do – differently from the topic of human rights – not refer to it 
explicitly.1422  
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i) The ACP states: The Cotonou Agreement 
 
The reorganization of external assistance programmes, which was effective from 1.1.2007 on, did 
not affect the Cotonou Agreement, which remains applicable until 2020, and the EDF, which, as 
10th EDF, is currently valid for the period 2008-2013. As regards both, reference can be made to 
the discussion above.  
 The most important novelty as regards democracy promotion in the ACP-EU context has 
been the introduction of the ‘Governance Initiative for ACP countries’ in mid-2006, discussed in 
Chapter 3.1423 About 12% or 2.7 billion Euros were earmarked for the ‘Governance Initiative’ 
under the 10th EDF. Entirely different from the ENPI Governance Facility, which provided 
additional funding to three out of 16 countries, the ACP Governance Initiative provided 
additional funding to 67 of 79 ACP states. There was some variation in the amounts or 
percentages the individual states received; however, overall, the additional funding was due to its 
wide distribution considered very modest and therefore potentially ineffective, which was also 
noted by the Commission in a review of the Initiative in 2009.1424 At the same time, the 
implementation of the Initiative has stimulated a stronger dialogue on governance issues, which 
has been judged highly positive and beneficial by all participants in the process.1425 
 
 
j) The Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized and other  
High-Income Countries and Territories (ICI)  
 
The Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized and other High-Income Countries and 
Territories (ICI) is since 1 January 2007 the EU’s principal programme for ‘economic, financial, 
and technical and other cooperation’ with industrialized and other high-income countries and 
territories (Article 1 of the ICI regulation).1426 It replaced a similar programme on cooperation 
and the promotion of commercial relations with industrialized countries.1427 The ICI programme 
currently applies to about 17 states and territories, including the US, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand, several countries in the Near and Middle East, that is, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as states and territories in Asia, namely, 
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Japan, Korea, Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Macao, and Singapore.1428 As mentioned, 
once a country emancipates from the OECD/DAC list of ODA recipients, it will also no longer 
be able to benefit from the DCI and be shifted to the ICI. Quickly growing countries, like 
Kazakhstan, might therefore soon be moved from the DCI to the ICI programme.  
The general aim of the ICI is to strengthen links and to increase engagement with the 
target states in order to create a more favourable environment for the development of relations 
and of dialogue to, more generally, foster EU interests. The ICI therefore mainly finances, among 
others, partnerships between economic, academic, scientific parties, dialogues between political, 
economic, social actors and NGOs, educational and training programmes and exchanges, and 
projects on the enhancement of awareness about the EU (Article 4 of the ICI regulation). The 
financial reference amount for the programme during 2007-2013 is 172 million Euros, which is a 
comparatively small amount.  
 It has been mentioned that during the reform of EU external assistance, the programme 
for cooperation with industrialized countries was initially foreseen to be part of the thematically 
and geographically broader development and economic cooperation programme DCECI. Only 
upon strong critique by the Parliament’s Committee on Development, which aimed at preserving 
development as an independent policy, the proposal was split, and DCI and ICI therefore 
separated. Interestingly, the Parliament’s Committee on Trade, which was involved in the 
scrutiny of the DCECI and became the main committee to report on the ICI, preferred keeping a 
single instrument with ‘two chapters’, in particular because such an arrangement would have 
given the Parliament more powers in the legislative process (co-decision instead of consultation) 
as regards matters now covered in the ICI.1429  
 The list of countries to which the ICI applies demonstrates that there can still be a 
demand for democracy promotion and assistance, even if a country is highly developed in socio-
economic terms – basically none of the mentioned states or territories except for the four 
Western states and Japan and South Korea, is even an electoral democracy. However, the 
references to democracy promotion in the ICI are rather weak and would be entirely absent – as 
was the case under the predecessor of the ICI –1430 if not for the explicit demands of the 
European Parliament during the consultation process. The ICI regulation now refers to the EU’s 
foundational values/principles in recital (5) of its preamble and in Article 3(1), which also 
mentions generally that the EU “seeks to promote commitment to these principles in partner 
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countries through dialogue and cooperation”. Article 4, which lists areas and forms of 
cooperation, does not expressly refer to democracy assistance, but does not exclude it either. 
While democracy assistance is not explicitly envisaged, it can be provided. Unlike all other major 
new regulations, the ICI lacks a political conditionality clause.  
 
2. Overview of the Theme- and Actor-specific Development Assistance Programmes 
 
Before 1 January 2007 
 
a) Co-financing with European NGOs (or B7-6000) 
 
The programme ‘Co-financing with European NGOs’, which was for some time also referred to 
under the name of its budget article ‘B7-6000’,1431 operated between 1976 and 2006. During the 
first 22 years of operation it was carried out on the basis of the EU budget only. General and 
specific programming guidelines by the EU institutions, in particular so-called ‘General 
Conditions’ by the Commission, provided rules on its implementation. Only in mid-1998 and 
after C-106/96 UK v. Commission1432 put in danger all programmes without a legal basis in 
secondary law, the Council adopted a regulation on the programme.1433 
‘Co-financing with European NGOs’ had several unique features among all EU 
programmes, including that it only provided funds to European development NGOs and that its 
thematic focus was very broadly circumscribed – ‘economic and social development needs, in 
particular poverty alleviation’ –, giving large freedoms to NGOs to suggest projects (‘right of 
initiative’ of NGOs or ‘demand-led approach’).1434 These two features led to the characterization 
of the programme as ‘actor-focused’ rather than theme-specific, as were basically all other specific 
programmes except for the B7-6002 (see next section). A third specific feature of the programme 
was that the EU usually at most financed 50% of the total costs of a project or 75% of the total 
contributions, which was lower than is usually the case in EU projects with NGOs (that is, 80-
100% of funding).1435 
 The creation of the programme responded to the rise of NGOs as development actors. It 
was highly appreciated by NGOs, but also helped the EC in the development of its development 
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policy, as it could use the expertise and more efficient procedures of NGOs.1436 The programme 
was soon complemented by a regular, EU funded, EU – development NGOs dialogue. In 
financial terms, the programme grew from 2.5 million ECU in 1976 to 210 million in 2006, not 
least due to intensive NGO lobbying of the European Parliament. Between 1976 and 1997 about 
775 NGOs received co-funding for more than 8000 projects.1437 Major points of critique of the 
programme, which were only partly remedied in the early 1990s, was the focus on European 
NGOs and the project-by-project approach, that hardly allowed for long-term strategies.  
 Given the time of its start, democracy and human rights promotion was unsurprisingly 
not a focus of B7-6000 in the first years of its operation. However, the Council and Parliament 
mentioned both topics in the context of the programme in 1992, that is, as soon as the policy of 
democracy promotion had emerged.1438 The 1998 regulation on the programme incorporated this 
link in secondary law and expressly stipulated that, next to primary focus on poverty alleviation, 
projects connected with “the strengthening of civil society and participatory development, and 
the promotion and defence of human rights and democracy” should be given particular attention 
(Article 2(1) of the regulation). All in all, democracy assistance projects under B7-6000 mainly 
constituted projects supporting local civil society organizations rather than other forms of 
democracy assistance.1439 
 
b) Decentralized Cooperation (B7-6002) 
 
In 1992 the EC started to implement the programme ‘decentralized cooperation’, which aimed at 
placing the ‘agents’ of development, in particular those in development countries, at the core of 
EC development policy. It was linked to the rising concept of decentralization in development 
policies in the late 1980s/early 1990s, that is, to the devolution of decision-making and 
administrative powers from the central to regional and local states authorities and the increasing 
involvement of private actors, including civil society organizations and economic actors, in 
governance, in particular to produce better and more sustainable policies and strengthen 
democratic forms of policy-making.1440 The programme B7-6002 was initially based on the EU 
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budget only1441 and was indeed a pilot project with the objective of increasingly using the 
decentralized approach also in general development programmes, like ALA.1442 However, in 1998 
it was given a legal basis in secondary law as an independent programme, which was amended 
twice.1443 All in all, the programme was very small though and on average only had an annual 
budget of about 6 million Euros between 1997 and 2006.1444 
 Grants under the programme could only be given to ‘decentralized cooperation actors’, 
like local authorities, NGOs, citizens’ organizations, local traders’ organizations, trade unions, 
churches, research institutes and universities, and the media (Article 3 of Regulation No 1659/98, 
as amended by Regulation No 635/2004).1445 Through the projects, these actors should be 
strengthened and encouraged to participate in local policy making. The thematic focus of projects 
was similar to the programme B7-6000, and concentrated on socio-economic development and 
poverty reduction (Article 1 of Regulation 1659/98). From 2004 on, the programme started to be 
particularly used in countries where official co-operation was unable to engage non-state actors 
or where general cooperation was suspended, like in Zimbabwe.1446  
 Democracy promotion was an explicitly mentioned objective of the programme. Article 1 
of Regulation No 1659/98 stipulated that the EC would support projects that contribute to “the 
diversification and reinforcement of civil society and grassroots democracy in the countries 
concerned”. Regulation 635/2004 added, in Article 2, that a priority field for cooperation under 
the Regulation was to be the “strengthening [of]…networks of social organizations and 
movements campaigning for sustainable development, human rights, in particular social rights, 
and democratization”. However, funds under the programme were, as mentioned, very limited. 
 
c) The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) 
 
The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), based on Regulation No 381/2001, emerged within the 
framework of the EU’s increasing engagement in civilian crisis management (CCM) in the late 
1990s and should, as first pillar instrument, complement respective EU actions within the 
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CFSP/ESDP pillar.1447 It allowed the Commission to respond in a rapid and flexible manner to 
situations of urgency, crisis, or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order or the 
security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to 
destabilize the country, in which the normal implementation of general assistance programmes 
was threatened or impossible. In such situations the Commission could quickly finance projects 
that aimed at preserving or re-establishing stable conditions in the target states (Article 3 of the 
RRM regulation). Additionally, the financed actions had to fall within the substantive scope of 
the general, geographical assistance programmes, like ALA and MEDA, or of specific, thematic 
programmes, like the EIDHR and B7-6000, with the exception of ECHO.  
The importance and specificity of the RRM mainly lay in the speedy procedures, with 
which projects could be implemented, rather than the thematic scope of RRM projects. The 
procedure basically foresaw that the Commission decided on projects, after informing the 
Council, without the need for programming exercises (which were hardly possible, if actions 
should respond to situations of crisis) or the use of comitology (Article 4 and 6 of the RRM 
regulation). Projects were, however, limited to a six-month period, with exceptional 
supplementary actions (Article 8 RRM regulation). The annual budget of the RRM increased 
from about 20 million Euros in 2001 to 32 million Euros in 2006.1448 
Given the broad thematic focus of the RRM, democracy assistance could also be 
provided through RRM projects. In practice, it was mainly used for election-related assistance in 
the case of elections decided at short notice (Georgia, Ukraine, Afghanistan), the media 
(Macedonia, Liberia, Afghanistan), and rule of law reform (Georgia).1449 
 
Since 1 January 2007 
 
d) The Instrument for Stability (IfS) 
 
The Instrument for Stability (IfS) forms part of the new package of assistance regulations that 
entered into force on 1 January 2007.1450 Its drafting process was marked by intensive discussions 
and disagreement between the EU institutions on delimiting the first and the second pillar as 
regards military aspects of peace-keeping and peace-support operations and disarmament 
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measures and the clearance and destruction of stockpiles. While the Parliament and Commission 
suggested a broader reading of Article 179 and 181a ECT, the Council was eventually successful 
in securing a more limited interpretation, allowing the mentioned measures, except for civilian 
aspects, only to be pursued under the intergovernmental pillar.1451 Further, nuclear safety 
measures, initially foreseen to be covered by the IfS, had for reasons of incompatibility of legal 
bases, to be regulated in a separate regulation (Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 
(INSC)). 
 On the one hand, the IfS to a certain extent continues along the lines of the RRM and 
two smaller EU programmes only briefly mentioned above (‘Aid for uprooted people in Asia and 
Latin America’ and ‘‘Rehabilitation and reconstruction in developing countries’). On the other 
hand, it constitutes, in its form and scope, an entirely new type of programme in EU external 
relations. It consists of two components. First, similar to the RRM, it funds projects in times of 
urgency, emerging crisis, or crisis, like when democracy, law and order, human rights, and the 
security and safety of individuals are threatened, or when there is fear that a situation escalates 
into armed conflict or destabilizes a country or region (Article 3(1) of the IfS regulation). In such 
cases, like under the RRM, the Commission can decide quickly on so-called ‘exceptional 
assistance measures’ and must report to the Council and Parliament only after the adoption of 
the measure. Thematically, such operations should help to preserve, establish, or re-establish 
conditions of stability. They may have a maximum duration of 18 months, which can be 
extended for an extra four months. The second component the IfS finances, in the context of 
stable conditions, are EC operations that help build the capacity in third states to address specific 
global and trans-regional threats having a destabilizing effect, like terrorism and international 
crime, including illicit trafficking of people, drugs and arms, and risks relating to chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear materials, as well as to ensure preparedness for pre- and post-
crisis situations (Articles 1(2)(b) and 4(1)-(3) of the IfS regulation). Unlike the first component, 
the just mentioned measures underlie the usual programming exercise applicable to external 
assistance programmes.  
 Democracy promotion is strongly present in the text of the IfS. On the one hand, a 
situation ‘posing a threat to democracy’ constitutes one of the expressly mentioned crisis 
situations that can give rise to exceptional measures under the first component of the IfS. On the 
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other hand, the IfS also explicitly enumerates various types of democracy that can be provided, 
including support for the development for democratic, pluralistic state institutions; support for 
effective civilian administration and related legal frameworks at national and local level, including 
the strengthening of civilian control and oversight of the security system; support for an 
independent judiciary; support for the development and organization of civil society and its 
participation in the political process; measures to promote independent, pluralist and professional 
media.  
 
e) Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development 
 
As mentioned, the DCI regulation has not only established the DCI but also five so-called 
thematic programmes that focus, as the name indicates, on specific substantive issues and that 
complement the general programmes in situations in which particular EU objectives cannot, due 
to different reasons, be sufficiently achieved by the general programmes (Articles 11-16 of the 
DCI regulation). Most notably, the thematic programmes are used in so-called difficult 
partnerships, when cooperation has been suspended or reduced or when a target state’s 
government is not committed to the participatory approach.1452 It has also already been 
mentioned that the programme can be implemented in all third states, not just those covered by 
the DCI.  
As regards democracy assistance, the most notable of all thematic programmes is ‘Non-
state actors and local authorities in development’.1453 It by and large constitutes the successor to 
the two NGO programmes discussed above (B7-6000 and B7-6002). Its objective is, within the 
primary aim of poverty alleviation, the promotion of an inclusive and empowered society in 
developing states, in particular through capacity building of NGOs and local authorities (Article 
14 DCI regulation). Additionally, it provides support for awareness-raising and information 
campaigns on development issues in EU Member States and supports cooperation and structured 
dialogues between civil society and local authority networks in the EU that serve development 
objectives (Article 14 DCI regulation). Eligible actors for funding are a broad range of non-state 
actors, including NGOs, universities, churches, media institutions, as well as independent political 
foundations (Article 24(2) of the DCI regulation). Responding to critique of the programme B7-
6000, more funds are reserved for local actors than EU-based actors, and EU-based NGOs 
anyway have to have local partners, who must be the initiator of projects. The financial envelope 
for the programme is 1 639 million Euros for the 2007-2013 period, of which the large majority 
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is reserved for projects initiated by civil society (rather than information campaigns and 
networks). The majority is spent in ACP and ALA countries, while ENPI states received only 
about 7% of all funds during the 2007-2010 period (which more or less corresponds to the 
distribution under the predecessor programmes).1454 
 The thematic programme on non-state actors and local authorities in development does 
not specifically mention democracy promotion or assistance and the primary underlying idea of 
strengthening civil society and local authorities in development policy and implementation is 
increasing aid effectiveness and efficiency rather than promoting democracy. However, many EU 
documents that elaborate on the principle of participation stress the crucial role of civil society 
organizations as promoters of democracy and human rights. Democracy promotion can therefore 




Chapter 7 has provided a comprehensive overview of all major external assistance programmes 
the EU has adopted and implemented during the last two decades. It has left aside the 
enlargement dimension, which is excluded from the focus of this study, some smaller 
programmes of little relevance, the rule of law missions adopted in the framework of CFSP, as 
well as other, minor activities by the EU institutions. It has first presented those programmes that 
have a general socio-economic development focus and then those with a more limited, actor- or 
theme-specific focus. Further, it has distinguished between the time before 1.1.2007 and after this 
date, when, as part of a major overhaul of EU external assistance, a whole range of new 
regulations entered into force, that, in part, changed the previous geographical grouping of 
countries. To recall all discussed instruments, reference should be made to Table 36, inserted at 
the beginning of section II, which presents all programmes in a single framework.  
As regards democracy promotion and assistance, the analysis of Chapter 7 has exposed 
the following details. First, the November 1991 resolution on human rights, democracy and 
development clearly stipulated the EU’s policy shift to democracy promotion and declared that 
more funds would be allocated to that end in development programmes, EU assistance 
regulations and, where applicable, agreements, started to be adapted to this new objective. The 
EU did not immediately amend all acts of secondary law in order to insert a reference to 
democratization and envisage democracy assistance, but usually waited until a regulation or 
agreement expired or had to undergo a planned amendment. However, by the mid-1990s 
basically all acts of secondary law providing the basis for development assistance in one way or 
                                                     




another explicitly referred to democracy promotion and assistance. The most notable exception 
was the regulation on cooperation with industrialized countries.  
 Secondly, there were differences in the expressivity with which the newly inserted 
provisions referred to the topic of democracy promotion, reflecting an initial hesitation to pursue 
the policy. Some regulations immediately used a very strong and outspoken language, in particular 
the ALA regulation of 1992, which can be explained by the pro-democratic climate in Latin 
America (albeit not in Asia). Other programmes, like Tacis and MEDA, which applied to 
countries where authoritarian regimes continued to prevail, required several rounds of 
amendments until the respective legal acts contained a strong and clear commitment to 
democracy promotion and envisaged democracy assistance. There was apparently fear of 
opposition to aid programmes by third states’ government, as, despite the unilateral nature of 
assistance regulations, the target states were/are involved in programming and implementation. 
Further, there was the idea that democracy assistance should primarily be provided through the 
EIDHR predecessor-programmes and only secondarily through the mainstream development 
programmes. In any case, in the course of the 1990s and in the context of prevailing interest in 
and support for the policy of democracy promotion, the language on democracy in development 
assistance regulations became increasingly outspoken. The changes introduced by the major 
overhaul of external assistance programmes that became effective on 1 January 2007, are just the 
final expressions of this trend that started in the early 1990s, and did not constitute a major, 
qualitative step foreward. 
 Thirdly, although not envisaged in any basic policy document, basically all regulations 
followed and still follow the same general pattern when addressing democracy promotion and 
assistance. This general structure consists of:  
(1) a general reference to democracy or democracy promotion in the preamble, either 
generally underlining its relevance and/or stipulating the importance of democratization 
for successful development policies. For example, recital six of the preamble of the DCI 
regulation stipulates that respect for democratic principles is ‘fundamental’ for long-term 
development. 
(2) Further, there is basically always a general reference to the objective of democracy 
promotion in one of the first Articles. The exact formulations differ from programme to 
programme. For example, Article 1 of the 1999 Tacis regulation mentioned that Tacis 
was a programme “to promote the transition to a market economy and to reinforce 
democracy and the rule of law in the partner state”. Article 1(3) of the ENPI regulation 
mentions that the Union is founded on the values of liberty, democracy, etc., and seeks to 




mentioned, in the course of the last twenty years, the objective of democracy promotion 
has been formulated increasingly clearly and outspokenly.  
(3) Most regulations envisage two to three different instruments of democracy promotion: 
conditionality, expressed through political conditionality clauses, that allowed/allow for 
the suspension or redirection of assistance in case of violation of democratic principles; 
less frequently, incentive conditionality, expressed as promise to provide more aid if 
certain conditions are met (for example, Article 7(2) of the ENPI regulation); and, 
usually, the provision of democracy assistance or support. As regards the latter, Article 
5(2) of the DCI regulation stipulates, for example, that “assistance shall include actions 
within the following areas of cooperation: …governance, democracy, human rights and 
support for institutional reform”.  
(4) Finally, the large majority of regulations specify the fields of democracy assistance, like 
election assistance or media assistance. Overall, there has been a trend to a more 
elaborate and more comprehensive enumeration of the various fields of democracy 
support since the early 1990s. For example, while the ALA regulation only generally 
referred to projects for the spread of democracy, the ENPI regulation mentions 10-odd 
topics of support. Importantly, the enumerations were/are always non-exhaustive, 
allowing the Commission to also finance projects on areas not explicitly mentioned. 
Nevertheless, the explicit mentioning suggests that the enumerated areas were the 
primarily envisaged sectors of engagement. The various regulations have not always 
neatly presented all sub-fields of democracy promotion under a single heading, but 
frequently they are spread out over several sections with different titles, which renders 
their extraction slightly difficult.  
Fourthly, the following topics of democracy assistance have been explicitly suggested in the 
15-odd programmes discussed above. As mentioned, these were the primarily envisaged fields 
of engagement. The EU could and did also finance projects in fields not expressly mentioned 
though. The enumeration in the assistance programmes and the following lists do not suggest 
any hierarchy among the various fields. It should be mentioned that none of the assistance 
regulations reserved a specific amount or share of the available funds for democracy 
assistance and/or the following listed sub-fields. 
 Elections: observation and assistance (ENPI) 
 Media support (MEDA 1996, MEDA 2000, ENPI, IfS) 
 Civil society (incl. NGOs) (Tacis 1993, Tacis 1996, Tacis 1999, MEDA 1996, MEDA 





 Institutional reform and support (legislative and executive bodies, at national, regional, 
local level) (Tacis 1999, Lomé IV revised, Cotonou Agreement, Regulation 1794/94 on 
Palestine, EPRD South Africa 2000, ENPI, DCI, IfS) 
 Rule of law: independence, professionalism and effectiveness of judicial system; training 
of security services; (Tacis 1999, MEDA 2000, Cotonou Agreement, ENPI, IfS) 
 Civilian control of security system (IfS) 
 Legal reform (Tacis 1993, Tacis 1996, Tacis 1999) 
Additionally, numerous of the regulations also referred to two related concepts:  
 Human rights (ALA, MEDA 1996, MEDA 2000, Cotonou Agreement, EPRD South 
Africa 1994, EPRD South Africa 2000, ENPI, DCI, B7-6000, B7-6002) 
 Good governance (ALA, MEDA 1996, MEDA 2000, Cotonou Agreement, EPRD South 
Africa 2000, ENPI, DCI) 
Reference should here also be made to the framework of other policy instrument that play a role 
for EU policy towards individual regions/countries. The analysis has shown that several of these 
other policy instruments also elaborate on democracy promotion and assistance and, for example, 
defined more specific fields of support. Reference should in this respect mainly be made to the 
three (CFSP) Common Strategies, which are now expired, and the cooperation agreements with 
some Latin American and former Soviet countries, some of which include a title on development 
and human rights, that provide a jointly agreed list of envisaged activities in the field. Overall, the 
fields enumerated in these documents do not go beyond the above outlined catalogue though 
and/or change basic approach.  
As many of the sectors mentioned in the numerous assistance programmes and the other 
referred to documents are relatively generally defined, like civil society aid, it is difficult to 
determine whether democracy assistance under the general and specific development 
programmes clearly follows Carothers’ developmental or political approach to democracy 
assistance. Overall, the developmental approach appears to prevail though. The very nature of 
most of the discussed programmes is to support processes of (mainly socio-economic) change in 
a mid- or long-term perspective, rather than to support individual actions at specific points of 
time and democracy assistance under the general development programmes is simply part of this 
longer term perspective, of slow, gradual change. Further, also the primarily envisaged fields of 
support point to the developmental approach: Institutional reform, developing an effective and 
professional judicial system, and supporting civil society to become a key factor in development 
and political change are core fields of engagement. Moreover, democracy assistance under the 




However, the political approach is not entirely absent. The ENPI expressly envisages activities 
concentrating on elections (election observation and assistance), several regulations referred to 
media support, and rule of law reform also focuses on the independence of the judiciary, which 
are features of a more political approach. Moreover, programmes like the RRM and the IfS allow 
for the swift provision of assistance in times of specific need or chance, just as envisaged by the 
political approach, which recognizes the existence of key moments. As in the case of the EIDHR, 
the provision of democracy assistance under the general programmes therefore pursues a mixed 
approach, having features of the developmental and political approach to democracy assistance, 
albeit with the developmental approach prevailing.  
 Due to the succinct nature of listing the individual thematic areas of support without 
providing more detailed information of the envisaged type of support, the lack of reserving a 
certain share or specific funds for individual topics, and the fact that the enumerations are non-
exhaustive, it is hard to discern a specific model of democracy that should be promoted though 
assistance in the mentioned fields. Depending on the extent to which elections are supported or 
on the extent and form of civil society assistance, that it is possible to discern an elitist or 
participatory model of democracy. The only argument that can be made on the basis of the 
numerous EU assistance regulations is that all enumerated topics overall relate to the seven 
minimum procedural features of liberal democratic system, as well as to the additional feature of 










Chapter 8: Democracy Assistance as Part of the EU’s Mainstream and Special 








Chapter 8 provides a detailed analysis of the provision of democracy assistance under the EU’s 
mainstream and specific development programmes introduced in Chapter 7. Just like Chapter 7, 
it aims at exposing core features of the EU’s strategy of democracy assistance that emerge from 
the EU’s mainstream and special development assistance programmes. In doing so and largely 
following Chapter 7, it addresses three main topics. First, it provides an overall quantitative 
account of the provision of EU democracy assistance in the framework of the mainstream and 
specific programmes during the period 1995 and 2009, distinguishing between commitment and 
expenditure data. Secondly, it addresses the thematic distribution of funds used for democracy 
assistance, which gives some insights into the model of democracy underlying the EU’s policy 
and the predominant approach of democracy assistance in the case of the mainstream and special 
development programmes, i.e. the political or developmental approach. Thirdly, it takes a closer 
look at the activities in major geographical regions in order to see in which regions the EU has 
concentrated democracy assistance and whether there were major differences in the focus on 
specific sub-fields in the various regions. Unlike Chapter 7, lack of data does not allow for 
provision of a more detailed analysis of project identification, different project types, and 
implementing partners.  
 Just like Chapter 7, Chapter 8 adopts a ‘macro’ perspective, presenting a global and 
regional picture of EU democracy assistance under the EU’s development programmes. It shows 
how much has globally been spent during the last fifteen years, in which thematic fields EU 
assistance has overall been concentrated, and in which regions the EU has been engaged to a 
greater or lesser extent and which sub-sectors it prioritized over others. The results are general 
statements on the overall EU strategy of democracy assistance, in particular, its model of 
democracy and model of democratization through assistance. Needless to say, EU actions in 
individual countries may and do diverge from this general pattern and a detailed picture of EU 




 As will be explained in more detail shortly below, the analysis of the implementation of 
democracy assistance under the mainstream and specific development assistance programmes 
suffers severely from limitations in the available data. The only available and used data source is 
the OECD database on official development assistance (ODA) flows, to which the Commission 
has reported since 1995.1455 The major problems of the OECD sources are that they report (only) 
on ODA flows and therefore fail to report on some states of interest here, like Russia, while they 
report on countries which are excluded from this study, in particular the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. Further, the OECD database does not include a section on democracy assistance, but 
only the broader category ‘government and civil society – general’, from which data on 
democracy can be re-constructed. Finally, the OECD data includes the EIDHR, which has to be 
taken into account, when establishing EU engagement beyond the EIDHR. All in all, when 
reading Chapter 8, these limitations of OECD data have to be borne in mind. 
 
II. An Analysis of Democracy Assistance under the EU’s Mainstream and Specific  
Development Assistance Programmes  
 
1. A General Quantitative Account 
 
Following the structure by which data on the EIDHR was represented in Chapter 5, this section 
also presents two types of quantitative data for democracy assistance provided under the 
mainstream and other specific development programmes: commitment and expenditure data. As 
explained in Chapter 5, both are legitimate representations of the EU’s financial engagement, 
showing political commitments as well as actual engagement and together providing an overall 
picture of its activities. Further, it has been mentioned that, while the two data sets should in the 
long run largely be identical except for those (usually small) amounts that are being de-
committed, they cannot be easily compared on an annual basis due to natural and non-natural 
delays in implementation, which stem from the time needed to implement a programme and 
which stem from non-efficient procedures and which differ from programme to programme, 
project to project, and year to year. The average time needed to disburse committed funds under 
all mainstream programmes was over four years between 1999 and 2003, when the Commission 
last published detailed data on the topic. It was particularly high in the case of the ALA and 
MEDA programmes (on average 6-7 years) and speedier overall in the case of Tacis (on average 3 
years).1456 A more recent study of the Court of Auditors on aid implementation since 2004 has 
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found improvements, in particular due to the ‘decentralization process’, that is, the transfer of 
competences and tasks to the Commission Delegations present in the target countries, but 
without providing more detailed data.1457 
 
a) Commitments for Democracy Assistance under the EU’s Mainstream and  
Specific Development Programmes 
 
While Chapter 5 on the EIDHR made recourse to the EU budget and its annual ‘commitment 
appropriations’, this is not possible in the case of democracy assistance under general and other 
specific development programmes because the EU budget usually only stipulates one 
commitment appropriation for the entire programme and overall, with very minor exceptions, 
does not single out specific appropriations for individual thematic fields, like democracy or 
human rights. The relevant decisions are taken during the programming and project/programme 
formulation or identification phase and therefore, with increasing detail as regards the thematic 
fields and the financial amounts, in the CSPs, NIPs, AAPs, and AWPs.1458 Commitments as 
regards the democracy-related elements of general socio-economic programmes are therefore 
pledges made in the aforementioned documents rather than in the annual EU budget. 
 In principle, three data sources exist for the aforementioned commitments to provide 
democracy assistance. First, there are the just referred to original programming and programme 
or project formulation/identification documents. AAPs are a sub-optimal source for this thesis 
because they cover a shorter time frame (– they are basically only available since 2002) and would 
involve the analysis of a very high number of documents that cannot be done in the framework 
of this study (over 1500 documents). It has also not yet been done in any other study from which 
data could be obtained. A look at the available CPSs and NIPs alone, which are fewer in number, 
gives some general insight into whether the topic of democratization is addressed, but does not 
provide overall detailed financial information. Secondly, the Commission has since 2001 included 
general ODA commitment data for all aid sectors in its annual report on development and 
assistance policies.1459 The disadvantage of these reports is that they are only available since 2001 
and, moreover, only provide aggregate data for more general OECD categories, that is, for the 
aggregate category ‘government and civil society’. They do not provide data for individual sub-
fields of this category and therefore for democracy assistance. Finally, the Commission has from 
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1995 on submitted financial data on ODA commitments (and, from 2002 on also on payments) 
in all external aid sectors to the OECD, which has published this data in its online database on 
ODA flows by all international donors.1460 Due to its longer time-span and more detailed 
categories, this source is the most useful for this thesis and is used for the creation of the 
financial tables provided. 
 As indicated in Chapter 2 and in the Introduction to this Chapter, OECD data has some 
disadvantages. First, it only reports on ODA, that is, on aid flows to countries on the 
OECD/DAC list of aid recipients. It therefore disregards flow to several countries of interest 
here, like to Russia and, until 2005, to Ukraine and Belarus. At the same time, it includes data on 
several countries that are excluded from the analysis in this thesis, that is, the Western Balkans 
and Turkey. As mentioned in Chapter 2, aid to the CEECs was never included in the ODA 
statistics database. The following Tables therefore have to be consulted with this awareness about 
the covered countries, that is slightly different from the intended focus of this Chapter. 
Secondly, the OECD does not work with a separate category of democracy assistance. As 
mentioned, it provides data on the sector ‘government and civil society’, which is sub-divided 
into two sub-sectors, ‘government and civil society – general’ and ‘conflict, peace, and security’. 
The first of these is further divided into the following eleven fields: (1) public sector policy and 
administrative development; (2) public financial management, (3) decentralization and support to 
sub-national governments; (4) anti-corruption organizations and institutions; (5) legal and judicial 
development, (6) democratic participation and civil society; (7) elections; (8) legislatures and 
political parties; (9) media and free flow of information, (10) human rights; (11) women’s equality 
organizations. Data for democracy assistance has to be constructed from among these various 
sub-fields. Following the substantive focus of the EIDHR, it is suggested that sub-sectors (5) to 
(9) be used in order to establish data for EU commitments in the field of democracy assistance. 
All other categories rather pertain to other sectors, that is, to good governance (in the more 
limited sense) and to human rights. However, this is only one possible construction of the field 
of democracy assistance and arguments can be made for also including some of the other sectors 
in the category, like decentralization and women’s equality organizations, which often have strong 
democracy promotion elements.1461 To do justice to this fluid borderline among the fields and 
overlapping character of the fields, the following discussion will provide data on both, the general 
OECD category ‘government and civil society – general’, as well as in the more limited field of 
democracy assistance. This will also allow an assessment of EU engagement in the sectors of 
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good governance and human rights, as compared to democracy assistance. To present data on 
the entire sector ‘government and civil society’, which includes data on ‘conflict, peace and 
security’ measures, is considered too broad.1462  
Finally, OECD data on ‘government and civil society – general’, as well as on democracy 
assistance extracted from this data, includes data on the EIDHR and therefore represents the 
EU’s overall engagement in the respective fields. In order to determine EU engagement in 
democracy assistance beyond the EIDHR – which is one of the main objectives of this Chapter – 
commitments for the latter therefore have to be taken into account. A problem here is that 
EIDHR data refers to ODA and OA and represents EU budget commitments rather than 
commitments made in programming documents, which are not necessarily identical, especially, 
not made in the same year. A simple subtraction of amounts committed for the EIDHR from 
OECD data is therefore not easily possible. Rather, EIDHR data should only be considered as 
approximate data for EIDHR commitments in a particular year.  
All in all, these various features of OECD data render it difficult to provide precise 
quantitative data on EU democracy assistance beyond the EIDHR. However, if the data 
limitations are taken into account in the drafting and consultation of Tables, OECD data can still 
give insight into approximate financial commitments made by the EU over the last 15 years.  
 
i. EU Commitments in the OECD Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ 
 
Table 37 provides data on ODA commitments in the entire OECD sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’. Column two presents the overall financial commitments made by the EU in 
that sector, which includes commitments in the above mentioned eleven sub-categories. As 
mentioned, it relates to all external assistance programmes, including the EIDHR. Column three 
therefore provides data on EIDHR commitments (extracted from Table 10 in Chapter 6), which 
allows assessing the approximate extent of EU engagement in the sector beyond the EIDHR. 
The fourth column provides data on overall ODA flows, while the fifth column provides the 
percentage of commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ of all ODA. 
Both should render the relative importance of flows to the sector ‘government and civil society’ 
clearer.  
 It should also be recalled that the Table includes data on the European region, which 
includes, in the OCED database, the three Western NIS Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, as well 
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as the Western Balkans and Turkey, as well as the commitments under the rule of law 
programmes adopted under the CFSP pillar.  
 
Table 37: EU ODA Commitments in the OECD Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ 1995-
2009 (in million Euros)1463 
 
Year ODA commitments 
in sector 
‘government and civil 
society – general’ (all 
programmes) 
Commitments for 
EIDHR in EU 
budget (ODA and 
OA) 
ODA commitments 
for all aid sectors 
Sector ‘government 
and civil society – 
general’ of all ODA 
in % 
1995 76.78 60 5923.88 1.3% 
1996 113.13 84.8 6188.04 1.8% 
1997 263.97 78.6 5381.53 4.9% 
1998 201.36 97 6703.80 3% 
1999 539.77 98 7153.04 7.5% 
2000 527.43 95 9040.93 5.8% 
2001 309.59 102 6513.91 4.8% 
2002 490.94 104 6535.66 7.4% 
2003 892.94 106 8589.70 10.4% 
2004 1549.36 125 7719.22 20% 
2005 1318.06 119 9618.02 13.7% 
2006 1819.83 128 10456.38 17.4% 
2007 1474.95 130 10035.77 14.7% 
2008 1317.60 138 11768.87 11% 
2009 1065.28 148 11703.81 9% 
Total 1995-2009 11960.99 1613.4 123332.56 9.7% 
 
Table 37 shows the strong increase of EU ODA commitments in the OECD sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ during the period 1995 and 2009. While the EU committed 77.79 
million Euros in 1995, the commitments reached 1819.83 million Euros in 2006, and, although 
again decreasing afterwards, still amounted to 1065.28 million Euros in 2009. In total, between 
1995 and 2009, the EU committed nearly 12 billion Euros for good governance, democracy, and 
human rights assistance. Also the data on the share of commitments in the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ of all ODA indicates a strong growth. While in 1995 only 1.3% of all 
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4% of all flows). In any case, given the lack of data on flows to all recipient in the 1995-2009 period and the small or 
absent flows to multilateral recipients, data provided on ‘ODA commitments in the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’ (column two) relates to flows to ‘all developing countries’, while data on ‘ODA commitments for 




ODA commitments were used for the sector, in 2004 the share had reached a remarkable, but so 
far also exceptional, 20%. Since then is has decreased again and in 2009 9% of all ODA 
commitments pertained to the sector ‘government and civil society – general’.  
In comparison, in 2009 the second sub-sector of the category ‘government and civil 
society’, that is, ‘conflict, peace, and security’ received 446.07 million Euros or 3.8% of all ODA. 
The sectors education and health, both belonging to the same broad heading as ‘government and 
civil society – general’, that is, ‘social infrastructure and services’, received about 930 million 
Euros or 7.9%, and about 371.52 million Euros or 3.2% of all ODA, respectively. About 1183.95 
million Euros or 10.12% of all aid were committed to the sector ‘economic infrastructure and 
services’, which included, among other things transport, energy, and banking.1464  
All aid sectors are legitimate spheres of attention and decisions on distributions are 
difficult to make and justify. Nevertheless, the EU’s overall commitments in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’ in the last two years of analysis – 2008 and 2009 – appear 
limited in view of the strong verbal commitments as regards the topic in the numerous assistance 
regulations and other policy documents (see Chapter 7) as well as the prevailing conviction that 
improvements in the sector are considered to be (pre)conditions for reform in other dimensions. 
Also a comparison with the major non-European donors – with the notable exception of Japan, 
which commits a rather low share of its ODA to the sector discussed here – shows that the EU 
overall committed a lower percentage of its overall ODA to the sector ‘government & civil 
society – general’. For example, in 2009, when the EU committed 9% of its ODA to this sector, 
Australia committed 24%, Canada 12% and the US 16%.1465 Data for 2008 shows slightly smaller 
differences between the EU’s and the other donor’s commitments, but confirms the EU’s lower 
level of engagement. In a ranking of the EU and its Member States as regards the shares of 
commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ of all ODA, the EU occupies 
a middle place, usually committing larger shares than, for example, but surprisingly, the 
Netherlands, but smaller shares than, for example, Denmark and Sweden.1466 
The growth in financial commitments for ‘government and civil society – general’ until 
the years 2004/2006 resulted from and constituted the implementation of the increasing 
relevance attributed to the topic in EU foreign and development policies, outlined in Chapters 3 
and 6. It is unclear though what has caused the decline in financial allocations since then. There 
was no change in policy objectives. On the contrary, documents like COM(2001) 252 final, the 
European Consensus on development of 2005, new policies like the ENP, and the series of new 
                                                     
1464 Data based on the OECD database on ODA flows. 
1465 Data extracted from the OECD database on ODA flows. See also Tables 6 and 7 in Chapter 2 for data on major 
international donors.  




assistance regulations that entered into force in January 2007 confirmed and even strengthened 
the position of democracy, human rights, and good governance and should have led to an 
increase rather than decrease of commitments. The volatility and decline can best be explained by 
the fact that the EU does not entirely and a priori determine the share of the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ of all ODA. Assistance regulations foresee engagement in the sectors 
and stress its importance, but do not reserve specific amounts or percentages for the sector. The 
budget (usually) only allocates an overall amount to the individual programmes. The relevant 
decisions on allocations are taken during the programming phase, in which the involved actors 
have considerable discretion to influence the actual distribution of funds among the possible 
fields. If several CSPs allocate fewer funds to the sector ‘government and civil society – general’, 
this can have important implications for the entire share of this sector of all ODA. In other 
words, there are no guidelines or mechanism that ensures a specific and stable share of the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’, and changing shares are the result of numerous, 
unrelated programming exercises. It remains to be seen, if, over the next years, a stable share of 
around 10% will be consolidated.  
 Finally, Table 37 reveals another important insight into EU commitments for government 
and civil society assistance (and implicitly for democracy assistance) under the EU’s development 
programmes. Table 37 shows that up to 1998 a large part of the overall commitments in the 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ were EIDHR commitments. In 1995, 1996 and 
1998 about half to three quarters of all ‘government and civil society – general’ commitments 
pertained to the EIDHR, while only about one fourth to one half were commitments under other 
programmes. Only from about 1999 on did the EU therefore start to increasingly commit funds 
for democratization, human rights, and governance as part of mainstream development 
programmes rather than specifically under the EIDHR. It therefore took a long time from the 
November 1991 resolution and the inclusion of references to democracy promotion in the 
various development assistance regulations in the first half of the 1990s, to actual commitments 
in programming documents to provide assistance. The reasons for this delay were the same as 
those explaining hesitations in choosing a strong wording in assistance regulations mentioned in 
Chapter 6. On the one hand, the EU was initially rather cautious in pursuing a strong policy of 
democracy promotion in authoritarian states, on the other hand, the idea was widespread that 
democracy assistance should primarily be promoted through the EIDHR rather than general 





ii. EU Commitments for Democracy Assistance  
 
This section focuses on EU democracy assistance, as opposed to data on the broader sector 
‘government and civil society – general’ discussed above. Column 2 of Table 38 provides data on 
all EU democracy assistance, constructed from sub-categories (5) to (9) of the OECD sector 
‘government and civil society – general’. It therefore comprises EU commitments in the 
following fields: legal and judicial development, democratic participation and civil society, 
elections, legislatures and political parties, and media and free flow of information. As this data 
on democracy assistance relates to all EU commitments in the sector, column three provides 
approximate data on EIDHR commitments for democracy assistance, which allows assessment 
of the extent of EU engagement beyond the EIDHR or the extent of EU democracy assistance 
provided by the mainstream programmes. As data on EIDHR commitments for democracy 
assistance is not available due to the structure of the EU budget (see Chapter 5), it has been 
constructed on the basis of average expenditure data for the EIDHR.1467 Importantly, it does not 
therefore represent actual EU commitments but just approximations in order to roughly 
determine EU engagement beyond the EIDHR. Columns 4 and 5 provide the shares of all EU 
democracy assistance of all ODA as well as of ‘government and civil society – general’. 
Table 38 shows the increase of overall EU democracy assistance between the mid-1990s 
and the late 2000s. While until 1998 the EU committed at most about 65 million Euros annually 
for democracy assistance, in 2008 it committed over 500 million Euros and in 2009 still slightly 
over 350 million Euros. During the entire period from 1995 to 2009 the EU’s overall 
commitments in the field amounted to about 3550 million Euros. Also data on the share of the 
sector democracy assistance of all ODA is proof of the increasing EU engagement in the field. 
While in 1998 the share of EU democracy assistance was only 0.6% if all ODA, it reached 5.2% 
in 2004 and still stood at 3% in 2009. Table 37 showed that the EU’s commitments in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’ reached a peak in 2006 (when considering absolute 
amounts) and has decreased since then. Overall commitments as regards democracy assistance 
developed differently and have grown more or less continuously between 1999 and 2008 – except 
in 2001 and 2007. Shares of commitments for democracy assistance of all ODA reached a peak 
in 2004, but have also stayed relatively high since then. Overall, the development of EU 
commitments for democracy assistance (in overall amounts and shares) was therefore more in 
                                                     
1467 Chapter 5 has revealed that between 1996 and 2000 and between 2000 and 2006 on average about 45% and 39%, 
respectively, of all EIDHR funds were spent for democracy assistance rather than for other fields covered by the 
programme, especially human rights. For 1995 45% and for the post-2006 period 39% of all EIDHR commitments 
are considered to have pertained to the field democracy assistance. Importantly, the data provided in column three of 





line with the growing relevance attributed to the topic in EU policy documents over the last two 
decades than commitments for the entire sector ‘government and civil society – general’. As 
regards the more recent slump in 2009 it only has to be seen if this was the beginning of a new 
downward trend or an exception. The just provided insights relating to the global data on EU 
democracy assistance (see Section III.2.c), will, however, show that there was quite some 
variation among the various world regions as regards the development of commitments for 
democracy assistance, with many countries offering data that diverges from the overall pattern 
exposed here.  
 

















programmes) of all 








civil society – 
general’ in % 
1995 1.32 (27)1469 0.02% 1.7% 
1996 30.74 (38.16)1470 0.5% 27.2% 
1997 65.17 35.37 1.2% 24.7% 
1998 40.25 (43.65)1471 0.6% 20% 
1999 120.36 44.1 1.7% 22.3% 
2000 165.1 37.05 1.8% 31.3% 
2001 70.07 39.78 1.1% 22.6% 
2002 149.96 40.56 2.3% 30.6% 
2003 279.42 41.34 3.3% 31.3% 
2004 394.07 48.75 5.2% 25.4% 
2005 455.46 46.41 4.7% 34.5% 
2006 494.86 49.92 4.7% 27.2% 
2007 406.99 50.7 4.1% 27.6% 
2008 525.12 53.82 4.5% 39.9% 
2009 351.97 57.72 3% 33% 
Total 1995-2009 3550.86 654.33 2.9% 29.7% 
 
Despite growth in absolute terms and its share since the mid-1990s, the EU spends less of its 
available funds on democracy assistance than other major international donors.1472 For example, 
in 2009 the EU spent about 3% if all ODA for democracy assistance, while the US and Canada 
spent about 10% and 7.7%, respectively. These countries also devote a higher share of all 
‘government and civil society – general’ commitments to democracy assistance than to the other 
                                                     
1468 Data is extracted from the OECD database on ODA flows, except for EIDHR data, which is calculated on the 
basis of the EU budget and expenditure data.  
1469 As approximate commitments for democracy assistance under the EIDHR cannot be larger than overall 
commitments for democracy assistance, there is some problem with OECD data for the years 1995 and 1996.  
1470 Ibid. 
1471 Ibid. 




fields, that is, to human rights and good governance. For example, in 2009 about 65% of all 
Canadian and US commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ were used 
for democracy assistance rather than other sub-sectors. At the same time, EU commitments for 
democracy assistance only constituted 33% of all commitments in the sector ‘government and 
civil society – general’.  
 Finally, just like Table 37, Table 38 shows that EU commitments for democracy were 
until 1998 mainly commitments under the EIDHR. Only from about 1999 on did the EU 
increasingly engage in democracy assistance beyond its specific democratization instrument. As 
explained above, this late start was mainly the result of the initial belief among Commission 
officials and other actors involved in policy-implementation that democracy and human rights 
promotion should mainly be carried out through the EIDHR and a greater willingness to pursue 
the policy of democracy promotion from the late 1990s on. 
 
b) Expenditure for Democracy Assistance under the EU’s Mainstream and  
Specific Development Programmes 
 
This section provides data on EU expenditure or, in OECD jargon, disbursements on EU 
democracy assistance under its mainstream and various specific development programmes. It 
therefore shows how much the EU annually paid rather than only committed for programmes 
and projects.  
There are three possible sources for expenditure data. First, there are the Commission’s 
annual reports on the EU’s development and assistance policies, which stipulate data on EU 
expenditure in various OECD sectors. As mentioned above, the reports are not ideal for this 
thesis, as they only mention data on the overall category ‘government and civil society’, without 
providing data on sub-categories. They do therefore not allow giving a more detailed insight into 
democracy assistance.  
Secondly, Europaid provides an online database on implemented EU assistance projects: 
the so-called ‘CSR Search Tool for Grants and Contracts’.1473 Also this database uses the OECD’s 
categories of sectors and sub-sectors and mentions all EU-funded development projects, 
providing their name, duration, beneficiary country, amount of funding, and DAC code. It 
definitely constitutes a highly valuable source for the study of EU democracy assistance. One 
major disadvantage is that it does not allow extracting aggregate data for entire sub-categories, 
                                                     
1473 This name, which was used in 2008, is not mentioned anymore on the relevant EU website. The database can be 





regions, or years but only lists individual projects. Further, it does not indicate the budget source 
of a project and therefore whether it constitutes an EIDHR project or a project funded in the 
framework of a mainstream programme and from which budget (year) it was funded. The year in 
which a project is categorized, is apparently the year in which its contract was signed. Moreover, 
the Search Tool lists only projects implemented since 2007. This limited time span renders the 
tool a sub-optimal source for this thesis. 
Finally, there is the OECD database on ODA flows, from which data on commitments 
has been extracted in the previous section. Unlike OECD data on commitments, OECD data on 
disbursements is only available since 2002. Nevertheless, due to this longer time frame than the 
CSR Search Tool and the fact that also commitment data was withdrawn from this database, the 
current section uses the OECD database as source. As regards the limitations of OECD data, in 
particular that it only refers to ODA and includes EIDHR data, reference should be made to the 
discussion above and in Chapter 2.  
 
i. EU Expenditure in the OECD Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ 
 
Table 39, provided on the next page, focuses on EU expenditure in the OECD sector 
‘government and civil society – general’. Column 2 provides the relevant OECD data on 
disbursements in the category ‘government and civil society – general’ for all external assistance 
programmes and instruments. Column 3 provides expenditure data for the EIDHR, which is 
taken from Table 12 of Chapter 6, but is, due to lack of data for the post-2006 period, 
incomplete. If read in connection with column 2, it allows an approximate determination of how 
much the EU annually paid for democracy assistance beyond its specific human rights and 
democracy programme. Column 4 provides data on all ODA disbursements in individual years, 
which allows assessment, in Column 5, of the share of EU payments in the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’.  
 Just as commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ rose, EU 
payments also increased considerably during the time-frame of analysis. While in 2002 the EU 
only paid about 105 million Euros for projects and programmes on democratization, human 
rights, the rule of law, and good governance, the payments were 1133.89 million Euros in 2009. 
According to OECD figures, an enormous surge occurred between 2004 and 2005, when 
payments increased from 141.1 to 949.78 million Euros. At the same time the share of payments 
in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ of all ODA payments also increased 
considerably from 1.8% in 2002 to over 11% from 2005. Between 2004 and 2005, the share rose 




commitments in the sector in the late 1990s that showed effects with a four-five years delay and 
from the reforms in aid implementation carried out in the early 2000s, like the strengthened 
programming exercise, that also started to be effective in the mid 2000s.1474 
 
Table 39: EU ODA Disbursements in the OECD Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ 1995-














and civil society – 
general’ of all ODA 
in % 
2002 105.14 73.9 5775.01 1.8% 
2003 180.97 135.3 6384.1 2.8% 
2004 141.1 64.4 6962.82 2% 
2005 949.78 147.7 7511.98 12.6% 
2006 1293.7 146.8 8196.11 15.8% 
2007 1179.15 - 8492.93 13.9% 
2008 1038.62 - 8973.96 11.6% 
2009 1133.89 - 9679.41 11.7% 
Total 2002-2009 6022.35 - 61976.32 9.7% 
 
A joint reading of columns 2 and 3 exposes that until 2004 a large share of all ODA payments in 
the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ were payments under the EIDHR. For 
example, in 2004, nearly half of all payments in the sector constituted EIDHR funding. Only 
from 2005 on did the EU therefore really start to increasingly disburse funds for programmes 
and projects in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ under its mainstream 
development programmes to a more than minor extent and to an extent that reflected the 
increasing commitments in the field. This shows that the EU’s increasing commitments in the 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ under mainstream and other specific development 
programmes that started around 1999, only started to have a practical effect from 2005 on. 
Further, it means that it took about 14 years until the November 1991 policy shift to democracy 
promotion started to have practical effects in the implementation of the policy. This delay can be 
explained, as indicated above, by initial hesitations in pursuing the policy of democracy 
promotion, by ideas that assistance should be provided through the EIDHR, and by natural and 
non-natural delays in implementation. 
 Column 5 of Table 39 confirms this delay also for the entire category of EU ODA 
‘government and civil society – general’. While Table 37 has shown that from about 2003 on the 
                                                     
1474 See Chapters 3 and 5 on these reforms.  
1475 Data is extracted from the OECD database on ODA flows, except for EIDHR data, which is taken from 




EU annually committed more than 10% of all ODA in the field of ‘government and civil society’, 
only from about 2005 on did annual expenditures reach a similar scope.  
 
ii. EU Expenditure for Democracy Assistance under Mainstream and other  
Specific Development Programmes 
 
This last section of the overall quantitative account aims at providing data on EU payments for 
democracy assistance rather than democracy, human rights, and good governance assistance in 
total, in particular, under the EU’s mainstream and specific development programmes. Just like in 
the section on EU commitments, ODA data on democracy assistance, presented in Column 2 of 
Table 40, is constructed from sub-categories (5) to (9) of the OECD sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’. As this OECD data includes EIDHR data, column three of Table 40 provides 
approximate data on EU payments under the EIDHR, calculated on the basis of the average 
share of payments for democracy assistance under the EIDHR between 2000 and 2006.1476 A 
joint reading of columns two and three allows for approximately determining EU payments for 
democracy assistance beyond the EIDHR. Columns 4 and 5 provide data on the shares of EU 
payments for all democracy assistance of all ODA and of ODA payments in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’.  
Table 40: EU ODA Disbursements for Democracy Assistance (in million Euros and %)1477 
 







assistance under the 





programmes) of all 






‘government and civil 
society – general’ in 
% 
2002 23.64 (28.8)1478 0.4% 22.5% 
2003 45.72 (52.77)1479 0,7% 25.3% 
2004 42.78 25.12 0,6% 30.3% 
2005 293.01 57.6 3.9% 30.9% 
2006 341.89 57.25 4.2% 26.4% 
2007 304.68  4% 25.8% 
2008 313.56  3.5% 30.2% 
2009 383.64  4% 33.8% 
Total 2002-2009 1748.92  2.8% 29% 
 
                                                     
1476 Chapter 5 has shown that no detailed, annual data on payments for EIDHR democracy assistance exists for the 
post-2000 period. Reports for the period 2000-2006 indicate that about 39% of all EIDHR payments were made for 
democracy assistance, which is used as basis for this Table. See Chapter 5, at.  
1477 Data is extracted from the OECD database on ODA flows, except for EIDHR data, which is calculated on the 
basis of Commission reports (see Chapter 6). 
1478 There are problems with the data, as expenditure data for the EIDHR cannot be smaller than overall expenditure 
for the democracy assistance. This problem might be the result of the fact that the provided numbers are just 
approximate calculations made on the basis of the average share of democracy assistance of all EIDHR payments 





Just as commitments for democracy assistance and payments in the sector ‘government and civil 
society –general’ increased, annual expenditures for democracy assistance also necessarily grew. 
While, according to the OECD database the EU paid around 25 million Euros in 2002, its 
payments have increased to 383.64 million Euros in 2009. In comparison, in the same years about 
149.96 million Euros (2002) and 351.97 million Euros (2009) were committed for EU democracy 
assistance. Similarly, the shares of payments for democracy assistance of all ODA also increased 
from about 0.6% between 2002 and 2004 to around 4% from 2005 on.  
 Further, if column three is taken into consideration, Table 40 reveals, just as the previous 
sections have shown, that only from about 2005 was the EU started to disburse more funds for 
democracy assistance under mainstream and other specific development programmes than under 
the EIDHR alone. Until 2004, the EU mainly paid for programmes and projects with EIDHR 
funds.  
 
On the whole, despite numerous data limitations of OECD statistics, the overall quantitative 
account on EU commitments and payments in the OECD sector ‘government and civil society – 
general’, which comprises good governance, democracy, and human rights assistance, and on EU 
democracy assistance, which has been constructed from several sub-sectors of this OECD sector 
(i.e. legal and judicial development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, 
legislatures and political parties, media and free flow of information), has provided some detailed 
data and has exposed some important general insights into the development of EU activities 
since 1995.  
First, the overview has shown the strong increase in commitments in both sectors since 
the mid-1990s. Annual EU ODA commitments in the OECD category ‘government and civil 
society – general’ worldwide rose from about 76.78 million Euros in 1995 to about 1819.83 
million Euros in 2006 and, while declining thereafter, still amounted to about 1065.28 million 
Euros in 2009. As this is ODA data, it does not include flows to Russia, until 2005 to Ukraine 
and Moldova, and onwards flows to the CEECs. Overall, the EU therefore committed (and paid) 
even higher amounts. During the entire period 1995 to 2009, commitments in the category 
‘government and civil society – general’ constituted about 9.7% of all ODA commitments. There 
are no obvious reasons for the decline since 2007, as EU policy documents have continued to 
stress the relevance of the topics in EU external relations ever since the early 1990s. As no 
specific amount or share is a priori reserved for the sector ‘government and civil society – 
general’ or one of its sub-sectors, the resulting and changing shares are just the nearly accidental 
result of numerous, individual programming exercises and individual decisions on how limited 




Commitments for EU democracy assistance rather than for the entire sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’, comprising assistance under the EIDHR and the mainstream 
development programmes, steadily increased between 1996 and 2008. In 1996, about 30.74 
million Euros and in 2008 about 525.12 million Euros were committed to all EU democracy 
assistance. In 2009 the EU committed, with 351.97 million Euros, slightly less than in the 
preceding year. It remains to be seen whether this was the beginning of a trend or an exception. 
All in all, the increase in commitments for democracy assistance was more in line with the 
growing relevance attributed to the topic ever since the early 1990s; however, as will be exposed 
in more detail further below, the growth was not in all regions as steady as the aggregate data 
suggests, but, at times, varied considerably. During the entire period 1995 to 2009, the average 
share of commitments for democracy assistance of all external aid ODA commitments was 2.9%. 
Secondly, while the growth in both mentioned sectors over the last 15 years is 
remarkable, the analysis of this section has shown that the EU spends smaller shares of its overall 
ODA commitments for ‘government and civil society – general’ and for democracy assistance 
than the major other non-European donors, in particular the US, Canada, and Australia. For 
example, while in 2009 about 11% of all EU commitments pertained to the sector ‘government 
and civil society’, the US committed 16%, Canada 12%, and Australia 24% for the same sector. 
Other years show similar distributions. Further, while only about 33% of all EU commitments in 
the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ constituted democracy assistance in 2009, the 
US and Canada spent about 65% of all its ‘government and civil society – general’ commitments 
for democracy assistance, rather than for human rights and good governance topics.  
The third major insight exposed by the analysis is that until 1998 EU commitments in the 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ and commitments for democracy assistance were 
overwhelmingly commitments under the EU’s specific democracy and human rights programme, 
the EIDHR. Only from 1999 did the EU really begin to increasingly commit funds for the 
relevant topics under its mainstream development programmes rather than EIDHR alone. It has 
been explained that the late start – eight years after the 1991 November resolution – was due to 
an initial hesitation to implement the policy shift of November 1991 in practice, especially in 
those regions where pro-democracy movements were weak and authoritarianism strong. This 
hesitation was also, as mentioned in Chapter 6, reflected in cautious references to democracy 
promotion in assistance regulations. Further, there was the belief that democracy and human 
rights should and would only or mainly be taken care of under the EIDHR, which was explicitly 
rejected in COM(1995) 457 final. During the period 2004 and 2009, between 7% an 14% of all 
funds committed in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ were funds stemming 




Fourthly, the section has provided data on the increasing EU payments in the field of 
‘government and civil society – general’ and of democracy assistance. While disbursements for 
‘government and civil society’ assistance amounted to only 105.14 million Euros in 2002, in 2005 
they surged to 949.78 million Euros, and amounted to more than 1133.89 million Euros in 2009. 
Payments for democracy assistance increased from about 43 million Euros in 2004 to 384 million 
Euros in 2009. The analysis has again exposed that only from about 2005 on disbursements were 
made increasingly and substantially under mainstream development programmes rather than the 
EIDHR. This means that the policy declaration of November 1991 to provide democracy 
assistance, which only led to increasing financial commitments under development programmes 
from 1999, only resulted in increasing disbursements from 2005 on. It took the EU therefore 
about 14 years to give practical effect to a new policy instrument. In addition to the above 
mentioned reasons which explain the delay in disbursements, that is, a cautious approach towards 
authoritarian states and ideas about the role of the EIDHR, natural and non-natural delays in 
implementation, which, for example between 1999 and 2003 on average amounted to four years, 
also accounted for this long delay.  
 
2. The Thematic Distribution of Funds 
 
This section focuses on the thematic distribution of funds used for democracy assistance, that is, 
how the funds made available for democracy assistance under the numerous EU mainstream and 
specific development programmes have been distributed among the possible sub-sectors of 
democracy assistance. As mentioned before, this issue is one of the core questions on the EU’s 
strategy of democracy assistance and gives insights into the EU’s approach to democracy 
assistance and conception of democracy.  
 As in the previous section, the Tables devised for this section draw from the OECD 
database on ODA flows, which indeed constitutes the only available source of information over a 
longer time span. The Commission’s annual reports on development external assistance do not 
provide detailed data on individual projects and no specific reports on the implementation of 
individual programmes are being published. As mentioned, using OECD data involved several 
problems though, in particular, it only reports on ODA and it includes data on the EIDHR, 
which has to be taken into account when assessing EU engagement beyond this specific human 
right and democracy programme. Further, as mentioned, the OECD does not operate with a 
separate category of democracy assistance, but with the category of ‘government and civil society 
– general’ and eleven sub-groups. Five of these groups have been identified as pertaining to the 




only be given for these pre-determined five sub-groups rather than for a broader spectrum of 
sub-fields. 
 Before providing the relevant financial Tables on the distribution of commitments and 
payments among the eleven sub-categories of the OECD sector ‘government and civil society – 
general’ the Chapter briefly analyzes the major EU external assistance regulations, the EU budget, 
and the major programming documents in order to show at which stage in the policy-making and 
implementation process which crucial decisions on the distribution of funds were taken.  
 
a) The Determination of the Thematic Distribution of Funds 
 
i. The EU’s Mainstream and Specific Development Assistance Regulations 
 
Chapter 5 has shown that since the mid-1990s the large majority of external assistance regulations 
explicitly referred to democracy assistance and enumerated areas of democracy support. The 
exact lists of fields of democracy assistance envisaged by the various regulations differed from 
programme to programme. Most included references to the following areas: media support, civil 
society support, institutional reform and support, and rule of law development. Fewer regulations 
explicitly referred to elections, civilian control of the security systems, and legal reform. As the 
lists were non-exhaustive, the Commission could also provide support in non-mentioned areas, 
which were, for example, identified in bilateral agreements between the EU and the respective 
third state or mentioned in broad policy guidelines like the Common Strategies. Nevertheless, the 
stipulation indicated a strong preference for those sectors expressly mentioned. Beyond the 
enumeration of possible and preferred fields of assistance, none of the regulations established a 
hierarchy among the fields or even reserved a certain amount of funding or percentage of the 
available budget for the individual sectors. There were also neither rules on whether certain 
political situations should be confronted with certain assistance measures, nor rules on a certain 
sequencing of democracy assistance.  
 Overall, secondary law therefore played a very minor role for the thematic distribution of 
funds. The numerous regulations indicated possible and preferred areas of support, but did not 
call for a specific distribution of available funds among these areas. 
 
ii. The EU Budget 
 
The annual EU budget in principle includes an appropriation for an entire programme, like Tacis 




like a separate appropriation for the Mediterranean and Eastern ENPI states, for Palestine, and 
for ENPI cross-border cooperation programmes.1480 Not infrequently, the budgetary remarks 
refer to democratization and call for the provision of democracy assistance, not envisaging 
certain amounts for this purpose though.1481 However, the budgetary allocations for the general 
programmes basically never single out the entire sector of democracy assistance or any related 
sector, like good governance or human rights, of an entire programme and allocate a specific 
amount to that field. Exceptionally, the EU budget at time includes individual appropriations for 
special democracy and human rights-related programmes, like in the 2008 budget, an 
appropriation of 2.5 million Euros for the programme ‘Minorities in Russia – developing culture, 
media, and civil society’.1482 Such specific allocations only constitute one part of the entire sector 
of democracy assistance though. 
 All in all, the annual EU budget plays a limited role in the choice of thematic areas of 
support in the field of democracy assistance and does not include specific allocations. Very 
seldom, the budget foresees a special democracy assistance programme and allocates a certain 
amount to it.  
 
iii. The Programming Stage 
 
Unlike Chapter 6, which has presented the five EIDHR programming documents adopted since 
2001, this section cannot, for reasons of space, do the same for each development programme 
and each country. In order to see to what extent and how these various programming documents 
play a role in the determination of the thematic distribution of funds, the relevant democracy 
assistance-related and government and civil society-related sections of the programming 
documents of one exemplary country – Georgia – should be reproduced. If a document is not 
mentioned in the Table, like the Annual Action Programme  (AAP) for 2009, it is because that 
document does not mention any democracy-relevant programme or project.  
  
                                                     
1480 See, for example, the EU budget 2009, Chapter 19 08 European Neighbourhood Policy and Relations with 
Russia.  
1481 See, for example, the EU budget 2010, Chapter 19 09 Relations with Latin America.  




Table 41: Thematic Priorities concerning Democracy Assistance in Tacis and ENPI Programming 
Documents concerning Georgia 2002-20131483 
 
Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006 Georgia (23.9.2003) 
Priority area 1 of 3: Support for institutional, legal, and administrative reform 
National Indicative Programme 2002-2003 Georgia (27.12.2001) 
Priority area 1 of 3: Support for institutional, legal, and administrative reform 
 PCA implementation (esp. legal approximation) 
Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006 [!] (23.9.2003) 
Key area 1 of 3: Promoting rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights and democratic institutions, 
including the strengthening of civil society and the promotion of active participation of non governmental 
organisations in further transition towards democracy 
National Indicative Programme 2004-2006 Georgia (23.9.2003) 
Area of cooperation: Support for institutional, legal, and administrative reform: (11.5 million Euros) 
 PCA implementation (esp. legal approximation) 
 Reforms in judiciary and law enforcement  
 Strengthening civil society and human rights – implemented especially through the IBPP 
Action Programme 2004/2005 for Georgia 
Area of Co-operation 1 : Support to institutional, legal and administrative reforms (6.8 million Euros) 
 PCA implementation (esp. legal approximation) 
  Reform of the General Procurator’s Office 
 Penitentiary reform 
 Assistance to Ministry of Interior  
Action Programme for Georgia 2004 (Part II) 
Area of Co-operation 1 : Support to Institutional, Legal and Administrative Reforms Millions (8.8 million Euros)  
 Legal and administrative reform (7.5 million Euros)  
Tacis Action Programme 2006 for Georgia  
Area of Co-operation 1 : Support to Institutional, Legal and Administrative Reforms Millions (12 million Euros) 
 Strengthening the rule of law in Georgia (7.9 million Euros): ministry of justice, criminal justice reform, legal 
aid, State Prosecution Service, etc.) 
ENPI Annual Action Programme 2007 in favour of Georgia 
Support to the public management reform in Georgia (16 million Euros; DAC sector: public finance) 
ENPI Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (explicitly building on the EU-Georgia ENP AP) 
Priorities:  
Priority Area 1: Support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance 
 Sub-priority 1.1: Democracy, human rights, civil society development 
 Sub-priority 1.2: Rule of law and judicial reform 
 Sub-priority 1.3: Good governance, public finance reform and administrative capacity building 
ENPI Georgia National Indicative Programme 2007-2010  
Priority Area 1: Support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance (31.5 million Euros/26% of 
total) 
 Sub-priority 1.1: Democracy, human rights, civil society development (functioning of institution, citizen’s 
involvement, freedom of expression, free media, NGOs, local governmental structures, social dialogue) 
 Sub-priority 1.2: Rule of law and judicial reform (independent criminal justice sector, Ombudsman) 
 Sub-priority 1.3: Good governance, public finance reform and administrative capacity building (quality and 
efficiency of public administration, fight against corruption, promoting transparency, strengthening public 
financial management) 
ENPI Annual Action Programme Georgia 2007 
 Support to the Public Finance Management reform in Georgia (16 million Euros; DAC sector: public 
finance management) 
ENPI Annual Action Programme Georgia 2008 (15.7.2008) 
Actions related to Priority Area 1: 
 Support to the reform of criminal justice system in Georgia (16 million Euros; DAC sector: legal and 
judicial development) 
 Support to the peaceful settlement of Georgian internal conflict (6 million Euros; DAC sector: concerns 
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various sectors, including strengthening civil society) 
ENPI Annual Action Programme Georgia 2010 (1.6.2010) 
 Support to the Public Finance Management reform in Georgia, Phase II (DAC sector: public finance 
management) 
ENPI Georgia National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 
Priority Area 1: Democratic development, rule of law and good governance (45-63 million Euros/ 25-35 % of total) 
 Sub-priority 1.1: Media freedom, political pluralism, human rights, civil society development (improved 
division of powers, checks and balances, media freedoms, respect of human rights, sustainable democratic 
reform, civil society participation in policy making and monitoring) 
 Sub-priority 1.2.: Justice Sector Reform (strengthening rule of law, effective functioning of the judiciary, 
increasing public confidence in the judiciary) 
 Sub-priority 1.3.: Public finance management and public administration reform (sound and transparent 
public finance management system, stronger, stable, citizen-oriented public administration) 
ENPI Annual Action Programme Georgia 2011 (13.7.2011) 
 Support to the Criminal Justice Sector (18 million Euros; DAC sector: legal and judicial development) 
 Framework Programme in support of EU-Georgia agreements (9.73 million Euros; DAC sector: Public 
sector policy and administrative management) 
 
Table 41 very well illustrates the increasingly detailed nature of the various subsequently adopted 
programming documents: while the CSPs identify priority areas and sub-priority areas, like 
‘Support for democratic development, the rule of law and governance’, NIPs elaborate these 
areas in more detail and mention the financial allocation or at least approximate financial 
allocation for the entire priority area. Finally, Annual Action programmes (AAPs) identify the 
individual activities – programmes or projects – to be funded and stipulate the exact amount 
allocated to each activity. While CSPs therefore determine whether democracy assistance will 
receive any funding at all during the period of validity of the CSP, the NIPs stipulate the overall 
amount that the sector will receive. Most relevant though, it is during the stage of drafting and 
adopting the Annual Action programmes, which are jointly agreed by the EU and the target state’ 
governments, that the final thematic distribution of funds among various sub-sectors of 
democracy is decided. This constitutes a major difference to the EIDHR, in the case of which the 
final decision on the distribution of funds is fundamentally influenced by the demand of potential 
aid recipients, as decisions on projects are made on the basis of proposals, and in the case of 
which the distribution of funds is therefore not decided during the programming, but 
implementation stage.  
 
b) The Thematic Distribution of Funds 
 
This section presents the thematic distribution of funds committed by the EU in the OECD 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ during the period 1995 and 2009 and therefore the 
overall result of the choices made in the just mentioned programming documents. As regards the 
data source, that is, the OECD ODA statistics, as well as the various limitations of this source, 




that are particularly relevant for this section shall be addressed here. First, the database does not 
work with a separate sub-sector on democracy assistance. The latter has to be constructed from 
among the various sub-fields of the sector ‘government and civil society – general’. As indicated, 
based on the EU’s general documents on democracy assistance and the thematic focus of the 
EIDHR, sub-sectors (5) to (9) have been identified as constituting (primarily) democracy 
assistance rather than (primarily) another theme, like good governance or human rights. It should 
be stressed though, that also projects in other sectors can pursue a democracy agenda, like 
decentralization and women’s equality organizations. Their major objective is usually a different 
one though, like increasing aid efficiency through involving local NGOs and local institutions or 
improving the overall situation of women in society, which calls for a separate treatment.  
A second problem of the OECD database is that it works with a limited number of sub-
categories, which allows only a very general insight into EU democracy assistance. For example, 
OECD data for the sector ‘legal and judicial development’ is not further broken down into 
individual sub-categories. It is therefore impossible to determine to which extent projects support 
the development of an independent judiciary that is widely considered a core concern of 
democratization or only the drafting of new business laws and the reform of commercial courts 
that is mainly considered relevant for economic reform.1484 Some sectors, like legislatures and 
political parties, have only been added to the list in 2009 and therefore currently only provide 
very limited information on EU engagement. Chapter 6 on the EIDHR, which could extract data 
from EU implementation reports on the EIDHR, has been able to provide a much more detailed 
list of sub-fields.  
Finally, it should be recalled that OECD data includes data on EU commitments under 
the general development programmes as well as under the EIDHR. When discussing EU 
engagement under the mainstream programmes, as is the purpose of this Chapter, the EU’s 
actions under the EIDHR have to be taken into account in the discussion of the Tables.  
 A few observations should first be made on those sub-sectors of the category 
‘government and civil society – general’, which are here not considered to be part of the core 
areas of democracy assistance. As is immediately visible, several thereof received considerable 
large shares of EU funds in the sector during the period 1995 to 2009. First, most notably, the 
sub-sector ‘public sector policy and administrative management’ received 50% (!) of all EU 
commitments during the period 1995 to 2009 and therefore by far much more than any other 
(nearly 6 billion Euros). It needs to be born in mind though, that the sector has a very broad 
substantive scope. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, until 2008 the OECD reported separately 
on ‘economic & development policy and planning’ and on ‘government administration’, both of  
                                                     




Table 42: Distribution of ODA Commitments for ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ 1995-2009 




1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Public sector 
policy and admin. 
management 
61.52 61.75 114.85 106.42 330.81 243.11 133.13 220.08 459.67 
Public financial 
management 
1.63 1.6 80.46 45.14 16.18 11.61 6.74 19.55 70.27 
Decentralization 
and support to 
sub-national gov. 




         
Legal and judicial 
development 




 24.61 16.2 8.19 91.1 46.54 38.76 78.95 91.23 
Elections 
 
1.26 5.96 42.26 8.72 25.85 27.5 14.03 30.51 34.06 
Legislatures and 
political parties 
         
Media and free 
flow of info. 
  0.05  1.52 11.29 1.6 3.7 9.23 
Human rights 
 
2.46 9.13 2.36 8.72 61.52 105.4 91.73 93.32 81.03 
Women’s equality 
organizations 
9.84 9.92 1.14 0.83 10.89 2.22 7.93 8.03 2.56 
 




2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total % of 
sector 
% of all 
ODA 
Public sector 
policy and admin. 
management 




68.68 63.49 208.42 159.84 61.75 44.77 860.13 7% <1% 
Decentralization 
and support to 
sub-national gov. 




     3.34 3.34 <1% <1% 
Legal and judicial 
development 




49.67 160.23 186.84 164.54 124.82 62.55 1141.23 10% 1% 
Elections 
 
156.5 141.93 139.22 108.28 41.61 102.03 879.72 7% <1% 
Legislatures and 
political parties 
     13.42 13.42 <1% <1% 
Media and free 
flow of info. 
2.71  7.38 2.3 2.69  42.47 <1% <1% 
Human rights 
 
142.02 112.7 122.19 165.24 171.32 153.26 1322.4 11% 1% 
Women’s equality 
organizations 
13.82 8.62 19.34 19.58 11.64 26.2 152.56 1% <1% 
Total 1549.35 1318.05 1819.84 1474.95 1317.59 1065.27 11960.99 100% 9.7% 
                                                     
1485 Data extracted from the OECD database on ODA recipients. Some of the numbers provided in the Table 
slightly diverge from those in Table 37, which is due to the conversion from US $ into Euros. Blank boxes indicate 




which on average received between 21% and 24% of all funds in the sector.1486 Only from 2009 
on were these two categories united in the new ‘super-sector’ ‘public sector policy and 
administrative development’. It has already been mentioned above that the EU devotes higher 
shares to governance-related topics than other major donors, in particular the US and Canada 
(Section III.1.b)ii., above), which is confirmed here. Basically all of these funds originated from 
mainstream development programmes rather than the EIDHR. An example of a project in the 
sector (or of the earlier sector ‘government administration’) is the DCI-funded project 
‘Strengthening access to land and property rights for all citizens in Bangladesh’ (10 million Euros; 
AAP 2008) that aimed at modernizing the system of land records management, which was 
regulated by more than 100 legal acts and implemented by at least three different institutions.1487  
 The sector ‘public finance management’ has received 7% of all EU funds committed in 
the sector ‘government and civil society – general’. Its growing shares have in part to do with the 
tendency in international development of providing increasing shares of foreign assistance as 
budget or sector support, foreseen, amongst others, in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness. As in that case the external funds usually become part of the national budget of a 
developing country, the external donors want to ensure the sound management of this budget, 
with clear and efficient procedures for adoption, implementation, and control. An exemplary 
project in the sector of ‘public finance management’ is ‘Support to the public finance 
management reform in Georgia’ (16 million Euros, AAP 2007). In that project, the finance 
reform should help in fighting poverty in the country, in particular through ensuring a better 
allocation of resources, improved service delivery, increased accountability and transparency in 
spending. 
 As indicated, the sector ‘Decentralization and support to sub-national governments’ has 
only been reported on separately since 2009, which to a large extent explains its minor share of 
1% of all commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ during the 1995 – 
2009 period. A look at the data of 2009 only, which reports on commitments of 111.28 million 
Euros, shows that the sector is indeed a major field of EU engagement. An example of a project 
in the sector is a joint UN project on ‘Local governance and decentralized service delivery’, 
implemented by UNDP in Somalia between 2008 and 2010 and supported by the EU with 5 
million Euros (about 30% of the project costs). Its goal was to improve access to better health, 
water, and sanitation facilities and better education and housing through making these services 
available through local government acting in accountable and transparent ways.1488  
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1487 All following examples are included in the CSR Search Tool for Grants and Contracts and/or AAPs for the 
respective individual countries.  




Similarly, the share of the sector ‘Anti-corruption organizations and institutions’ is very 
small (much lower than 1% of all commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – 
general’ between 1995 and 2009). Also this can be explained by the recent creation of the sub-
sector. Before 2009 the EU funded projects in the field of anti-corruption, which was reported 
on the sector of government administration. Chapter 5 has shown, that between 1996 and 2006 
about 14.8 million Euros were spent for anti-corruption projects under the EIDHR. Also the 
CSR Search Tool for Grants and Contracts of Europeaid mentions numerous projects for 2008. 
All in all, the exact share of anti-corruption projects is therefore hard to determine, but appears 
higher than the 3.34 million Euros reported on in the OECD database.  
 During the period 1995 to 2009 the EU spent about 1.3 billion Euros in the sector 
‘human rights’, which was about 11% of all funds spent in the sector ‘government and civil 
society’. The evolution of this sector indicates that commitments for human rights only started to 
reach larger proportions in 1999, when OECD data mentions commitments of 61.52 million 
Euros. The low numbers before that year are, however, in slight contradiction to Table 12 (on 
EU Expenditure under the EIDHR and its Forerunner Programmes 1992 and 2006, provided in 
Chapter 5), which already indicate higher expenditure for human rights projects in the early 
1990s. Overall, a comparison of the EIDHR data and Table 42 suggests that about 40-50% of all 
funds for human rights projects between 1995 and 2009 originated in the EIDHR budget.1489 The 
mainstream development programmes have therefore only to a minor extent funded projects in 
that area, but worked with the assumption that it should primarily be the EIDHR that should 
fund the promotion of the respect for human rights.  
 The last not democracy assistance-specific sub-sector of the OECD category 
‘government and civil society – general’ relates to ‘Women’s equality organizations’, which 
received about 152.56 million Euros, or 1% of the overall commitments in the entire sector 
between 1995 and 2009. A comparison with data on the EIDHR, in particular Table 17 and 18 of 
Chapter 5, shows that between one third and half of these funds were EIDHR funds.  
 As mentioned, the remaining five sub-sectors should be considered to constitute 
democracy assistance. The sector ‘legal and judicial development’ or, as called in Chapter 5, ‘rule 
of law’, has received the largest share of ODA funds related to democracy assistance. Between 
1995 and 2009 about 1.5 billion Euros or 12% of all funds committed in the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ related to legal development and the justice sector. The evolution of 
the commitments shows a strong surge in commitments in 2003, since when they have annually 
always been between 100 and 200 million Euros (and in 2007 even 356 million Euros). A 
                                                     
1489 Only approximate comparisons are possible, as Table 12 reports on expenditure, while Table 42 reports on 




comparison with Table 17 relating to the EIDHR (see Chapter 5) shows that until 2000 about 
half of the funds used for the promotion of legal and judicial development were from the 
EIDHR budget, and that since then the large majority of rule of law projects have been funded 
under general development programmes. Between 2000 and 2006 only about 8% of all assistance 
on the promotion of rule of law have stemmed from the EIDHR budget. The reason for this 
development is not only a shift away from institutionally-focused aid, including the judiciary, by 
the EIDHR from 2000 on, but also, and even more importantly, a stronger focus on legal and 
judicial development in the case of mainstream development programmes. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, (only) from 1999 on, newly adopted or amended mainstream development assistance 
regulations, like Tacis 1999, MEDA 2000, the Cotonou Agreement, and the ENPI, have explicitly 
mentioned the rule of law as a possible and preferred target sector for development aid.  
As the title of the category suggests, two principal types of activities are covered by the 
sector ‘legal and judicial development’.1490 The first type relates to legal reform, like the enactment 
of new laws and regulations in fields unregulated, for example, due to the prior existence of a 
different (non-market) economic system or in fields badly (inconsistently) regulated, which is 
frequently the case in developing countries.1491 Thematically, the focus of most projects was on 
the economic and trade sector, often because the projects supported the implementation of trade 
and cooperation agreements signed between the EU and the respective third state(s). Many 
projects also related to the criminal law sector and aimed at reforming penal law codes. In several 
former Soviet countries the EU has for many years funded so-called policy and legal advice 
centres, like UEPLAC in Ukraine and GEPLAC in Georgia, which regularly advised the 
respective state’s public bodies (parliament and ministries) in the drafting of new legislative or 
regulatory acts, in particular as regards PCA (and therefore predominantly trade-related) issues.1492 
In other countries, projects just supported the local law-making institutions as regards a single 
law or topic.1493 The second major type of projects of the sector related to the judicial branch (in 
the broad sense). Institutionally, many of these projects focused on ministries of justice, courts, 
public prosecutor’s offices, law enforcement agencies (in particular the police), penitentiary 
institutions, legal education and training institutions and legal aid clinics and aimed at rendering 
these institutions and procedures more independent, transparent, professional, efficient, and 
effective. Thematically, there was, as already mentioned, a strong focus on the criminal law 
                                                     
1490 The following analysis is based on the projects mentioned in numerous AAPs as well as in the CSR Search Tool.  
1491 T. Carothers, ‘The Rule of Law Revival’, in T. Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of 
Knowledge (2006), at 5; L.-H. Piron, ‘Time to Learn, Time to Act in Africa’, in T. Carothers (ed.), Promoting the Rule of 
Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (2006), at 281.  
1492 Ukrainian – European Policy and Legal Advice Centre and Georgian – European Policy and Legal Advice Centre 
at http://ueplac.kiev.ua/en/ and http://www.geplac.com/ (last accessed on 19.12.2011). 




sector, aiming at rendering criminal investigation procedures more efficient, reducing corruption 
of involved public officials and judges, and improving the situation of prisoners. Frequently, 
projects concentrated on juvenile offenders and juvenile penitentiary institutions. Next to legal 
reform and the judicial sector, there was a third major area of focus of many EU projects: border 
management and border control issues, for example, to control human and drugs trafficking.  
In comparison to rule of law projects under the EIDHR, there was overall much 
overlapping between EIDHR and mainstream development projects in terms of objectives, focus 
institutions, and themes, with the major exception of a weaker focus on the economic domain 
and a stronger focus on civil society organizations by the EIDHR. While many rule of law 
projects funded under the EIDHR supported NGOs and advocacy groups of lawyers and funded 
public information and education campaigns in order to improve access to justice, projects under 
the mainstream programmes hardly did so, but rather focused at work with public institutions.  
 The EU committed about 1141.23 million Euros on the sector ‘democratic participation 
and civil society’ between 1995 and 2009, which constitutes about 10% of all commitments in the 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’. About one tenth thereof was committed under 
the EIDHR, while the remaining, much larger share came from general or specific development 
programmes, in particular the specific NGOs programme B7-6000 and the Thematic programme 
‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’. Two types of projects appear to prevail 
in this sector. First, a large number of activities aim at the inclusion and representation of 
disadvantaged groups in the political process, in particular, in key processes of a democratic 
system, like an upcoming election campaign. Among the major groups targeted in this kind of 
projects are women, youth, children, disabled, and ethnic minorities, who are encouraged, 
trained, and supported to actively participate in the political process. Secondly, a large number of 
projects focus on the inclusion of civil society organizations in local development projects and on 
cooperation among non-state and local state actors.1494 Thematically, such projects cover a very 
broad spectrum and can range from infrastructure projects like the building of bridges to social 
policy issues. Both types of projects usually involve the capacity development of NGOs, 
including advocacy and financial management training. Some of the funded NGOs were critical 
of governmental policies and provided opposition in certain policy fields; however, the 
programmes hardly financed civil society groups that explicitly and mainly pursued a pro-
democracy agenda, including aiming at regime change. Rather, targeted NGOs were groups 
working on the broad spectrum of development issues. This constituted a major difference to the 
EIDHR, in the framework of which more politically-focused, regime-critical NGOs were 
supported. 
                                                     




 About 880 million Euros (or 7% of all EU funds) committed in the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ during the period 1995 and 2009 pertained to the sector ‘elections’, 
comprising election assistance and election observation. As only about 20% thereof were 
committed under the EIDHR (see Chapter 5), the major part of EU election assistance was 
therefore provided under the mainstream development programmes rather than the specific 
human rights and democracy programme. As noted in Chapter 5, the EU’s decision in 2000 to 
increasingly engage in electoral assistance, mainly led to an increase of activities under the 
mainstream programmes rather than the EIDHR.1495 The evolution of commitments in the sector 
‘elections’ in Table 42 also shows, that it took several years until the policy choice of COM(2000) 
191 final showed effects on AAPs: only from about 2004 on did commitments for electoral 
assistance indeed increase. All in all, the Table 42 shows that there was no obsession with free 
and fair elections, as was frequently criticized, but also no lack of focus on elections, as was more 
recently remarked.1496 Election assistance projects funded under the mainstream programmes 
frequently consisted of support to UNDP projects on electoral support. Thematically, they 
frequently covered the entire organization of an election, that is, in particular technical and 
material support to the central electoral commissions. Additionally, projects would also support 
voter and civic education programmes or local monitoring bodies. Another important insight of 
Table 42 is that the majority of EU funds used for electoral support relates to election assistance 
rather than election observation missions, which have since the early 2000s been exclusively 
funded under the EIDHR.  
 Little can so far be said about EU support to parliaments and political parties, as the 
OECD only allows independent reporting for this sector since 2009. In that year about 13.42 
million Euros were committed for projects in this sector. The Europeaid SCR Search Tool on 
Grants and Contracts includes entries for about 8 major parliamentary support projects during 
between 2007 and 2010, basically all of which focused on the national parliament of a country, 
rather than political parties. In any, due to advocacy from within the European Parliament, in 
particular by the OPPD, there might be more projects in the sector in the future.1497 
 Finally, the OECD database allows donors to report on projects in the sector ‘media and 
free flow of information’. According to the database, the EU only committed about 42.47 million 
Euros in this sector during the entire period 1995 and 2009. This number appears small, given 
that EU reports on EIDHR expenditure 1995 to 2009 mention higher amounts (62.1 million 
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Euros). While this inconsistency cannot be explained (but might in part be the result of 
differences in reports on commitments in the OECD database and on expenditure in EU 
EIDHR implementation reports), it shows that the overwhelming majority of projects in this 
sector are supported under the EIDHR.  
 All in all, Table 42 presents the thematic distribution of all EU funds used for democracy, 
human rights, and good governance assistance between 1995 and 2009. The shares of EIDHR 
funds from all expenditure differs from category to category, but overall ranges between very 
little (as in the case of public sector policy) to a rather high share of 50% (as in the case of human 
rights projects) or even 80% in the case of media and free flow of information. In most sectors 
of democracy assistance, between 8% and 20% of all funds have stemmed from the EIDHR 
rather than a mainstream programme. Table 42 exposes the very unbalanced distribution of funds 
among the eleven sub-sectors of the OECD category ‘government and civil society – general’. 
About 60% of the funds have been used in the sector good governance (administrative 
development, public finance management, decentralization, anti-corruption), the overwhelming 
majority of which came, as mentioned, from the budgets of the mainstream development 
programmes. About 11% of all funds were spent on human rights projects, half of which were, 
however, funded under the EIDHR. The remaining 30% of funds committed under ‘government 
and civil society – general’ were used for democracy assistance programmes and projects. About 
12% (1.5 billion Euros) of the overall funds in the sector were used in the sector of ‘legal and 
judicial development’, about 10% (1.1 billion Euros) for projects on ‘democratic participation and 
civil society’, and about 7% (880 million Euros) for election assistance projects. The large 
majority of these funds came from the mainstream or specific development programmes rather 
than the EIDHR, indicating that a major share of EU democracy assistance is indeed provided 
under the mainstream rather than specific development programmes. The OECD database 
includes very minor shares for the sectors parliaments/political parties, which is mainly due to 
the more recent creation of these OECD categories.  
The low number of different categories of democracy assistance and lack of more 
detailed, aggregate information about projects renders it difficult to draw valid conclusions as to 
the extent to which the EU has pursued the developmental and/or political approach to 
democracy assistance through the mainstream and special development assistance programmes. 
Nevertheless, analysis of Table 42 and of various projects included in the CSR Search Tool for 
Grants and Contracts in each category seem to confirm the results of the analysis of the legal 
texts of the regulations made in Chapter 6. It appears that the EU is primarily following the 
developmental approach when promoting democracy through its mainstream programmes. First, 




other major international donors. More than half of the funds spent in the sector ‘government 
and civil society’ have been used for this purpose. Secondly, also a look the five sectors of the 
OCED statistics that are considered to be democracy assistance shows a preference for the 
development approach. The main focus is on a broadly defined rule of law agenda, including legal 
reforms, in particular in the economic, trade and criminal law sectors and institutional reforms 
targeting ministries, courts, and law enforcement agencies. The question of an independent 
judiciary, which can act as a strong and independent power vis-à-vis the government (and 
parliament), is partly addressed in some projects, but does not appear as a major issue. Further, 
the EU supports a broad range of civil society actors, in particular at the local level, which should 
be enabled to participate in the elaboration and implementation of policies. However, while 
individual NGOs targeted in projects are regime critical and fight for democratization, such type 
of groups are not the primary target of EU support, but rather concerned with a broad range of 
less regime and government critical development issues.  
Nevertheless, the political approach is also not entirely absent. Indeed, a considerable part 
of the funds under the mainstream programmes have been used for the organization of, 
participation in, and (local) monitoring of elections, which is a core element of the political 
approach. Additionally, as mentioned, some rule of law projects also focus on the independence 
of the judiciary and some civil society support projects train NGOs that are opposing ruling 
undemocratic governments. All in all, like the EIDHR, also the mainstream and specific 
development programmes have pursued a mixed approach to democracy assistance, with, 
however, the developmental approach prevailing over the political one.  
 
3. The Geographical Distribution of Funds 
 
While the previous sections have followed a global approach, this last section of Chapter 6 takes 
a closer look at EU democracy assistance in various major world regions. It first provides some 
more detailed insight into how much the EU committed in the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’ and on democracy assistance in individual world regions and secondly how the 
EU distributed democracy assistance among the various sub-groups in those regions. Both topics 
need to be read in connection with the global data presented above and aim to present regional 
differences and variations as well as to expose some underlying pattern, like a stronger focus on 
democracy assistance in regions closer to the EU, as was discovered in the case of the EIDHR . 
The data source is again the OECD database on ODA flows in the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’. Unfortunately, the OECD’s regional groupings do not entirely overlap with 




‘Central America’ covers countries under the ALA and DCI programmes as well as ACP states, 
while the ENPI states are reported on in the OECD group ‘Africa North of the Sahara’ and, in 
part, the ‘Middle East’ and ‘Europe’. This divergence has to be taken into account when 
consulting the Tables and relating them to EU development programmes. Also all other 
limitations of OECD data, like its limitation to ODA and the inclusion of EIDHR data should be 
recalled. For lack of space and time, the distribution of funds among countries, which has been 
provided in Chapter 5 on the EIDHR, is neglected here. Just like other sections, the discussion 
should first focus on the question at which stage in the policy-making process, the crucial 
decisions were taken.  
 
a) The Determination of the Distribution of Funds 
 
i. The Regulations  
 
As discussed above, the various mainstream and specific development programmes mention a 
financial reference amount, which suggests how much money will (approximately) be available 
for the specific programme in question during the entire duration of the regulation. However, the 
geographically-focused programmes, like Tacis, do not determine how much of this amount is 
going to be spent for individual areas, like ‘government and civil society’ or democracy assistance. 
Similarly, internationally-focused programmes, like the NGO programmes B7-6000, only 
envisage a general budget and do not determine, in secondary law, how the available funds are 
going to be distributed among the major world regions. 
 All in all, secondary law is therefore silent on the geographical distribution of funds in the 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ and democracy assistance.  
 
ii. The EU Budget 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the EU budget includes an appropriation for an entire 
programme, like the ENPI, or a major sub-programme, like the Mediterranean and Eastern 
ENPI states. However, the budget basically never allocates exact amounts to the OECD sector 
‘government and civil society’ or to differently defined areas like democracy, good governance or 
human rights. Exceptionally, individual democracy-related projects or programmes are allocated a 
specific sum of money, which only constitutes part of the entire sector.  
 All in all, the budget therefore does not play a role in the determination of the geographic 





iii. The Programming Stage 
 
Also in this section reference can be made to the above discussion of the programming stage as 
regards the thematic distribution of funds and to Table 41. As shown there, it is during the 
programming stage that crucial decisions are taken on how much of the available budget for an 
entire region is spent for democracy assistance or other substantive areas. These decisions are, in 
particular, taken in the NIPs, which allocate specific amounts to specific areas. AAPs, which 
include action fiches of individual programmes or projects, determine the allocation of funds into 
different sub-heading of ‘government and civil society – general’. 
 The development of NIPs, which are negotiated with the recipient states’ government 
and signed by the EU and that government, are therefore crucial for the determination of the 
percentage of available funds for the entire category ‘government and civil society – general’, 
while the AAPs are crucial for the allocation of funds to the various sub-sectors of this sector.  
 
b) The Regional Distribution of Funds in the Sector ‘Government and Civil Society’ 
 
Table 43 provides a detailed picture of EU ODA commitments in the sector ‘government and 
civil society – general’ in the major world regions. As mentioned, the provided data has been 
extracted from the OECD ODA database and works with different regional categories than the 
EU usually does, which makes it difficult to relate the data to EU assistance programmes. It 
should also be mentioned that the data slightly – by 1-2% – diverges from the aggregate data 
provided in Table 37 above, which is partly the result of bringing data down to a round figure 
when converting OECD data in US$ to Euros, but also the result of an internal inconsistency in 
the OECD database, that, due to its small degree, should be neglected here.  
 As absolute amounts committed in one region have to be assessed in relation to the 
number of countries covered by that region, Table 44 provides data on average commitments in 
the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ in country in each region. For example, it 
shows that in ‘Africa – North of the Sahara’, in each of the covered five states on average 133.3 
million Euros were committed in the sector ‘government and civil society’ between 1995 and 
2009. It should be stressed that the actual distribution of funds among countries was different. 
The main purpose of Table 44 is to relate the absolute regional expenditure to the number of 
countries.1498 
 
                                                     




Table 43: Commitments in the Sector ‘Government and Civil Society general’ 1995 – 2009 per major 
Region (in million Euros)1499 
 
Year/Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
36.49 40.74 89.82 93 310.32 259.05 65.48 141.02 
Europe (incl. We 
NIS)1500 
10.25 - 30.69 31.35 61.31 50.46 52.29 161.58 
South and Central 
Asia 
0.8 1.05 0.05  4.5 5.26 10.73 7.09 
Middle East (incl. 
Iraq) 
 25.09 42.75 12.03 43.83 24.89 25.88 43.96 
Africa North of 
Sahara 
   2.01 8.17 45.45 3.79 14.01 
Central America 11.76 0.32 10.73 34.14 31.64 53.35 34.98 27.74 
Far East Asia - 11.34 - 12.86 20.07 6.26 23.73 17.9 
South America 6.8 9.31 16.45 1.23 3.03 22.77 14.84 6.71 
Oceania 0.97 0.6 0.49 1.17 3.76 2.35 10.91 2.3 
Unspecified 9.7 24.66 72.9 12.42 36.34 56.48 60.37 66.79 
Total 76.77 113.11 263.88 200.21 522.97 526.32 303 489.1 
 
Year/Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
156.33 402.4 383.27 423.94 420.42 299.38 374.85 3496.51 
Europe (incl. We 
NIS) 
319.94 449.77 465.66 746.91 280.46 496.87 299.25 3456.79 
South and Central 
Asia 
124.06 126.9 143.49 173.43 95.7 107.77 69.72 870.55 
Middle East 28.39 83.97 59.29 67.82 117.37 69.23 66.72 711.22 
Africa North of 
Sahara 
73.64 123.5 77.06 158.57 169.38 50.76  726.34 
Central America 83.78 58.67 50.4 36 27.65 60.34 59.59 581.08 
Far East Asia 36.08 41.76 20.6 49.01 20.27 25.11 16.44 301.43 
South America 16.75 45.62 21.44 43.42 47.06 10.49 1.01 266.93 
Oceania 11.7 7.66 2.38 9.7 25.52 10.18 3.46 93.15 
Unspecified 30.35 177.68 93.42 46.22 266.79 187.48 170.22 1311.82 
Total 881.02 1517.93 1317.01 1755.02 1470.62 1317.61 1061.26 11815.83 
 
Table 44: Average EU Commitments in the Sector ‘Government and Civil Society- General’ per Country 
in each major Region 1995 -2009 (in million Euros)1501  
 





























230.5 144.4 68.6 50.8 51.2 20.5 20 15.85 4.9 
 
Table 45 provides data on the average share of commitments of the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’ of all ODA beween 1995 and 2009 in all major OECD regions. 
 
                                                     
1499 Data extracted from the OECD database on ODA flows. Calculations in Euros were made on the basis of 
average annual exchange rates. Blank boxes indicate that the OECD database did not report on any aid flows. 
1500 The region Europe covers the CEECs, the Balkans, the Western NIS, and Turkey. As countries, which have firm 
dates for accession to the EU, graduate from the DAC list of ODA recipients, the Table does not include data on aid 
flows to these states from varying fixed points of time. Russia is excluded due to its membership in the G8.  




Table 45: Average Share of Sector ‘Government and Civil Society – General’ of all EU ODA 

























































As regards the general insights provided by Table 43, reference can be made to the discussion of 
Table 37 above. Table 43 reports the same overall increase in commitments in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’ during the period 1995 and 2009, the peak (in absolute 
terms) in 2006, and decreasing commitments since then. It shows that many regions have 
followed this average pattern, even if some went a slightly different way, like Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which committed relatively high amounts already in the late 1990s, and Africa North of the 
Sahara and Oceania, which only reached a peak in commitments in 2007. Table 43 also shows, 
however, that the peak in commitments in 2007 was mainly due to a very high allocation in 
Europe (and there, in particular, in Turkey).  
 As regards the differences in the various regions, Table 43 shows that several regions 
spent considerably more money on governance and civil society issues than others. The 
frontrunners are Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, where in each region during the entire period 
under analysis, over 3.4 billion Euros were spent for good governance, democracy, and human 
rights promotion. This was four times more than in South and Central Asia, the region with the 
third largest commitments, and much more than in all other regions. The picture looks slightly 
different, when also considering the number of countries in each region. Europe still appears as 
the region where most funds were spent in the sector government and civil society, followed by 
the five North African states. Very little has been invested in the field in the Far East Asia (a 
group that includes China). Table 45 shows that except in Europe, where a higher share of all 
ODA was committed in the sector government and civil society (20.2 %), in most other regions 
between 7.1 % and 10.3 % of all ODA was committed in the sector.  
 All in all, it strongly appears that more efforts were invested into ensuring that countries 
carry out reforms in the sector ‘government and civil society - general’ in regions closer to the 
EU, in particular in countries in Europe themselves (the Balkans, Turkey, the Western NIS), as 
well as in its closer neighbourhood (Africa North of the Sahara). These are the regions were most 
money has in the last 15 years been committed to that end, if taking the number of countries into 




usually between approximately 7 % and 10 % is committed for democracy, human rights, and 
good governance aid.  
 
c) The Regional Distribution of Funds for Democracy Assistance 
 
Table 46 presents a detailed picture of how much was annually committed to democracy 
assistance in individual geographical regions. It needs to be mentioned that the individual and 
overall amounts of democracy assistance mentioned in Table 46 are in part slightly different from 
the amount stipulated in Table 38 above (divergence of 1-2%). This is again due to some minor 
data variations resulting from rounding up when converting US$ to Euros and, in particular in 
2006, an internal inconsistency in the OECD database, that might be due to a lack of reporting in 
the regional data on certain flows. Table 46 is nevertheless able to provide an interesting insight 
into regional similarities and differences as regards the attention for democracy assistance. As 
mentioned above, until 1998 most of the funds committed in the sector were from the EIDHR 
budget and only from 1999 on did the EU increasingly commit funds for democracy assistance 
under other programmes. 
 
Table 46: Commitments for Democracy Assistance 1995 – 2009 per major Region (in million Euros)1502 
 
Year/Region 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.22 19.52 49.38 5.89 83.62 81.97 19.3 72.46 
Europe (incl. We NIS)1503   0.47 3.57 9.69 6.9  23.98 
South and Central Asia  0.13   0.34 1.2 3.78 2.88 
Middle East (incl. Iraq)   14.66 5.23 12.42 22.84 19.9 25.51 
Central America 0.06 0.21 0.31 10.73 2.68 0.46 11.87 15.9 
Africa North of Sahara     6.26 33.91 0.49 5.81 
Far East  10.82  12.55  1.48 4.54 0.77 
South America   0.35  2.05 8.18 1.62 1.69 
Oceania     0.09  3.49 0.07 
Unspecified    2.02 2.65 6.13 5.35 2.38 
Total 1.28 30.68 65.18 39.99 119.83 163.14 70.34 151.45 
 
Year/Region 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.28 149.85 208.22 193.96 133.85 194.98 141.14 1427.64 
Europe (incl. We NIS) 74.64 83.08 106.32 102.17 80.26 157.35 70.11 718.54 
South and Central Asia 10.38 33.67 39.48 33.69 39.53 76.32 64.55 305.95 
Middle East (incl. Iraq) 11.42 43.23 32.12 5.22 39.25 25.99 8.06 265.85 
Central America 19.8 1.89 28.38 32.48 6.77 32.37 19.26 183.17 
Africa North of Sahara 42.96 36.78 17.39  16.99 16.67  176.38 
Far East Asia 31.38 8.94 16.31 27.5 2.01 9.12 12.93 138.35 
South America 8.45 27.98 7.35 28.26 4.12 7.26  97.31 
Oceania 1.64 0.32  4.88 4.99   15.48 
Unspecified 2.25 11.4  12.77 76.38 4.9 35.92 162.15 
Total 275.2 397.14 455.57 440.93 404.14 524.96 351.97 3490.82 
                                                     
1502 Data extracted from OECD ODA database. Blanc fields indicate that the OECD database did not report on aid 
flows. 
1503 The region Europe covers the CEECs, the Balkans, the Western NIS, and Turkey. As countries, which have firm 
dates for accession to the EU, graduate from the DAC list of ODA recipients, the Table does not included data on 





Table 47 shows the average commitments for democracy assistance per country in each major 
region between 1995 and 2009. As mentioned above, this average share is of course different 
from the actual amount committed and only has the purpose of relating the regional amount to 
the number of countries in the region.  
 
Table 47: Average (!) Commitments for Democracy Assistance per County in each Major Region 1995 – 
2009 (in million Euros) 
 





























45.23 35.43 28 19.2 17.9 7.68 7.49 6.23 1.01 
 
Table 48 shows how much of the overall amount committed in the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’ pertained to democracy assistance in individual regions.  
 
Table 48: Average Share of Democracy Assistance of Sector ‘Government and civil society – general’ in 

























































Like Table 38, Table 46 shows the overall growth in commitments for democracy assistance 
programmes and projects over the period 1995 and 2009. At the same time, it also shows that in 
most regions the development was not a very steady one, as suggested by the aggregate data of 
Table 38, but rather a volatile one, with much variation from year to year. In some regions, most 
money was spent for democracy assistance in the early 2000s (especially 2003 and 2004), while in 
other regions a peak was reached in 2008. In several regions very low amounts or nothing was 
committed in individual years, in particular in 2003 and 2009. The steadily increasing 
commitments for democracy assistance presented in Table 38 were therefore mainly due to the 
three regions that spent most in the sector, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and South and Central 
Asia. Overall, there is still a strong need to ensure that a certain, stable share of all ODA is 




 Table 48 on the share of democracy assistance of all ODA for ‘government and civil 
society – general’ in each region also provides important insights. Table 38 showed that during 
the period 1995 and 2009 the EU on average committed about 30% of all ODA in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’ for democracy assistance, which was less than major 
other international donors do. Table 48 shows that there were considerable differences among 
individual regions. Very surprisingly, in the region were most was (on average) spent for 
democracy assistance per country – Europe – the average share of democracy assistance of all 
ODA in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ is only 20% and therefore 
considerably lower than in most other regions. Similarly, in North Africa, where each country on 
average received a relatively high amount between 1995 and 2009, only about 24% of all 
commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ were used for democracy 
assistance. At the same time, in two regions, Far East Asia (including China) and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, a relatively high share of 41% and 46%, respectively, of all funds committed for 
‘government and civil society – general’ were used for democracy assistance. Overall, 
commitments for democracy assistance in Far East Asia were very minor though. The region 
Sub-Saharan Africa appears as quite a positive performer as regards democracy assistance, which 
is in stark contrast with the low share African states received under the EIDHR (see Chapter 5, 
Table 26). In Sub-Saharan Africa not only a very high overall amount was spent for democracy 
assistance between 1995 and 2009 (1427.93 million Euros) but a comparatively very high average 
amount per country (28 million Euros) and percentage of all ODA in the sector ‘government and 
civil society – general’ (40.8%) was also spent.  
 Overall, due to the different results emerging from Tables 47 and 48 – i.e. regions with 
high amounts spent for democracy assistance are at the same time regions with low shares of 
democracy assistance of all ODA – there are difficulties extracting some pattern of EU 
engagement. It nevertheless seems possible to say that, due to the high amounts committed in 
individual countries in Europe and Africa North of the Sahara, the EU engages more in regions 
close to its borders. At the same time, the region Sub-Saharan Africa is a remarkable example of a 
strong effort on behalf of the EU and the respective recipient states to devote not only a 
relatively high and stable share to democracy assistance projects, but also a relatively high and 
stable share of all ODA. Finally, as in the case of the EIDHR, it is not possible to discern a clear 
pattern of stronger or weaker engagement in more or less democratic regions.1504 Among the 
major recipients per country as well as per percentage of all ODA are regions with lower (Africa 
North of the Sahara) and regions with higher average levels of democratic development 
                                                     
1504 As regards average levels of democracy in individual regions, reference should be made on the data of Freedom 




(Europe). Similarly, among the minor recipients of democracy assistance are regions with higher 
(Central and Southern America) and lower levels (Far East Asia) of democratic development. All 
in all, levels of democratic development therefore seemed not to have been decisive for the 
provision of EU democracy assistance, with more or less democratic countries among major and 
minor recipients of democracy assistance.  
 
d) The Regional Distribution of Funds among Sub-Sectors of Democracy Assistance 
 
This last section concentrates on the question of how the funds committed for democracy 
assistance in individual regions were distributed among the five OECD sub-categories on 
democracy assistance. The discussion in particular aims at discovering regional differences and 
similarities and at exposing some underlying patterns. Table 49 (see next page) provides detailed 
data on how much money was committed in the five mentioned sectors in each individual region 
during the period 1995 and 2009. The Table is consistent with Table 46 above, however, in part 
diverges from Tables 38 and 42, in particular as regards the flows in the sector ‘democratic 
participation and civil society’ and ‘media and free flow of information’. As mentioned above, the 
reasons are small differences due to conversions and rounding-out, however, also an 
inconsistency in the OECD database, which provides slightly different results when searching for 
data on all recipients and for data on individual regions.  
 As in Table 42, the total amounts in Table 49 show that most EU democracy assistance 
was spent in the sector ‘legal and judicial development’ (40% of all democracy assistance), slightly 
less on the sector ‘democratic participation and civil society’ (31%), and 25 % on election 
assistance and observation (of which most part – over 80% - was used for election assistance 
projects). The sectors ‘legislatures and political parties’ and ‘media and free flow of information’ 
have received very minor shares. It needs, however, to be recalled that the first of these is a new 
sector of OECD reporting that has only existed since 2009, which explains the low numbers, 
while commitments on the media appear too limited in view of the information provided in EU 
reports on the EIDHR (see Chapter 6).  
 Table 49 shows that hardly any individual region follows this general pattern but each 
shows a specific, different picture. Nevertheless, in half of the regions the biggest share was 
committed in the sector ‘legal and judicial development’ and in three regions the biggest share 
was committed on ‘democratic participation and civil society’. ‘Elections’ rarely received the 





Table 49: Thematic Distribution of Commitments for Democracy Assistance in Major Regions 1995-2009 

















































































































Unspecified 162.15 10.28 77.6 72.97  1.3 
 
Total 3490.82 1474.91 1080.62 887.04 13.42 34.83 
 





Total in % 






 Nearly 100% 
 
elections and civil society. In Europe, the remarkable high share of funds was spent for ‘legal and 
judicial development’ (73%), which is mainly due to the strong efforts in approximating and 
harmonizing national legislation with EU law.1505 In Africa North of the Sahara and Far East Asia 
an equally high share of the funds was spent for rule of law reform (73%), there less driven by 
efforts to approximate legislation but apparently rather by fears to address more politically 
challenging topics. In both regions, election received rather little support. Remarkably high shares 
of funds were committed for ‘political participation and civil society’ in Latin America (60%), 
which can be explained by the EU’s strong interest in fighting inequality and exclusion of large 
parts of the population in that region. Finally, nearly 40% of the available funds were committed 
for election assistance in South and Central Asia, which is a remarkable high share, given the 
presence of authoritarianism in most of this region.  
                                                     




 Overall, the diverse distribution of funds among the different thematic fields in each 
region makes it again difficult to draw general conclusions as to an underlying pattern. In any 
case, the data seems to support the argument that in difficult, undemocratic environments, like in 
North Africa and in several countries in Far East Asia and South and Central Asia, the EU 
prefers to provide rule of law assistance rather than other forms. At the same time, in at least two 




The main aim of Chapter 8 has been the analysis of the provision of democracy assistance in the 
framework of the EU’s mainstream and specific development programmes. In this respect, the 
Chapter has intended to complement the analysis of the EIDHR in Chapter 6. As the data source 
for statistical information on EU democracy assistance, the OECD database on ODA flows, 
covers data relating to all EU external ODA assistance programmes, the data provided in Chapter 
8 has usually included flows under the mainstream development programmes as well as the 
EIDHR. The Chapter has therefore provided an overall picture of EU democracy assistance 
between 1995 and 2009. In order to assess EU engagement under the mainstream programmes 
only and therefore beyond the EIDHR, flows under the latter programme have, as much as this 
is possible in view of data restraints on the EIDHR, to be taken into account and reduced. 
 The use of the OECD database had several other implications for the discussion in 
Chapter 8. Two issues warrant particular mentioning. First, as also mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
OECD does not operate with a separate category of democracy assistance but only with the 
broader field of ‘government and civil society – general’, which consists, since 2009, of eleven 
sub-categories. Aggregate data on democracy assistance has to be constructed from among these 
sub-sectors. Given the thematic scope of the EIDHR, the following five sub-sectors have been 
chosen to constitute democracy assistance: legal and judicial development, democratic 
participation and civil society, elections, legislatures and political parties, media and free flow of 
information. Acknowledging that this is only one possible choice, that might be objected to by 
some analysts, who envisage a broader or even narrower definition, and also allow assessing the 
scope of democracy assistance in relation to assistance in the fields good governance and human 
rights, the Chapter has also provided data on the entire category ‘government and civil society – 
general’, not only on democracy assistance alone. Secondly, the OECD database records data on 
ODA flows and therefore does not report on assistance to some countries of interest here, in 




been excluded from the scope of the thesis, in particular the Western Balkans and Turkey. The 
Tables provided in Chapter 8 have to be consulted with these limitations in mind. 
Largely following Chapter 6, which has analyzed the EU’s specific programme for 
democracy and human rights, Chapter 8 has analyzed three main questions. It has, first, focused 
on overall quantitative data on EU democracy assistance, distinguishing between commitment 
and expenditure data; secondly, on the thematic distribution of funds; and thirdly, on regional 
similarities and differences. Table 37 has shown the strong growth in commitments for the entire 
sector ‘government and civil society – general’ between 1995 and 2009. They increased from 
about 76.78 million Euros in 1995 to about 1819.83 million Euros in 2006 and, while declining 
thereafter, still amounted to about 1065.28 million Euros in 2009. The share of commitments for 
‘government and civil society – general’ of all ODA increased from only 1.3% to 20% in 2004, 
and, while declining thereafter, still amounted to about 9% in 2009. A look at the commitments 
in the various covered regions shows that, with few exceptions, most regions have followed this 
average pattern of growth. Overall, it appears though that in regions closer to the EU – especially 
in Europe itself and in Northern Africa – higher amounts were committed for the sector 
‘government and civil society’. It is unclear what caused the declines in 2004 and 2006, as the 
topics of good governance, democracy, and human rights have ever since the mid-1990s been 
attributed increasing relevance in assistance regulations, as shown in Chapter 6. In particular, the 
various new regulations that entered into force on 1 January 2007 have continued the trend of 
stressing the importance of the themes and of focusing assistance in its respective fields, which 
has however not materialized. As shown in Chapter 6, secondary law does not require a certain 
share of funds to be spent for democracy, human rights, and good governance issues, and does 
therefore not ensure a stable share for each of the themes. Similarly, CSPs necessarily require 
addressing the issue, but also do not ensure that funds are devoted to that end. A comparison 
with other major international donors, like the US, Canada, and Australia, has shown that the EU 
provides a smaller share of its ODA for good governance, human rights, and democracy 
assistance. For example, in 2009, the EU committed about 11% of all ODA in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’, while the US committed 16%, Canada 12%, and 
Australia 24% for that field.  
Looking at democracy assistance alone, which comprises the above-mentioned sub-fields, 
Chapter 8 has shown that the committed funds increased from about 30.74 million Euros in 1996 
to about 525.12 million Euros in 2008. Commitments were smaller in 2009 (about 351.97 million 
Euros). It only has to be seen whether this was the beginning of a downward trend, as had, some 
years earlier, also happened in the case of the sector ‘government and civil society – general’. A 




the development has been a rather volatile one, with much variation in the commitments from 
year to year. Despite the overall increase, there was no sign of a constant, annual, and growing or 
at least stable appropriation of funds for democracy assistance programmes. Most funds were 
committed for democracy assistance in countries in Europe or closer to its borders, in particular 
North Africa, as well as in Sub-Saharan Africa. During the entire period 1995 to 2009 the average 
share of commitments for democracy assistance of all ODA was about 3% and about 30% of 
commitments in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’. In six of nine regions the 
average share for democracy assistance of all commitments in the sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’ was even 30% and 45%. Interestingly, those regions where most was spent for 
democracy assistance – Europe and Africa North of the Sahara – had a considerably lower share 
of all ODA. In any case, EU shares for democracy assistance were comparatively little when 
compared with other international donors. For example, in 2009, the US, which spent a higher 
share of all ODA in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ as well as a higher 
absolute amount (see Tables 6 and 7 in Chapter 2), devoted about 65% of all ODA in the sector 
‘government and civil society – general’, in the field of democracy assistance. Table 50 provides a 
brief summary of the major commitment flows. 
 
Table 50: EU ODA Commitments 1995-2009 (in million Euros and %)1506 
 
Sector Amount in Euros % of total ODA % of sector ‘government 
and civil society – 
general’ 
ODA total/All aid sectors 123332.56 100% - 
Government and civil 
society – general  
11960.99 9.7% 100% 
Democracy Assistance 3550.86 2.9% 29.7% 
 
As regards the amounts of democracy assistance provided beyond the EU’s specific democracy 
assistance programme, the EIDHR, Chapter 8 reveals that until about 1998 a large part indeed – 
one half to three fourths – of all democracy, human rights, and good governance assistance was 
provided under the EIDHR. Only from 1999, did this start to change. Since then the large 
majority of all assistance in these sectors derives from the mainstream and specific development 
programmes rather than the EIDHR. The exact share of EIDHR and mainstream democracy 
assistance funds differed though from sub-sector to sub-sector. For example, good governance 
projects were for about 100% funded under mainstream programmes and human rights projects 
were equally shared between mainstream programmes and EIDHR (50% each). As regards 
democracy assistance, legal and judicial development projects and projects for democratic 
participation and civil society were since 2000 about 80% to 90% funded under mainstream 
                                                     




programmes and only 10% to 20% under the EIDHR.  Election assistance and observation were 
during the period 1995 and 2009 80% funded under mainstream programmes and 20% under the 
EIDHR. Due to the growing share of EU EOMs of the EIDHR, the latter has, however, 
increasingly become and important provider of election support. The financially very small 
categories of parliaments and political parties (which has only been reported on since 2009) and 
the media and free flow of information are to a much larger extent – between 50% and 100%, 
respectively – supported by the EIDHR programme. 
 Data as regards payments for ODA in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ 
have grown from about 105.14 million Euros in 2002 to about 1133.9 million Euros in 2009. 
Payments for democracy assistance projects increased from about 42.78 million Euros in 2004 to 
about 383.64 million Euros in 2009. In both sectors payments started to strongly increase 
between 2004 and 2005. While it is difficult to overall relate commitment and expenditure data 
due to different time-spans required and used for individual programmes and projects, the data 
confirms a delay between commitments and payments of about five years.  
 The data for commitments and payments shows, that from the day of adoption of the 
1991 November resolution, which called for the promotion of good governance, democracy, and 
human rights though mainstream assistance programmes, it took the EU about seven to eight 
years (until 1999) to increasingly commit mainstream development funds for that end under 
mainstream programmes, and a further six years (until 2005) for these commitments to result in 
increased payments for democracy, human rights, and good governance projects in target 
countries. It therefore basically took fourteen years for a policy declaration to show real effect. 
While some of the delay could not be prevented due to the time needed for programming and aid 
implementation, at least two other factors were responsible for the delay. On the one hand, there 
was an initial hesitation in the relevant Commission services to pursue the policy shift, in 
particular in authoritarian countries, which only had to be overcome. On the other hand, there 
was a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the EIDHR and the mainstream 
programmes, and the question whether democracy and human rights assistance should not 
predominantly be implemented through the specific programme. Only COM(1995) 457 final 
explicitly stipulated that democracy support should be provided through both, mainstream 
programmes and the EIDHR. 
 The second set of questions discussed in Chapter 8 have related to the thematic 
distribution of funds in the sector ‘government and civil society – general’. The Chapter has first 
outlined that it was during the time of adoption of the programming documents, in particular of 
the AAPs, that the crucial decisions on the thematic distribution funds are taken. Table 42 has 




‘government and civil society – general’. It has shown that the overwhelming share of funds has 
been committed for governance reform-related topics (nearly 60%), about 11% for human rights, 
and about 30% for democracy assistance programme and projects. As regards the five thematic 
sub-sectors of democracy assistance, most was committed for legal and judicial development 
(12%), slightly less for the field democratic participation and civil society (10%), about 7% for 
election assistance and observation, and very small shares of 1% for legislature and political 
parties as well as for media projects (see also Table 51). 
Chapter 8 has also shown that individual regions have followed a different pattern than 
suggested in Table 51. While in most regions the largest part of funds has been spent for legal 
and judicial development, in several regions most was spent on democratic participation and civil 
society. In two regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and in South and Central Asia, remarkably high 
shares of the funds were spent for election assistance and observation (36% and 39% of all 
commitments in the sector democracy assistance, respectively). Due to very mixed results, hardly 
any clear pattern of a preference for certain themes in certain region has become visible. It seems 
though, as is frequently suggested in the literature on democracy assistance,1507 that regions in 
which authoritarianism prevails are preferably targeted with rule of law assistance, while more 
politically focused assistance, in particular electoral assistance, is more limited.  
 
Table 51: Distribution of ODA Commitments among Sub-Sectors of ‘Governance and Civil Society – 
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1507 Carothers, ‘The “Sequencing” Fallacy’.  




As regards the approach to democracy assistance pursued through the mainstream programme, 
Chapter 8 has come to the result that also assistance through mainstream development 
programmes has features of both approaches, that is, the developmental and the political 
approach to democracy assistance. However, there is a clear preference for the developmental 
approach. On the one hand, this is indicated by the strong focus on good governance issues, 
which complement democracy assistance, as well as the fact that assistance is planned and 
programmed as part of a mid- and long-term EU development agenda in a particular country, 
that is, moreover, agreed with the target state. Secondly, also the projects and programmes on 
democracy assistance per se show features of the developmental method, as they predominantly 
consist of projects in the sectors rule of law, civil society development and participation in local 
development issues, with a strong focus on the local level. At the same time, the political 
approach, even if moderate, is visible in the case of projects that focus on the independence of 
the judiciary, on NGOs working on core political issues, like elections, and election support itself.  
 Finally, the thematic focus of assistance points to a very basic model of liberal democracy, 
consisting of Robert Dahl’s seven minimum procedural conditions and the additional feature of 
the rule of law. The EU aims at creating a democratic system in which people’s representatives 
are elected in regular, free and fair elections, in which parliaments carry out their law-making and 
controlling functions, in which associational autonomy allows for the establishment of political 
parties and civil society organizations, and in which a free media acts as information channel and 
watchdog over governmental activities. The system should be held together by the rule of law, 
consisting of a healthy legal system as well as an independent judiciary. There is no evidence that 
the EU goes any further in promoting a specific model of (liberal) democracy. It definitely 
envisages something more than elitist democracy, as the focus on elections is complemented with 
an even stronger focus on civil society and civic participation beyond the electoral process and 
therefore the selection of representatives. The EU invests considerable efforts in developing the 
capacity of civil society organizations and their participation in policy-making and 
implementation. However, these efforts do not go far enough in considering the creation of 
pluralist democracy, in which a much broader range of actors would need to be constantly 
involved in deliberation and decision-making. The importance accorded to the role of state 
institutions and elections also renders it impossible to speak of system of pluralist democracy. 
Similarly, despite the focus on civil society, on democratic participation, and decentralization, the 
EU does not create participatory democracy in third states, which would require initiatives for 
more widespread, active and direct participation of all citizens in a broader sphere than the 
political process, like also projects for democratizing educational establishments, firms, and civil 




action. Social issues and socio-economic equality issues as well as social rights are frequently 
objectives of EU development programmes and projects, however, not expressively as part of its 
democracy agenda, but rather as part of its general development objectives. All in all, in 
implementing democracy promotion through its mainstream programmes, the EU works with a 











“What is the EU’s strategy to promote democracy abroad through the use of democracy 
assistance and how has it evolved since its start?”. The major research question addressed in the 
present thesis is broad. It relates to the means and their use, in this case of different democracy 
assistance programmes and projects, in order to facilitate democratization processes in third 
states. It encompasses, among others, issues of the structure of EU aid programmes in the field 
of democracy assistance, the thematic focus of assistance, the geographical concentration, 
questions of implementation including the mode of project selection, and the role attributed to 
recipients of aid. More fundamental questions concerning the EU’s strategy relate to the 
underlying notion of democracy, the envisaged model of democratization, and the overall 
approach to democracy assistance. The research question has not only focused on the status quo, 
but also on the evolution of the strategy since its beginning in the mid-1980s and early-1990s. 
The thesis has addressed the various outlined issues in six analytical chapters on EU 
democracy assistance. It has provided a comprehensive account of the tool of EU democracy 
assistance, both in terms of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, terms that are used to refer to the policy 
objectives outlined in core policy-making documents and their implementation through 
programmes and projects. It is believed that only a look at both allows an all-encompassing 
overview of the policy instrument and expresses what the policy is. 
 This conclusion briefly recapitulates the main findings of each of the six chapters on EU 
democracy assistance, addressing the questions of its emergence and evolution, the legal 
dimension of EU competences to provide democracy assistance, the institutional and procedural 
dimension, and the specific features of the EIDHR and mainstream programmes. It should 
provide the reader with a concise overview of major issues concerning EU democracy assistance. 
Detailed findings have been provided in the conclusions to the individual chapters. After the 
brief outline of the major research results, the Conclusion addresses the three more fundamental 
issues mentioned above and relating to the model of democracy that apparently underlies EU 
democracy assistance and possibly democracy promotion more generally. It concludes with a 
brief enumeration of the major remaining problems in the field and points to one field 





1. The Emergence and Evolution of EU Democracy Assistance 
 
The EU’s first democracy assistance programme started to operate in 1986, it was for that 
time endowed with a comparatively high budget and provided assistance to NGOs in Chile, a 
country that was then widely criticized and isolated due to General Pinochet’s dictatorial rule and 
widespread human rights violations. It was in 1990 followed by a second programme concerning 
Chile and other Latin American states. Both programmes were created by the European 
Parliament, which had since the 1970s started to engage with human rights topics, internally and 
abroad, was obviously impressed by developments in the field of human rights and democracy 
promotion in the US, and used its newly gained budgetary powers to insert a line for the 
programmes into the annual EU budget. Lobbying by Chilean opposition politicians and other 
regime critics apparently also played a role for the initiation of the programme. The start of 
programmes in Latin America was also related to the ongoing democratization processes in that 
region. Overall, EU democracy assistance therefore began in the same geographical areas as that 
of the US.  
The Council only followed suit in 1991, when it announced in its crucial 28 November 
1991 resolution that the EC would support projects suggested by NGOs and governments 
aiming to foster the development of democracy. The suggestion was part of a broader 
announcement as to the ‘real’ start of an EU external human rights and democratization policy, 
which would be pursued with numerous instruments and that followed a weaker declaration on 
the role of human rights in EC external relations in 1986. Obviously, the development was a 
direct result of the spread of the third wave of democracy to Central and Eastern Europe and 
other parts of the world in the late 1980s, the concurrent end of the Cold War, and a shift in 
development policy that stressed the relevance of the factor of good governance for economic 
development. Overall, the EU as well as its Member States thus entered the international arena of 
democracy promotion and democracy assistance slightly later than other major western states, in 
particular the US. 
Ever since the 1991 November resolution, democracy assistance has remained part of the 
EU’s portfolio of tools of democracy promotion. Indeed, the EU’s appreciation of the ‘positive’ 
character of democracy assistance, which works openly, pro-actively, and in partnership and 
cooperation with institutions and organizations of target states, has increasingly rendered it one 
of the preferred instruments. This preference has expressed itself in the geographical spread of 
assistance programmes: by the mid-1990s democracy assistance could be provided on the basis of 




Further, commitments for EU democracy assistance have overall been rising and, in particular in 
the case of the EIDHR, can be expected to rise during the next multiannual financial framework. 
Special democracy assistance facilities or facilities with strong democracy assistance elements 
have been founded over the last years. Finally, numerous policy documents, including more 
recent publications, confirm the EU’s overall belief and interest in the tool. 
The development of EU democracy assistance since 1991 did not follow a pre-conceived 
plan, but has moved on gradually and step-by-step. Key stages in the evolution were: (1) the 
parallel development of specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes (EIDHR 
forerunner programmes) and of democracy assistance components in mainstream development 
programmes without a clear idea about their specific features and the usefulness of the emerging 
structure during the 1990s, in particular the first half of the 1990s. The parallelism continues to 
be a key feature of EU democracy assistance; (2) the dispute on EU competence to fund 
democracy assistance projects through specific programmes (1997-1999) and its resolution in 
favour of a broad interpretation that allowed the adoption of the first set of EIDHR regulations 
in 1999; (3) the unification of the EU’s specific democracy assistance programmes into a single 
EIDHR programme and the efforts of providing the EIDHR with a distinctive character (2000-
2003); (4) the so-called ‘mainstreaming’ of democracy assistance, that is, the increasing focus on 
democracy assistance within mainstream development programmes, in particular as part of the 
increasingly popular good governance agenda (2003-2006, and beyond); (5) the establishment of 
the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) as part of a fundamental 
overhaul of external assistance programmes. The adoption of the new regulation again led to a 
dispute among EU institutions, which was also this time solved in favour of a (slightly) stronger 
human rights and democratization policy (2006/7); (6) a series of small initiatives by the 
European Parliament in the field: the creation of the Democracy Caucus in the Parliament, the 
establishment of the European Partnership of Democracy (EPD), that despite its current 
independent character can be traced to an initiative of the Parliament, and the creation of the 
Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD) (2006-2008); (7) a fresh focus on EU 
Democracy Promotion initiated by various Council presidencies and the adoption of Council 
conclusions on ‘Democracy Support in EU External Relations’, which has focused particularly on 
questions of coherence in respect of the multiplicity of promotion tools (2009). The response to 
the Arab Spring has been the creation of a Civil Society Facility, initially focusing on the 
Mediterranean region, and a possible shift to a slightly more political approach to EU democracy 
assistance, which has however still to be seen. Finally, the European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED), although created outside the formal EU structure, constitutes the latest addition to 




Various factors account for the numerous step-by-step developments of EU democracy 
assistance. A key role has been played by the preferences and powers of various EU institutions, 
in particular, the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, but also the Court of 
Auditors and, albeit more indirectly, the ECJ. The three legislative institutions at times have had 
strong preferences for specific paths. For example, the parallel structure of the EIDHR and 
democracy assistance under mainstream programmes have resulted from the early initiative of the 
European Parliament and its prevailing persistence to keep the EIDHR. That institution has also, 
eventually successfully, pushed hard for an independent, separate EIDHR regulation in 2006. 
Current efforts to ensure a coherent use of policy instruments can be traced to the Council’s 
initiative in 2009. The Commission initiated reforms on the basis of experiences in implementing 
EU assistance programmes, frequently also upon critical evaluations by independent consultants 
and/or reports by the Court of Auditors. At times, important external factors have led to policy-
reforms or changes, like the Arab Spring, that have given birth to a series of new policy tools and 
new thematic foci areas. There is also evidence that the EU institutions have continued to 
observe US and UN policies and activities. Overall, the development of EU democracy assistance 
is the result of multiple preferences, factors and events. 
 
2. Competence and Legal Basis for EU Democracy Assistance 
 
As an organization of limited competences, the EU needed to be provided with relevant 
powers before it could act in the field of democracy assistance. Chapter 4 has complemented the 
general evolutionary account provided with an overview and analysis of the development of 
primary law from the early 1990s until the most recent changes introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
When discussions were carried out in 1990 and 1991 on the start of an EU external human 
rights policy, the drafters of the Treaty of Maastricht were quick to also insert a relevant reference 
into primary law. The newly drafted Treaty on European Union made the promotion of 
democracy an objective of CFSP and mentioned that EC development policy should ‘contribute 
to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy’ (ex-Article 130u ECT; after 
Amsterdam Art. 177(2) ECT). The new provisions suffered, however, from several limitations 
that reflected the uneasiness with which competence in the field of human rights should be 
transferred to the EC and EU. As regards democracy assistance, the limitations related to the 
absence of a legal basis for assistance in third countries, for which recourse needed to be made to 




incompatible legislative procedures needed to be followed in the adoption of democracy 
assistance-related legislation as regards developing and other, third countries, which necessitated, 
amongst others, the adoption of two identical EIDHR regulations in 1999. Further, the 
ambiguous wording used in ex-Article 130u ECT contributed to a major dispute that erupted in 
the preparation of the EIDHR regulations and during which EC competences to run 
programmes like the EIDHR were seriously questioned. Overall, the dispute was solved in favour 
of a broad interpretation of EC competences in external human rights and democracy 
promotion, which also allowed the adoption of the mentioned EIDHR regulations. The two 
treaty revisions that followed Maastricht – Amsterdam and Nice – inserted two minor, but still 
important innovations into primary law. The Treaty of Amsterdam changed applicable legislative 
procedures that would later allow the adoption of a single EIDHR regulation and the Treaty of 
Nice introduced a separate provision into the ECT that would provide an explicit legal basis for 
the provision of democracy assistance in third countries (Article 181a ECT).  
Overall, since 2001 primary law has therefore contained two explicit legal bases 
concerning democracy assistance in developing and third countries. They were interpreted 
broadly and allowed for an extensive thematic range of democracy assistance programmes and 
projects to be funded. A strange feature of the two legal bases was that the Parliament had more 
powers as regards developing countries than third countries. Competence in democracy 
promotion was shared with that of the Member States, which could act in a parallel way as long 
as EC and Member States coordinated their activities. Finally, Article 47 TEU strongly restricted 
the provision of democracy assistance under the TEU, only authorizing it when the act to be 
adopted mainly pursued non-EC objectives and democracy assistance was just an incidental aim.  
 The Treaty of Lisbon introduced important changes for EU democracy promotion, in 
particular the mentioning of democracy as a guiding principle and democracy promotion as an 
aim of all EU external action. Hitherto disputed issues, like whether human rights clauses could 
be included in pure trading agreements, were resolved. The new Treaty included some, although 
minor changes for democracy assistance, which could now be provided on the basis of Articles 
209(1) and 212(2) TFEU, to be used for developing and other, third countries, respectively. The 
inclusion of two legal bases with an identical thematic but different geographical scope is a legacy 
of the pre-Lisbon legal framework and, as outlined in more detail in Chapter 4, a nearly accidental 
side-effect of choices made in Maastricht in 1992. A highly positive innovation was the 
harmonization of legislative procedures, which now gives each institution the same powers as 
regards developing and third countries. The field continues to be a field of shared competence. 




assistance to be provided under CFSP as long as the purpose of the action is the furtherance of 
CFSP goals.  
 As will be returned to further below, while envisaging an external policy of democracy 
promotion, primary law is silent on the strategy to be pursued, like the instruments to be used, 
thematic and geographical preferences of assistance, as well as on the concept of democracy 
underlying EU action. Several provisions of the TEU and TFEU can or do give input into the 
policy, like reference to international policy documents or the EUCFR. However, none really 
provides clear strategic or conceptual input. Overall, policy makers are left with a very large 
margin of discretion when implementing the policy. 
 Chapter 4 has identified the absence of a separate Title or Chapter on democracy 
promotion as a major shortcoming of the current (and previous) legal framework. Such a separate 
section would, amongst other things define democracy, outline principles, and in a non-
exhaustive fashion enumerate its instruments. This appears relevant for questions of principle: an 
important, independent policy like EU democracy promotion should have a separate section in 
primary law. Furthermore, it would be a better guarantee for a strong external policy. 
 
3. The Institutional and Procedural Dimension 
 
Chapter 5 has shed light on the procedures to be followed in policy-making and implementation 
as regards EU democracy assistance, amongst others, to present the major stages in decision-
making and the role of all involved actors, including EU institutions, civil society, and target 
states’ governments. Overall, it has shown that both policy-making and policy-implementation 
involve numerous actors in different ways that to different degrees influence the decisions to be 
taken. Decisions on crucial features, like the thematic and geographical distribution of funds, are 
not taken in single documents, but are the result of numerous documents adopted at different 
points of time in the policy-cycle.  
 The analysis has shown that policy-making in the field of democracy assistance is 
dominated by the classical, albeit ‘refined’ Community method rather than any new form of 
governance. This implies that acts of secondary law play a crucial role in policy-making and 
stipulate basic principles and guidelines for the policy and for the process of implementation, 
even if they leave a large degree of discretion to the Commission in implementation. The most 
central acts of secondary law are the EIDHR and mainstream development regulations, as well as 
the EU budget and the Financial Regulation, which provides rules and guidelines for the 




 The EU institutions have adopted the relevant acts of secondary law on the basis of the 
powers attributed to them in the Treaties. A special procedure applies to the adoption of the EU 
budget. In other cases the Commission proposes the act and the Council and Parliament adopt it. 
Applicable legislative procedures to be used in the adoption of the EIDHR as well as of 
mainstream development programmes have changed frequently. In these reforms the European 
Parliament has increasingly received more powers, which it has also been willing to use to 
influence the substantive content of acts. The 2006 EIDHR regulation, for example, shows some 
clear traces of the preferences of the Parliament.  
 Next to secondary law, the three mentioned institutions have defined the use of 
democracy assistance in numerous different types of non-legally binding policy documents, like 
communications, reports, and resolutions. Indeed, before 1999, EIDHR policy-making was 
nearly exclusively – except for the remarks in the EU budget and the rules of the Financial 
Regulation – based on these policy documents. Individual institutions were differently active at 
different points of time to push for reforms or to introduce new initiatives.  
 The discussion of the stage of policy-implementation has shown that the EIDHR is 
exclusively implemented through the project approach, in the case of which the EU retains an 
important say as regards the formulation and implementation of projects. Democracy assistance 
as part of mainstream assistance programmes can also be implemented through the budget or 
sector approach, in the case of which the EU has much less control and the target state’s 
government plays the key role in project formulation and implementation. Exact data on each 
approach is not available.  
 The first and highly crucial stage in the implementation of assistance projects in the 
framework of the project approach is the drafting of programming documents. Their purpose lies 
in the definition of concrete thematic and geographical priorities for EU democracy assistance 
during a particular period of time and the allocation of funds to each priority. Overall, they 
therefore to some extent determine the thematic and geographical allocation of funds, although 
not entirely. Before the early 2000s, programming was given little attention with respect to the 
EIDHR, which has led to criticism and has been identified as one reason for ineffective policies. 
In the early 2000s this was changed and a standard framework for the programming of thematic 
programmes was introduced. In the case of mainstream assistance programmes, for which 
programming documents were already adopted during the 1990s, the problems were rather the 
lack of reference to human rights and democracy-related questions. A common framework for 
their programming, introduced in 2000, necessitated the consideration of the political situation in 




 One particular feature of EIDHR programming documents, in particular of Strategy 
Papers (SPs), is their global perspective. They focus on the EIDHR as a globally focused 
programme, which should be implemented through international projects as well as, and 
predominantly, through projects in target countries. SPs identify uniform thematic priorities for 
all third states. EIDHR SPs intend to summarize over hundred individual strategies for individual 
countries in a single document. The EU decided to pursue such an approach in the late 
1990s/early 2000s, in the wake of criticism for not being strategic and for not unifying the 
numerous EIDHR lines into a single programme. 
 Such a global perspective is problematic, as it does not guarantee a proper country-
focused strategy of democracy assistance for each individual target state, taking local 
circumstances sufficiently into account. Such individual strategies would overall be preferable to 
the current arrangement, with an EIDHR SP focusing only on global projects and programmes. 
The current form of strategic papers and programming can nevertheless not be criticized for 
imposing an – in the Commission’s own words – ‘one size fits all’ approach or of imposing a 
particular model on each third state, irrespective of the target states’ situation. On the one hand, 
the global priorities that are provided in EIDHR SPs are at least in part identified with a bottom-
up approach, through the involvement of Union Delegations in target states and the consultation 
of civil society in Europe and, albeit not in all cases, in third states. On the other hand, thematic 
priorities in EIDHR SPs are defined broadly and the locally implemented so-called Country 
Based Support Scheme (CBSS) can officially be adjusted to local circumstances by the 
Delegations. All in all, there is therefore room for targeted approaches, however, not during 
programming but rather during the subsequent stages of implementation.  
 Reference should at this point also be made to the recent announcement in 2011 by the 
Commission to draft individual human rights strategies for basically all third countries that would 
outline the EU’s approach in each state. It remains to be seen whether they will include a detailed 
programming exercise for democracy assistance in the particular state and to which extent they 
will affect EIDHR programming.  
 The Commission steers the process of drafting EIDHR programming documents and 
takes the final decision. It has, however, to involve numerous other actors, in particular European 
and also local civil society, but not, and that is defining feature of the EIDHR, target states’ 
governments. It seems that European NGOs mainly give input into procedural issues of 
implementation rather and less on thematic issues. The involvement of local civil society, which 
has to happen via the Union Delegations, is still insufficient. The Member States are involved 
through a management committee and, since 1 March 2011 an examination committee. The 




to control if the Commission exceeds its ‘implementing powers’. All in all, programming is 
therefore the result of inputs by numerous actors into a process guided and concluded by the 
Commission. 
 The programming process in the case of mainstream development programmes shares 
many features and problems of EIDHR programming, but also reveals particularities. The 
problem of lack of country-focused strategies discussed above does not apply, as the 
programming of mainstream development programmes results in individual or, at least, regional 
strategic documents. The major problem as regards these programmes has always been the lack 
of focus on democracy and human rights, due to the multiplicity of other objectives covered by 
the programme and the existence of the EIDHR, which was believed to primarily cover 
democracy assistance. The major difference between the EIDHR and the mainstream 
programmes as regards the programming process relates to the involvement of the authorities of 
the target state in the selection of priorities.  
 Chapter 5 has also briefly addressed the various stages of implementation following 
drafting of programming documents. Most importantly, it has revealed that the EIDHR is mainly 
implemented through calls for proposals, leaving the final recipients of grants the possibility of 
influencing the thematic distribution of funds. Mainstream programmes are implemented in more 
diverse ways, including calls for proposals, the formulation of projects by the Commission and 
authorities of the target state, or by the target state itself.  
 
4. An Analysis of the EIDHR 
Chapter 6 has analyzed the EU’s specific democracy and human rights assistance programme, the 
EIDHR, both as regards policy making as well as and, in particular, as regards the 
implementation of the programme. While the main focus has been on democracy assistance, at 
times also human rights assistance was looked at, especially when no separation was possible. The 
EIDHR has always been the most visible democracy assistance programme in the EU, even if 
democracy assistance provided through mainstream programmes has from the late 1990s on 
outnumbered commitments under the EIDHR.  
 Chapter 6 has first presented data on the financial development of the EIDHR and its 
forerunner programmes, distinguishing between data on commitments and data on expenditure, 
both of which give important insights into EU engagement and together provide a complete 
picture thereof. In the long run, taking natural and non-natural delays into account, committed 




Unfortunately, separate data on EU commitments for the democracy-related and human 
rights-related parts of the EIDHR is not available and data on commitments can only be 
provided for the entire EIDHR. Table 10, included in Chapter 6, has demonstrated the gradual 
growth of EU commitments for human rights and democracy assistance from 1978 to 2011. In 
1978 the EC budget first included a budget line of 200.000 ECU for a small human rights 
programme, in 1990 the commitments rose to about 22 million Euros and already included 
democracy assistance programmes, by the end of the century they stood at about 100 million 
Euros, and by 2011 the EU committed about 158 million Euros for the EIDHR forerunner 
programmes. The recently published proposal for the post-2013 EIDHR envisaged a further 
increase during the period 2014-2020, when on average about 225 million Euros will be available 
annually for the EIDHR. Annual commitments have so far usually grown each year, either 
because of the creation of new programmes or the increase of funds for already existing 
programmes. Remarkably, the policy shift in November 1991 led to an immediate strong increase 
in commitments for specific human rights and democracy assistance programmes. In 
comparison, commitments under mainstream programmes grew at a much slower rate, despite 
the Council’s preference for democracy assistance as part of mainstream programmes. Reasons 
lie in the interest of the Parliament in the specific programmes as well as in the need to adjust 
mainstream development programmes to the new objective and to ensure the focus on 
democracy in their implementation. Overall, despite the growth of commitments for democracy 
and human rights assistance under the EIDHR the programme only accounts for a small share of 
all external assistance provided (about 1.5% between 2002 and 2007). In total, between 1978 and 
2011 the EU committed about 2.1 million Euros under the EIDHR 
 EU expenditure data for the EIDHR and its various forerunner programmes shows a 
more volatile picture, due to lack of a regular pattern of implementation, like irregular calls for 
proposals. Detailed data is provided in Table 12, provided in Chapter 6. Between 1992 and 2006, 
the period for which detailed data is available, the EU spent about 1.2 million Euros for 
democracy and human rights assistance projects under the EIDHR. Expenditure data has also 
allowed for the determining of the approximate share of democracy and human rights assistance 
of the overall funds provided. During the period 1996 and 2000, in total about 166.6 million 
Euros were spent for democracy assistance worldwide under the EIDHR; during the period 2000 
and 2006, about 286 million Euros were spent for democracy assistance. These amounts 
constituted about 45% and 39% of all EIDHR funds respectively. While democracy assistance 
therefore increased in absolute amounts from 2000 on, it decreased in terms of the share of 




 One further interesting fact exposed by the statistical data on the EIDHR and the 
research carried out in Chapters 7 and 8 is that until 1999 more funds were committed for 
democracy and human rights assistance than under mainstream programmes and, moreover, until 
2003 more funds were paid for democracy assistance under the EIDHR than under mainstream 
programmes. For an important stretch of time, the EIDHR therefore played a crucial role in the 
field, despite its comparatively small budget.  
 The second major focus in the analysis of the EIDHR has been on the thematic 
concentration of EIDHR assistance. It has provided insights into the concept of democracy, the 
model of democratization, and the approach to democracy assistance, which will be discussed in 
separate sections further below. A general overview of the thematic distribution and its evolution 
should be provided here. 
 Initially it should be mentioned that the thematic distribution of EIDHR funds is the 
result of the interaction of numerous actors at different stages. Although the EU, in particular the 
Commission, has overall control of the process resulting in the final distribution of funds, it is 
working within constraints, in particular because of the involvement of numerous non-EU actors 
in programming and, even more, the use of calls for proposals. The final recipients of aid can 
through their project proposals, even to a considerable degree, influence the thematic distribution 
of funds.  
Some general observations on the distribution of EIDHR funds during the period 1996 
and 2006, for which detailed data was available, should be made before providing more detailed 
data on democracy assistance. As has already been mentioned, an increasing share of the EIDHR 
was spent for human rights projects rather than for democracy assistance (including election 
observation). Secondly, the share of election observation of all EIDHR funds has increased 
during the period 1996 and 2006. This increase has mainly occurred at the expense of democracy 
assistance, the share of which has decreased. Finally, the conceptual overlap of human rights and 
democracy implies that numerous human rights projects also implicitly benefit democratization.  
 The actual distribution of EIDHR democracy assistance-related funds among different 
thematic sub-areas during the more recent period of analysis 2000-2006 was as follows: the 
largest share was spent for election observation, albeit in fact a tool different from democracy 
assistance but funded from the EIDHR, which received about 34% of all funds spent for 
EIDHR democracy assistance. This share constituted an enormous increase compared to the 
previous period, reflecting that EU EOMs only became a preferred policy tool in the late 1990s. 
Civil society development, in particular the strengthening of NGOs, and fostering civil 
participation received 29% of all democracy assistance funds and therefore only slightly less than 




and overall, if leaving aside election observation, constituted the main area of concentration of 
the EIDHR. The field of rule of law development, including access to justice programmes, legal 
reform projects, and the independence of the judiciary, received about 16% of all EIDHR 
democracy assistance in 2000-2006. This was a smaller share than during the earlier period, a 
reduction that formed part of a conscious choice to shift rule of law projects to mainstream 
development programmes. Media and freedom of expression-focused projects, some of the most 
political elements of the EIDHR, received about 9% of all EIDHR democracy assistance. 
Election assistance only received about 4%, which is relatively little compared to the costs of EU 
EOMs and the announcement as early as in 2000 to ensure follow-ups for EU EOMs. Projects 
concerning so-called public institutions (like local councils and trade unions) received about 4% 
of the funds, transparency and anti-corruption projects made up about 4%, and parliaments 
received about 0.7% of all democracy assistance funds.  
 Questions as to the geographical distribution of funds have caused much concern in the 
Commission, particularly when it was decided that the EIDHR should be made more ‘strategic’ 
and therefore focus on fewer, targeted states. Overall, the Commission has over the last decade 
tried out various approaches, which were complex and in part not realizable. It has eventually 
returned to its original, simpler model, in the case of which it makes regional allocations for parts 
of the available funds, country-allocations for CBSSs, next to leaving some funds unallocated. All 
in all, over the period of analysis for which detailed data was available (1996-2006) the 
Commission pre-determined the allocation of about half of the available funds, while the 
distribution of the remaining funds was decided with the decision on a project.  
 Data on the regional distribution of funds for EIDHR assistance during 1996 and 2006 is 
different, depending on whether the number of countries per region is taken into account or not. 
If the number is taken into account, which should be done, the MEDA region was the major 
recipient, followed by South-Eastern Europe, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and 
the NIS. Asian and ACP states received a very minor share. This distribution suggests that the 
EU overall invested more efforts into countries closer to home, which were for various reasons 
more important for the EU. Latin America constitutes the major exception. At the same time, the 
EU also tried to have a foot in all regions. If flows to regions are considered without taking the 
number of countries in regions into account, a different picture emerges, and the ACP region 
receives the largest share, followed by Latin America, the MEDA region, the NIS, the CEEC, 
Asia, and SEE.  
 The analysis of the distribution of funds among countries revealed a highly unbalanced 
picture. In most regions, except for the Mediterranean, the available EIDHR funds were 




democracy assistance alone. It is difficult to establish a clear pattern as regards the distribution of 
funds among countries. Some of the data suggests that preference was given to politically more 
important states, either because of the geopolitical importance of states or particular problems in 
third states, like narcotics production or conflicts. The level of human rights protection and/or 
the level of democracy and trends in democratization did not play a role, as similar types of 
countries received different shares of assistance.  
 At last, detailed data on EIDHR projects has allowed an analysis of types of projects and 
partners in implementation. Between 2000 and 2006 about 55% of all projects were so-called 
macro projects with an average project size of 610.000 Euros, about 25% were micro-projects 
with an average size of about 65.000 Euros, while about 6% were targeted projects and 14% were 
EU EOMs. Minimum and maximum sizes for projects were adjusted several times, taking needs 
of NGOs as well as management capacities of the Commission into account. Two trends in 
projects types have been the strong increase in targeted projects in the mid- to late-1990s, when it 
was legally rendered an exceptional type in order to increase transparency in project selection as 
well as the quality of projects. Further, the EU has over the last decade increasingly built out the 
micro-project scheme and, its successor, the CBSS, indicating the need for country-focused 
programmes, implemented as closely as possible to the target state in question.  
 A standard critique of EU democracy assistance is that it mainly benefits western NGOs. 
Indeed, this study finds also that between 2000 and 2006 about 63% of all macro projects were 
implemented by western organizations. However, if taking the entire EIDHR into account, the 
majority of funds has been channeled through local organizations (43.5%) than other actors. 
 
5. An Analysis of Mainstream Development Assistance Programmes 
 
Chapters 7 and 8 have concentrated on the EU’s mainstream development programmes and have 
aimed at outlining the provision of democracy assistance through these programmes, which is 
neglected in the literature generally speaking. That part of EU democracy assistance is also more 
difficult to trace due to the lack of detailed reporting in EU documents and the stronger 
involvement of third states that in part implement projects and sub-programmes and therefore 
report on it (or not) in national documents.  
 Chapter 7 has presented the numerous major external EU development programmes that 
have been implemented over the last two decades. It has shown that, following the 
announcement by the Council to provide democracy assistance through mainstream development 




amended to explicitly foresee the provision of some form of democracy assistance. In some 
cases, the EU hesitated to immediately insert strong and outspoken provisions, reflecting some 
uneasiness as regards the new objective, the critical views of target states, and the prevailing idea 
that the EIDHR should cover democracy assistance. In the course of the 1990s, however, the 
language on democracy promotion in external regulations became increasingly outspoken and 
committed. The numerous new regulations that became effective on 1 January 2007 continue this 
trend and democracy and democratization form important parts of mainstream development 
programmes.  
 Basically, all external assistance regulations follow the same structure in their provisions 
on democracy promotion and assistance. First, the preambles confirm the importance of 
democratization for successful socio-economic development. Secondly, one of the first Articles 
of each regulation stipulates democracy promotion to be an objective of the relevant 
development programme. The newer the regulation, the more outspoken the declaration is. 
Thirdly, most regulations envisage two to three forms of democracy promotion, including 
conditionality, incentive conditionality, as well as democracy assistance. Fourthly, most 
regulations enumerate fields of support for democracy assistance, like media or election 
assistance. The newer a regulation is, the more likely it does provide a more elaborate list. These 
lists are, however, always non-exhaustive and allow the EU to also provide support to non-
mentioned sub-sectors of democracy assistance. The topics enumerated in the various regulations 
are highly similar to the EIDHR programme: election observation and assistance, media support, 
civil society support, institutional reform and support, rule of law reform, civilian control of 
security systems, legal reform. Additionally, the fields of good governance and human rights are 
mentioned. Fifthly, the regulations do not suggest a hierarchy among the mentioned sectors but 
leave the final pattern of distribution to the implementation stage. Moreover, no regulation 
reserves specific shares or amounts of available funds for democracy assistance.  
 EU relations with particular countries or regions are also regulated or addressed in other 
documents than assistance regulations, like in bi- or multilateral agreements, Common Strategies, 
or communications. These can and do also address the policy of democracy promotion and 
envisage fields of support for democracy assistance. Usually these documents do not go beyond 
the above provided list of sub-fields and also only provide non-exhaustive enumerations.  
 All in all, the various assistance regulations therefore enable the EU to provide democracy 
assistance in particular third states or regions and provide some indication as the sub-fields of 
assistance that should be targeted. They leave, however, much freedom in devising particular 




 Chapter 8 has looked in more detail at the implementation of EU democracy assistance 
under the mainstream development programmes. Statistical data on this issue has not easily been 
available, but has had to be constructed with data from the OECD database on ODA flows to 
which the Commission has reported annually since 1995. The OECD does not collect data on 
democracy assistance, but on eleven sub-sectors of the so-called sector ‘government and civil 
society – general’. Following the thematic scope of the EIDHR, five sectors of these eleven sub-
sectors have been chosen to pertain to the field of democracy assistance (legal and judicial 
development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, legislatures and political 
parties, media and free flow of information). Two further features of OECD have additionally to 
be kept in mind. They include data on the EIDHR, which has to be reduced in order to establish 
commitments and expenditure on the mainstream development data. Further, they do not report 
on some of the countries included in this study, like Russia, but do include data on some 
countries excluded from the scope of the study, like the Western Balkans.  
 EU commitments in the entire sector ‘government and civil society – general’, which next 
to the above mentioned fields of democracy assistance also include commitments for, amongst 
others, public sector policy and administrative development, public financial development, and 
human rights, strongly increased between 1995 and 2009. In 1995 the EU committed about 77 
million Euros for projects in the sector, a figure that might be slightly higher due to initial 
weaknesses in reporting by donors; in 2006 commitments were with 1819.83 million Euros 
extraordinarily high; in 2009 the figure was about 1819.83 million Euros. In terms of percentages 
of overall ODA, commitments for the sector increased from only 1.3% in 1995 to an 
extraordinary 20% in 2004, while declining thereafter to about 9% in 2009. The further 
development remains to be seen. The increase in absolute amounts and percentages of all ODA 
occurred in most regions, but the EU committed more funds and higher shares in countries in 
Europe and North Africa than elsewhere. This confirms, as established in the discussion of the 
EIDHR, that the EU puts more effort into supporting countries closer to its borders. Overall, 
despite the strong increase the EU has usually committed less for the field of ‘government and 
civil society – general’ than other major donors, in particular Australia, Canada, and the US. 
Neither secondary law nor the programming documents for mainstream assistance regulations 
establish a specific share of the budget of a specific programme for the sector. The numbers and 
percentages provided therefore are the result of the individual preferences and decisions of all 
involved actors in the programming and implementation of individual assistance programmes. It 
is therefore also difficult to make predictions for the future development of the shares.  
 Although some analysts equate democracy assistance with the just discussed sector 




part of this sector. Data for democracy assistance has been constructed from sub-fields of the 
sector, choosing those thematic sub-sectors that the EU considers to be democracy assistance in 
policy documents and in its specific democracy assistance programme, the EIDHR. The data 
suggests that EU democracy assistance – comprising assistance under the EIDHR and 
mainstream programmes – has increased from about 31 million Euros in 1996 to about 525 
million Euros in 2008. In 2009 it decreased to about 352 million Euros. In terms of the share of 
democracy assistance of all ODA, the percentage of democracy assistance of all ODA grew from 
a very low share (around 1%) in the mid-1990s to over 4% in the mid- to late-2000s. Overall over 
the period 1995 to 2009 the EU committed about 3350 million Euros for democracy assistance 
in third (ODA recipient) countries.  
A look at individual regions during the period of 1996 to 2009 shows that, despite the 
overall growth, in most regions the development of commitments for democracy assistance was a 
rather volatile one, with much variation in commitments from year to year. Despite the – quite 
considerable – overall increase, there was no sign of a constant, annual, and growing or at least 
stable commitment of funds for democracy assistance programmes or projects. Overall, this is 
the result of the lack of reserving a constant share for democracy assistance in secondary law or 
in policy documents on programming. As just mentioned, the committed amounts are the result 
of preferences by the numerous actors involved in programming and implementation, on the 
basis of the provisions of secondary law and the framework for programming that envisage 
democracy assistance but do not reserve specific shares or amounts for it.  
 Just as in the case of the EIDHR, the geographical distribution of funds has shown that 
the EU has invested more efforts into building democracy through democracy assistance in 
regions closer to its borders, in particular in Europe (like Eastern Europe and – although outside 
the focus of this thesis – the Western Balkans) and in Africa North of the Sahara. Additionally, 
Sub-Saharan Africa also appears a major recipient of democracy assistance, reserving relatively 
high and stable shares for democracy assistance. Levels of democracy do not seem to have played 
a role for the provision of democracy assistance.  
Overall, compared to other major international donors the EU does not appear as a 
leading actor in the field of democracy assistance. For example, the US overall devotes higher 
amounts to democracy assistance as well as considerably higher shares of all ODA and shares of 
the sector ‘government and civil society – general’ to democracy assistance than the EU. 
 While OECD data exposes overall EU commitments for democracy assistance, Chapter 8 
mainly intends to show how much democracy assistance the EU provides under its mainstream 
development programmes. Taking data on the EIDHR into account, Chapter 8 has shown that 




minor: only about one fourth to one half of annual EU democracy assistance were then provided 
under the EU’s mainstream programme. Only from 1999 did this change and mainstream 
development programmes started to account for an increasingly large share of all EU democracy 
assistance and to overshadow the EIDHR. For example, between 2004 and 2009 annual 
commitments for democracy assistance under mainstream programmes were between 300 and 
about 470 million Euros, while commitments for democracy assistance under the EIDHR were 
usually only between 50 and 57 million Euros. Overall, with annual variations, the EIDHR 
usually only accounts for about 10% to 15% of all democracy assistance provided, including the 
financing of EU EOMs under the mainstream programmes. While the EIDHR is the first 
mentioned and most widely known EU democracy assistance programme, the data just provided 
indicates the importance of the mainstream programmes for EU democracy assistance. 
 A look at individual categories of democracy assistance shows that commitments under 
mainstream programmes outnumber EIDHR commitments in the majority of sub-fields of 
democracy assistance, but not all. This is little surprise, given the conscious decision in the early 
2000s to shift institutionally-focused assistance to mainstream programmes and away from the 
EIDHR, since 2000 about 90% of project funds for the development of the legal and judicial 
sphere have come from mainstream development programmes. Election support measures 
(including election monitoring and assistance) were in the early 2000s to a large part financed 
through mainstream programmes (for about 80%). With the increasing number of EU EOMs, 
the EIDHR has become a more important source for election support measures and in 2009 over 
40% of election support measures were supported by the EIDHR, a large part of which were 
however used for EOMs. Interestingly civil society and civic participation measures have also for 
a large part – roughly 80% - been funded from mainstream programmes rather than the EIDHR, 
despite the fact that the EIDHR is the EU’s most specific and devoted civil society instrument. 
The EIDHR is highly important though for difficult partnerships, in the case of which civil 
society cannot be built through mainstream programmes. Finally, some fields, like projects on the 
media and free flow of information, have nearly exclusively been funded under the EIDHR 
rather than through mainstream programmes. 
 Chapter 8 has also provided data on EU expenditure for democracy assistance. Payments 
in the field of democracy assistance (and other sub-fields of the category ‘government and civil 
society – general’) only started to strongly increase from about 2004/2005 on. Overall from the 
crucial 1991 November Council resolution, in which the Council established that the EU would 
provide democracy assistance through mainstream development programmes, it took the EU 
seven to eight years to make increasing commitments under mainstream programmes and even 




long delay of about fourteen years from the policy idea to its effective implementation. The delay 
can in part be explained by the average delay of about five years from budgetary commitments to 
actual payments, the hesitation by Commission staff to perform the shift to political aid, in 
particular in authoritarian states, and the unclear relationship between mainstream programmes 
and the EIDHR, in particular, the persistent belief – despite clear policy declarations – that 
democracy assistance should mainly (or even only) be provided by the EIDHR.  
 The analysis has also exposed the thematic distribution of funds among the various sub-
sectors of ‘government and civil society – general’. The provided data includes data on the 
EIDHR, which cannot be separated due to the lack of detailed data on EIDHR commitments. 
Crucial decisions on the thematic distribution are taken during the programming phase, in 
particular the AAPs. Unsurprisingly, the sector public policy and administrative development, 
which for example includes projects on economic policy advice, received about half of all funds 
and therefore the largest share of the entire sector. An interesting insight, in view of the frequent 
argument made on the distribution of funds between democracy and human rights assistance, has 
also been that overall, including all external assistance programmes, the EU invests considerably 
more efforts into democracy assistance: only about 11% of all funds in the sector ‘government 
and civil society – general’ have been commitments for human rights projects, while about 30% 
have been commitments for democracy assistance. This also shows that, while democracy 
assistance is provided by the EIDHR and, to a large extent, mainstream development 
programmes, the EIDHR plays a much more important role for the sector of human rights.  
 As regards the five OECD sub-sectors of democracy promotion, the distribution of 
commitments was as follows: about 12 % of the funds of the sector ‘government and civil society 
– general’ was committed for legal and judicial development projects, about 10% for democratic 
participation and civil society projects, about 7% for election support, and rather small shares of 
less than 1% for the categories legislatures and political parties and media projects. As mentioned, 
detailed commitment data on the EIDHR is not available and it is therefore difficult to present 
information on the thematic preferences of mainstream programmes as opposed to the EIDHR. 
It appears though that the mainstream programmes put a stronger emphasis on the sector of rule 
of law development, but also commit considerable amounts for civil society development and 
civil participation. Further, while the EIDHR basically exclusively accounts for EU EOMs, 
election assistance is for the most part provided through mainstream programmes. Media 
projects have so far largely been neglected.  
 OECD data has also allowed an analysis of the regional distribution of funds in different 
sub-sectors of democracy assistance. It has shown considerable variation in the focus in 




also rendered it difficult to withdraw a general pattern. It appears though that regions where 
authoritarianism has prevailed, like in North Africa, Far East Asia and South and Central Asia, 
the EU has preferred providing rule of law assistance and in several thereof generally refraining 
from more political aid, like electoral assistance.  
 
6. The EU’s Motivations to Provide Democracy Assistance 
 
There are plenty of references to the reasons for EU democracy (and human rights) promotion, 
including democracy assistance. These are, however, usually rather general and simplified 
statements and fail to present their exact effect on democracy and democratization. This makes it 
also difficult to say whether instrumental or value-driven motivations prevail. Moreover, the 
various motivations are spread out over numerous documents and nowhere mentioned 
comprehensively.  
 The most often mentioned reason for EU democracy promotion is its assumed positive 
effect on socio-economic development. The EU believes that successful democratization is a 
condition for developing a country socio-economically and therefore for the success of its 
development policies. It does not, however, explain the exact relationship in more detail. 
Secondly, EU documents frequently mention that democratic states are more peaceful and 
politically stable and that a higher number of democracies means a higher level of local, regional, 
and global security. Thirdly, on one occasion the European Commission explicitly spoke of 
“moral imperatives” to promote democracy abroad. Frequent references to the ‘universality’ of 
human rights and therefore to the idea that each human person should be endowed with the 
same rights irrespective of her or his country of origin, allude to similar value-driven underlying 
motivations. Fourthly, in one of the Commission’s early documents on EU democracy 
promotion, which was clearly influenced by the ongoing events in Central and Eastern Europe in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, that institution referred to European public opinion as one reason 
for the provision of democracy support. Fifthly, the EU was clearly also pushed into its role as 
international promoter of democracy by other Western actors, which started to pursue equal 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s. In this sense the policy constitutes a tool for establishing the 
EU’s international presence and of promoting its image in third states. Finally, individual EU 
institutions had their own motivations for beginning and pursuing an EU policy of democracy 
promotion. In particular the European Parliament used the theme to promote its role and 




 The various reasons constitute value-driven or instrumental motivations or present 
mixtures of both. It is difficult to judge which of the two is prevailing, in particular also because 
of the lack of more elaborate discussions of the issue in EU documents. Overall, just as other 
international promoters of democracy, in particular states or international organizations, EU 
action is driven by a combination of self-interests and normative motivations.  
 
7. The Model of Democracy 
 
Does the EU attempt to build a specific form of democracy in third states and, if yes, which one? 
This first major basic or overarching question this thesis has tried to answer concerns the model 
of democracy that underlies EU action. The thesis has first analyzed EU policy documents in 
order to see whether the EU or individual EU institutions have addressed the question explicitly 
and, in the affirmative, which definition they have suggested. Secondly, the thesis has looked at 
the EU’s specific democracy assistance programme and its mainstream development programmes 
in order to determine whether specific models emerge in the course of the implementation of EU 
democracy assistance.  
 The question of the underlying model of democracy and its explicit definition has always 
been one of the most contentious ones in the discussion of EU democracy assistance. The topic 
has been raised several times in the EU framework, with some voices calling for the explicit 
provision of a definition of democracy and others preferring to remain vague or silent on the 
issue. The main reason for the disputed nature of the topic lies in the fear of critique for 
imposing some alien model of democracy on third states, in particular some ‘European model’, 
which does not match local circumstances and situations and, moreover, could be considered 
some form of neo-colonialism. The EU has also declared the non-imposition of alien models as 
one of the principles of EU democracy assistance. Consequently, the EU would only facilitate the 
development of locally rooted processes of change leading to the development of a locally 
chosen model of democracy. 
The three main EU institutions involved in EU democracy assistance have relatively 
constantly held diverging views on the topic. The Parliament has been the staunchest defender of 
adopting an explicit definition of democracy for EU democracy promotion policies. It has not, 
however, drafted and suggested a definition by itself. Most recently, in 2009, in the context of 
intensive discussions on developing an ‘EU consensus on democracy support’, it suggested 
linking EU policy to the conception of democracy suggested by the UN General Assembly, 




which is the institution that would need to publicly adopt the EU’s definition of democracy, has 
not followed-up on the issue. Overall, it has been the most critical institution concerning the 
topic and has exercised strong restraint on making policy declarations on the issue. The 
Commission has pursued the most pragmatic path. It has on various occasions tried to explicitly 
define democracy, like in COM(2011) 303 final and COM(2011) 886 final, or has developed the 
individual elements of democracy during the implementation of specific democracy assistance 
and governance programmes. It has, however, not stressed that it was suggesting the EU’s 
definition of democracy and has not made suggestions to the Council for adoption of its 
proposed definition.  
The official position of the Council is currently that the EU is not promoting a specific 
model of democracy and that it therefore refrains from providing a definition. Rather, according 
to the Council, the EU is promoting a range of universally accepted common principles of 
democracy. Unfortunately, the Council does not comprehensively enumerate these principles. It 
only refers to various features, which all democracies supposedly share, including elections, 
accountable rulers, parliaments, political parties, an independent media, civil society, and respect 
for a broad range of human rights. The Commission’s documents mention the same elements, in 
addition to the rule of law, the separation of powers, political and civil rights like the freedom of 
association, assembly, and expression, transparent and non-corrupt administrations, and at times, 
decentralization.  
The analysis of the EU’s major democracy assistance programmes confirms its 
engagement in the enumerated areas. Additionally, the EIDHR and mainstream development 
programmes suggest providing assistance in the following fields, which partly overlap with the 
above-mentioned areas: institutional reform and support (for legislative and executive bodies), 
legal reform, and civilian control of the security system. The implementation of the specific 
democracy assistance and general development programmes reveals EU engagement in the same 
fields, of course to different degrees in different geographical areas and countries and at different 
points in time.  
Despite the Council’s suggestion that the EU is not promoting a specific model of 
democracy, there is strong evidence that the EU is working within a specific model: a basic model 
of liberal democracy that shows all the essential features identified by Robert Dahl as well as, 
going beyond the basic elements, the rule of law. The EU is doing more than promoting basic 
principles: it promotes specific procedures, actors, and institutions that do realize principles but 
are much more concrete than principles, which are by definition more basic and abstract ideas. 
Overall, both policy document and an analysis of the implementation of programmes shows that 




There is no evidence that beyond this basic model the EU promotes a more specific 
model of (liberal) democracy, like the ones presented in Chapter 1. The increasing share of funds 
of the EIDHR used for EU EOMs as well as increasing amounts committed for democracy 
assistance under mainstream programmes from the early 2000s on could point to an elitist model 
of democracy. The EU has, however, on various occasions explicitly distanced itself from such 
limited form of democracy and has introduced upper limits to the funds that can be reserved for 
EU EOMs. Additionally, the election-focused support has always been balanced by an at least 
equally strong focus on civil society development, which is incompatible with an elitist form of 
democracy. Civil society development has always been a central focus of EU democracy 
assistance and has overall received one of the largest shares of all thematic sectors; however, 
policy documents and the form of civil society assistance provided suggests that the EU 
facilitates the development of civil society to perform its role in liberal democracy – as providers 
of policy-inputs and as watchdogs – rather than to create a form of pluralist democracy. The 
support provided to governmental and parliamentary institutions also speaks against the pluralist 
model. Both the focus on elections and representative democracy and the focus on state 
institutions exclude the participatory model of democracy. At last – although a broader range of 
conceptions of democracy exist in the literature and could taken into consideration at this point – 
there is also no real evidence that the EU promotes social democracy. The EU promotes social 
development through its mainstream development programmes, constantly stresses the 
indivisibility of human rights and therefore the importance of social rights, and has stressed the 
need of a just distribution of development gains in developing countries. It has not, however, 
explicitly linked its democracy agenda with social features that would allow a clear identification 
of social democracy.  
While the EU is working within the liberal model of democracy and envisages support in 
a pre-defined range of thematic areas of support, the concrete model of democracy to be 
supported in a particular third state is to a considerably degree influenced and/or decided by 
target states’ governments and recipient civil society groups and not imposed by the EU. The 
reason for this lies in the EU’s programming and project implementation methods that envisage 
agreement with target states’ governments or, albeit still with some difficulties, the involvement 
of local and EU-based civil society in EIDHR programming and the use of call for proposals in 
the implementation of the EIDHR and, to some degree, also mainstream programmes. Overall, 
as long as assistance remains within the liberal model of democracy, individual target states 
and/or their civil societies can for this reason suggest or push for a the support of a specific 
model of democracy that goes beyond the basic liberal model suggested in EU policy documents 




supported, but allows such specific support and focus upon the wishes and initiatives of recipient 
states and societies as well as European civil society, as long as support remains with the basic 
liberal model.  
 
8. The EU’s Approach to Democratization 
 
Of the two basic approaches to democratization – the structural and the transition approach – 
EU democracy assistance very clearly pertains to the transition approach. There is no indication 
that the EU still believes that socio-economic development, the most important factor in the 
developmental approach, is a precondition of democratization and/or that socio-economic 
development would necessarily lead to political reform and to democracy. The EU to a strong 
degree engages in socio-economic development, however, not to promote democracy, but just to 
achieve the objective of socio-economic development itself. Recently, in the framework of the 
upheavals in the Southern Mediterranean there have been calls for a better linkage between 
efforts to promote socio-economic development and democratization. It recognizes that 
democratization can benefit from higher grades and levels of socio-economic development, but 
does not render socio-economic development a condition and therefore does not change the 
basic approach to democracy assistance. Overall, the EU therefore assists in the development of 
democracy through assistance to actors, institutions, and processes in order to facilitate political 
liberalization, transition, and the consolidation of democracy rather than promoting democracy 
through socio-economic development.  
 Within the transition approach it is difficult to establish a clear preference of the EU for a 
particular approach to democratization. Although individual EU institutions have discussed 
questions relating to EU democracy assistance that indirectly inform parts of its approach to 
democratization, they have not explicitly expressed a clear preference for a specific approach, like 
for a top-down approach in which reformers or soft-liners of the ruling regime are supported or 
a bottom-up approach in which civil society is developed and encouraged to push for reform. All 
in all, the broad spectrum of thematic areas supported and the existence of different types of 
democracy assistance programmes with different programming and project selection modes in 
principle allows pursuing different approaches, depending on the EU’s choice as regards a 
particular country as well as the specificities of the political situation in the target state and the 
preferences and possibilities of its actors.  
 Despite this broad spectrum of possible approaches the EU has so far overall preferred a 
gradual, bottom-up approach to democratization. Ideally it would like to see informed citizens 




reforms, supported by reformed public institutions staffed with pro-democracy-minded officials 
and a reformed, independent judiciary that would in crucial moments take the side of pro-
democracy forces. This preferred approach finds expression in both the thematic focus of EU aid 
and its predominant programming method. Thematically, there is a strong focus on projects in 
the sector of democratic participation and civil society development, with the majority of projects 
aiming at informing citizens of their (human) rights and supporting civil society organizations in 
carrying out their typical role in democratic systems of government, which also raises these 
organizations’ expectations. Additionally the EU strongly focuses on the fields of legal and 
judicial development as well as supporting areas pertaining to the field of good governance, 
which would eventually facilitate political reform processes and support civil society demands. 
Furthermore, the largest part of EU democracy assistance is programmed in cooperation with the 
target state’s government, which points to a gradual process of reform in agreement with the 
mentioned governments. The EU has the possibility of exceptionally providing assistance at very 
short notice upon the demand posed by special circumstance, but this is, as mentioned, the 
exception rather than the rule.  
 A top-down approach would require a stronger focus on the reformist political elite of a 
third state, either on soft-liners of the ruling regime or political opposition figures and parties. 
EU democracy has so far largely avoided such engagement, although it could in principle be 
carried out through an EIDHR project under the leadership of a European political foundation. 
Further, the revolutionary approach cannot be excluded either. EU support to civil society may 
lead to revolutionary actions that aim at overthrowing a leading un-democratic regime. There is 
no indication though that the EU intentionally aims at training NGOs and other groups to carry 
out such activities. 
 
9. The EU’s Approach to Democracy Assistance 
 
EU policy makers have over the course of the last two decades at various times discussed topics 
that relate to the EU’s approach to democracy assistance, like on its thematic focus or time-
perspective. Only more recently have they, however, began to explicitly speak of ‘approaches’ and 
to more consciously reflect on the EU’s approach and its possible reform. The issue is one of the 
very few cases in which EU institutions have shown a strong interest in the academic discussion 
of a democracy assistance-related topic and taken over terminology developed in that framework, 
whilst giving the concepts of ‘developmental’ and ‘political’ approach a slightly different meaning 




 Overall, just as with the model of democracy and the EU’s approach to democratization, 
it is difficult to extract the EU’s preferred approach to democracy assistance from EU policy 
documents, programmes, and implemented projects. The main reasons are the lack of explicit 
statements on the topic until recently and the lack of detailed information on individual 
substantive areas of EU support. Nevertheless, the available documents and data show that both 
approaches exist in EU democracy assistance, both in the EIDHR and its mainstream 
development programmes. Overall, in both cases the EU gives preference to the developmental 
approach over the political approach to democracy assistance. In the case of the EIDHR there 
are stronger traces of the political approach than within mainstream assistance programmes, 
albeit of a moderate version thereof that, in particular, lacks a strong focus on political parties. In 
the case of mainstream assistance programmes there is a clear preference for the developmental 
approach, although the political approach is not entirely excluded either.  
 As mentioned in the discussion of the EU’s approach to democratization, the preferred 
approaches mainly derive from the substantive distribution of funds and from programming and 
aid implementation methods. EU democracy assistance is distributed over a thematically broad 
range of areas including such pertaining to the state apparatus as well as the independent third 
sphere of civil society. Assistance is given to state institutions at local, regional, and national level; 
there is a strong focus on rule of law reform with a particular emphasis on the judiciary and 
access to justice issues; democracy assistance has been strongly linked to human rights assistance 
and good governance reform. Civil society assistance facilitates the development of a broad range 
of civil society organizations, including many moderate organizations whose primary objective is 
not the immediate change of the political regime. Assistance is to a large extent programmed in 
cooperation with the target state’s government and is, in basic features, planned for time spans of 
up to seven years ahead. All these features are indications of the EU’s preferred developmental 
approach to democracy assistance.  
 Elements of the political approach are the provision of assistance to regime-critical civil 
society organizations, human rights defenders, the media, and projects concerning the 
independence of the judiciary. Although some of these sectors are mainly targeted by the 
EIDHR, they do also receive support under the mainstream programmes. Several procedural 
features of the EIDHR further support the existence of the political approach. EIDHR 
assistance, although known to target state’s governments, is programmed without the 
involvement of these governments and therefore in principle able to support more regime-critical 
projects than mainstream programmes. Since 2006, political foundations, which are amongst 
others strongly involved in political party development, are explicitly mentioned as eligible 




programmed in advance but kept in reserve for unforeseen events. This allows the EU to quickly 
act in unexpected but crucial times, including the case of regime changes.  
 Finally, more recently EU institutions explicitly discussed the limited use of the political 
approach in EU democracy assistance and deliberated about its development, in particular 
through a stronger focus on political party development and more possibilities to support civil 
society organizations and civic movements engaged in democratization processes. While political 
party development has largely been delegated to the European Endowment for Democracy 
(EED) that is currently being created outside the formal EU framework, the Commission is 
creating a specific civil society facility to provide increasing support to actors of the third sector.  
 
10. Key Remaining Issues 
 
This thesis has revealed several issues that appear problematic in policy-making and the 
implementation of EU democracy assistance. Some have already been mentioned in this 
concluding part of the thesis. The most salient issues should briefly be listed here.  
 The first issue relates to the issue of explicit statements on the model or models of 
democracy supported by the EU. The Council currently prefers the view that the EU is not 
facilitating the establishment of a particular type of democracy, but just some universally accepted 
principles, without, however, mentioning these. Various EU documents and its programmes 
suggest, on the contrary, that the EU is promoting some basic model of liberal democracy and, 
depending on the input of recipient states’ governments and civil society, more specific versions 
thereof. It is suggested here that the Council should be more outspoken on this issue and 
explicitly stipulate what the EU is indeed doing – promoting some form of liberal democracy in 
the broad sense – and offering assistance for specific models that form part of the basic liberal 
model. At the very least, the Council needs to list the various basic principles of democracy it 
suggests to promote.  
 Secondly, despite considerable experience of with democracy assistance programmes, 
there is need for a stronger conceptual engagement with the numerous thematic areas of EU 
democracy support. The EU, in particular the Commission, has so far failed to commission 
experts – academics, consultants, research institutes – to develop papers or handbooks on all 
core thematic areas of EU democracy assistance. Such papers would engage in detail in a 
conceptual discussion of the particular field in question, address issues that could arise in 
different cultural contexts, like on possible different conceptions of civil society in Muslim states, 




those involved in the implementation of assistance programmes about the particular area in 
question. Such documents exist for election-related reform and, more recently, for parliamentary 
support. A comprehensive handbook on governance reform includes short sections on various 
topics, is, however, little visible. Topics like civil society, civil-military relations, the media, and 
political parties have so far insufficiently been addressed.  
 Thirdly, ever since the mid-1990s the Commission has mentioned the need for proper 
knowledge of the situation in third states for EU policy-making and aid implementation. The 
information base has improved with the opening of an increasing number of Commission – now 
EU – Delegations in third states and the increasing deployment of human rights experts in these 
Delegations. Specific tools to collect detailed information as to the level of democracy – on the 
basis of data for various pre-defined sub-systems of democracy – have been developed for 
various regions, in particular the ACP countries and the ENP region, but not for all. Calls for a 
standardized format for the collection of information – similar to procedures in the US – were 
rejected in the early 2000s. It is suggested here that such a standardized format for detailed 
information on the democratic situation in all third states – possibly including the human rights 
dimension – should also be used in the EU. It could be developed on the basis of existing tools, 
like the existing governance profiles. Such standardized democracy and human rights data sheets 
would provide the EU with a better basis for policy-making towards those states for which such 
tools do not yet exist, would ensure enhanced objectivity as all states would be assessed on the 
basis of the same structure, and would render the overall EU framework less complex and 
simpler.  
 Fourthly, the decision of the EU to draft individual human rights strategies for all third 
states that are targeted by EU human rights promotion policies has to be welcomed. It will have 
to be seen to which extent these strategies will also in detail cover issues of democratization. It is 
suggested here that the EU needs an individual democratization strategy for each third state in 
which it promotes democracy. This strategy, which should be based on the above suggested 
standardized information sheets, should be comprehensive in the tools it covers and also relate to 
the EIDHR and mainstream programmes. Depending on the level of democracy in the particular 
third state in question, especially whether a country has already undergone a transition to 
democracy and is in the process of consolidation, or whether it is still ruled by an authoritarian 
government, the government of the third state can be involved in the deliberations of the 
strategy. Similarly, local civil society organizations as well as European civil society organizations 
working in the field should be involved in deliberations as far as these organizations exist and can 




 Fifthly, as suggested by numerous other actors and some of the EU institutions 
themselves, there is need for the EU to more strongly pursue a political approach to democracy 
assistance. Political parties are crucial actors in existing (liberal) democracies and functioning 
models in which political parties are replaced by different bodies have not yet been used in 
practice. The EU has so far largely avoided engaging in political party support, for the fear of 
being accused of political intervention. The US and political foundations have not. If handled 
carefully and if support is distributed among numerous parties – on the condition that they 
respect democratic rules of the game – such support can be provided without having to fear 
political critique. Additionally, analysis of EU programmes has shown a limited engagement in 
media development, which is an area that necessarily has to be given a stronger focus. 
 Sixthly, the EU has made commitments to more strongly involve European and local civil 
society in aid programming, both, for the EIDHR and mainstream programmes. In practice, it 
does not yet live up to this expressed commitment. There is need that the Delegations search for 
more civil society contacts in the particular countries for which they are responsible. They need 
to be staffed and provided with funds accordingly. European civil society is also deploring the 
lack of sufficient impact in EU democracy assistance programming, and more timely meetings 
and a better flow of information should be ensured. 
 Seventhly, the global approach to EIDHR programming with the attempt to establish 
globally valid priorities that should then be implemented in all states but can also be adapted if 
they do not fit local situations should be given up. Rather, EIDHR programming documents – 
strategy papers – should consist of two separate sections. On the one hand, a globally-focused 
section should establish a set of global priorities that will be targeted in all states and through 
global calls for proposals. On the other hand, the EU should programme EIDHR assistance for 
each target state individually, that is, CBSSs should be programmed for each state without the 
need for common global priorities. Individual CBSS programming documents can then be 
included in the EIDHR strategy paper and form its – of course comprehensive – second part. 
Importantly, CBSS programming documents have to be based on EU democracy strategies for 
the particular state in question.  
 Finally, on the major current and future issues is the question of the coherent application 
of all existing EU democracy promotion tools, both supranational ones as well as CFSP tools. 
This in particular also encompasses the coherent use of democracy assistance funds under the 
mainstream development programmes and the EIDHR. The EU has for many years been aware 
of this problem and its difficulty and has introduced measures to ensure coherent use, like the 
need to take EIDHR programming into account when programming the respective mainstream 




election support measures. A major tool to increase coherence would be the above mentioned 
democracy strategies for individual states, which would be guiding documents for the 
programming of individual democracy assistance programmes and would address questions of 
the coherent use of instruments before the actual programming processes of the EIDHR and 










Table A: EU Commitments for the EIDHR its Forerunner Programmes1509  
(Source: EU budgets 1978-20111510) 
 
                                                     
1509 Because administrative expenditure is not been mentioned in the table, the sum of the commitments of individual items in 
one budget year does at times not correspond to the mentioned total. 
1510 The mentioned budgets 1978 to 2006 have been published in the following OJs: Budget 1978: OJ 1978 L36; Budget 1980: OJ 
1980 L242; Budget 1981: OJ 1980 L378; Budget 1982: OJ 1982 L31; Budget 1984: OJ 1984 L12; Budget 1985: OJ 1985 L206; 
Budget 1986: OJ 1985 L358; Budget 1987: OJ 1987 L86; Budget 1988: OJ 1988 L226; Budget 1989: OJ 1989 L26; Budget 1990: 
OJ 1990 L24; Budget 1991: OJ 1991 L30; Budget 1992: OJ 1992 L26; Budget 1993: OJ 1993 L31; Budget 1994: OJ 1994 L34; 
Budget 1995: OJ 1994 L369; Budget 1996: OJ 1996 L22; Budget 1997: OJ 1997 L44; Budget 1998: OJ 1998 L44; Budget 1999: OJ 
1999 L 39; Budget 2000: OJ 2000 L 40; Budget 2001: OJ 2001 L 56; Budget 2002: OJ 2002 L 29; Budget 2003: OJ 2003 L 54. 
Since 2007 EU budgets are published at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/www/index-en.htm (last accessed on 1.7.2012). 
Year Budget-Titles 
or Chapters 






1978 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1979 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1980 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1981 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1982 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1983 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.2  
1984 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.35  
1985 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.35  
1986 293 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.35  
992 NGOs in Chile 2  
  2.35  
1987 303 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion. 0.37  
992 NGOs in Chile 2  
  2.37  
1988 303 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 0.90  
992 NGOs in Chile 3  
  3.9  
1989 303 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 1.3  
992 NGOs in Chile 5  
  6.3  
1990 303 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 1.8  
992 NGOs in Chile 10  
3021 Democracy in Chile and Central America 10  
  21.8  
1991 A-3030 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 1.8  
B7-5073 NGOs in Chile 5  
B7-5078 Democracy in Chile and Central America 10  
B7-5076 NGOs protecting human rights   0.2  
  17  
1992 A-3030 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 2.8  
B7-5073 NGOs in Chile 4.5  
B7-5078 Democracy in Chile and Central America 10  
B7-5053 Human rights and democracy in developing countries 10  
B7-6000 Phare Democracy 5  
  32.3  
1993 A-3030 NGOs humanitarian and human rights promotion 3.5  
B7-5073 NGOs in Chile 4.85  
B7-5078 Democracy in Chile and Central America 15  
B7-5053 Human rights and democracy in developing countries 16  




                                                     
1511 Chapter B7-52 is part of Chapter B7-50 concerning ‘Other Cooperation Measures’. 
1512 Technically Title B7-7 is a Title of Subsection B7 (External Relations), which is part of Part B (Expenditure) of Volume 4 
(Section 3) of the EU budget relating to the Commission. Title B7-7 contains several Chapters on various elements of the 
EDIHR. 
B7-5079 NGOs working for human rights in Turkey 0.5   
  44.4  
1994 Chapter B7-
521511 
   
 B7-5200 Phare Democracy 5  
B7-5201 Support peace process and develop democracy in former 
Yugoslavia 
- 4 
    
B7-521 Tacis Democracy 5  
B7-522 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries 
14  
B7-523 Support to democratization in Latin America (LA) 13  
B7-5240 NGOs pursuing human rights objectives  5  
B7-5241 NGOs working for human rights in Turkey 0.5  
B7-525 European Forum for migrants 0.6  
B7-527 Rehabilitation centres for torture victims and NGOS helping 
victims of human rights abuses 
2  
  45.1  
1995 Chapter B7-52    
B7-5200 Phare Democracy  11  
B7-5201 Support peace process and develop democracy in former 
Yugoslavia 
5  
B7-521 Tacis Democracy 10  
B7-522 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries 
14  
B7-523 Support to democratization in LA 14  
B7-524 Subsidies for NGOs pursuing human rights objectives 6  
B7-526 Support for freedom of expression/press -  
  60  
1996 Title B7-71512    
B7-703 Support to democratization in LA 14  
B7-702 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries 
19  
B7-7000 Phare Democracy 11  
B7-7001 Support peace process and develop democracy in former 
Yugoslavia (YU) 
5  
B7-7002 Enforcement of Sanctions in YU 8.75  
B7-704 NGOs human rights activities 7  
B7-701 Tacis Democracy 11  
B7-705 Meda for democracy 9  
B7-706 Press freedom -  
1997 B7-7  84.75  
B7-7000 Phare Democracy 10  
B7-7001 Support peace process and develop democracy in former YU 5  
B7-701 Tacis Democracy 10  
B7-702 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries 
17  
B7-703 Support to democratization in LA 12.6  
B7-704 NGOs human rights activities 7  
B7-705 Meda for democracy 8  
B7-707 Torture victims 6  
B7-708 Int. criminal tribunals and ICI 3  




  78.6  
1998     
B7-700 Phare Democracy including SEE 15  
B7-701 Tacis Democracy 10  
B7-7020 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries 
17  
B7-7021 HR and D in southern African countries 5  
B7-703 Support to democratization in LA 12.6  
B7-7040 NGOs human rights activities 14.7  
B7-705 Meda for democracy 10  
B7-707 Torture victims   
B7-708 Int. criminal tribunals and ICI 3  
B7-707 Human Rights and Democracy in Asian countries 5  
B7-709 Transition and Supervision of Elections 2  
B7-710 Special programme for democracy and good governance in 
Nigeria 
3  
  97.3  
1999     
B7-700 Phare Democracy including SEE 15  
B7-701 Tacis Democracy 10  
B7-7020 Support for human rights and democracy in developing 
countries. in particular ACP 
17  
B7-7021 HR and D in southern African countries 4  
B7-7022 Special programme for democracy and good governance in 
Nigeria 
4  
B7-703 Support to democratization in LA 12.6  
B7-7040 NGOs human rights activities 15  
B7-705 Meda for democracy 10  
B7-707 Torture victims   
B7-708 Int. criminal tribunals and ICI 3.3  
B7-707 Human Rights and Democracy in Asian countries 5  
B7-709 Support for. and supervision of. electoral processes 2  
  97.9  
2000 Title B7-7    
 B7-700 Democracy in CEEC and former Yugoslavia 11.8  
 B7-701 Democracy in NIS and Mongolia 7  
 B7-7020 Human rights and democracy in developing countries 14.6  
 B7-7021 Human rights in Southern African countries 4  
 B7-703 Democratization in Latin America 14.6  
 B7-704 Organizations pursuing human rights objectives 14  
 B7-705 Meda for democracy 9  
 B7-706 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
2.9  
 B7-707 Human rights and democracy in Asian countries 7  
 B7-709 Democratic transition and electoral supervision 4.6  
  Various headings concerning administrative expenditures for 
individual programmes 
  
   94.8  
2001 Title B7-7    
B7-701 Promotion and defence of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms 
35  
B7-702 Support for democratization process and strengthening rule of 
law 
35  
B7-703 Conflict prevention and restoring civil peace 19  
B7-704 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
3  




                                                     
1513 Starting with the 2004 budget, the EU budget was given a new type of numbering. Technically Chapter 19 04 is part of Title 
19 (External Relations), which is part of Volume 4 (Section 3) of the budget relating to the Commission. Chapter 19 04 contains 
several Article items on various elements of the EIDHR.  
 Additional headings on administrative expenditure   
  102  
2002 Title B7-7    
B7-701 Democracy and the rule of law – respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
95.4  
B7-702 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
5  
 Additional administrative expenditure 104  
2003 Title B7-70    
 Democracy and the rule of law – respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
94  
 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
7  
 Additional administrative expenditure 106  
2004 Chapter 19 
041513 
   
19 04 01 European Inter-university Centre - 1.7 
19 04 02 Support for victims of human rights abuses 7  
19 04 03 Democracy and the rule of law – respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
110.5  
19 04 04 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
7  
19 04 05 Pilot project to establish a conflict prevention network 4  
  125.6  
2005 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Inter-university Centre 1.7  
19 04 02 Support for victims of human rights abuses - 7 (Chapter 31 
02) 
19 04 03 Democracy and the rule of law – respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
- 104.2 (Chapter 
31 02) 
19 04 04 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
- 7 (Chapter 31 
02) 
19 04 05 Pilot project to establish a conflict prevention network -  
  1.77 118.6 (Chapter 
31 02)  
2006 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Inter-university Centre 1.8  
19 04 02 Support for victims of human rights abuses 7  
19 04 03 Democracy and the rule of law – respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
105.4  
19 04 04 International criminal tribunals and International Criminal 
Court (ICC) 
7  
19 04 05 Pilot project to establish a conflict prevention network 1.5  
  122.7  
2007 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Inter-university Centre -  
19 04 02 Democracy and human rights   
19 04 02 01 Democracy and human rights in ENPI countries -  
19 04 02 02 Democracy and human rights in DCI countries -  
10 04 02 03 Democracy and human rights in IPA countries -  
10 04 02 04 Democracy and human rights in countries covered by the 
Stability Instrument 
-  
19 04 03 EU electoral and observation missions -  
19 04 03 01 Electoral and observation mission in ENPI countries  -  
19 04 03 01 Electoral and observation mission in DCI countries -  






19 04 06 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  129.97 (Chapter 
40 02) 
  1.5 129.97 (Chapter 
40 02) 
2008 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 106.1  
19 04 02  Pilot project – European emergency judicial assistance -  
19 04 03 Electoral observation 31  
19 04 04 Preparation to establish a conflict prevention network -  
  137.1  
2009 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 116.29  
19 04 02 Pilot project – European emergency judicial assistance -  
19 04 03 Electoral observation 32.07  
19 04 04 Preparation to establish a conflict prevention network -  
  148.35  
2010 19 04 01 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 116.5  
19 04 02  Pilot project – European emergency judicial assistance -  
19 04 03 Electoral observation 37.7  
19 04 04 Preparation to establish a conflict prevention network -  
  154.2  
2011 Chapter 19 04    
19 04 01 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights 118.31  
19 04 03 Electoral observation 38  
19 04 04 Preparation to establish a conflict prevention network -  
19 04 06 Pilot project Civil Society Forum EU-Russia 0.4  
19 04 07 Pilot project Funding for victims of torture 1  
  157.7  




Table B: Micro Project Facility Allocations per Region and Country 1999-2006 (in 100.000 Euros)1514 
 
 Region/Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
 CEE and SEE          
1 Albania 165 524 400 0 0 0 525 402 2016 
2 BiH 230 619 1000 500 500 435 855 615 4754 
3 Bulgaria 325 444 0 0 0 0 0 0 769 
4 Croatia 210 969 1000 0 0 0 0 0 2179 
5 Czech Rep. 280 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 580 
6 Estonia  110 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 210 
7 FYROM 100 519 500 0 0 0 0 250 1369 
8 Hungary 370 319 0 0 0 0 0 0 689 
9 Latvia 120 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 220 
10 Lithuania 120 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 220 
11 Poland 470 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 470 
12 Romania 460 309 0 0 0 0 0 0 769 
13 Slovakia 190 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 390 
14 Slovenia 70 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 170 
15 Serbia & Montenegro 280 115 0 500 500 435 745 535 3110 
16 Turkey 0 0 600 600 600 520 515 385 3220 
 Regional Total          21135 
 
Western 
NIS/Caucasus          
17 Armenia 125 0 500 0 0 0 800 765 2190 
18 Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
19 Belarus  250 0 0 0 0 0 420 400 1070 
20 Georgia 125 0 500 500 500 435 1025 950 4035 
21 Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
22 Russia 750 1000 1000 1000 1000 870 1555 1415 8590 
23 Ukraine 250 0 0 600 600 520 1025 950 3945 
 Regional Total         19830 
 Central Asia          
24 Kazakhstan 250 300 800 0 0 0 1135 1030 3515 
25 Kyrgyzstan 0 100 400 0 0 0 570 550 1620 
26 Tajikistan 0 0 300 0 0 0 570 550 1420 
 Regional Total        6555 
 Asia          
27 Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 570 550 1120 
28 Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 525 403 928 
29 Cambodia 0 0 0 0 500 435 680 480 2095 
30 China 0 840 0 0 500 435 800 0 2575 
31 Indonesia 0 0 0 800 800 690 760 533 3583 
32 Laos 0 0 0 0 0 0 490 375 865 
33 Nepal 0 0 200 0 400 345 490 375 1810 
34 Pakistan 0 0 500 500 500 435 745 535 3215 
35 Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36 Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 490 375 865 
37 Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 385 275 660 
 Regional Total 99-06         17716 
                                                     
1514 Sources: SEC(2001) 891, at 4. Micro-Projects Facility; EIDHR Programming 2005-2006, Annex I; EIDHR 
Annual Work Programme 2005, Annex 2;  






East          
38 Algeria 0 0 0 400 500 435 800 765 2900 
39 Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 1000 800 765 2565 
40 Israel 0 0 450 0 500 435 855 615 2855 
41 Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 680 800 765 2245 
42 Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 500 300 280 1080 
43 Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 1000 1025 950 2975 
44 Syria 0 0 0 0 0 500 340 250 1090 
45 Tunisia 0 0 0 250 0 215 300 275 1040 
46 Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
47 West Bank/Gaza 0 0 500 0 500 435 1275 1180 3890 
 Regional Total         20640 
 Central and Latin America         
48 Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
49 Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 0 680 480 1160 
50 Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 680 480 1160 
51 Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
52 Colombia 0 0 500 500 500 435 855 615 3405 
53 Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
54 Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 465 300 765 
55 El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
56 Guatemala 0 0 0 300 300 260 525 403 1788 
57 Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
58 Mexico 0 0 600 500 500 435 525 403 2963 
59 Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60 Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
61 Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 575 380 955 
63 Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
64 Venzuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 615 425 1040 
 Regional Total         13236 
 ACP states          
65 Angola 0 0 0 0 500 435 645 668 2248 
66 Burundi 0 0 0 0 250 215 490 375 1330 
67 Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 235 150 385 
68 DRC 0 0 0 0 400 345 645 668 2058 
69 Eritrea 0 0 0 0 150 210 150 105 615 
70 Ethiopia 0 0 0 400 400 345 800 765 2710 
71 Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 260 0 0 260 
72 Haiti 0 0 0 0 400 345 650 453 1848 
73 Ivory Coast 0 0 400 400 400 345 745 802 3092 
74 Mozambique 0 0 0 0 400 345 460 515 1720 
75 Nigeria 0 0 0 0 600 520 915 980 3015 
76 Rwanda 0 0 0 0 500 435 615 635 2185 
77 Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 250 215 0 0 465 
78 Sudan 0 0 0 0 500 435 1075 940 2950 
79 Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 185 153 338 
80 Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 650 345 800 765 2560 
 Regional Total         27779 





Table C: Major Recipients of EIDHR Funds in the NIS, the Mediterranean&Middle East, Asia, and Latin 





















1 Colombia 26.901 4/4 LMIC 1 Georgia 2.81 3.5/4 LMIC 
2 Russia 13.38 5/5 UMIC 2 Gaza/West Bank 2.4 6/6 LMIC 
3 Georgia 13.227 3.5/4 LMIC 3 Israel 1.36 - - 
4 Iraq 11.006 7/6 LMIC 4 Guatemala 0.86 4/4 LMIC 
5 Guatemala 10.612 4/4 LMIC 5 Lebanon 0.81 6/5 UMIC 
6 Israel 9.096 - - 6 Ecuador 0.68 3/3 LMIC 
7 Gaza/West Bank 8.655 6/6 LMIC 7 Chile 0.68 1.5/1 UMIC 
8 China 8.105 7/6 LMIC 8 Cambodia 0.64 6/5 LDC 
9 Cambodia 8.035 6/5 LDC 9 Armenia 0.62 4.5/4 LMIC 
10 Egypt 7.144 6/5 LMIC 10 Colombia 0.61 4/4 LMIC 
11 Ukraine 7.007 4/3.5 LMIC 11 Iraq 0.45 7/6 LMIC 
12 Indonesia 5.841 3/4 LMIC 12 Jordan 0.4 5/5 LMIC 
13 Nepal 5.828 4/4 LDC 13 Tunisia 0.38 6/5 LMIC 
14 Mexico 5.662 2/2 UMIC 14 El Salvador 0.35 2/3 LMIC 
15 Algeria 5.538 6/5 LMIC 15 Bolivia 0.34 2/3 UMIC 
16 Pakistan 5.148 6/5 LIC 16 Kyrgyzstan 0.303 6/5 LIC 
17 Peru 4.964 2/3 LMIC 17 Kazakhstan 0.28 6/5 LMIC 
18 Ecuador 4.469 3/3 LMIC 18 Nepal 0.23 4/4 LDC 
19 Iran 4.265 6/6 LMIC 19 Nicaragua 0.23 3/3 LIC 
20 Kazakhstan 4.125 6/5 LMIC 20 Moldova 0.2 2.5/4 LIC 
21 Brazil 3.908 2/3 LMIC 21 Peru 0.18 2/3 LMIC 
22 India 3.883 2/3 LIC 22 Algeria 0.17 6/5 LMIC 
23 Tunisia 3.766 6/5 LMIC 23 Tajikistan 0.16 6/5.5 LMIC 
24 Morocco 3.559 5/4.5 LMIC 24 Ukraine 0.15 4/3.5 LMIC 
25 Lebanon 3.399 6/5 UMIC 25 Morocco 0.12 5/4.5 UMIC 
26 Bolivia 2.96 2/3 UMIC 26 Honduras 0.1 3/3 LMIC 
27 Bangladesh 2.497 3.5/4 LDC 27 Egypt 0.099 6/5 LMIC 
28 El Salvador 2.29 2/3 LMIC 28 Russia 0.092 5/5 UMIC 
29 Jordan 2.245 5/5 LMIC 29 Azerbaijan 0.08 6/5 LMIC 
30 Armenia 1.987 4.5/4 LMIC 30 Laos 0.07 7/6 LDC 
31 Philippines 1.679 2/3 LMIC 31 Iran 0.064 6/6 LMIC 
32 Chile 1.63 1.5/1 UMIC 32 Venezuela 0.06 3/4 UMIC 
33 Venezuela 1.549 3/4 UMIC 33 Syria 0.055 7/7 LMIC 
34 Kyrgyzstan 1.515 6/5 LIC 34 Mexico 0.054 2/2 UMIC 
35 Burma 1.441 7/7 LDC 35 Malaysia 0.037 5/4.5 UMIC 
36 Nicaragua 1.246 3/3 LIC 36 Costa Rica 0.036 1/2 UMIC 
37 Tajikistan 1.083 6/5.5 LIC 37 Pakistan 0.034 6/5 LIC 
38 Argentina 0.989 2/3 UMIC 38 Burma 0.029 7/7 LDC 
39 Vietnam 0.984 7/6 LIC 39 Argentina 0.027 2/3 UMIC 
40 Syria 0.956 7/7 LMIC 40 Indonesia 0.026 3/4 LMIC 
41 Malaysia 0.931 5/4.5 UMIC 41 Sri Lanka 0.024 3/3.5 LMIC 
42 Moldova 0.845 2.5/4 LIC 42 Brazil 0.022 2/3 LMIC 
43 Honduras 0.7 3/3 LMIC 43 Philippines 0.02 2/3 LMIC 
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44 Azerbaijan 0.66 6/5 LMIC 44 Yemen 0.02 5.5/6 LDC 
45 Sri Lanka 0.455 3/3.5 LMIC 45 Bangladesh 0.017 3.5/4 LDC 
46 Yemen 0.396 5.5/6 LDC 46 Vietnam 0.012 7/6 LIC 
47 Laos 0.394 7/6 LDC 47 Afghanistan 0.01 6/6 LDC 
48 Afghanistan 0.295 6/6 LCD 48 China 0.0063 7/6 LMIC 
49 Costa Rica 0.15 1/2 UMIC 49 India 0.00236 2/3 LIC 
50 Uzbekistan 0 7/6 LIC 50 Uzbekistan 0 7/6 LIC 
51 Turkmenistan 0 7/7 LMIC 51 Turkmenistan 0 7/7 LMIC 
52 Belarus 0 6.5/6 LMIC 52 Belarus 0 6.5/6 LMIC 
53 Maldives 0 6/5 LDC 53 Maldives 0 6/5 LDC 
54 North Korea 0 7/7 LIC 54 North Korea 0 7/7 LIC 
55 Mongolia 0 2/2 LIC 55 Mongolia 0 2/2 LIC 
56 Bhutan 0 6/5 LDC 56 Bhutan 0 6/5 LDC 
57 Singapore 0 5/4 HIC 57 Singapore 0 5/4 HIC 
58 Brunei 0 6/5 HIC 58 Brunei 0 6/5 HIC 
59 Thailand 0 2/3 LMIC 59 Thailand 0 2/3 LMIC 
60 Oman 0 6/5 UMIC 60 Oman 0 6/5 UMIC 
61 Saudi Arabia 0 7/7 
UMIC/
HIC 61 Saudi Arabia 0 7/7 
UMIC/
HIC 
62 Panama 0 1/2 UMIC 62 Panama 0 1/2 UMIC 
63 Paraguay 0 3.5/3 LMIC 63 Paraguay 0 3.5/3 LMIC 
64 Uruguay 0 1/1 UMIC 64 Uruguay 0 1/1 UMIC 






Table D: Major Recipients of EIDHR Funds for Democracy Assistance in the NIS, MEDA&Middle East, 



















1 Iraq 9 7/6 LMIC 1 Georgia 1.65 3.5/4 LMIC 
2 Georgia 7.762 3.5/4 LMIC 2 Gaza/West Bank 0.68 6/6 LMIC 
3 Egypt 7.144 6/5 LMIC 3 Iraq 0.37 7/6 LMIC 
4 Russia 3.912 5/5 UMIC 4 El Salvador 0.35 2/3 LMIC 
5 Peru 3.15 2/3 LMIC 5 Armenia 0.34 4.5/4 LMIC 
6 Colombia 3.034 4/4 LMIC 6 Guatemala 0.24 4/4 LMIC 
7 Guatemala 2.992 4/4 LMIC 7 Kazakhstan 0.18 6/5 LMIC 
8 Kazakhstan 2.703 6/5 LMIC 8 Kyrgyzstan 0.18 6/5 LIC 
9 Gaza/West Bank 2.464 6/6 LMIC 9 Ecuador 0.14 3/3 LMIC 
10 Algeria 2.325 6/5 LMIC 10 Peru 0.12 2/3 LMIC 
11 El Salvador 2.29 2/3 LMIC 11 Bolivia 0.12 2/3 LMIC 
12 Ukraine 2.003 4/3.5 LMIC 12 Jordan 0.115 5/5 LMIC 
13 Indonesia 1.861 3/4 LMIC 13 Tunisia 0.106 6/5 LMIC 
14 Ecuador 1.726 3/3 LMIC 14 Honduras 0.1 3/3 LMIC 
15 Pakistan 1.338 6/5 LIC 15 Egypt 0.099 6/5 LMIC 
16 Morocco 1.149 5/4.5 LMIC 16 Cambodia 0.078 6/5 LDC 
17 Armenia 1.08 4.5/4 LMIC 17 Algeria 0.073 6/5 LMIC 
18 Tunisia 1.049 6/5 LMIC 18 Colombia 0.069 4/4 LMIC 
19 Bolivia 1 2/3 LMIC 19 Tajikistan 0.06 6/5.5 LIC 
20 Cambodia 0.979 6/5 LDC 20 Moldova 0.06 2.5/4 LIC 
21 Burma 0.92 7/7 LDC 21 Ukraine 0.042 4/3.5 LMIC 
22 Kyrgyzstan 0.913 6/5 LIC 22 Azerbaijan 0.04 6/5 LMIC 
23 Nepal 0.854 4/4 LDC 23 Morocco 0.038 5/4.5 LMIC 
24 Mexico 0.72 2/2 UMIC 24 Costa Rica 0.036 1/2 UMIC 
25 Honduras 0.7 3/3 LMIC 25 Syria 0.035 7/7 LMIC 
26 Jordan 0.632 5/5 LMIC 26 Nepal 0.034 4/4 LDC 
27 Syria 0.621 7/7 LMIC 27 Russia 0.027 5/5 UMIC 
28 Venezuela 0.6 3/4 UMIC 28 Venezuela 0.02 3/4 UMIC 
29 China 0.515 7/6 LMIC 29 Chile 0.02 1.5/1 UMIC 
30 Tajikistan 0.428 6/5.5 LIC 30 Burma 0.019 7/7 LDC 
31 Argentina 0.38 2/3 UMIC 31 Lebanon 0.012 5/4.5 UMIC 
32 Azerbaijan 0.36 6/5 LMIC 32 Argentina 0.01 2/3 UMIC 
33 Chile 0.296 1.5/1 UMIC 33 Pakistan 0.009 6/5 LIC 
34 Moldova 0.261 2.5/4 LIC 34 Indonesia 0.008 3/4 LMIC 
35 Vietnam 0.233 7/6 LIC 35 Laos 0.0072 7/6 LDC 
36 Bangladesh 0.176 3.5/4 LDC 36 Mexico 0.007 2/2 UMIC 
37 Costa Rica 0.15 1/2 UMIC 37 Sri Lanka 0.0037 3/3.5 LMIC 
38 Afghanistan 0.099 6/6 LDC 38 Afghanistan 0.0034 6/6 LDC 
39 Sri Lanka 0.071 3/3.5 LMIC 39 Vietnam 0.0029 7/6 LIC 
40 Lebanon 0.051 5/4.5 UMIC 40 Bangladesh 0.0012 3.5/4 LDC 
41 Laos 0.04 7/6 LDC 41 China 0.0004 7/6 LMIC 
42 Cuba 0 7/7 LMIC 42 Cuba 0 7/7 LMIC 
43 Nicaragua 0 3/3 LIC 43 Nicaragua 0 3/3 LIC 
44 Paraguay 0 3.5/3 LMIC 44 Paraguay 0 3.5/3 LMIC 
45 Brazil 0 2/3 LMIC 45 Brazil 0 2/3 LMIC 
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46 Uruguay 0 1/1 UMIC 46 Uruguay 0 1/1 UMIC 
47 Panama 0 1/2 UMIC 47 Panama 0 1/2 UMIC 
48 Belarus 0 6.5/6 LMIC 48 Belarus 0 6.5/6 LMIC 
49 Uzbekistan 0 7/6 LIC 49 Uzbekistan 0 7/6 LIC 
50 Turkmenistan 0 7/7 LMIC 50 Turkmenistan 0 7/7 LMIC 
51 Bhutan 0 6/5 LDC 51 Bhutan 0 6/5 LDC 
52 Maldives 0 6/5 LDC 52 Maldives 0 6/5 LDC 
53 North Korea 0 7/7 LIC 53 North Korea 0 7/7 LIC 
54 Singapore 0 5/4 HIC 54 Singapore 0 5/4 HIC 
55 Brunei 0 6/5 HIC 55 Brunei 0 6/5 HIC 
56 Malaysia 0 5/4.5 UMIC 56 Malaysia 0 5/4.5 UMIC 
57 India 0 2/3 LIC 57 India 0 2/3 LIC 
58 Mongolia 0 2/2 LIC 58 Mongolia 0 2/2 LIC 
59 Philippines 0 2/3 LMIC 59 Philippines 0 2/3 LMIC 
60 Thailand 0 2/3 LMIC 60 Thailand 0 2/3 LMIC 
61 Iran 0 6/6 LMIC 61 Iran 0 6/6 LMIC 
62 Oman 0 6/5 UMIC 62 Oman 0 6/5 UMIC 
63 Saudi Arabia 0 7/7 
UMIC/ 
HIC 63 Saudi Arabia 0 7/7 
UMIC/
HIC 
64 Yemen 0 5.5/6 LDC 64 Yemen 0 5.5/6 LDC 
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